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| Teresa Woody v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
02S01-9976-CH-00052
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded the plaintiff benefits based on a finding of 25 percent permanent partial disability to her whole body. The defendant appeals, asserting the excessiveness of this award and the bar of the statute of limitations. An in-depth discussion of her employment history with the defendant is necessary for an adequate assessment of her claim. She was 34 years old at the time of trial and lives in Obion County, Tennessee. She completed high school and attended Vanderbilt University for a short period of time. At the time of trial, she was a senior at the University of Tennessee at Martin majoring in English, lacking approximately three hours before graduation. Following graduation, she plans to attend graduate school, seek a Masters Degree in English, and ultimately teach. Her work history includes a work study program at Vanderbilt University, primarily clerical in nature. She has worked for Baptist Hospital in Union City as an admission clerk, a clerical position, and in 1988, she began working for Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, in the gift shop. Shortly thereafter, she moved into the factory, working on a bias unit, which involved repetitive overhead lifting, twisting and turning. In June of 1989, she began having pain and problems with her shoulders, and informed her supervisor, David Stephenson, of these problems and filled out an incident report in July, 1989. She was initially seen by Dr. David St. Clair who diagnosed impingement syndrome. Her claim for workers' compensation benefits was eventually denied. She continued to work on the bias machine and her shoulder problems progressively worsened. In 199, she resigned her position with the defendant to attend school, and worked part-time for Baptist Hospital in Union City, again 2
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Chancellor |
Obion County | Workers Compensation Panel | 03/02/98 | |
| Harold P. Cousins, D/B/A Cousins Construction, v. MK Ferguson of Oak Ridge Company
03A01-9709-CV-00435
This is an action to recover profits the plaintiff contractor alleges he would have made had he been allowed to construct an additional four warehouses similar in design and usage to a fifth warehouse he constructed and for which he was paid.
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge WIlliam H. Inman
Originating Judge:Judge James B. Scott, Jr. |
Court of Appeals | 03/02/98 | ||
| Janet Wynn v. Tecumseh Products Co.
02S01-9709-CV-00081
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). The trial court awarded the plaintiff a 3 percent permanent partial disability to her right leg, a 4 percent permanent partial disability to each of her arms, and medical expenses in the amount of $77.. The trial court noted that the plaintiff is very bright and capable of expressing herself. The defendant raises the following issues on appeal: "1. Does the evidence preponderate against the Trial Court's finding that Plaintiff sustained a thirty (3%) percent permanent partial disability to her right leg. 2. Does the evidence preponderate against the Trial Court's finding that Plaintiff's condition to each of Plaintiff's arms was caused by the work activities performed at Tecumseh Products Company. 3. Does the evidence preponderate against the Trial Court's finding that Plaintiff sustained a forty (4%) percent permanent partial disability to each of her arms. 4. Did the Trial Court err in finding that Tecumseh should pay Dr. James Spruill's medical charges in the amount of $77.." We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Creed Mcginley, |
Henry County | Workers Compensation Panel | 03/02/98 | |
| Beverly Riddle v. Murray Outdoor Products
02S01-9706-CH-00058
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial judge awarded the plaintiff 58 percent permanent partial disability to each arm as a result of carpal tunnel syndrome. The defendant raises the following issues on appeal: I. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the plaintiff had properly satisfied notice and statute of limitations requirements for her alleged left upper extremity injury. II. Whether the trial court erred in awarding the plaintiff 58 percent impairment to each arm. We affirm the judgment.
