APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Please enter some keywords to search.
State of Tennessee Department of Human Services, v. Sylvia Fetterolf Ford, and Stanley Fetterolf

01A01-9704-JV-00171

This is an appeal by respondents/appellants, Stanley Fetterolf and Sylvia Fetterolf Ford, from a decision of the Putnam County Juvenile Court terminating their parental rights. Ms. Ford argues petitioner/appellee, State of Tennessee Department of Human Services (“Department”), filed its petition for termination of parental rights in the wrong court and contends the proper venue was the Overton County Juvenile Court which had handled the initial custody proceedings.1 The pertinent facts are as follows.

Authoring Judge: Judge Walter W. Bussart
Originating Judge:Judge John Hudson
Putnam County Court of Appeals 11/14/97
State vs. David Hassell

02C01-9611-CR-00396

Originating Judge:W. Fred Axley
Shelby County Court of Criminal Appeals 11/13/97
Stat e vs. Michael Moore

02C01-9705-CR-00180

Originating Judge:Bernie Weinman
Shelby County Court of Criminal Appeals 11/13/97
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
Court of Appeals 11/13/97
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
Jefferson County Court of Appeals 11/13/97
State vs. Clifton Epps

02C01-9601-CR-00022
Shelby County Court of Criminal Appeals 11/13/97
Willie M. Nutt v. Angelica Uniform Group

01S01-9609-CH-00195
This Workers' Compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff, Willie M. Nutt, appeals the judgment of the trial court in dismissing her complaint as being barred by the statute of limitations. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Willie M. Nutt worked for the defendant, Angelica Uniform Group, from 1982 to 1989 when she quit due to pain in her shoulders and back. She then worked for Tennessee River for several months, but again had to quit due to the physical inability to do her job. In November 1989, she was advised by Dr. Howard Fuchs that her shoulder problems were work- related. With the encouragement of the plant manager, and the assurance of light duty, Ms. Nutt returned to work for Angelica Uniform in July, 199. She was able to handle small parts for a few days, but her shoulder symptoms returned when she was assigned to heavier work. She was terminated because she was unable to perform her job. Plaintiff filed suit on January 28, 1991, and alleged on or about July 31, 199, she became aware she had suffered an injury to her shoulders. The defendant answered and pled the statute of limitations as a defense. After a trial on October 2, 1994, the trial court took the matter under advisement and entered judgment on December 16, 1994, dismissing plaintiff's cause of action. The trial court found: The shoulder problems suffered by Ms. Nutt, however, were long standing problems and were not caused by a work-related injury during her brief period of employment at Angelica's plant in July of 199. The Court further finds that Ms. Nutt was aware of her shoulder problems and aware that those shoulder problems were work related several years before the complaint in this action filed. The statute of limitations applicable to her claims, therefore, expired prior to the filing of this action on January 28, 1991, and Ms. Nutt's action was untimely and barred by the statute of limitations. The scope of review of issues of fact is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of evidence is otherwise. Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Lollar v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 767 S.W.2d 143 (Tenn. 1989). When a trial court has seen and heard witnesses, especially where issues of credibility and weight of oral testimony are involved, considerable deference 2
Authoring Judge: W. Michael Maloan, Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. William B. Cain
Wayne County Workers Compensation Panel 11/13/97
State vs. Nassel Brown

02C01-9606-CR-00187

Originating Judge:Bernie Weinman
Shelby County Court of Criminal Appeals 11/13/97
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
Morgan County Court of Appeals 11/13/97
Raymond Morris vs. Voil Morris

02A01-9610-CH-00236

Originating Judge:George R. Ellis
Gibson County Court of Appeals 11/12/97
Lasalle Dudley vs. Raye Dudley

02A01-9705-CH-00104
Shelby County Court of Appeals 11/12/97
Jewell Maness vs. Estate of Acie Maness

02A01-9611-CH-00270

Originating Judge:Joe C. Morris
Henderson County Court of Appeals 11/12/97
Shirley Shelburne v. Frontier Health

E2000-02551-SC-R11-CV
Plaintiff, both individually and as next friend of her minor son, brought suit against Carter County, Frontier Health, and Woodridge Hospital for the wrongful death of her husband. The trial court granted summary judgment to Frontier and Woodridge. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Frontier and Woodridge could not be held vicariously liable for the acts or omissions of their employee because he was entitled to immunity as a state employee. We granted review to determine whether summary judgment was properly granted in light of our decision in Johnson v. LeBonheur Children's Medical Center, 74 S.W.3d 338 (Tenn. 2002). We hold that Johnson governs the present case and that Frontier and Woodridge are not immune from liability for the acts or omissions of their immune employee. Accordingly, summary judgment was not appropriate.
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Originating Judge:Thomas J. Seeley, Jr.
Carter County Supreme Court 11/12/97
State vs. Michael Walton

