APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In 1995, the petitioner entered pleas of guilty to two counts of murder. Subsequently, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief attacking his sentence. Relief was denied by both the post-conviction court and this court. His post-conviction counsel neither withdrew nor filed an application for permission to appeal. Subsequently, he filed a number of other pleadings of various types, including a second petition for post-conviction relief, the dismissal of which is the basis for this appeal. Through that petition, he sought to file an application for permission to appeal to the supreme court the judgment of this court affirming dismissal of his first petition for post-conviction relief. Based upon our review, we remand the matter to the post-conviction court for an evidentiary hearing.

I concur fully in the lead opinion with respect to the attempted murder convictions of both defendants. I also concur fully with Judge Woodall’s opinion in all other respects save for the issue concerning the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of robbery and attempted robbery to the aggravated robbery indictment and the attempted aggravated robbery indictment. For the reasons stated below I would find this failure to instruct with respect to these lesser-included offenses constituted reversible error. A reading of the recent cases of State v. Bowles, ___ S.W.3d ___(Tenn. 2001); and State v. Ely & Bowers, 48 S.W.3d 710 (Tenn. 2001); leads one to the inescapable conclusion that our high court has mandated that lesser-included offense instructions be given anytime the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction for these offenses.  This means that anytime the proof is sufficient for a conviction of the indicted offense, the proof will a fortiori be sufficient for a conviction of the lesser-included offenses. See Bowles ___ S.W.3d at ____. As a practical matter, this in turn means that it will almost always be error to fail to instruct the jury as to all lesser-included offenses of the indicted offense.1 Thus, the only real inquiry, in my opinion, in virtually all of the cases raising the lesser-included offense issue is whether the error in failing to instruct on the lesser offenses can be said to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  It should be noted at the outset of this discussion that although defendant Richmond raised
on appeal the lesser-included offense issue, defendant Johnson did not. Nevertheless, pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(b) and the case of State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274 (Tenn. 2000); I would find as to Johnson that the failure to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of robbery and attempted robbery constitutes plain error. As such I would therefore grant relief on this issue to both defendants.

I concur with Judge Woodall's lead opinion as to the defendant Johnson and would affirm in all respects. I disagree with Judge Smith that this court should reverse Johnson's aggravated robbery and attempted aggravated robbery convictions on a plain error basis for failure to instruct on the lesser offenses of robbery and attempted robbery. Johnson did not present the issue on appeal.  Five factors determine whether the failure to charge lesser included offenses qualifies as reversible, plain error:

1. The record must clearly establish what happened in the trial court;
2. a clear and unequivocal rule of law must have been breached;
3. a substantial right of the accused must have been adversely affected;
4. the accused did not waive the issue for tactical reasons; and
5. consideration of the error is necessary to do substantial justice.

Following a jury trial, a Knox County jury found the Defendants, Linnell Richmond and Shervon Johnson, guilty of aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery and two counts of attempted first degree premeditated murder. Defendant Johnson was also convicted of the additional attempted aggravated robbery of Leonard Hill. The trial court sentenced Defendant Richmond to an effective sentence of twenty-two years for his convictions. Defendant Johnson was order to serve an effective sentence of seventy years for his convictions. The trial court further ordered that both Defendants serve their state sentences consecutively to a federal sentence arising out of the same situation and conduct as the state sentences. In this appeal as of right, the Defendants raise the following issues:

1) whether the evidence was sufficient to convict each Defendant of attempted first degree premeditated murder, attempted aggravated robbery and aggravated robbery; 2) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the natural and probable consequences rule; 3) whether the trial court erred in allowing the state to proceed under a theory of criminal responsibility against Defendant Richmond, when the indictment failed to charge him with criminal responsibility; 4) whether the trial court erred in failing to charge lesser-included offenses; 5) whether the trial court erred in failing to allow the victim, Mose Cuxart, to be impeached with false statements concerning his income tax returns; 6) whether the trial court erred in admitting photographs of Shannon Brown and Kevin Brown; 7) whether the trial court erred in amending the indictment for aggravated robbery; and 8) whether the trial court erred in ordering the Defendants’ state sentence to run consecutively to their federal sentence. After a thorough review of the evidence and the applicable law, a majority of the panel affirms each of Defendant Johnson’s convictions and sentences. A majority of the panel reverses and remands for a new trial Defendant Richmond’s convictions for aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, and attempted murder.

