APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves retrospective insurance premiums for an assigned risk workers’ compensation insurance policy. The insured employer is a roofing contractor. The insurance company conducted a retrospective premium audit and determined that the roofing contractor owed retrospective premiums based on the fact that its primary subcontractor was uninsured during a portion of the policy period. The roofing contractor refused to pay the increased premium, so the insurance company canceled the insurance policy. The roofing contractor filed this lawsuit against the insurance company, alleging negligence, promissory estoppel, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The insurance company filed a counterclaim for the unpaid balance owed for the premiums under the policy. The insurance company filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims asserted by the roofing contractor and on its own counterclaim. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, dismissed the claims asserted by the roofing company, and entered judgment in favor of the insurance company and against the roofing contractor for $66,212 plus prejudgment interest. However, the trial court denied the insurance company’s subsequent motion to enforce the judgment against the two individuals who operated the roofing company and served as the sole officers and shareholders of the corporation. Both parties raise issues on appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the chancery court in part, we reverse in part, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Appellant sought a prescriptive easement over an existing road across Appellees’ property. The trial court granted Appellees’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02(2) motion for involuntary dismissal at the close of Appellant’s proof and held that Appellant’s occasional use of the road to access his property for hunting purposes did not satisfy his burden of proof to establish an easement by prescription. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Marlon William Cotham, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to nine years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction, and the trial court erred in imposing a sentence of nine years. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Curtis Reed Hosendove, pleaded guilty as a Range II, multiple offender to making a false report, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-16-502 (2018). Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant received a four-year sentence, and the trial court was to determine the manner of service. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the court committed reversible error by receiving evidence in the form victim impact statements. Although we conclude that the victim impact statements were irrelevant to the Defendant’s conviction for making false report, the error was harmless. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Billy Mack Jones, appeals his Dyer County Circuit Court jury conviction of facilitating the sale of a Schedule II substance, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator. Because the record is insufficient to facilitate our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jason Doty, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury in count one for aggravated child abuse and in count two for “aggravated child neglect or endangerment” based on injuries that occurred to his three-month-old son. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of the lesser offense of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony, in count one and the indicted offense of “aggravated child neglect or endangerment,” a Class A felony, in count two. After merging the reckless aggravated assault conviction into the aggravated child neglect or endangerment conviction, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-five years at 85 percent in the Department of Correction. The Defendant raises the following five issues on appeal: (1) Whether the trial court issued incomplete and misleading jury instructions that violated his constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict; (2) Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction; (3) Whether the trial court erred by not allowing the Defendant to cross-examine the State’s child abuse medical expert about a prior dependency and neglect case involving the victim in which a juvenile court magistrate had found the expert’s opinion less credible than the opinion of the opposing expert witness; (4) Whether the jury’s verdicts finding the Defendant guilty of both reckless aggravated assault and aggravated child neglect are mutually exclusive; and (5) Whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we conclude that the conviction in count two must be reversed and remanded for a new trial because the Defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict was violated. The Defendant’s conviction for reckless aggravated assault is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Raymond Denton, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, seeking relief from his convictions of aggravated rape, aggravated burglary, and physical abuse of an impaired person and resulting effective ninety-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner claims that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to obtain an expert to rebut the State’s expert regarding penetration; failed to object to medical opinions given by the victim’s granddaughter, who was not an expert; and failed to object to the prosecutors’ improper closing arguments. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, James Bennett, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of theft of property over $10,000, a Class C felony, and was sentenced to seven years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his prior bad acts, and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Danny Jay Branam, Jr., appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Petitioner, Kenneth Cole, appeals from the Tipton County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty plea conviction for violation of the sex offender registry and his six-year, Range III sentence. He contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying his claim that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel in the conviction proceedings. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this post-conviction appeal, we clarify the appropriate standard to be applied when a criminal defendant claims ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to file a timely motion for new trial. The petitioner, Antonio Howard, was convicted of several offenses, including aggravated rape, especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault. Following the conviction and sentencing, the petitioner’s trial counsel admittedly failed to file a timely motion for new trial. Consequently, the petitioner was found to have waived several issues on direct appeal. The petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief claiming, among other things, that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely motion for new trial. However, the post-conviction court denied his request, concluding that trial counsel was deficient but that the petitioner was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s deficiency. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the post-conviction court that counsel was deficient for failing to file a timely motion for new trial but, relying on Wallace v. State, 121 S.W.3d 652, 658 (Tenn. 2003), held that the petitioner was presumptively prejudiced by the deficiency. The intermediate appellate court, therefore, concluded that the petitioner was entitled to post-conviction relief in the form of a delayed appeal. We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal to address whether the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly determined that the petitioner was presumptively prejudiced under these circumstances. We conclude that trial counsel’s failure to file a timely motion for new trial does not require a presumption of prejudice, overruling this Court’s previous decision in Wallace. We have determined, therefore, that the post-conviction court properly considered whether the petitioner was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s deficiency, and we find no error in the post-conviction court’s conclusion that he was not. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the post-conviction court denying
post-conviction relief.

