APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion. I write separately, though, to express my strong belief that the appellant’s conduct in this case is free of any blame, given the context of the question in issue. In this respect, whether I or anyone else would have found a more circumspect way to prove the point or make a record is largely irrelevant. Likewise, whether all the evidence -- viewed in hindsight -- actually proved the points sought to be proved relative to the appellant’s question is largely irrelevant.

This is an action by Appellee, Dodson Roberts(Roberts), to recover the compensation allegedly due him from his former employer, the appellant, National Safety Associates, Inc. (NSA).

In this medical malpractice action, Plaintiff-Appellant, Jeannie Farrow (“Farrow” or “Plaintiff”), appeals the trial court’s judgment granting the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant-Appellee, Warren G. Reed (“Dr. Reed” or “Defendant”).

In this medical malpractice action, Plaintiff-Appellant, Jeannie Farrow (“Farrow” or “Plaintiff”), appeals the trial court’s judgment granting the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant-Appellee, Warren G. Reed (“Dr. Reed” or “Defendant”).

This case presents the question of whether the plaintiff, attorney Frank White,may recover attorney’s fees from the estate of Kasper McGrory. This broad question may, in turn, be divided into two specific subissues: (1) whether the contingency fee contract between White and McGrory is “clearly excessive” under Disciplinary Rule 2-106 of the Code of Professiona Responsibility, Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, and is, thus, unenforceable; and (2) if the contingency fee contract is unenforceable, whether White may, nevertheless, recover attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the contract is unenforceable and that White is not entitled to recover under the theory of quantum meruit. Because the probate court and the Court of Appeals held that White could not recover under the contract, but could recover on a quantum meruit basis, we reverse the latter part of the judgment.

This case presents for review the right of a child born out of wedlock to  inherit from his natural father who died prior to the amendment of Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-2-105(a)(2)(B) (Supp. 1995) in 1978. The record supports the finding of paternity, but the claimant failed to establish the right to inherit as required by the statute; however, the appellant is estopped to deny the claimant's asserted interest in the decedent father's real property.

This case presents for review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming an award of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs' suit charging the breach by a  majority shareh older of a fiduciary duty owed to minority shareholders is barred by the o ne year statute of limitations. This Cou rt concludes that the applicable period of limitations is three years and remands the case to the trial court to determine whether plaintiffs' action was time-barred.

In this retaliatory discharge action, the plaintiff, Geneva Coffey, appeals fromtwo aspects of the Court of Appeals’ judgment: (1) its suggested remittance of the punitive damage award from $500,000 to $150,000; and (2) its disallowance of the $20,000 in “front pay” awarded by the trial court. After a careful consideration of the law and the record in this case, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in both respects. Therefore, we reverse that court’s judgment, and reinstate, in its entirety, the judgment rendered by the trial court.
 

Plaintiff Shirley Moore, on her own behalf and on behalf of her deceased son, Tracy W. Moore, appeals the trial court’s order granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Appellee Haulers Insurance Company, Moore’s uninsured motorist carrier. In granting the motion, the trial court ruled that the automobile insurance policy issued by Haulers did not cover Moore’s claim because Moore failed to give prompt notice of the claim to Haulers as required by the policy provisions. We affirm.