APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a suit by Scott McCluen, County Attorney for Roane County, against The Roane County Times, Inc., D/B/A The Standard, and its owner and publisher Gerald Largen, seeking damages for libel incident to two separate publications in The Standard.

This current litigation is what we shall call economic fallout from an earlier domestic relations case. Linda Ann Carlton (“plaintiff”) filed suit for divorce in 1990 from James Thomas Carlton (“defendant”) in the Chancery Court of Haywood County. In October 1991, the chancellor granted plaintiff a divorce from defendant on the grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment, awarded joint custody of the parties’ 28 year-old handicapped daughter, Donna, with the principal place of residence with plaintiff, divided the parties’ marital property, and awarded rehabilitative alimony and attorney’s fees to plaintiff. Defendant appealed to this court. The primary issues presented on appeal related to the custody of the parties’ daughter, the division of marital property, and the award of rehabilitative alimony and attorney’s fees to plaintiff. The record reflects that the marital property was valued in excess of two million dollars ($2,000,000), with defendant and plaintiff receiving slightly over one million dollars ($1,000,000) each as a result of the chancellor’s decree.

At the oral argument in this matter on July 5, 1996, an amicus curiae brief was filed by John King, who purports to be the Tennessee Republican party's nominee for the Supreme Court vacancy at issue in these cases. Verbal permission was granted by the Court at the July 5 hearing for the filing of additional briefs no later than Monday, July 8, 1996. Yesterday, in accordance with the Court's deadline, Mr. King filed a supplemental amicus curiae brief in this matter, asserting that this Court had erred in denying him the equitable relief granted to Justice Penny White and Appellant Lewis Laska. Mr. King does not assert that it was inappropriate for this Court to fashion the equitable relief granted; he “. . . simply asserts that, under the circumstances he is also entitled to an equitable remedy in the form of an extension of the qualifying deadline for nominees of a party to the same extent extended for Justice White and Mr. Laska.” (Supplemental Amicus Curiae Brief of John K. King, page 5.) Because of the pressing nature of this matter, the Court made its ruling and entered an Order on July 5, 1996 within a few hours after oral argument, to be followed by an opinion. Although none of the parties had called T.C.A. § 17-1-301 to the Court's attention, in the course of researching the law and preparing to write its opinion over the weekend, the Court reviewed the provisions of T.C.A. § 17-1-301, which make it clear that the Supreme Court vacancy at issue in this case must be filled from the Eastern Grand Division of Tennessee. This effectively mooted the issue of Appellant Laska's residence in the Western Grand Division. On Monday, July 8, 1996, this Court issued its Order vacating its remand to the Chancellor for a ruling as to Mr. Laska's residence vel non in the Western District and denying Mr. Laska’s request for mandamus on grounds that he lacked standing to become a candidate.

The appellant, Timmy L. Laster, entered pleas of guilty to three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, a class A felony, two counts of aggravated assault, a class C felony, and one count of aggravated burglary, a class C felony. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-two years for each of the three especially aggravated kidnappings in case number 55799; one of the sentences is to run consecutively to the others, for an effective total of forty-four years. He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent six year sentences for the aggravated assault and the aggravated burglary in case number 55800, and to six years for the aggravated assault in case number 55801.2 The six-year sentence for the aggravated burglary in case number 55800 is to run consecutively to the sentences in case number 55799. The total
effective sentence is fifty-six years in the Department of Correction.

On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court applied an improper enhancement factor, failed to apply appropriate mitigating factors, and erroneously imposed consecutive sentences. He also argues that the trial court’s failure to apply the purposes and principles of sentencing resulted in a sentence that was not reasonably related to the seriousness of the offenses. We find no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I agree that the trial court's judgment should be affirmed. I join in Judge Tipton's concurring opinion because I believe that this record is adequate for our full appellate review. I am of the opinion that the procedures outlined in State v. Winsett, 882 S.W.2d 806 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) have been followed.

On May 23, 1994, this Court affirmed petitioner's conviction for first-degree murder and remanded the cause for resentencing. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a timely petition pursuant to Rule 30, Tenn. R. App. P. for a rehearing.  We grant the petition to rehear and remand the cause to the trial court for the conduct of a sentencing hearing consonant with our holidng in State v. Richard Odom.