The Appellant, Shannon Daniels, appeals the Campbell County Criminal Court’s revocation of her probation and ordering that she serve the balance of her effective ten-year sentence in confinement. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant grocery store appeals a jury verdict against it after a shopper fell in its store while operating a three-wheeled cart. The grocery store argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for directed verdict, in granting summary judgment to a third-party defendant, and in not granting a new trial or remittitur of the substantial verdict. Because the grocery store has not met its burden to show reversible error, we affirm.

Following the denial of his motion to suppress, the Defendant, David Rivera, entered a guilty plea to driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), fourth offense, but properly reserved, in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A), a certified question of law regarding the legality of his traffic stop. Because the Defendant’s traffic stop was supported by probable cause, or at a minimum, reasonable suspicion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Knox County jury convicted the defendant, Tony Lynn Nix, of aggravated robbery, and the trial court imposed a sentence of nine years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction and requests plain error review of improper statements by the prosecutor. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a premises liability action arising from an injury suffered by a guest who slipped on ice in the parking lot of a hotel.  The plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant.  Upon a thorough review of the record, we conclude that there is no dispute of material fact and that summary judgment in favor of the defendant was properly granted; accordingly, we affirm.

The Davidson County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner, Jarrett A. Jones, on one count of sexual exploitation of a minor (over 100 images) and thirty-four counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, all Class B felonies. Petitioner pled guilty as a Range I offender to one count of sexual exploitation of a minor (over 100 images) and two counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. All other counts were dismissed based upon his guilty plea. The trial court sentenced Petitioner, pursuant to the plea agreement, to eight years at 100% on each count and ordered the sentences to run consecutively, for a total effective sentence of twenty-four years’ incarceration. Petitioner timely filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, and the post-conviction court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief in a written order. On appeal, Petitioner argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not entered into knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Lonnie Duane Orr, appeals from the trial court’s community corrections revocation for his eight-year, Range III sentence for his conviction of burglary. He contends that the court erred in revoking his community corrections sentence and ordering him to serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case concerns a municipality’s attempt to restrict the persons who are able to collect and dispose of construction waste within its city limits. In relevant part, the municipality generally prohibits persons from collecting and disposing of waste accumulated within its borders. That task is reserved, subject to certain exceptions, to the municipality, who has entered into an exclusive contract with a corporate entity for waste disposal. The Appellants herein are a waste disposal services company and its managing member. The managing member was cited individually in the municipality’s Environmental Court for unauthorized refuse and trash disposal, and he was found to be in violation of the municipal ordinance. A de novo appeal was thereafter taken to the Circuit Court, where the waste disposal services company became a participating party. Among other things, the waste disposal services company asserted that the municipality’s effort to circumscribe waste collection was a violation of the Tennessee Constitution’s anti-monopoly and equal protection provisions. These constitutional claims were dismissed at summary judgment. In addition to its asserted constitutional claims, the waste disposal services company averred that certain of the City’s municipal ordinances provided it with authority to conduct its operations. Following a later hearing, the Circuit Court declined to issue any fines but nonetheless enjoined the waste disposal services company from further removal of waste when it was not the actual producer of waste. Several issues are now raised for our review on appeal. For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed, and the injunction is vacated.

The petitioner, Kane Stackhouse, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2008 Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. In this appeal, the petitioner claims, as he did below, that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm. 

The defendant, Darius Patterson, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping, possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more but less than 15 grams of heroin, possession with intent to sell or deliver 26 grams or more of cocaine, simple possession of marijuana, evading arrest, unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony after having been previously convicted of a felony, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the sentencing decision of the trial court. We discern no error in the proceedings below, and, as a result, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal, pursuant to the de novo standard as required under Rule 10B, § 2.01, we reverse the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal and remand with instructions for another judge to be designated to preside over this case.

The Defendant, Catherine Ann Pinhal, was convicted upon her 2019 guilty pleas of vehicular homicide by reckless conduct, a Class C felony, and two counts of possession of contraband in a penal facility, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-213 (2019) (vehicular homicide); 39-16-201 (2019) (possession of contraband). The length and manner of service of her sentence were reserved for the trial court’s determination. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed six years for the vehicular homicide conviction and four years for each possession of contraband in a penal facility conviction. The court, likewise imposed partial consecutive service, for an effective ten-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying her request for alternative sentencing and by imposing consecutive service. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Monqueze L. Summers, Defendant, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 in which he argued that his life sentence was illegal. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a divorce action. During the trial court proceedings, the parties agreed on a distribution of a majority of the marital property. However, a hearing was necessary concerning missing gold and silver that had been purchased during the marriage. The Trial Court found Husband not to be a credible witness. The Trial Court further found that the gold existed, that Husband had control of the safe room where the gold was located, and that Husband was responsible for the gold being missing. Husband appeals the Trial Court’s judgment to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm.