APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Fredrick Devill Rice, was convicted by a Hamilton County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder. The trial court merged the two convictions and sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment. The defendant appeals, claiming that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his merged convictions; (2) the trial court erred by admitting a videotaped search of the defendant's residence into evidence; and (3) the state argued outside of the record twice during closing argument. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, David W. Bass, was indicted for driving under the influence, violation of the implied consent law, failure to appear, and operating a motor vehicle with an improper taillight. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant entered a plea of guilt to driving under the influence, first offense. After the entry of his plea but before sentencing, the defendant sought to withdraw his plea, arguing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. The trial court denied the motion and imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with all but three days suspended. In this appeal of right, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner pled guilty to four felony drug offenses and received an effective sentence of sixteen years. After a hearing, the trial court ordered the sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the trial court dismissed without a hearing for failure to state a colorable claim. Concluding that the Petitioner stated a colorable claim, we reverse and remand for a hearing.

The petitioner appeals pro se from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denying him habeas corpus relief from his three 1999 convictions for the sale or delivery of more than one-half gram of crack cocaine for which he received an effective sentence of twenty-four  years. The petitioner contends that the convictions are void because the presentment “does not charge the overt act, offense of knowingly possession with intent to sell or deliver a Schedule II controlled substance, and nor, does it charge, knowingly possessed a Schedule II controlled substance, exceeding one-half gram.” He also asserts that evidence “seized and manufactured through an informant, after-the-fact, through inducement” is insufficient to show probable cause in Tennessee. The trial court denied relief.

The defendant was convicted by a Lauderdale County Circuit Court jury of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, and sentenced by the trial court as a Range III, persistent offender to sixty years, to be served at 100%, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred in using his prior Illinois convictions to classify him as a persistent offender; and (3) whether the trial court erred in its application of enhancement factors. We conclude that the evidence was more than sufficient to support the defendant's conviction, and that his prior convictions in Illinois qualified him as a persistent offender. We further conclude that, although the trial court erred in applying three enhancement factors, the remaining enhancement factors justify the sixty-year sentence imposed in this case. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The appellant, John Wesley Johnson, was indicted by the Gibson County Grand Jury for one count of desecration of a venerated object, to wit: a place of burial, a class A misdemeanor. He was convicted by a jury, sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail, placed on probation, and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $2,574. The appellant, proceeding pro se, filed an untimely notice of appeal. This court, upon motion of the appellant, waived timely filing
of the appeal; accordingly, the appeal is properly before this court. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issues: (1) “w[h]ether the trial court reviewed the record”; (2) “w[h]ether the (State) conspira[cy] used their position to withhold facts in order to receive a conviction”; (3) “w[h]ether the public officers used the court to reach their gold”; and  (4) “w[h]ether the trial court erred in its review of the records and facts of law as to this case.” Upon review of the record and the parties’
briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant pled guilty to second degree murder, and the trial court imposed an agreed sentence of fifteen years in the Department of Correction. The Defendant subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that she did not enter a voluntary and knowing guilty plea and alleging that she received ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with her plea. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief. This appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Henderson County Circuit Court jury found the defendant, Olivia Washburn, guilty of the sale and delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine, Class B felonies, and assessed two separate $25,000 fines. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender, imposed an eight-year sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction, and merged the fines so that the defendant was ordered to pay a total of $25,000. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in concluding both that her statement to law enforcement officers was voluntary and that the evidence against her was sufficient, as well as in allowing into evidence a videotape not produced to the defense. These assignments are without merit. However, we conclude that the trial court erred in admitting the defendant's statement without considering whether the probative value of the numerous references to other drug offenses outweighed their prejudicial effect. The judgments of the trial court are reversed, and the matter is remanded for a new trial.

The petitioner appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to timely discover the existence of another individual who was questioned regarding the aggravated assault and for failing to interview or cross-examine the victim of the assault. After review, we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.

Discount Communications, Inc. purchases telephone services from BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. and resells the services at an increased rate to Discount's own residential and commercial customers. Some of Discount's customers qualify for a Federal Communication Commission program called Lifeline, which provides telephone services at a reduced rate through federal and state subsidies. BellSouth and Discount got into a dispute about whether their agreement required BellSouth (1) to provide directory assistance to Discount's customers and (2) to pass the $3.50 per month state subsidy through to Discount. The Tennessee Regulatory Authority decided that the agreement required BellSouth to provide directory assistance at no charge to Discount's customers and that BellSouth was not required to forward the $3.50 monthly charge to Discount. We affirm.

Petitioner, an inmate in custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction, filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking judicial review of a disciplinary hearing wherein the inmate was found guilty of assault and strong arm activity and received a deduction of one-year in good time and was upgraded to maximum security. The trial court granted respondent's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. We affirm.

Originally charged in an indictment with the offense of attempted first degree murder, the Defendant, Genee Hardin Snow, Sr., entered into a negotiated plea agreement wherein he pled guilty to the lesser-included offense of attempted second degree murder, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of his sentence following a sentencing hearing. Additional charges of aggravated assault, reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, and possession of a weapon in a public place were dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve nine (9) years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Arguing that he should have received the minimum sentence of eight (8) years, and that he should have been ordered to serve the sentence on probation or some other form of alternative sentence, Defendant has appealed. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Humphreys County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant of rape, and the trial court sentenced him as a violent offender to ten years, with 100% of his sentence to be served. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding sufficient evidence to convict him of rape, in admitting a statement he made to the police, in admitting evidence of the victim's mental capacity, in denying his Tennessee Rule of Evidence 412 motion, and in failing to instruct the jury as to assault. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal challenges the dismissal of a defendant. The circuit court granted John Cook's Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02 motion for involuntary dismissal and found that he did not personally guarantee the debt of Bennett Hill Spring, LLC when he signed the Credit Application as "Operations Manager." Appellant challenges the circuit court's decision to grant the motion which dismissed John Cook as an individual defendant. As discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court granting John Cook's motion for involuntary dismissal. The circuit court was correct that, from a reading of the contract as a whole, it is not apparent that John Cook personally guaranteed payment by signing the Credit Application.