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| 01A01-9603-CH-00099
01A01-9603-CH-00099
Originating Judge:Robert S. Brandt |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 06/26/96 | |
| Margaret Danmole v. Charles L. Wright
01A01-9512-CV-00565
Defendant, Charles L. Wright, has appealed from the judgment of the trial court entered on the jury's verdict for plaintiff, Margaret Danmole. The jury awarded plaintiff $17,000.00 for her injuries and damages sustained as the result of an automobile accident. In the instant case, we find no evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. Moreover, there is not even a scintilla of evidence in this record that the jury which tried this case was anything other than fair and impartial. Therefore, it results that the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further necessary proceedings.
Authoring Judge: Judge Samuel L. Lewis
Originating Judge:Judge Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr. |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 06/26/96 | |
| 01A01-9512-CH-00571
01A01-9512-CH-00571
Originating Judge:Tom E. Gray |
Sumner County | Court of Appeals | 06/26/96 | |
| Brenda Gail Ward v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company
03S01-9509-CH-00109
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer's insurer contends the evidence preponderates against the award of permanent disability benefits. The panel concludes the judgment should be reversed and the cased dismissed. The only issue litigated at trial was the extent of the claimant's permanent disability, if any. On February 19, 1993, the employee or claimant, Brenda Gail Ward, was sweeping a floor for her employer, United Parcel Service, when she suddenly slipped and fell, injuring her back, neck and shoulder. On April 7, 1993, she visited Dr. David Hauge, who treated her until January 26, 1994. Dr. Hauge diagnosed chronic degenerative changes unrelated to the above accident. His diagnosis was confirmed by an MRI of the spine. He found no evidence of an acute injury, except some muscle spasm which was resolved with physical therapy. He estimated her permanent impairment from her degenerative changes at nine percent to the whole body, but provided no proof of medical causal connection to the work-related accident. Approximately two years after the accident, the claimant was evaluated by Dr. William E. Kennedy, who found no permanent anatomical injury or change as a result of the work-related accident, but assessed her permanent impairment from her subjective complaints of pain at eight percent to the whole person. A vocational expert, Norman Hankins, estimated her industrial disability at between thirty-four and sixty-one percent, depending on her physical restrictions. The chancellor awarded permanent partial disability benefits based on forty-five percent to the body as a whole. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of the trial court, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2). This tribunal is required to conduct an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Billy Joe White, |
Campbell County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/25/96 | |
| Joseph Jarreau v. Vanliner Insurance Company
01S01-9512-CH-00228
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This appeal presents the questions whether and under what circumstances, if any, an injured worker may give up his right to future medical expenses. The panel concludes the trial court's judgment, approving a settlement in which the right to future medical expenses was voluntarily surrendered for consideration, should be affirmed. The employee or claimant, Jarreau, commenced this civil action by filing a complaint for workers' compensation benefits, averring that he had suffered an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment by Ozark Motor Lines, Inc. The complaint further averred, in relevant part, that his injury had been diagnosed as a tear of the left medial meniscus, that he had reached maximum medical recovery and would retain a permanent impairment but that there was a genuine dispute as to the extent of his permanent disability. He sought to recover medical and permanent partial disability benefits. Vanliner Insurance Company served its answer admitting it was the insurer for Ozark, but denying that the claimant had suffered a compensable injury or that he was permanently disabled. On September 8, 1994, before the case could be tried, the claimant and his attorney and the attorney for Vanliner appeared before Judge Capers seeking approval of a negotiated settlement. By the settlement terms, the claimant was to receive $25,459.2, representing a permanent partial disability of forty percent to the left leg, and an additional $9,54.8 in consideration of the claimant's relinquishment of any claim for future medical benefits, for a total of $35,.. Additionally, the claimant had already received $15,481.3 in medical benefits and $12,481.3 in temporary total disability benefits. We find in the record no transcript of the settlement hearing, but Judge Capers found that Dr. Robert V. Russell had opined the claimant had reached maximum medical improvement and would retain a permanent anatomical impairment of ten percent to the leg. The judge further found the settlement to be in the best interest of the claimant, "in light of the controversy and dispute between the parties." The agreement was approved as a full, final and complete settlement of Mr. Jarreau's claim against the employer and its insurer. Almost eight months later, on April 28, 1995, the claimant applied to the court, per Tenn. R. Civ. P. 6.2, for an order setting aside the settlement 2
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Originating Judge:Hon. Bobby Capers, |
Wilson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/25/96 | |
| Wade v. Davies
03C01-9509-CC-00260
Originating Judge:Mary Beth Leibowitz |
Knox County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/25/96 | |
| Anna Lue Mckamey v. Red Kap Industries
03S01-9505-CH-00053
