APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Douglas M. Ferguson, was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and was sentenced to five years’ probation. See T.C.A. § 39-13-102 (2018). Subsequently, the trial court found the Defendant violated conditions of his probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by ordering the Defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Patrick L. Moore, Petitioner, appeals from the dismissal of two petitions for habeas corpus relief which were consolidated by this Court on appeal. After a thorough review, we affirm the dismissal of the petitions.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child. The trial court determined that there were statutory grounds for terminating the father’s parental rights and that termination was in the child’s best interest. On appeal, we conclude that the father was given sufficient notice of three statutory grounds: abandonment by failure to visit or support the expectant mother, abandonment by wanton disregard, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility of his child. The record contains clear and convincing evidence to support two of the grounds for termination. But, because the trial court’s order lacks sufficient findings regarding the child’s best interest, we vacate and remand.

The Appellant, Cedarius J. Robertson, was convicted in the Madison County Circuit Court of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, a Class B felony; tampering with evidence, a Class C felony; driving under the influence (DUI) and DUI per se, Class A misdemeanors; possessing a handgun while under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor; and failing to maintain his lane of travel, a Class C misdemeanor. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the DUI convictions and ordered that he serve an effective thirteen-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm and possession of a handgun while under the influence. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Christopher Lynn Inman, was convicted by a jury of introduction of contraband into a penal facility and possession of marijuana. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range II multiple offender to an effective sentence of six years’ incarceration. In this direct appeal, Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by admitting the marijuana into evidence because the State failed to establish a proper chain of custody and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for introduction of contraband into a penal facility. Following our review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Xavier Montelious Riley, Defendant, entered a best interest guilty plea with the length and manner of the service of the sentence to be determined following a sentencing hearing. The trial court denied an alternative sentence and imposed an effective sentence of ten years and six months to be served in confinement. After a review of the record and applicable law and finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Gregory Gilliam, of four counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of forty-two years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

An inmate filed a complaint alleging theft against the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Correction and against the prison Warden. The Commissioner and the Warden moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6). The trial court granted the motion. We have determined that the trial court failed to provide reasons for the dismissal of the complaint. Therefore, we vacate the judgment and remand.

A collecting bank sued the drawer of a check, claiming that the drawer stopped payment on the check with fraudulent intent. The general sessions court, as well as the circuit court on de novo appeal, ruled in favor of the drawer. The bank argues that, because it was a holder in due course, the drawer was still liable on the check despite the stop-payment order. And it seeks an award of interest, court costs, attorney’s fees, and treble damages from the drawer, contending that the proof showed the drawer acted with fraudulent intent. We affirm the dismissal of the claim based on the drawer’s alleged fraudulent intent, but we vacate the dismissal of any claim based on the drawer’s obligation on the check.

The Defendant, Michael Broyles, was convicted by a Greene County Criminal Court jury of four counts of cruelty to animals, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 39-14-202(a)(2) (2018). The trial court denied judicial diversion and sentenced the Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days for each conviction and imposed the sentences concurrently. The court ordered split confinement consisting of ninety days’ jail service followed by probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the animal cruelty statute under which he was convicted is unconstitutionally vague, (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (3) the court erred in denying judicial diversion, (4) the court erred in imposing a sentence involving confinement, and (5) the court erred in imposing fines and restitution without making the appropriate factual findings. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Plaintiff employee appeals the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment on her claims under the Tennessee Human Rights Act. We affirm, as modified, the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims. 

This appeal concerns a real estate transaction that fell through. The Estate of Katherine N. Mounger (“the Estate”), as well as executors Katherine M. Lasater and E. Jay Mounger (“Defendants,” collectively), seek reversal of the judgment of the Circuit Court for Roane County (“the Trial Court”) whereby they were ordered to return $150,000 in earnest money to Nelson E. Bowers, II (“Plaintiff”), successor in interest to would-be purchaser of the property at issue, McKenzie Loudon Properties, LLC (“MLP”). Defendants appeal to this Court, arguing, among other things, that MLP first materially breached the contract for sale (“the Agreement”) by failing to perform a title examination and failing to notify it of a defect in title stemming from oral claims of ownership made by Charles Mounger. However, we find, as did the Trial Court, that the Estate had actual notice of the defect in title. Further, it was the Estate, rather than MLP, that materially breached the Agreement by failing to provide marketable title. Aside from an award to Plaintiff of attorney’s fees incurred on an earlier appeal in this matter which Plaintiff did not request from this Court in that earlier appeal, which we reverse, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for an award to Plaintiff of reasonable attorney’s fees incurred on this appeal as requested.