The defendant entered a best interest guilty plea to aggravated burglary for an agreed sentence of three years as a Range I standard offender, with the potential for alternative sentencing left to the discretion of the trial court, and a misdemeanor theft count was dismissed. Prior to the sentencing hearing, the defendant filed a motion to set aside his plea pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(f), claiming he unknowingly entered it. Following a hearing, the trial court concluded the plea was knowingly entered and denied the defendant's request for alternative sentencing. In this appeal, the defendant claims the trial court erred (1) by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and (2) by denying alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendants, Matthew DeLoss Larsen and Andrew Lee Matthews, were indicted for aggravated robbery and aggravated assault. Pursuant to negotiated plea agreements, the defendants pled guilty
to robbery, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-401, and aggravated assault, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102, both Class C felonies. The defendants also agreed to serve consecutive sentences, with the manner of service and length of their sentences to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed five-year sentences for each felony conviction and denied any form of alternative sentencing, which resulted in effective sentences of ten years confinement for both defendants. In this appeal, Larsen and Matthews separately challenge their sentences on similar grounds, essentially alleging that the trial court erred by (1) finding no mitigating factors were applicable in their respective cases, and (2) denying both defendants any form of alternative sentencing. Our de novo review reveals that the trial court erred in its application of enhancement factors. After a thorough review of applicable law and all relevant facts and circumstances in the record, we modify the trial court’s sentencing determination concerning the length of the defendants’ sentence for aggravated assault and affirm all other aspects of the judgment of the trial court.

After a trial, Defendant, Martin Stuart Hammock, was found guilty by a Davidson County jury of murder first degree. In accordance with the jury's verdict, the trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment with parole. Also accused of murder first degree was a co-Defendant, Brent Rollins, with Angela Watson being indicted for Accessory After the Fact to murder first degree. The co-Defendants were severed prior to trial. In this direct appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in denying introduction of testimony from the victim's neighbor, David Thompson, regarding the victim's past violent behavior; and (2) the verdict was contrary to the evidence and law in that the proof was insufficient to support a verdict of guilty. After reviewing the record, we reverse, modify and remand the trial court's judgment.

The defendant, Cayle Wayne Harris, was convicted of three counts of rape of a child. The jury assessed a fine of $50,000 for each count and the trial court imposed sentences of twenty-one years for each offense, two terms to be served concurrently and one to be served consecutively. The effective sentence is, therefore, forty-two years. In this appeal of right, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient. The judgments are affirmed.

A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant of theft over $60,000, a Class B felony. The defendant contends in this appeal that (1) the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of a state's witness who heard the victim's testimony despite the trial court's order to sequester witnesses; and (2) the trial court erred in not giving an enhanced unanimity instruction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Dennis Harry Johnson, pled guilty to two counts of sexual exploitation of a minor. The trial court imposed a sentence of one year and six months on each count, to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of three years. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his request for alternative sentencing and by ordering the sentences to be served consecutively. The judgments are affirmed.

The Defendants, Johnie Jefferson and Larry Johnson, were found guilty by a Shelby County jury of first degree murder in No. W1999-00747-CCA-R3-CD. Both Defendants received life sentences with the possibility of parole. The Defendants now appeal, arguing (1) that there was insufficient evidence to convict them of first degree premeditated murder, (2) that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a demonstrative exhibit showing the organizational structure of the Gangster's Disciples, (3) that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to take an exhibit showing the organizational structure of the Gangster's Disciples into the jury room during deliberations, (4) that the trial court erred in admitting for impeachment purposes Jefferson's prior convictions, (5) that the trial court erred in denying Jefferson's motion to sever, and (6) that the trial court erred in allowing into evidence the contents of Johnson's car. In addition, Defendant Jefferson sought relief in a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, which was denied by the trial court. Jefferson's appeal from the denial of this petition came before this court in a separate appeal, No. W2000-01970-CCA-R3-CO; however, both cases were consolidated for appellate purposes. We find no reversible error with regard to any of the issues raised; thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.