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellant suffered a stroke while working on an assembly line. Substantial disability resulted, which she alleges is compensable as being accident- related. The trial judge disagreed, and she appeals. Our review is de novo, with the presumption that the judgment is correct unless the evidence otherwise preponderates. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Mrs. McKamey is 49 years old, with limited skills and education. Her assembly-line job involved the sewing of shirt collar stays, which may be fairly described as repetitive and monotonous. On May 12, 1992, while working the 7: a.m. to 3:3 p.m. shift, she suffered a stroke shortly before the end of her shift which resulted in total vocational disability. She alleges that, like all other employees, she was expected to make production, with its attendant pressures and tensions, which caused or contributed to the stroke. Causation is the dispositive issue. The proof revealed that Mrs. McKamey had been suffering from hypertension for years and had been regularly taking medication for that disease since 1988. She had smoked cigarettes since age 14; at the time of her stroke, she smoked more than twenty per day. Responding to a hypothetical question, Dr. John Purvis, a neurosurgeon, testified that the sewing of hundreds of collar stays during a regular shift could be a contributory factor to the cerebral accident, depending upon a resolution of certain factors, those being arteriosclerosis and hypertension, the former being aggravated or caused by smoking which "played a part" and contributed to her pre-existing condition. The inducing causes of her stroke was the rupture of a blood vessel. After reviewing a videotape of the assembly-line workers, Dr. Purvis testified as -2-
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Frank V. Williams, III |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/25/96 | |
| 03C01-9508-CC-00237
03C01-9508-CC-00237
|
Loudon County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/25/96 | |
| Debbie G. Farrow v. Phillips Consumer Electronics Company
03S01-9508-CV-00089
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employee or claimant, Farrow, contends the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that her injury did not arise out of her employment. The panel concludes that the judgment should be reversed and the case remanded for an award of benefits. On October 6, 1993, the claimant was injured while she was hurriedly walking from her work station to the cafeteria at the start of a ten minute break period. She had almost reached the stop of a stairway when she came down hard on her foot, injuring her knee. She suffered internal knee derangement, according to the operating surgeon. The trial judge found that the injury occurred in the course of employment, but did not arise out of the employment, as required. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2). Conclusions of law are subject to de novo review without any presumption of correctness. Presley v. Bennett, 86 S.W.2d 857 (Tenn. 1993). Generally, an injury arises out of employment if it has a rational causal connection to the work; and any reasonable doubt as to whether an injury arose out of the employment or not is to be resolved in favor of the employee. Hall v. Auburntown Industries, Inc., 684 S.W.2d 614 (Tenn. 1985); White v. Werthan Industries, 824 S.W.2d 158 (Tenn. 1992). Where an employee is injured on the employer's premises during a break period provided by the employer, such an injury is generally compensable. Wellington v. John Morrell and Co., 619 S.W.2d 116 (Tenn. 1981); Drew v. Tappan Co., 63 S.W.2d 624 (Tenn. 1982); Holder v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 723 S.W.2d 14 (Tenn. 1987). The rule is derived from the notion that an employer who directs or permits his employees to eat at a place provided for that purpose or otherwise within the premises, owes such employees the same duty of protection from danger there that it does at the place where the employees work. Johnson Coffee Co. v. McDonald, 143 Tenn. 55, 226 S.W. 215 (192). On the strength of those authorities, the panel finds that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding and in favor of a finding that the claimant's injury is compensable. The judgment of the trial court is accordingly reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for an award of benefits. Costs on appeal are taxed to the defendant-appellee. 2
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Wheeler Rosenbalm, |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/25/96 | |
| 01S01-9510-CC-00173
01S01-9510-CC-00173
Originating Judge:Donald P. Harris |
Supreme Court | 06/24/96 | ||
| 01S01-9412-FD-00155
01S01-9412-FD-00155
|
Supreme Court | 06/24/96 | ||
| 01S01-9601-CC-00022
01S01-9601-CC-00022
|
Supreme Court | 06/24/96 | ||
| 01S01-9601-CC-00022
01S01-9601-CC-00022
|
Supreme Court | 06/24/96 | ||
| 03C01-9506-CR-00181
03C01-9506-CR-00181
|
Hamilton County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/24/96 | |
| Gene v. Aaby,
03S02-9507-CH-00073
|
Supreme Court | 06/24/96 | ||
| State of Tennessee v. Maurice Lydell Purdy
W2000-00460-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Gary R Wade
Originating Judge:William B. Acree |
Obion County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/23/96 | |
| O1C01-9503-CC-00100
O1C01-9503-CC-00100
Originating Judge:W. Charles Lee |
Marshall County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/21/96 | |
| 03C01-9503-CR-00061
03C01-9503-CR-00061
Originating Judge:William R. Holt |
Cocke County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/21/96 | |
| The Petitioner, Relying In Part Upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-Cc-00267
02C01-9611-CC-00409
|
Lake County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/20/96 | |
| 1996. In The Present Appeal, The Petitioner, Relying In Part Upon State v. Roger Dale Hill,
02C01-9612-CC-00452
|
Lauderdale County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/20/96 | |
| Corbin B. Scroggins v. Kenneth Ray Ely
03S01-9510-CH-00121