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Joe C. Morris, |
Madison County | Workers Compensation Panel | 03/02/98 | |
| Lucy B. Anderson v. Lenzing U.S.A
03S01-9704-CV-00036
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appeal has been perfected by Lucy Anderson, widow and administratrix of the Estate of Billy Joe Anderson, deceased, from a ruling by the trial court that her claim for death benefits was not compensable as she failed to establish her husband's death was caused by his work activities. At the time of his death, Mr. Anderson was 54 years of age, was six foot four inches tall and weighed between 26-28 pounds. He had been employed as a cutter operator with defendant, Lenzing U.S.A., for about six years but had worked a total of 21 years for the company. Plaintiff testified her husband was in good health, took no medication and never complained of chest pains. She said he smoked cigars sometimes but did not appear to inhale the smoke. She also stated he had no complaints before reporting to work on March 11, 1993. He was working the "C" shift which started at 12 midnight and ended at 7: a.m. Arvine Taylor, decedent's shift supervisor, testified and described the duties of a cutter operator. The employer is engaged in the business of producing rayon fiber. As the material moves through the production line, it is called a "tow." A cutter operator is responsible for keeping the tow moving down the production line. If knots appear in the tow, the operator uses a knife and cuts the knot out. If the tow stops for any reason, the operator reels it back up on the machine and continues the process. Also, if co-workers spot a knot along the production line, a horn is sounded to alert the cutter operator. It appears a cutter operator has the responsibility of watching over several machines involved in this process. On the night in question, the deceased was looking after four units on the production line. The evidence indicates that among the four machines, there were 42 breaks during the shift. Records showed there was a break on unit #2 at 5:25 a.m. and at 6:3 a.m., unit #4 and unit #1 were down. Supervisor Taylor told the court the records indicated it was an average night on the production line. He said it would normally take ten to fifteen seconds to remove a small knot and that there was very little physical exertion in cutting out a knot or resuming a tow if it was down. 2
Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Ben K. Wexler, |
Anderson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 03/02/98 | |
| Beryl Jack v. State
01S01-9706-BC-00136
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee contends the evidence preponderates against the commissioner's finding that her claim is barred because of a false statement contained in her employment application. The panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. The claimant has been a certified nursing technician since 1973. She began working for Bethany Health Care, a nursing home, in May of 199 and soon thereafter injured her back while lifting a patient. As a result of that injury, she received two laminectomies at L5-S1. Following those surgeries, she had difficulty standing, bending and sitting for long periods of time. The operating surgeon imposed lifting and bending restrictions. She was awarded permanent partial disability benefits and applied for social security disability benefits. She was terminated from Bethany because that employer did not have work for her within her limitations. On October 1, 1991, she made written application for employment at Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute. On that application, she was asked, "Do you have a limiting disability or handicap?" She responded, "No." In response to a question as to her reason for leaving Bethany, she wrote, "Illness in the family." On another document, she denied having any "history of physical defects." On the strength of that application, she was approved for employment by the state. We find in the record no evidence that the employer had any knowledge of her pre-existing disability. It is equally clear in the record that she could not have been employed as she was if the above questions had been accurately answered. The commissioner denied compensation benefits because of the false application. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6- 225(e)(2). Where the trial judge has seen and heard the witnesses, especially if issues of credibility and weight to be given oral testimony are involved, considerable deference must be accorded those circumstances on review. Kellerman v. Food Lion, Inc., 929 S.W.2d 333 (Tenn. 1996). A false statement in an employee'sapplication for employment will bar recovery of workers' compensation benefits if all three of the following elements exist: first, the employee must have knowingly and willfully made a false representation as to his physical condition; second, the employer must have relied upon the false representation and such reliance must have been a substantial factor in the hiring; and third, there must have been a causal connection between the false representation and the injury. Federal Copper and Aluminum Company v. Dickey, 493 S.W.2d 463 (Tenn. 1973). The causal 2
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. William Robert Baker, |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 03/02/98 | |
| Joey Sweat v. Superior Industries, Inc.
03S01-9701-CH-00006
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. I This is a psoriatic arthritis1 case, an on-going debilitating condition, which pre-existed the plaintiff's employment. He alleges that he was asymptomatic prior to his employment by the defendant and that the nature of his job triggered his symptoms and worsened the underlying disease. The defendant says that only the symptoms, i.e., pain and swelling, were exacerbated by employment (as any physical activity would do) but that the disease per se was not worsened. Dr. David Lurie testified by deposition. The precise issue of whether the plaintiff's employment caused a progression of the disease or whether it merely aggravated the symptoms was not sufficiently articulated by Dr. Lurie in the opinion of the trial judge, and he requested that Dr. Lurie elucidate the point either by a supplemental deposition or by letter. Counsel agreed to the latter. He was asked: In your opinion, based on a reasonable medical probability, did Sweat's activities . . . advance and result in an actual progression of his underlying psoriatic arthritis? To which Dr. Lurie responded: "In my opinion, based on reasonable medical probability Sweat's work . . . advanced and resulted in actual progression of his underlying psoriatic arthritis." He testified that the allocation of the progression of the disease from physical activity as contrasted to spontaneous progression was not quantifiable, but that the "repetitive, strenuous, weight-bearing activities resulted in some permanent joint injury." 1A connective tissue arthritis, not curable, and highly debilitating. 2
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Thomas J. Seeley, Jr., |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 03/02/98 | |
| David E. Lind, et ux. Myra Gwinn Lind, v. Allen M. Well, Clyde N. Well, and Aster Vance Webb
03A01-9710-CH-00473
In this boundary line dispute the defendants appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiffs, insisting that the evidence established their right to the disputed area by adverse possession.
