APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Defendant, Mark Alan Kirby, pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The agreement provided that Defendant’s sentence was three years as a Range I standard offender. The manner of service of the sentence was reserved for determination by the trial court following a sentencing hearing. The trial court ordered the entire sentence to be served in confinement. Defendant has appealed, asserting the trial court should have granted full probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Henderson County jury convicted the Petitioner, John N. Moffitt, of reckless aggravated assault, as a lesser included offense of aggravated assault, for slashing the victim’s arm with a pocketknife following a property dispute. State v. John N. Moffitt, No. W2014-02388-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 369379, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 29, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 24, 2016). This Court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal; however, this Court also reduced the amount of restitution that the trial court ordered and remanded the case to the trial court to determine the amount of restitution that the Petitioner could pay. Id. On March 10, 2020, the Petitioner, acting pro se, filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that his conviction for reckless aggravated assault was “an illegal and unconstitutional conviction” because the indictment failed to allege “recklessly,” which the Petitioner contends is a “required mental state indicating a lesser kind of culpability” than that required for aggravated assault. The Petitioner alleged that he was entitled to due process tolling of the statute of limitations because he was “totally unaware of the fact about [sic] the illegal and unconstitutional conviction.” The coram nobis court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that it was time-barred and that the Petitioner’s allegations did not constitute new evidence and thus did not toll the statute of limitations. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

This is an appeal from a divorce proceeding involving a short-term marriage with minor children.  In conjunction with its divorce judgment, the trial court designated the mother as the primary residential parent, allowed her to relocate to Mississippi, and awarded her both transitional alimony and alimony in solido.  Father now raises several issues for our review on appeal.  While we affirm the trial court’s judgment pertaining to the parties’ parenting plan and its determination about the children’s best interests, we vacate a component of the in solido award given to the mother in a purported attempt to equalize the division of the marital estate.  We further vacate the award of transitional alimony and remand the case for that issue to be reconsidered by the trial court.  The balance of the judgment is affirmed.  The mother’s request for an award of attorney’s fees on appeal is granted.

The petitioner, Christopher N. Hernandez, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his convictions of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and solicitation of a minor, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Petitioner, Jermarlon Sanders, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction of aggravated robbery, for which he received an eight-year term of imprisonment. In his appeal, the Petitioner argues that his guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered based on the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Brandon Lee Clymer, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

The Tennessee Supreme Court has remanded this case for reconsideration in light of Howard v. State, 604 S.W.3d 53 (Tenn. 2020). See Ugenio Dejesus Ruby-Ruiz v. State, No. M2019-00062-CCA-R3-PC, 2019 WL 4866766 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 2, 2019) (“Ruby-Ruiz I”), case remanded (Tenn. Aug. 7, 2020). Upon further review, we conclude that the supreme court’s holding in Howard does not apply to the untimely filing of an application for permission to appeal to the supreme court. Consistent with the holding of the majority in our previous opinion in this case, we reverse the judgment of the postconviction court and remand the case for the entry of an order granting the Petitioner a delayed appeal for the limited purpose of filing an application for permission to appeal to our supreme court. The Petitioner’s remaining allegations shall be held in abeyance in the post-conviction court until the resolution of the delayed appeal.

