APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

We granted permission to appeal to the Defendant to examine the propriety of his convictions for money laundering based on his receipt of payment for drugs he “fronted” to a confidential informant.  On separate occasions, the Defendant delivered a quantity of marijuana to the informant.  At the time of delivery, the informant paid the Defendant for a portion of marijuana, but the Defendant also fronted additional marijuana to the informant, meaning the Defendant had an expectation that he would be paid later with proceeds from the informant’s sale of the drugs.  The Defendant subsequently received payment.  Based on these actions, the Defendant was charged with and convicted of two counts of delivering marijuana and two counts of money laundering.  See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-903(c)(1) (2006); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. 2008).  The Defendant challenged whether the evidence supported his money laundering convictions, whether those convictions violated double jeopardy protections, and whether the money laundering statute was unconstitutionally vague.  The trial court rejected the Defendant’s challenges, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgments.  We hold that the evidence supporting one of the money laundering convictions was legally sufficient, because the proof supported an inference that the Defendant purchased marijuana with the proceeds he had received with the intent to promote the carrying on of the sale of marijuana.  With respect to the second money laundering conviction, we hold that the evidence was insufficient, because the proof showed only that the Defendant received payment for drugs he had fronted.  We further hold that the Defendant’s punishment for both delivery of marijuana and money laundering does not violate double jeopardy protections and that the money laundering statute is not unconstitutionally vague by virtue of its use of the undefined phrase “carrying on.”  Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

On July 12, 2019, Defendant-Appellant, Robert Collier, entered a guilty plea to criminal attempt aggravated sexual battery and indecent exposure, for which he received an effective sentence of seven years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days, all of which was to be served on supervised probation. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, 39-13-504 (2019). As part of his sentence, the Defendant was also ordered to register as a violent sex offender and placed on community supervision for life. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-524 (2014). Within three months, on October 15, 2019, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s supervised probation based on a violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-211(d)(1)(B) (2019), which restricts movement of violent sex offenders, and ordered the Defendant to serve the original sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals the order of the trial court arguing that subsection (d)(1)(B) is unconstitutional in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because certain terms including “playground,” “any other specific or legitimate reason,” “stand,” “sit idly,” and “remain” are not defined and ambiguous.” He additionally argues that subsection (d)(1)(B) is overbroad in violation of his First Amendment rights because (1) it applies to all sex offenders even if the offense did not involve a child victim; and (2) the term “playground” can include a church, an offender’s front yard, and places where other adults are present. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Milton Simpson, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation and imposing an effective ten-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to establish that he violated the terms of his probation by breaking the law and that (2) his right of confrontation was violated when a court liaison testified in lieu of his probation officer and when a certified copy of an indictment was introduced as evidence. Following our review, we affirm.

In this termination of parental rights case, Appellants Mother and Stepfather appeal the trial court’s finding that termination of Father’s parental rights was not in the Child’s best interest. Appellee Father appeals the trial court’s finding that he abandoned the Child by willful failure to visit and willful failure to support. Upon review, we conclude that Father abandoned the Child by willful failure to visit and support. Because the record supports the conclusion that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest, we reverse the trial court as to this issue, and we remand for entry of an order terminating Father’s parental rights.

In this divorce appeal, Husband challenges the court’s failure to grant a continuance, the child support and alimony obligation imposed, and certain provisions of the parenting plan prohibiting contact with his children and revoking the parental rights set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-101(a)(3)(B). This proceeding also involved allegations of a conspiracy to defraud Wife of funds resulting from a sale of marital property in Gaza during the pendency of the divorce by Husband, his brother, and his brother’s wife; those nonspousal parties challenge the court’s jurisdiction over them and over the property in Gaza, as well as the court’s valuation of that property. They also challenge the court’s rulings that they engaged in a civil conspiracy and whether the judgment imposed against them is supported by the pleadings and the evidence. Upon our review of the issues raised, we discern no reversible error in the rulings of the court and accordingly affirm it in all respects.

In this Opinion, we are tasked with reviewing two separate cases concerning the State’s oversight of a child care center in Memphis. Somewhat uniquely, these cases were adjudicated under a single docket number in the Shelby County Chancery Court and were appealed to this Court in that posture. One of the cases, which concerns a petition for a writ of mandamus, was originally filed in the Davidson County Chancery Court and was subsequently transferred to the Shelby County Chancery Court. The second case involves judicial review under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. As to the mandamus case at issue, we conclude that venue lies only in Davidson County and, therefore, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter relief. Accordingly, that judgment is vacated, and we direct that the case be transferred back to the Davidson County Chancery Court. As to the case for judicial review, we conclude that the decision of the hearing officer was supported by substantial and material evidence and therefore reverse the trial court and remand for the entry of an order reinstating the hearing officer’s decision.