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issue in this case is whether the trial judge erred in granting a summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's petition for workers' compensation benefits because there is no jurisdiction over this case in Tennessee. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The relevant facts in the case are simple. On or around May 17, 1991, the plaintiff learned that Ely's Trucking, a Knoxville company, had a possible opening for a driver. The plaintiff learned this from another driver, who lived, as did the plaintiff, in Nebraska. The plaintiff called Ely's Trucking Company from his home in Nebraska. Ray Ely, the owner of the trucking company, and plaintiff discussed plaintiff's desire to work for Ely. The plaintiff's testimony, taken by deposition, clearly shows Ely made an offer of employment to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff accepted the offer at his home in Nebraska, where he was when the discussion took place. There was no written contract of employment between the plaintiff and Ely. The only document signed by the parties was a listing of benefits the plaintiff had with Ely's Trucking. This was signed on May 21, 1991 in Knoxville. The injury of which the plaintiff complained did not occur in Tennessee. The Chancellor found there was no jurisdiction to try the case in Tennessee. The evidence supports this finding. There was no contract of employment entered into in Tennessee, nor was the employment principally localized within this state as required by TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-115 to give jurisdiction to this state. The contract was completed in Nebraska when the plaintiff accepted the employment offer from Ely. Tolley v. General Accident Fire & Life Ins. Corp., 584 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1979). We affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand the case thereto with costs assessed to the plaintiff. 2
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge John K. Byers
Originating Judge:Hon. Frederick D. Mcdonald |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/20/96 | |
| Petitioner, Relying In Part Upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-Cc-00267
02C01-9612-CC-00465
|
Lake County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/20/96 | |
| Eunice Irene Freeman v. Sportswear and Associates and Liberty Mutual Insurance
01S01-9511-CV-00193
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special 1 Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial judge found the plaintiff had suffered a 65% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole and entered judgment accordingly. The issues raised by the defendant are: 1) Whether the proof preponderates against the trial court's judgment as excessive. 2) Whether the trial court erred in holding that the plaintiff's award was not limited to two and a half times the medical impairment rating. 3) Whether the trial court erred in awarding the plaintiff a lump sum payment. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. There is no dispute that the plaintiff, who is 58 years of age, with a high school education, whose primary job was as a sewing machine operator, was injured in an industrial accident. Further, there is no dispute that the plaintiff sustained a permanent vocational impairment to the body as a whole. The plaintiff submitted the only medical evidence in this case. The physician testified that the plaintiff had sustained a 17% permanent medical impairment to the body as a whole. The plaintiff, her husband and a co-worker testified concerning the plaintiff's condition subsequent to the injury. Each of these witnesses testified to the limitations of the plaintiff's ability to perform work as a result of her injuries. Without question the plaintiff sustained a significant injury in this accident. The trial judge saw and heard the witnesses who testified in court and credited their testimony. Credibility of these witnesses is for the trial judge to find, and we do not, and can not, reweigh the credibility on appeal. On appeal, we review the judgment of the trial court with a presumption of correctness. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). We are required, however, to 2
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge John K. Byers
Originating Judge:Hon. Bobby Capers, |
Macon County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/20/96 | |
| Johnson Controls v. Shelby J. Cotham and Larry Brinton, Director, Second Injury Fund
01S01-9511-CV-00212
Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Donald P. Harris, |
Johnson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/20/96 | |
| Betty Jo Cleghorn v. Suburban Home Health, Inc.
01S01-9510-CH-00178
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special 1 Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court held that the plaintiff had not met her burden of proving that she sustained a permanent vocational disability as a result of her work-related injury. Plaintiff appeals, asserting that the evidence does not support the trial court's judgment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. No transcript of the evidence was filed. The evidence available for our review consists of the medical depositions offered in the trial court and their attendant exhibits. The medical evidence, taken as a whole, supports the judgment of the trial court. Our standard of review is de novo on the record accompanied by the presumption that the findings of fact by the trial court are correct. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(2) Where no transcript of the evidence is filed, the appellate courts will conclusively presume that every fact admissible under the pleadings was found in favor of the appellee. Wilson v. Hafley, 189 Tenn. 598, 226 S.W.2d 38, 311 (1949); Hollingsworth v. Safeco Ins. Cos., 782 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Tenn. App. 1989). Upon the record in this case, we can only find that the evidence does not preponderate against the judgment of the trial court. We affirm the judgment and the costs are taxed to the plaintiff/appellant. We remand the case to the trial court. John K. Byers, Senior Judge CONCUR: 2
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Claudia C. Bonnyman |
Davidson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/20/96 |