Defendant, Joseph Christopher Hendry II, was indicted for one count of felony first degree murder, one count of premeditated first degree murder, one count of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder, and four counts of aggravated assault.  Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to second degree murder and received a sentence of 25 years to be served at 100 percent.  Defendant filed a motion seeking to reduce his sentence pursuant to Rule 35 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure.  Following a hearing, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion.  Defendant appeals.  Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Gregory Goff, of especially aggravated robbery and aggravated assault for which he received an effective thirty-five-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and the trial court’s jury instruction regarding self-defense. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A franchisor sued a franchisee in Texas and obtained a default judgment, which it sought to enroll in Tennessee.  The franchisor moved for summary judgment, and the franchisee asserted there was a genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether it had been served properly in the Texas action.  The trial court granted the franchisor’s motion, concluding that the Texas judgment was entitled to full faith and credit in Tennessee, and awarded the franchisor its attorneys’ fees.  On appeal, we affirm the trial court’s award of summary judgment but reverse the award of attorneys’ fees.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion granting the delayed appeal based upon the reasoning set forth in my dissenting opinion in this appeal filed on October 2, 2019. I strongly disagree that the Tennessee Supreme Court performed a mere perfunctory or administrative review of the Petitioner’s motion to late-file an application for permission to appeal to which the Petitioner attached his application before denying the Petitioner’s motion. Rather, I conclude that the Tennessee Supreme Court has already reviewed the substantive underlying issues of the appeal in determining not to accept the late-filed appeal in the interest of justice. Accordingly, I would affirm the post-conviction court’s decision to deny the Petitioner delayed appeal, and I would deny a stay of the resolution of the remaining issues raised by the Petitioner.

A legal parent appeals a child support award.  He claims his voluntary acknowledgment of paternity for the child should be rescinded due to a material mistake of fact.  He also claims that requiring him to pay child support would violate public policy because he is not the biological father of the child.  Upon our review, we conclude that the legal parent failed to prove the existence of a material mistake of fact that would warrant rescission of the voluntary acknowledgement of paternity.  We also conclude that ordering a legal parent to pay child support is consistent with public policy.  So we affirm.

The Petitioner, Susan Jo Walls, appeals the Bedford County Circuit Court’s denial of her post-conviction petition, seeking relief from her convictions of first degree premeditated murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder and resulting effective life sentence.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that she received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this contract action, the trial court entered a judgment dismissing the plaintiff logging company’s complaint for breach of contract, determining that the defendant landowner had been within his rights to terminate the parties’ agreement because (1) the contract, which had been drafted by the owner of the logging company, was not sufficiently specific to be enforceable and (2) the logging company had violated what was an unambiguous section of the contract requiring that the logging company follow directions concerning the logging operation given by the landowner’s property manager. The logging company has appealed. Having determined that the parties’ contract is enforceable, we reverse the trial court’s first basis for dismissal of the logging company’s breach of contract claim. However, we affirm the remainder of the trial court’s judgment in its entirety.

Former employee sued her former employer for retaliatory discharge under the Tennessee Public Protection Act, disability discrimination, and religious discrimination. Former employee voluntarily dismissed the religious discrimination claim prior to trial; the jury returned a verdict in favor of the former employee on only the retaliatory discharge claim, awarding total damages of $15,500.00, inclusive of punitive damages. Former employee then sought an award of over $100,000.00 in attorney’s fees under the applicable statutes, which the trial court reduced to $12,500.00, the same amount of punitive damages awarded by the jury. Former employee appeals only the attorney’s fee award. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal involves a licensure disciplinary action.  The Tennessee Board of Nursing charged an advanced practice registered nurse with overprescribing controlled substances.  After a contested case hearing, the Board found the nurse practitioner guilty of violations of Tennessee’s nursing rules.  However, during the deliberations of the Board, one member conducted her own research.  She observed that her findings had “changed her mind” and shared the information with the other panel members.  The Board subsequently imposed a much-reduced sanction than what was sought by the State.  After the administrative law judge twice denied the State’s motions for mistrial, the parties filed appeals with the chancery court.  Upon review, the trial court determined that the procedural errors in the record, including the introduction of extrinsic prejudicial information, constituted an abuse of discretion that affected the merits of the Board’s decision.  The court reversed and remanded the matter for a new contested case hearing to be heard before and deliberated by a different Board panel.  We affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, Yolanda Tucker, pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated assault,1 a Class C felony, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-102, in Shelby County Criminal Court. Following the Defendant’s testimony at her guilty plea hearing, the trial court denied her request for judicial diversion and imposed a sentence of three years to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court committed plain error in denying her statutory right to allocution and requiring her to testify under oath in order to request judicial diversion, and that (2) the trial court erred in failing to adequately explain its reasoning for denying the Defendant’s application for judicial diversion. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mother challenges the trial court’s granting of father’s petition to modify the residential parenting schedule to give him equal residential parenting time. She argues that the father failed to establish a material change in circumstances affecting the child’s well-being in a meaningful way. We have determined that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings that there was a material change of circumstances under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(C) and that modification of the parenting schedule was in the best interest of the child.    