James E. Simons and Margaret B. Simons (“plaintiffs”) filed suit in the Chancery Court of Madison County against Herbert H. Replogle, Jr. (“defendant”) for the purpose of establishing a common boundary line between the parties. Following a bench trial the chancellor established the parties’ common boundary line based on the calls in defendant’s deed. On appeal plaintiffs have presented one issue for our review: whether the evidence preponderates against the chancellor’s finding. In our opinion, the chancellor did err and we accordingly reverse.

The appellant, Danny A. Blankenship, doing business as Danny Blankenship Bonding Company, sought permission from the trial court to write bail bonds in Sumner County. The proposed resident representative of the company in Sumner County was the appellant, Glen M. Davis. In the event Davis was not available to write a bond, the proposed substitute was Richard L. Gregory, an employee of the bonding company and also an appellant in this case. The trial court denied the application because Blankenship did not possess sufficient personal assets to support his company’s writing of bail bonds in the general sessions and criminal courts of Sumner County. The appellants appeal as of right from this judgment. Since the evidence supports the findings made by the trial court, the judgment is affirmed.

Appellant, Bobby Love, was convicted in Maury County Circuit Court of the crime of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, by a jury. The trial court found that appellant was a standard offender and imposed a Range I sentence of confinement for six years in the Department of Correction and ordered restitution to the victim.

These cases were heard before the Special Supreme Court on an expedited basis on
July 5, 1996. Due to the fact that our decision in these consolidated cases will affect the election which is set for August 1, 1996, the Court is issuing this Order today, with a more detailed Opinion to follow.

The Court finds as follows:
1. The statutory scheme for judicial selection and evaluation, popularly known as “The
Tennessee Plan”, T.C.A. Section 17-4-101 et seq. does not violate the Tennessee Constitution. State v. Dunn, 496 S.W. 2d 480 (Tenn. 1973).
2. Under the provisions of T.C.A. Section 17-4-114 (c), the Tennessee Plan is not applicable
unless the judicial evaluation commission recommends the retention of a judge. In the forthcoming judicial election, the judicial evaluation commission was not yet fully operational and, through no fault of Justice White, it did not act to recommend her retention as a Supreme Court Justice. Accordingly, the provisions of the Tennessee Plan are not applicable to the election to be held on August 1, 1996, and under T.C.A. Section 17-4-114(c), a political party may nominate a candidate, and independent candidates may qualify under the general election law for the general election which is the regular August election.
3. In accordance with the provisions of T.C.A. Section 2-5-101, independent and primary
candidates should have qualified for the upcoming August 1, 1996, election by filing all nominating petitions no later than twelve o’clock noon, May 16, 1996. Appellants Laska and Hooker attempted to obtain such petitions from Defendant Appellee Thompson, but were unsuccessful in their efforts because of an erroneous interpretation of the law to the effect that Justice Penny White was running unopposed in a “retention election” under the Tennessee Plan.
4. Appellants Hooker and Laska have made good faith efforts to qualify for the upcoming election. Similarly, Justice White has acted in good faith in declaring her candidacy for the Supreme Court.
5. At all times relevant to this Court’s decision, Appellant Hooker lacked the qualifications necessary under T.C.A. Section 2-5-106 to qualify for the office of Supreme Court Justice in the August 1, 1996, election, because Appellant Hooker’s law license was suspended as a result of his failure to meet continuing legal education requirements.
6. The Defendants have raised an issue as to the residency of Appellant Laska, who has
attempted to qualify as a candidate for the Western Grand Division of this State. Considerable proof regarding whether Mr. Laska is a bona fide resident of the Western Grand Division was offered at the Chancery Court hearing on this matter, but the Chancellor did not make a ruling as to Mr. Laska’s residency.

The determinative issue on appeal is whether the appeal should be dismissed because the appellant did not file notice of the appeal with the clerk of the appellate court designated in the notice of appeal.

The Probate Court of Putnam County dismissed a claim against the estate of Rupert O. Newman because the claimant lacked standing to make the claim. We affirm.

While I concede tha the majority opinion is technically correct and the reasoning employed comports with previous case law, I observe that this Court, or at least this member of this Court, has routinely overruled such motions when the only defect as to the serviceof thenotice of appeal is failure to file a copy with the Clerk of this Court.