The Petitioner, Coy McKaughan, filed a post-conviction petition in the Shelby County Criminal Court seeking relief from his conviction of aggravated sexual battery and accompanying twelve-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The postconviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that (1) his trial counsel was ineffective, (2) his appellate counsel was ineffective, (3) his due process rights were violated by the State’s withholding evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, (4) his due process rights were violated by the State’s assembling a “rigged grand jury foreperson,” (5) the State violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution, and (6) he was denied his constitutional right to a “full and fair” post-conviction hearing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, John William Anderson, appeals his Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convictions of attempted theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000 and criminal simulation. He challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the propriety of the sentencing decision of the trial court. The evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, but the trial court erred by imposing a sentence in the absence of a presentence report. Consequently, we affirm the defendant’s convictions but reverse the sentencing decision of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.

A Shelby County grand jury indicted the defendant, Andre Bowen, and his co-defendant, Anthony Olivo, for two counts of first-degree, felony murder (Counts 1 and 2) and attempted especially aggravated robbery (Count 3). The grand jury also indicted the defendant for two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Counts 4 and 5). After a joint trial, the jury acquitted the defendant on Count 1 but found him guilty of the lesser-included offense of facilitation of first-degree, felony murder in Count 2, attempted especially aggravated robbery in Count 3, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in Counts 4 and 5, for which the trial court imposed an effective sentence of seventy-two years. On appeal, the defendant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and argues the trial court erred in sentencing. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court, but remand the case for a new sentencing hearing as to Counts 4 and 5 to reflect the appropriate felony classification for each offense and for entry of new sentences for each conviction.

The defendant, Robert Earl Grady, Jr., pleaded guilty to two counts of felon in possession of a firearm for which he received consecutive twelve-year sentences for an effective sentence of twenty-four years’ confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred by imposing consecutive terms. Upon our review of the record, the applicable law, and the arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Phillip Harvey Wallace, appeals the sentencing decision of the trial court that followed the revocation of his probation in case number 5263 and his pleading guilty in case number 5376, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to consider a community corrections placement and by ordering that the 12-year sentence imposed in case number 5376 be served consecutively to the remainder of the two-year sentence in case number 5263. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Joshua Michael Stewart, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2017 Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery. He argues that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is an action to set aside a quitclaim deed. The sole issue on appeal is whether the grantor delivered the deed to the grantee with the intention that it be an effective conveyance. After the grantor signed a quitclaim deed transferring title to a 42-acre tract to the grantee, the grantor’s mother, the grantee took possession of the deed. Later that day, the deed was placed in a lockbox maintained for the grantee’s benefit but co-owned by the grantor and her sister. Approximately three years later, while the deed remained in the lockbox, the grantor died. Shortly thereafter, the mother instructed the surviving daughter to bring the deed to her, which she did, and the mother recorded the deed. Upon learning of the recording of the deed, the grantor’s husband and children commenced this action to set aside the deed for failure of delivery arguing the deed remained in the grantor’s possession and control from the time she executed it until her death. Following a bench trial, the court found that the grantor delivered the deed to her mother with the intention that it be an effective conveyance and held that the conveyance was valid. We affirm. 

The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate a mother’s parental rights based on abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; substantial noncompliance with permanency plans; failure to remedy persistent conditions; and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the child. The trial court granted the petition, finding that the Department proved all alleged grounds by clear and convincing evidence and that terminating the mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the child. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Tywan Montrease Sykes, appeals from the Blount County Circuit Court’s order summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely and as a second impermissible petition. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that due process requires tolling of the one-year limitations period, that he should have been given an evidentiary hearing to present additional proof of tolling, and that his first petition was not resolved on the merits. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court summarily dismissing the petition as untimely.