01C01-9509-CR-00290

Originating Judge:Seth W. Norman
Davidson County Court of Criminal Appeals 11/12/97
Terry Phelps vs. State

01C01-9610-CC-00451

Originating Judge:W. Charles Lee
Lincoln County Court of Criminal Appeals 11/12/97
Patrick v. Kelfalla,

01C01-9608-CR-00357

Originating Judge:Seth W. Norman
Davidson County Court of Criminal Appeals 11/10/97
State vs. Orlando Hobson

01C01-9612-CC-00527

Originating Judge:Jim T. Hamilton
Maury County Court of Criminal Appeals 11/10/97
Jimmy R. Turner v. Travelers Insurance

01S01-9610-CV-00203
Authoring Judge: William S. Russell, Retired Judge
Originating Judge:Hon.
Sequatchie County Workers Compensation Panel 11/10/97
J. C. Mcdowell v. United Technologies/Carrier Corp.

01S01-9703-CH-00045
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This complaint in Chancery was filed November 9, 1995 seeking benefits for a back injury which the plaintiff alleged he suffered on March 14, 1995 while attempting to move a heavy tank. The employer defendant answered in course, alleging that the plaintiff had a degenerative back condition of many years duration and denying the plaintiff suffered a compensable injury as alleged or that it had notice of any injury. The trial judge referred the case to the Clerk and Master pursuant to RULE 53, TENN. R. CIV. P.1 A judgment was entered finding that the plaintiff sustained a compensable injury on March 14, 1995 resulting in a 3 percent permanent partial disability to his whole body, and benef its were awarded accordingly. The defendant appeals and presents the issue of whether the evidence preponderates against the finding of a compensable injury. We hold that it does not for reasons hereafter recited, and therefore affirm the judgment. The plaintiff is 52 years old and has been employed at Carrier since 1972. He had three prior back surgeries in 1975, 1976, and 1985. On March 14, 1995, while working on a chiller tank, he twisted his body, and, as he stated, "I hurt myself." He did not report for work the following day, but on March 16, 1995, he went with a shop steward to see Joel Holt, the Safety Director. He testified that he reported to Holt that he had injured his back and requested some time off. He saw his family physician who said the pain was not work related. In course, he was referred to Dr. George Lien, a neurosurgeon who performed surgery on May 7, 1995. The plaintiff returned to work on August 23, 1995 with restrictions. 1A Spec ial Maste r may b e appo inted in any ca se, and his/her du ties ma y be particula rized. W e ass um e the Clerk and M aste r was appo inted as S pec ial Ma ster to hear and r epo rt the t estim ony, with recommendation, but there is no Appointing Order in the record. There are two relevant documents in the record. The first such is a Finding of Fact signed by the trial judge. The second is an Order reciting that "the cause came on to be heard before the Honorable Charles D. Haston, Judge., etc. who referred the matter to J. Richard McGregor, Special Master. Thereafter, the court . . . filed a finding of fact . . . which is incorporated herein . . ." This Order [i.e. Judgment] is signed, not by the trial judge, but by J. Richard McGregor. "In the absence of the Judge, J. Richard Mc Gregor, sitting as Chancellor pro tem ." So far as the record reveals the Spe cial Master filed no repo rt, and the trial judge thus made findings o f fact without hearing any proof. The anomaly continues: the Special Master, as Judge Pro Tem, also entered the final judgment, thereby approbating his prior action. The parties make no issue of this `unusual' procedure, and we therefore treat the case as one heard in compliance with RULE 53.4. 2
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Charles D. Haston,
Warren County Workers Compensation Panel 11/10/97
Evans & Arnold vs. Board of Paroles, et. al.

01S01-9610-CH-00210
Davidson County Supreme Court 11/10/97
01C01-9510-CR-00347

01C01-9510-CR-00347

Originating Judge:Jerry Scott
Court of Criminal Appeals 11/10/97
Hunter vs. Brown

03S01-9607-CV-00070
Supreme Court 11/10/97
Margaret Williamson v. Clarksville Memorial Hospital

