APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Travis L. Lindsey, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his convictions for the sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, the sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, and his effective twenty-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to fully advise him of the deadline by which he could enter into a plea agreement with the State in order to avoid a trial. We conclude that the Petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to relief, and we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an appeal from a divorce proceeding. The parties were married for around thirty years, during which time the husband built a successful business and the wife was a homemaker and stay-at-home mother to the parties’ two children. After five days of trial, the trial court classified, valued, and divided the parties’ sizeable marital estate; awarded the wife alimony in futuro; and ordered the husband to pay a portion of the wife’s attorney’s fees. Both parties raise various issues on appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendants, Humberto Morales, Mario Garcia Flores, and Keyona Martina Newell, (collectively “the Defendants”) were convicted of aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated burglary, theft of property valued at $1,000 or more, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. Mr. Flores also was convicted of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. After merging various convictions, the trial court ordered Mr. Morales to serve an effective sentence of forty-eight years, Mr. Flores to serve an effective sentence of thirty years, and Ms. Newell to serve an effective sentence of twenty-four years. On appeal, the Defendants, either collectively or individually, challenge: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the convictions; (2) the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress based upon the constitutionality of the stop of the vehicle in which some of the perpetrators fled the scene; (3) the trial court’s denial of a continuance based upon the State’s late disclosure of discovery materials; (4) the trial court’s decision to admit expert testimony of evidence extracted from the perpetrators’ cell phones; (5) the trial court’s denial of Mr. Morales’s motion for mistrial after Ms. Newell’s counsel questioned a witness about evidence that the trial court previously ruled to be inadmissible; (6) the trial court’s failure to issue an accomplice instruction; and (7) the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from the second jury trial of the Defendant-Appellant, Randall Kenneth Reed, for which he was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, aggravated robbery, and theft of property, and received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202(a)(1), (a)(2), 39-13-402, 39-14-103. In this appeal, Reed argues: (1) the trial court erred in denying his right to self-representation; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, which it construed as a motion for reconsideration; (3) the evidence is insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the offenses; (4) the guilty pleas he made in front of the jury should have been assessed and a new jury empaneled to ensure that he had a fair and unbiased trial; and (5) the trial court erred in admitting life and death photographs of the victim at trial. After carefully reviewing the record and the applicable law, we remand the case for entry of corrected judgment forms in Counts 1 and 2 as specified in this opinion. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

After a nursing home resident died, her daughter filed a wrongful death action against the facility. The nursing home moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement signed by the daughter when her mother was admitted to the facility. The daughter claimed that she lacked authority to sign the arbitration agreement for her mother. The trial court agreed and denied the motion to compel. On appeal, we conclude that the Federal Arbitration Act required the trial court to resolve the issue of whether an agreement to arbitrate had been formed. Because the nursing home failed to establish an agreement to arbitrate had been formed with the patient, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Timothy D. Carter, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. In it, he repeats the same issue he raised on direct appeal and his post-conviction petition, namely that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue a search warrant for his vehicle. Because the Petitioner has failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, we affirm the denial of the habeas corpus petition.

The Defendant, Djuan Manning, was convicted of aggravated assault and tampering with evidence for his involvement with a shooting, and he received an effective four-year sentence. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, asserting that the State did not negate his theory of self-defense and that the State did not establish that he destroyed or concealed the weapon. The Defendant also maintains that the State failed to provide him adequate notice of the charges. After a thorough review of the record, we discern no error, and we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Lincoln County jury convicted Defendant, Michael Domonic Sales, of first degree premeditated murder, for which he received a life sentence. After filing a notice of appeal, Defendant filed a motion with this court requesting that the court stay his direct appeal so that he might seek relief through a petition for writ of error coram nobis. This court granted Defendant’s motion to stay his direct appeal, and Defendant filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis in the trial court. Following a hearing, the trial court denied relief. On appeal, Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in failing to act as the thirteenth juror and grant a judgment of acquittal based on Defendant’s claim of self-defense; (2) he is entitled to a new trial based on improper prosecutorial argument, including the prosecutor’s assertion that Defendant was a Crips gang member and that Defendant’s possession of a weapon as a convicted felon prevented his claim of self-defense; and (3) the trial court erred in denying his petition for writ of error coram nobis. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm.

A citizen filed a petition of remonstrance with the Tennessee General Assembly and then filed a petition for writ of mandamus in chancery court requesting that the legislative chambers be ordered to hear and consider his petition of remonstrance. The trial court dismissed the petition for writ of mandamus on the basis that the petitioner was not entitled to mandamus relief. We affirm.