Authoring Judge: Judge Herschel P. Franks
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Knox County | Court of Appeals | 03/02/98 | |
| Bruce O. Tibbs, Jr. v. City of Humbodlt, Tn
02S01-9706-CH-00057
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). The trial judge awarded the plaintiff 33 percent vocational impairment for injuries occurring on October 27, 1995. We affirm the judgment. The plaintiff was employed as an officer with the defendant. The plaintiff finished nine years of formal education and subsequently obtained a G.E.D. He was trained and worked as a machine mechanic prior to becoming employed as an officer with the defendant. At the time of trial, the plaintiff was 33 years of age. Prior Injury On October 9, 1994, the plaintiff injured his back in the course of his employment with the defendant. In February 1995, a lumbar laminectomy at L5-S1 was performed. The treating physician, Dr. John W. Neblett, concluded the plaintiff had reached maximum medical improvement from this injury on June 14, 1995 and found the plaintiff suffered a ten percent permanent medical impairment to the body as a whole. The plaintiff was released with restrictions of not repeatedly lifting more than 2 pounds at a time nor ever lifting as much as 4 pounds at a time and that he should not sit more than one hour at a time whether standing or walking. On July 18, 1995, the plaintiff returned to Dr. Neblett and reported he had significantly improved. Dr. Neblett, upon the request of the plaintiff and upon the 2
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. George R. Ellis, |
Gibson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 03/02/98 | |
| John W. Gray, Iii v. Gray and Williams, Inc., et al
02S01-9706-CH-00054
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The trial judge awarded the plaintiff 6 percent permanent partial disability. The defendants say the evidence presented at trial preponderates against the trial court's award of 6 percent permanent partial disability to the plaintiff's body as a whole as a result of his work related accident. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Neal Small, |
Shelby County | Workers Compensation Panel | 03/02/98 | |
| Brown vs. Davidson
01A01-9702-CV-00049
|
Court of Appeals | 02/27/98 | ||
| Allstate vs. Auto
03A01-9706-CH-00225
|
Court of Appeals | 02/27/98 | ||
| 03A01-9709-CV-00444
03A01-9709-CV-00444
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Knox County | Court of Appeals | 02/27/98 | |
| Reid vs. Sundquist
01A01-9709-CH-00494
Originating Judge:Carol L. Mccoy |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 02/27/98 | |
| Copas vs. Copas
03A01-9708-CV-00375
|
Sevier County | Court of Appeals | 02/27/98 | |
| Witt vs. Tennessee
03A01-9709-CH-00400
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Bradley County | Court of Appeals | 02/27/98 | |
| State vs. Garrison
03C01-9702-CC-00047
Originating Judge:Thomas W. Graham |
Bledsoe County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 02/27/98 | |
| Lampley vs. Lampley
01A01-9708-CH-00423
|
Court of Appeals | 02/27/98 | ||
| Hooker vs. Thompson
01A01-9709-CH-00533
Originating Judge:Carol L. Mccoy |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 02/27/98 | |
| Webb vs. Mortgage Systems Corp.
01A01-9512-CH-00566
Originating Judge:Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr. |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 02/27/98 | |
| Walker vs. Exchange
03A01-9709-CV-00402
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Court of Appeals | 02/27/98 | ||
| Molin, M.D., et . ux. vs. Perryman Construction Co.
01A01-9705-CV-00232
Originating Judge:Barbara N. Haynes |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 02/27/98 | |
| Lampley vs. Lampley
01A01-9708-CH-00423
|
Court of Appeals | 02/27/98 | ||
| Pehlman vs. Pehlman
03A01-9708-CV-00339
|
Court of Appeals | 02/27/98 | ||
| State vs. Manning
03C01-9501-CR-00012
Originating Judge:R. Steven Bebb |
Bradley County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 02/27/98 |