01S01-9703-CV-00066
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial judge found that the plaintiff had a 1 percent anatomical impairment which, extrapolated by the multiplier of 2.5, resulted in a permanent partial disability of 25 percent and awarded benefits accordingly. The employer appeals, insisting that there is no basis for a finding of an anatomical impairment of 1 percent.1 The thrust of the Hospital's argument is directed to the alleged discrediting of Dr. Fishbein's testimony by the Chancellor.2 It is conceded that the plaintiff, a nurse, sustained a neck and shoulder injury on July 8, 1993 while lifting a patient at the defendant Hospital. She was initially seen by Dr. Douglas Porter, an orthopedist of Clarksville, who referred her to Dr. G. B. Lanford, a neurosurgeon, whom we assume practices in Nashville.3 Dr. Lanford testified that the plaintiff had some disc bulging and spondylosis, but no nerve root compression and no operative problems. Because of continuing arm and back pain Dr. Lanford assessed her anatomical impairment at 5 percent. Dr. Richard E. Fishbein, orthopedist, practicing in Antioch, testified that at the request of plaintiff's counsel he examined the plaintiff on July 7, 1994. Before that time he had been furnished with copies of Dr. Porter's and Dr. Lanford's evaluations, and had reviewed the x-ray and myelogram reports. He referred to Dr. Porter's report that the plaintiff had suffered an acute herniation of a disc; he found exquisite tenderness over the para cervical muscles, weakness of grip strength, "and basically I noted that she had a herniated disc as noted, and that her history and physical findings were consistent with it." Dr. Fishbein opined that she had a 1 The record consists only of the depositions of Dr. Lanford and Dr. Fishbein, and the memorandum of the Chancellor. 2 As observed by a different Panel on another occasion, the plaintiff, in this Montgomery County case, travelled a long distance in employing Dr. Fishbein, overlooking many dozens of orthopedic specialists in the process. 3 Neither his deposition nor his CV reveal this information.
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. James E. Walton,
Williamson County Workers Compensation Panel 11/10/97
Mary A. Clark v. Micropore, Inc. & Berwind Industries Management

01S01-9703-CH-00062
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This complaint was filed April 17, 1995, alleging that the plaintiff had been employed at Porelon since 1974 and that in 1993 she began to develop pain in her right shoulder and arm which was evidence of a gradually developing compensable injury. Micropore, Inc. (formerly Porelon) filed its answer on June 7, 1995, alleging that it was sold on May 6, 1994 with a resulting change in workers' compensation insurers. It denied having notice of any claimed injury and affirmatively alleged that it is not liable for "any benefits due plaintiff which accrued on or after May 6, 1994." The plaintiff amended her complaint on June 21, 1995 and joined Berwind Industries Management Company as a defendant. She alleged that in 1993 and until May 1994 the manufacturing plant known as Porelon, where she worked and developed the gradual injury, was owned by Johnson Worldwide Associates, Inc. ["JWA"], which sold the plant to Berwind in May 1994. The plant continued to operate under the name of Micropore, Inc., allegedly a subsidiary of Berwind. Micropore, Inc. answered the amended complaint, acknowledging the sale of the plant by JWA to Berwind in May 1994. It again denied that, although the plaintiff was regularly employed by Porelon for 2 years and was so employed May 1994, when the change in ownership occurred, the plaintiff had developed a gradually occurring injury as alleged. It admitted that on November 3, 1993, the plaintiff reported to management that she had been diagnosed with fibromyosis, but that she did not relate that the condition was work related. Berwind answered the amended complaint on July 26, 1995, asserting that the plaintiff was last employed on March 6, 1995, and that it was not liable for benefits under the gradual occurring rule. The Chancellor ruled that the plaintiff's injuries were gradual "and manifested themselves in May 1993, but they did not progress to the point of making the plaintiff unable to work until March 3, 1995, and therefore March 3, 1995, under Tennessee 2
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Vernon Neal,
Putnam County Workers Compensation Panel 11/10/97
John Shultz v. City of Lawrenceburg, et al .

01S01-9701-CV-00017
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer, City of Lawrenceburg, contends (1) the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding of a compensable injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, (2) the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the employee's compensation rate is $38.8, (3) the evidence preponderates against the trial court's award of temporary total disability benefits from August 5, 1994 through October of 1995 and (4) the trial court erred in commuting permanent partial disability benefits to a lump sum. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. The employee or claimant, John Schultz, was forty-nine years old at the time of the injury. He has an eighth grade education and a GED. He has worked as a heavy equipment operator since 1968. On January 21, 1994, while working for the employer, he injured his neck and back while operating a backhoe as a jackhammer on frozen ground. He injured his left shoulder again on August 5, 1994 while working for the employer and running out of a hole filling with water. He attempted to work the next day before going to a doctor's appointment, then was totally disabled until October 18, 1995, when he reached maximum medical improvement. The claimant was treated or evaluated by a number of physicians and assigned permanent impairment ratings of from six to ten percent from the injuries which the physicians related to the work he was performing. He continues to have neck and shoulder problems. The record contains conflicting documentary evidence as to the employee's average weekly wage, but the employer had actually paid benefits of $38.8 from the August injury until the date of maximum medical improvement, for his temporary total disability. The trial court awarded no additional temporary total disability benefits, but did award the claimant's reasonable and necessary medical expenses and permanent partial disability benefits based on thirty-two percent to the body as a whole, payable in a lump sum. The claim against the Second Injury Fund was dismissed. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2). 2
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Jim T. Hamilton,
Lawrence County Workers Compensation Panel 11/10/97