After a bench trial, the Robertson County Circuit Court convicted the Appellant, Jenniffer Danine Harper, of driving under the influence (DUI) and sentenced her to eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served as forty-eight hours in jail followed by supervised probation. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, seventeen-year-old Devonta Kevon Curry, was transferred from juvenile court and convicted by a Madison County jury of aggravated burglary (count one); aggravated robbery (counts two, five, and six); especially aggravated kidnapping (counts three and four); and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony (count seven). See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-403, -13-402, -13-305; 39-17-1324(a). Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a five-year term of imprisonment for the aggravated burglary; a concurrent ten-year term of imprisonment for each count of aggravated robbery; a concurrent twenty-year term of imprisonment for each count of especially aggravated kidnapping; and a three-year term of imprisonment for the possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, to be served consecutively to the aggravated burglary. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1324(e)(1). The concurrent ten-year term of imprisonment for the aggravated robbery convictions was ordered to be served consecutively to the concurrent twenty-year term of imprisonment for the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions, for an effective sentence of thirty years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence regarding each of his convictions arguing that (1) the State failed to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the offense; and (2) the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions were merely incidental to the aggravated robberies in violation of State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012). The Defendant also appeals the order of consecutive sentencing, arguing that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact in classifying him as a dangerous offender and that the trial court failed to apply certain mitigating factors. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Mark Ethan Felices, appeals the revocation of his probation, arguing that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, Roger Terrell, was convicted by a Madison County jury of aggravated sexual battery, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-504, (count one) and seven counts of rape of a child, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-522, (counts two through five and counts eight through ten). Following a sentencing hearing, the Defendant received an effective sentence of fifty-eight-years’ imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises the following issues for review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain each of his convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of other crimes not charged in the indictment; (3) whether the trial court erred in restricting defense counsel from questioning the victim on cross-examination concerning the origin of a urinary tract infection after the State “opened the door” on direct examination; (4) whether the trial court erred in prohibiting the Defendant from viewing the victim’s Department of Children’s Services (DCS) records; (5) whether the trial court erred in finding the State’s comments during rebuttal closing argument were not improper; and (6) whether the trial court’s order of partial consecutive sentencing was proper. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, James Currie, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his guilty-pleaded convictions of burglary of a motor vehicle (5 counts), fraudulent use of a credit card for a value more than $1,000 but less than $10,000 (2 counts), attempt to fraudulently use a credit card, and theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The pro se Defendant, Titus Avery Brittain, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for pretrial jail credits. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Leonard B. Casteel, pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated assault, and he received a six-year sentence on each count. The Defendant was sentenced to serve one year for each count and to complete supervised probation for the remaining time. The Defendant was released on probation, a revocation warrant was issued, and the trial court found that the Defendant had violated the terms of his probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Mother appeals the trial court’s decision to award the parties equal parenting time and to allow the parties to make major educational decisions jointly. We reverse the trial court’s decision to order alternating weekly parenting time and vacate the trial court’s decision regarding major educational decisions. 

Frederick Perry (“Employee”) worked for Thyssenkrupp Elevator Corporation (“Employer”) at a variety of jobs beginning in 1988. On February 22, 2013, Employee was working on a cutting machine cutting steel elevator panels. While attempting to move a large steel panel from the work table to a pallet with a jib crane, Employee slipped and fell. Employee was determined to have suffered a torn labrum in his right hip and a torn meniscus in his right knee, which were surgically repaired. Employee’s treating orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Adam Smith, placed Employee at maximum medical improvement (“MMI”) on June 13, 2014. He assigned Employee anatomical impairment ratings of 3% to the lower right extremity for the right hip injury and 3% to the lower right extremity for the right knee injury, for a combined anatomical impairment rating of 6% to the lower right extremity or 2% to the body as a whole. Dr. Smith placed certain restrictions on Employee. Employer returned Employee to work at another job accommodating his restrictions and providing a higher rate of pay. On March 3, 2015, Employee underwent an independent medical examination by physical medicine and rehab physician, Dr. Samuel Jae Jin Chung, on referral from his attorney. Dr. Chung diagnosed Employee as suffering “[r]esidual from right knee injury requiring extensive surgical intervention with ongoing symptoms of right patellofemoral arthritis” and “[r]esidual from right hip injury secondary to fall with status post surgical intervention with ongoing symptomatology.” Dr. Chung assigned Employee anatomical impairment ratings of 15% to the right lower extremity for the right knee injury and 22% to the right lower extremity for the right hip injury, for a combined anatomical impairment rating of 34% to the lower right extremity or 13% to the body as a whole. Dr. Chung placed certain restrictions on Employee and suggested the possibility of need for a future right knee replacement. A Benefit Review Conference was held on December 2, 2015, resulting in an impasse. The parties were unable to resolve the extent of Employee’s anatomical impairment or his vocational impairment. Employee brought suit. The parties stipulated or agreed that Employee had received all the temporary total disability benefits to which he was entitled, Employer had paid all authorized medical expenses, and the 1.5 multiplier cap applied. The trial court rejected the anatomical impairment ratings of both Dr. Smith and Dr. Chung and adopted its own modified anatomical impairment ratings of 18% to the lower right extremity for the right hip injury and 14% to the lower right extremity for the right knee injury, for a combined anatomical impairment rating of 29% to the lower right extremity or 12% to the body as a whole. The trial court awarded Employee permanent partial disability benefits based upon a vocational impairment of 18% to the body as a whole. Employer has appealed and the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.

