APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The matters currently pending before this Court are a Petition to Rehear filed by Appellant Hooker, Appellees' Motion for Clarification and Appellees' Motion to Supplement the Record filed by the Attorney General, Petition on behalf of Holly K. Lillard and Jerry L. Smith to Intervene for the Limited Purpose of Responding to Appellees' Motion for Clarification, Petition for Rehearing and Motion to Supplement the Record filed by appellant Laska, Appellees' Petition to Rehear filed by the Attorney General and Motion of Penny J. White to Intervene.

I agree that the trial court's judgment should be affirmed. I join in Judge Tipton's concurring opinion because I believe that this record is adequate for our full appellate review. I am of the opinion that the procedures outlined in State v. Winsett, 882 S.W.2d 806 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) have been followed.

At the oral argument in this matter on July 5, 1996, an amicus curiae brief was filed by John King, who purports to be the Tennessee Republican party's nominee for the Supreme Court vacancy at issue in these cases. Verbal permission was granted by the Court at the July 5 hearing for the filing of additional briefs no later than Monday, July 8, 1996. Yesterday, in accordance with the Court's deadline, Mr. King filed a supplemental amicus curiae brief in this matter, asserting that this Court had erred in denying him the equitable relief granted to Justice Penny White and Appellant Lewis Laska. Mr. King does not assert that it was inappropriate for this Court to fashion the equitable relief granted; he “. . . simply asserts that, under the circumstances he is also entitled to an equitable remedy in the form of an extension of the qualifying deadline for nominees of a party to the same extent extended for Justice White and Mr. Laska.” (Supplemental Amicus Curiae Brief of John K. King, page 5.) Because of the pressing nature of this matter, the Court made its ruling and entered an Order on July 5, 1996 within a few hours after oral argument, to be followed by an opinion. Although none of the parties had called T.C.A. § 17-1-301 to the Court's attention, in the course of researching the law and preparing to write its opinion over the weekend, the Court reviewed the provisions of T.C.A. § 17-1-301, which make it clear that the Supreme Court vacancy at issue in this case must be filled from the Eastern Grand Division of Tennessee. This effectively mooted the issue of Appellant Laska's residence in the Western Grand Division. On Monday, July 8, 1996, this Court issued its Order vacating its remand to the Chancellor for a ruling as to Mr. Laska's residence vel non in the Western District and denying Mr. Laska’s request for mandamus on grounds that he lacked standing to become a candidate.

This is a suit by Scott McCluen, County Attorney for Roane County, against The Roane County Times, Inc., D/B/A The Standard, and its owner and publisher Gerald Largen, seeking damages for libel incident to two separate publications in The Standard.

This current litigation is what we shall call economic fallout from an earlier domestic relations case. Linda Ann Carlton (“plaintiff”) filed suit for divorce in 1990 from James Thomas Carlton (“defendant”) in the Chancery Court of Haywood County. In October 1991, the chancellor granted plaintiff a divorce from defendant on the grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment, awarded joint custody of the parties’ 28 year-old handicapped daughter, Donna, with the principal place of residence with plaintiff, divided the parties’ marital property, and awarded rehabilitative alimony and attorney’s fees to plaintiff. Defendant appealed to this court. The primary issues presented on appeal related to the custody of the parties’ daughter, the division of marital property, and the award of rehabilitative alimony and attorney’s fees to plaintiff. The record reflects that the marital property was valued in excess of two million dollars ($2,000,000), with defendant and plaintiff receiving slightly over one million dollars ($1,000,000) each as a result of the chancellor’s decree.

The appellant, Timmy L. Laster, entered pleas of guilty to three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, a class A felony, two counts of aggravated assault, a class C felony, and one count of aggravated burglary, a class C felony. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-two years for each of the three especially aggravated kidnappings in case number 55799; one of the sentences is to run consecutively to the others, for an effective total of forty-four years. He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent six year sentences for the aggravated assault and the aggravated burglary in case number 55800, and to six years for the aggravated assault in case number 55801.2 The six-year sentence for the aggravated burglary in case number 55800 is to run consecutively to the sentences in case number 55799. The total
effective sentence is fifty-six years in the Department of Correction.

On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court applied an improper enhancement factor, failed to apply appropriate mitigating factors, and erroneously imposed consecutive sentences. He also argues that the trial court’s failure to apply the purposes and principles of sentencing resulted in a sentence that was not reasonably related to the seriousness of the offenses. We find no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

On May 23, 1994, this Court affirmed petitioner's conviction for first-degree murder and remanded the cause for resentencing. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a timely petition pursuant to Rule 30, Tenn. R. App. P. for a rehearing.  We grant the petition to rehear and remand the cause to the trial court for the conduct of a sentencing hearing consonant with our holidng in State v. Richard Odom.

James E. Simons and Margaret B. Simons (“plaintiffs”) filed suit in the Chancery Court of Madison County against Herbert H. Replogle, Jr. (“defendant”) for the purpose of establishing a common boundary line between the parties. Following a bench trial the chancellor established the parties’ common boundary line based on the calls in defendant’s deed. On appeal plaintiffs have presented one issue for our review: whether the evidence preponderates against the chancellor’s finding. In our opinion, the chancellor did err and we accordingly reverse.