Napoleon Emmanuale Person, Defendant, appeals from the trial court’s judgment revoking his probation and placing his original sentences into effect. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Following the trial court’s denial of interlocutory appeals pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State sought extraordinary appeals pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure in the above cases, which this court granted and consolidated. On appeal, the State contends that the trial court abused its discretion in disqualifying the District Attorney General’s Office for the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District after finding that Derek T. Grooms and Allen Hatley were defendants in cases prosecuted by this district attorney’s office but were also victims in other cases prosecuted by this office. After review, we reverse the orders of the trial court and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

The Petitioner, Zakkawanda Zawumba Moss, appeals the Lincoln County Circuit Court’s denial of his post-conviction petition, seeking relief from his six convictions of first degree premediated murder and six consecutive life sentences. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that we should remand the case to the post-conviction court in order to provide the Petitioner an opportunity to present additional proof in support of his petition. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we disagree with the Petitioner and affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

Appellant prison inmate appeals the dismissal of his petition for a writ of certiorari. On appeal, Appellant asserts that the board failed to comply with the Uniform Disciplinary Procedure in imposing discipline in this case. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the appellant relief, we affirm. 

While I concur with the end result reached by the majority in this case, I write separately to note my disagreement with the the majority’s suggestion that the split of authority surrounding In re Amynn K., No. E2017-01866-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 3058280 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018) and In re Ayden S., No. M2017-01185-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 2447044 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2018), has been fully resolved in favor of In re Amynn K. See, e.g., In re Allyson P., No. E2019-01606-COA-R3-PT, 2020 WL 3317318, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 17, 2020) (following In re Ayden S. and reversing the trial court’s decision to terminate a mother’s parental rights based upon this ground when the proof showed that mother was unable to assume custody of her child but was not unwilling). As I perceive it, this split remains clear and irreconcilable.

This appeal concerns a noncompetition agreement. The Total Garage Store, LLC (“TGS”) sued former employee Nicholas C. Moody (“Moody”) in the Chancery Court for Montgomery County (“the Trial Court”). TGS alleged that Moody violated his noncompetition agreement (“the Agreement”). At the end of a hearing on TGS’s motion for a temporary injunction held 35 days after suit was filed, the Trial Court invoked Tenn. R. Civ. P. 65.04(7) to declare that the hearing was on the merits of the case, not just the injunction. The Trial Court found the Agreement enforceable and entered an injunction order. Later, TGS filed a motion for contempt against Moody alleging that he violated the order. After a hearing, the Trial Court found Moody guilty of six counts of criminal contempt. The Trial Court also awarded damages to TGS. Moody appeals. Because the record does not reflect that Moody received adequate notice that the injunction hearing also would be on the merits, we vacate the Trial Court’s judgment as it pertains to Moody’s alleged violation of the Agreement. However, this does not and did not entitle Moody to ignore the temporary injunction, and we affirm the Trial Court in its finding Moody guilty of criminal contempt. We therefore affirm, in part, and vacate, in part, the Trial Court’s judgment, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

This case arises from a breach of contract dispute involving the construction of two storage buildings. Among other issues is whether Appellee’s actions were “unfair or deceptive” pursuant to the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court ultimately found that there was a breach of contract, but that Appellee’s actions were not deceptive and dismissed the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claim. Appellant now appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his claim under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.