In this health care liability action, the defendant moved to compel arbitration based upon an agreement entered into between the parties that provided for binding arbitration. The plaintiff opposed the defendant’s motion, taking specific umbrage at a provision in the parties’ agreement that indicated the expenses of arbitration would, by default, be subject to a 50/50 split. Contending that he was unable to pay for arbitration expenses, the plaintiff opposed enforcement of the arbitration agreement by advancing a cost-based unconscionability defense. Although the defendant acted to relieve the plaintiff of this asserted burden by offering to pay for the costs of arbitration, the trial court held that the subject fee-splitting provision in the agreement was unconscionable and denied the motion to enforce the agreement and compel arbitration. For the reasons stated herein, while we agree with the trial court that, under the facts of this case, the fee-splitting provision was unconscionable, we hold that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration.

The Notice of Appeal filed by the appellant, Agness McCurry, stated that the appellant was appealing the judgment entered on August 17, 2020. As the August 17, 2020 order does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Defendant, L. Clay Shuler, II, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, tampering with evidence, and setting fire to personal property or land. The trial court imposed a sentence of life for first degree murder, six years for tampering with evidence, to be served consecutively to the life sentence, and a concurrent two-year sentence for setting fire to personal property. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Scott A. Brown, pled guilty to one count of statutory rape, a Class E felony, and one count of possession of more than .5 grams of methamphetamine with intent to sell, a Class B felony, in exchange for an effective sentence of eight years in the Department of Correction. Following a hearing to determine whether the Defendant should be placed on the sex offender registry, the trial court ordered that the Defendant be placed on the registry, which decision the Defendant now appeals. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Kimberly Reed, pled guilty to forgery, a Class E felony; identity theft, a Class D felony; theft of property valued at $2,500 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony; theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $2,500, a Class E felony; theft of property valued at less than $1,000, a Class A misdemeanor; attempted misdemeanor theft, a Class B misdemeanor; fraudulent use of a credit card, a Class A misdemeanor; criminal impersonation, a Class B misdemeanor; and criminal trespass, a Class C misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -14-103, -14-114, -14-118, - 14-150, -14-405, -16-301. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of ten years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm.

In this termination of parental rights action, the father has appealed the trial court’s final order terminating his parental rights to the minor child, Brayla T. (“the Child”) based on several statutory grounds. The mother and the stepfather filed a petition to terminate the father’s parental rights and to allow the stepfather to adopt the Child after the juvenile court adjudicated the Child dependent and neglected as to the father. The trial court found that statutory grounds existed to terminate the father’s parental rights upon its determination by clear and convincing evidence that the father had abandoned the Child by willfully failing to visit the Child and had failed to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody of or financial responsibility for the Child. The trial court also found clear and convincing evidence of two statutory grounds applicable solely to putative fathers. The trial court further found by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the Child’s best interest to terminate the father’s parental rights. The father has appealed. Having determined that the evidence presented at trial did not support a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the father was a putative father, we reverse as to those two statutory grounds applicable only to putative fathers. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of the father’s parental rights.

This appeal concerns a disassociated partner’s buyout. Stephen Boesch (“Boesch”), Jay Holeman (“Holeman”), and Richard Fraser (“Fraser”) formed a partnership to start a flavored-moonshine and whiskey business, Tennessee Legend. Boesch contributed technical know-how and labor. Early on, Boesch was disassociated from the partnership. Boesch sued Holeman and Fraser (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Chancery Court for Sevier County (“the Trial Court”) alleging, among other things, misappropriation of trade secrets. Later, Crystal Falls Spirits, LLC, an entity created by Holeman, intervened to sue Boesch. At trial, the parties put on competing proof as to the value of Boesch’s interest. Ultimately, the Trial Court adopted Defendants’ value and rejected Boesch’s trade secrets claim. Boesch appeals. Because the experts failed to contend with Tenn. Code Ann. § 61- 1-701, which governs the determination of a disassociated partner’s buyout price when a partnership is not dissolved, we reverse and remand for a new determination in keeping with the statute’s requirements. Otherwise, we affirm the Trial Court’s judgment. We, therefore, affirm in part, and reverse, in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.