The Defendant appeals as of right from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s revocation of his probation and reinstatement of the remainder of his three-year sentence for one count each of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $2,500 and forgery in the same amount. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation because: (1) the Defendant remained actively employed and made efforts to contact his probation officer; (2) the Defendant’s probation revocation “robbed victims of owed restitution and imposed an unnecessary financial burden upon the state’s taxpayers”; (3) the Defendant’s probation revocation “runs contrary to the Governor’s stated desire to use alternatives to incarceration for low-level, nonviolent offenders”; and (4) the Defendant’s probation revocation does “not reflect the trial court’s expectation that [he] would be released soon after his revocation hearing.” Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

James Howard Theus, III, Defendant, was indicted for four counts of violating the sex offender registry. He pled guilty to the charges as stated in the indictment with an agreed upon sentence of three years with the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court after a sentencing hearing. The trial court denied alternative sentencing, ordering Defendant to serve his sentence in incarceration. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion. After a review, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Defendant, Terrill J. Whitelow, was indicted by the Dyer County Grand Jury on three counts: Count 1, attempted carjacking; Count 2, aggravated burglary; and Count 3, evading arrest. After a trial, the jury found Defendant guilty as charged on Counts 2 and 3. Defendant received an effective sentence of ten year’s incarceration. Defendant filed a motion for new trial in which he argued the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. The trial court denied the motion for new trial. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the matter to the trial court for entry of a judgment disposing of Count 1 of the indictment.

The Defendant, Jeremy Lee Fleming, was convicted by a Bedford County Circuit Court jury of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder in the perpetration of a theft or arson, arson, and theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000. The trial court merged the first degree murder convictions and imposed a life sentence. The court sentenced the Defendant to fifteen years for arson and to twelve years for theft, as a Range III, persistent offender, and the court imposed the arson and theft sentences concurrent to each other but consecutive to the life sentence, for an effective sentence of life plus fifteen years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. We affirm the first degree murder and arson judgments, but we modify the judgment for theft to reflect a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days.

The Petitioner, William Pillars, filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

We granted permission to appeal in this case to address whether a claim for wrongful termination of employment can be asserted under the Teacher Tenure Act, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 49-5-501 to -515, by classifying a tenured teacher’s resignation as a constructive discharge rather than a voluntary quit. The plaintiff tenured teacher in this appeal quit her teaching position and sued for wrongful termination under the Tenure Act. We conclude that the doctrine of constructive discharge is inconsistent with the robust procedural framework in the Act, intended to give tenured teachers ample opportunity to be heard and ensure that dismissal decisions are made methodically, with transparency, and by consensus of professional educators. We reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision to apply the doctrine of constructive discharge to the plaintiff’s claims, and we hold that constructive discharge is not applicable to wrongful termination claims under the Tenure Act. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of those claims. We also affirm the lower courts’ dismissal of the plaintiff teacher’s tort claims against the school system and individual school officials.

A jury convicted Caitlyn Metz, Petitioner, of first-degree felony murder, aggravated child abuse, and aggravated child neglect in the death of her twenty-three-month-old son, the victim, and the trial court sentenced her to an effective life sentence. Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel, a Brady violation, and improper prosecutorial argument, and the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, Petitioner contends that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s failure to pursue a motion for severance from Joshua Starner, Co-Defendant, and other pretrial motions; failure to investigate Co-Defendant’s military records and Petitioner’s mental health; failure to present witnesses; and cumulative error. Following a thorough review, we conclude that Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel. We reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court, vacate and set aside the judgments of conviction, and remand for a new trial.

This is an appeal from an order entered on September 21, 2020, dismissing the husband’s petition seeking to set aside a 2014 judgment. Because the husband did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the order appealed, we dismiss the appeal.

This appeal arises out of a boundary dispute. Following a bench trial, the court determined that the plaintiffs established the boundary line based on an oral boundary agreement between the parties’ predecessors in interest. On appeal, the defendant takes issue with the trial court’s finding that the parties to the oral boundary agreement were uncertain of the location of the original boundary at the time they entered into the agreement. The defendant also takes issue with the trial court’s determination that the plaintiffs’ deed was not void for champerty based on the court’s conclusion that the remnants of the fence the defendant relied on to establish the property line met none of the requirements of adverse possession. After reviewing the evidence presented at the trial, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

Tennessee Bonding Company, Appellant, surrendered the defendant, Larry Patton, to the Lewis County Sheriff’s Department but failed to notify the trial court of the surrender. Five weeks later, the trial court sua sponte entered an order exonerating Appellant on the bond but requiring Appellant to return “any and all premiums previously paid” and discharging the defendant from any remaining obligation for payment on the bond. Appellant filed a motion to reconsider asking for a hearing, which was summarily denied by the court. In this extraordinary appeal, Appellant claims the trial court erred by denying Appellant a hearing. After review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.