APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Marquiceon Fields, was convicted of one count of rape of a child and was sentenced to twenty-eight years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to require the State to make an election of offenses, that the evidence is insufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction, and that the trial court erred by sentencing the Defendant as a Range II offender. The State concedes that the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant. Based on our review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction but modify his sentence to twenty-five years and remand for entry of an amended judgment.

The estate of the decedent appeals the trial court’s decision to grant the widow’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss the estate’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The complaint, filed in 2019, sought rescission of a quitclaim deed executed by the decedentin 1990 that created a tenancy by the entirety with his wife. The complaint alleged that the decedent executed the deed shortly after the marriage in consideration of and reliance on “a contract” between the spouses. The complaint alleged that the contract obligated the husband “to create a tenancy by the entirety” and, in return, the wife was “obligated to cohabit with him and to provide the love, affection and companionship that was essential for a ‘long and enduring marriage.’” Although the couple remained married until the decedent’s death in 2018—28 years after they married—the complaint alleged that the 1990 deed should be rescinded for the failure of consideration and the failure of a condition subsequent. The complaint additionally asserted that the wife was unjustly enriched by the conveyance and asked that a constructive trust be imposed on the property. The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that it did not allege facts that would give rise to any obligation upon the wife because the deed unambiguously evinced the husband’s intent to convey the property as a gift. The court also found, inter alia, the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations applicable to each claim, the doctrine of gross laches, and the statute of frauds. We affirm.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Gary Thomas Russell, of violating the sex offender residential restrictions and acquitted him of harboring a runaway child. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to six years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction because he was not “alone with a minor” as defined by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-211(k)(2). After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The defendant, Jessica Cox, appeals her Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated child abuse and reckless endangerment, arguing that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of an expert witness, that the trial court erred by excluding certain testimony and preventing her from mounting a defense, and that the evidence was insufficient to support certain convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Corbyn Davis, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition challenging his convictions for first degree, premeditated murder and possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to provide him discovery in a timely manner, failing to investigate telephone records and social media accounts, failing to move to suppress the murder weapon, failing to present the testimony of a witness, and failing to prepare him for trial. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the Petitioner has failed to show deficiency or prejudice with regard to each claim, and we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Sullivan County General Session Court found the defendant, Fallon Jenkins Moore, guilty of driving under the influence in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55- 10-401. The defendant appealed the judgment to the Criminal Court for Sullivan County and filed a suppression motion, arguing the police did not have reasonable suspicion to justify her initial seizure. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion, and the State appealed, asserting the defendant’s seizure was supported by reasonable suspicion. Upon our review of the record, arguments of the parties, and pertinent authorities, we agree with the State and reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, James Michael Johnson, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his four-year sentence in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal concerns a dispute over church property. David A. Hall (“Bishop Hall”), a bishop with The Church of God in Christ, Inc. (“COGIC”), tried to assert control over New Jerusalem Church of God in Christ (“New Jerusalem Church”), a COGIC member church, but was blocked by parties opposed to his pastorate. Bishop Hall, COGIC and New Jerusalem Church (“Plaintiffs,” collectively) sued these opponents (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Chancery Court for Shelby County (“the Trial Court”). Plaintiffs later filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted. Defendants appeal. Defendants argue, among other things, that under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, the Trial Court and this Court lack subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate this dispute. However, we find this case amenable to resolution under the hybrid neutral-principles approach articulated by our Supreme Court in a factually similar case. The undisputed material facts show that New Jerusalem Church’s property is held in trust for COGIC and that Bishop Hall is the duly appointed Jurisdictional Bishop with rights of pastor at New Jerusalem Church. Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment. We affirm.

This negligence action arose from approximately 102 events of food poisoning or illness purportedly related to numerous patrons (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) who dined at or visited Adventure House, LLC d/b/a River Drifters Restaurant and River Drifters Adventure Center (“the Restaurant”), located on real property owned by Robert L. Newman (“the Premises”). Plaintiffs filed suit against the Restaurant; Mr. Newman; and Charles and Renee Eich, the owners of the Restaurant. Upon Plaintiffs’ motion to certify the action as a class action, the Hamilton County Circuit Court (“trial court”) denied Plaintiffs’ motion upon a determination that Plaintiffs had failed to carry their burden to prove the commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation elements required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 23.01. The trial court further determined that if those elements were met, the class could maintain its certification pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 23.02(1)(b). However, based on its determination that the class did not satisfy the threshold certification requirements under Rule 23.01, the trial court denied Plaintiffs’ motion to certify the litigation as a class action. Plaintiffs have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Nathan B. (“Father”) and Kendra B. (“Stepmother”) appeal the judgment of the Campbell County Circuit Court (the “Trial Court”) denying their petition for termination of the parental rights of Hannah B. (“Mother”), as to Mother’s two biological children. Because the Trial Court’s final order does not contain sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the best interests of the children, this Court is unable to engage in meaningful appellate review, and the judgment of the Trial Court is vacated and remanded.