The Bradley County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Donald Ray Pennington, Jr., for two counts of rape of a child. Following a trial, a jury found Defendant guilty of rape of a child in count 1 and the lesser-included offense of aggravated sexual battery in count 2. On appeal, Defendant asserts that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for rape of a child; (2) he is entitled to relief under plain error due to prosecutorial misconduct; and (3) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following the dissolution of the law firm formerly known as Hill Boren, PC, Appellant brought, inter alia, the following claims: (1) Count 1: “Joint Enterprise/Venture/Aiding and Abetting Fiduciary Breach;” (2) Count 2: “No Derivative Cause of Action: Negligence and/or Fraud;” (3) Count 4: “Attempted Cover Up: Punitive Damages;” (4) Count 6: “Strict Liability in Tort for Misconduct of a Lawyer;” and (5) Count 7: “Liability of Lawyer Misconduct Causing Harm/Damage to a Foreseeable Non-Party Non-Client Ethical Differentiation Standard.” The trial court dismissed Appellant’s lawsuit on grant of Appellees’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12 motion to dismiss and on grant of Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. In part, the dismissal was based on a final judgment in the underlying lawsuit, Boren v. Hill Boren, PC, No. W2019-02235-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 1109992 (Tenn. Ct. App. March 23, 2021). Subsequently, however, this Court dismissed the appeal of the underlying lawsuit on the ground that the order appealed was not final. As such, we vacate the trial court’s dismissal of a portion of Count 2 and Count 4 on the grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The trial court’s orders are otherwise affirmed, and the Appellant’s request for stay is denied.

The Defendant, Antonio D. Blaylock, entered an open plea to multiple charges resulting from a high-speed chase through Jackson, which culminated in an automobile crash injuring the other driver, a collision with a telephone pole, and damage to the front porch of a house. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of eight years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying him probation. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we reverse the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Aaron Reinsberg, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his convictions of rape, assault, and official misconduct, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

An inmate filed a petition for a common law writ of certiorari seeking review of the Tennessee Department of Correction’s disciplinary decisions. Because the inmate’s petition failed to comply with constitutional and statutory requirements, the trial court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm.

While I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s request for full probation, I write separately to respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred in not imposing some form of alternative sentencing such as split confinement. Additionally, if the trial court had abused its discretion in not imposing some form of alternative sentencing, I disagree with the majority’s decision to impose a sentence of split-confinement and conclude that the appropriate remedy would be to remand the matter for a new sentencing hearing especially in light of the majority’s finding that the trial court abused its discretion in by not considering the Strong R Assessment.

The petitioner, Darius Jones, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

The Defendant, John Calvin Murray, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his “Motion for Rule 36 Clerical Mistakes” and denial of his motion to reconsider, which he argues should be liberally construed as a motion to correct an illegal sentence, asserting that he was not awarded all the credits for time served in the community corrections program to which he was entitled. Upon reviewing the record and applicable law, we dismiss the appeal. 

This appeal arose from a personal injury action. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, accompanied by a statement of material facts in compliance with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.03. The plaintiff responded to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment but failed to respond to the separate statement of material facts. As a result of the plaintiff’s failure to respond to the statement of material facts, the Trial Court deemed those facts as stated by the defendant as admitted and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant upon its determination that the defendant had negated an essential element of the plaintiff’s claim. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A preferred service employee appealed the termination of his employment. After failing to obtain relief at the Step I or Step II reviews, the employee requested a Step III hearing before the Board of Appeals. At the conclusion of the employee’s proof, the state agency moved for an involuntary dismissal. The Board of Appeals found the employee had failed to present sufficient evidence to show a right to relief. The Board dismissed the appeal and upheld the dismissal decision. The employee sought judicial review of the Board’s decision. The chancery court affirmed. Finding no basis to reverse or modify the Board’s decision, we also affirm.  

The Defendant, Vernon Lee Ivey, pled guilty in the Campbell County Criminal Court to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; theft of property valued over $2,500, a Class D felony; burglary, a Class D felony; two counts of theft of property valued over $1,000 but less than $2,500, a Class E felony; one count of automobile burglary, a Class E felony; and four counts of theft of property valued $1,000 or less, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective term of thirty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by misclassifying him as a career offender for the Class D and E felonies, by imposing an excessive sentence, and by ordering a sentence of confinement rather than probation or other alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the sentences as imposed by the trial court.

Tyler Ward Enix, Defendant, was indicted for three counts of first degree felony murder, one count of premeditated first degree murder, one count of especially aggravated robbery, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, and one count of carjacking. The trial court dismissed the kidnapping and carjacking counts at the State’s request. After a jury trial, Defendant was found not guilty of felony murder. The jury found Defendant guilty of first degree premeditated murder and especially aggravated robbery. After the jury deadlocked on a sentence for first degree murder, the trial court imposed a life sentence. After a separate sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered Defendant to serve a consecutive twenty-five-year sentence for especially aggravated robbery. The trial court denied a motion for new trial and this appeal followed. On appeal, Defendant raises the following issues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions for first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery; (2) the State made improper statements during closing argument; (3) the State made improper statements during opening statements; (4) the trial court improperly admitted hearsay evidence; (5) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting multiple photographs of the victim’s body; (6) the trial court erred by denying a motion for change of venue; (7) the trial court erred in refusing to give a definition of passion to the jury; and (8) cumulative errors After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm Defendant’s convictions and sentences.

After the trial court found that a scrivener’s error mistakenly listed the incorrect grantee on a warranty deed, it reformed the deed to list the correct grantee. Discerning no error, we affirm.