Appellant appeals the trial court’s denial of its Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24 motion to intervene. Because the trial court’s order does not state the basis for its denial of the motion, we cannot review the ultimate decision. Vacated and remanded.

This is the second appeal in this case. In the first appeal, we affirmed the trial court’s enrollment of Appellee’s Pennsylvania judgment. In enrolling the foreign judgment, the trial court omitted the 1.5% interest awarded by the Pennsylvania court and entered judgment only for the principal amount of the foreign judgment. In seeking to enforce its judgment, Appellee filed a bank levy against Appellant, wherein Appellee included the 1.5% interest. Because neither party raised an issue in the first appeal concerning whether the trial court’s omission of the interest was error, the question is waived, and Appellee is entitled to only post-judgment interest under Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-14-121(a). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to quash Appellee’s bank levy in the amount of $40,482.03. The case is remanded for calculation of post-judgment interest consistent with this opinion.

Subsequent to the grant of partial summary judgment in the trial court, we granted an application for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Having reflected upon the specific issue for which our Rule 9 order granted review, we are of the opinion that the present appeal was improvidently granted as framed. In addition, we observe that the trial court’s partial summary judgment order fails to clearly articulate the legal grounds upon which that order is based. Given our conclusion that the interlocutory appeal was improvidently granted, we dismiss the appeal.

The defendant in a malicious prosecution action moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. He contended that the prior suit that engendered the malicious prosecution action was not terminated on its merits. The plaintiff responded that the prior suit was dismissed on multiple grounds and that one of those grounds was on the merits. The trial court agreed with the defendant and granted the motion to dismiss. We do as well and affirm. 

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court found the sole ground raised by the Department for termination against the child’s father of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child or assume financial responsibility pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(14) had been established. The court further found that the termination of father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. Father filed a timely appeal. On appeal, we vacate the trial court’s order terminating father’s parental rights due to the court’s failure to consider all required elements of the statutory ground for termination.

A Shelby County jury found the defendant, Ruben Walton, guilty of second-degree murder, and the trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-two years to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, two evidentiary rulings of the trial court regarding threatening statements the defendant made prior to the murder, and his sentence. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Cordell Ash, of especially aggravated robbery, attempted first-degree murder, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirty years in confinement. In this delayed appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial after the victim made a reference to the defendant’s alleged gang activity. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Zachary Thompson, was found guilty of first-degree premeditated murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on self-defense and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After Mother failed to timely appeal the final order terminating her parental rights, she sought relief pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court denied the motion, and Mother timely appealed from that order. Because we conclude that the trial court erred in denying Mother’s Rule 60.02 motion, we proceed to consider the correctness of the trial court’s final order terminating Mother’s parental rights. But we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding clear and convincing evidence of grounds for termination and that termination is in the child’s best interest. We therefore affirm the
termination of Mother’s parental rights.

Relief under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02(5) is reserved for extraordinary circumstances.  Outcomes, specifically judgments, occasioned by a party’s own inaction or lack of attention are not extraordinary.  And a court does not abuse its discretion in denying a Rule 60.02(5) motion when a judgment results from such circumstances.  So we affirm.

The petitioner, Demetrice A. Smith, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2017
guilty-pleaded convictions of possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony drug offense and failure to appear, alleging that his guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary because he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Because no final order issued in the court below, we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed, and the case is remanded to the post-conviction court for a new evidentiary hearing.

A husband challenges the trial court’s award of alimony in solido to his wife for a period of eight years. Having examined the record and the trial court’s analysis of the statutory factors, we find no abuse of discretion and affirm the trial court’s decision. We further award the wife her reasonable attorney fees on appeal

After seventeen years of marriage, a wife filed a complaint for divorce. The husband answered and filed a counter-complaint for divorce. The trial court granted the wife a divorce, named her primary residential parent of the parties’ minor children, classified and divided the marital estate, ordered the husband to pay the wife $1,941 per month in child support, and awarded the wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $6,000 per month. The husband appealed. We affirm the trial court’s designation of Wife as the primary residential parent and the division of the marital estate as modified. We vacate the award of child support and the amount of alimony and remand for recalculation.

I concur in the decision to affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Washington County. I write separately to explain what I think is an additional crucial difference in this case from Barkes v. River Park Hosp., Inc., 328 S.W.3d 829 (Tenn. 2010). In addition to what is stated in this Court’s Opinion, I believe what distinguishes this case from Barkes is the respective plaintiff’s proof as to the defendant hospital’s duty of reasonable care to its patients and the applicable standard of care relative to that hospital’s duty.

This appeal arises from a hospital’s action against a patient to recover payment for medical services. After a bench trial, the court determined there was not an enforceable contract between the parties, but the hospital was entitled to recover the value of its services under a quantum meruit theory and ruled that the charges billed to the patient represented the actual value of the hospital’s services. The court based its determination on the testimony of the hospital’s witness that, because the rates that a hospital could charge were set by Medicare, the amount charged to the patient was comparable to what other hospitals would charge for the same or similar services. The patient appeals and asks this court to consider whether the hospital proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount it charged for medical services represented the actual value of those services. We affirm the trial court’s decision.