Gary Reatherford v. Lincoln Brass Works, Inc.
01S01-9504-CV-00058
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiff was doing construction work at the Lincoln Brass Works facility, moving the employee break room from one side of the building to another, when a nail flew into his right eye, requiring several surgical procedures and resulting in total permanent loss of vision in the eye. The trial judge found that he was a statutory employee of Lincoln Brass Works and held the company liable for 1 percent permanent disability to plaintiff's right eye. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The only issue before us is the status of the plaintiff for workers' compensation insurance purposes. The plaintiff contends, and the trial judge held, that he was a statutory employee and Lincoln Brass Works was a principal contractor (statutory employer) under TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-113. Lincoln Brass Works contends plaintiff was either an independent contractor or a casual employee. Under TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-113(a), "A principal, or intermediate contractor, or subcontractor shall be liable for compensation to any employee injured while in the employ of any of the subcontractors of the principal, intermediate contractor, or subcontractor and engaged upon the subject matter of the contract to the same extent as the immediate employer," (commonly referred to as a "statutory employer"). This court has consistently held that where a business enterprise undertakes to act as its own principal contractor and contracts directly with a subcontractor for various phases of construction on its own premises, the business enterprise is subject to liability imposed by the Workers' Compensation Act. Acklie v. Carrier, 785 S.W.2d 355 (Tenn. 199). Lincoln Brass asserts the construction workers were independent contractors rather than statutory employees under TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-113(a). The factors to be considered in determining whether a relationship to the principal was that of employee or independent contractor include: (1) the right to control the conduct of 2
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge John K. Byers
Originating Judge:Hon. William B. Cain |
Wayne County | Workers Compensation Panel | 05/17/96 | |
02C01-9508-CC-00227
02C01-9508-CC-00227
Originating Judge:John Franklin Murchison |
Madison County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 05/17/96 | |
02C01-9504-CC-00114
02C01-9504-CC-00114
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Madison County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 05/17/96 | |
Gary Reatherford v. Lincoln Brass Works, Inc.
01S01-9504-CV-00058
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiff was doing construction work at the Lincoln Brass Works facility, moving the employee break room from one side of the building to another, when a nail flew into his right eye, requiring several surgical procedures and resulting in total permanent loss of vision in the eye. The trial judge found that he was a statutory employee of Lincoln Brass Works and held the company liable for 1 percent permanent disability to plaintiff's right eye. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The only issue before us is the status of the plaintiff for workers' compensation insurance purposes. The plaintiff contends, and the trial judge held, that he was a statutory employee and Lincoln Brass Works was a principal contractor (statutory employer) under TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-113. Lincoln Brass Works contends plaintiff was either an independent contractor or a casual employee. Under TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-113(a), "A principal, or intermediate contractor, or subcontractor shall be liable for compensation to any employee injured while in the employ of any of the subcontractors of the principal, intermediate contractor, or subcontractor and engaged upon the subject matter of the contract to the same extent as the immediate employer," (commonly referred to as a "statutory employer"). This court has consistently held that where a business enterprise undertakes to act as its own principal contractor and contracts directly with a subcontractor for various phases of construction on its own premises, the business enterprise is subject to liability imposed by the Workers' Compensation Act. Acklie v. Carrier, 785 S.W.2d 355 (Tenn. 199). Lincoln Brass asserts the construction workers were independent contractors rather than statutory employees under TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-113(a). The factors to be considered in determining whether a relationship to the principal was that of employee or independent contractor include: (1) the right to control the conduct of 2
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge John K. Byers
Originating Judge:Hon. William B. Cain |
Wayne County | Workers Compensation Panel | 05/17/96 | |
02C01-9404-CC-00082
02C01-9404-CC-00082
Originating Judge:John Franklin Murchison |
Henderson County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 05/17/96 | |
01A01-9510-CH-00481
01A01-9510-CH-00481
Originating Judge:Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr. |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 05/17/96 | |
01A01-9601-CH-00030
01A01-9601-CH-00030
Originating Judge:Ellen Hobbs Lyle |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 05/17/96 | |
01C01-9506-CC-00166
01C01-9506-CC-00166
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Sequatchie County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 05/16/96 | |
02A01-9502-CH-00025
02A01-9502-CH-00025
Originating Judge:Dewey C. Whitenton |
Fayette County | Court of Appeals | 05/16/96 | |
01A01-9506-JV-00262
01A01-9506-JV-00262
Originating Judge:W. Nowlin Taylor |
Bedford County | Court of Appeals | 05/15/96 | |
01A01-9508-CH-00365
01A01-9508-CH-00365
Originating Judge:Allen W. Wallace |
Court of Appeals | 05/15/96 | ||
03A01-9509-CH-00318
03A01-9509-CH-00318
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Carter County | Court of Appeals | 05/14/96 | |
03S01-9502-CH-00018
03S01-9502-CH-00018
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Supreme Court | 05/13/96 | ||
01S01-9503-CC-00035
01S01-9503-CC-00035
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Supreme Court | 05/13/96 | ||
03S01-9502-CV-00015
03S01-9502-CV-00015
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Supreme Court | 05/13/96 | ||
03S01-9410-CR-00106
03S01-9410-CR-00106
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Supreme Court | 05/13/96 | ||
03S01-9508-CC-00096
03S01-9508-CC-00096
Originating Judge:Leon C. Burns, Jr. |
Supreme Court | 05/13/96 | ||
01C01-9704-CR-00129
01C01-9704-CR-00129
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Wilson County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 05/13/96 | |
03S01-9410-CR-00106
03S01-9410-CR-00106
Originating Judge:Douglas A. Meyer |
Supreme Court | 05/13/96 | ||
03S01-9508-CC-00096
03S01-9508-CC-00096
Originating Judge:Leon C. Burns, Jr. |
Supreme Court | 05/13/96 | ||
03S01-9501-CH-00008
03S01-9501-CH-00008
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Supreme Court | 05/13/96 | ||
03C01-9505-CR-0
03C01-9505-CR-0
Originating Judge:Frank L. Slaughter |
Sullivan County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 05/10/96 | |
03C01-9510-CC-00297
03C01-9510-CC-00297
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Blount County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 05/10/96 | |
Charles Steven Denbow, v. Sandra Kay Denbow
02A01-9410-CH-00238
This is a domestic relations case with an unusual twist. On May 3, 1994, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Chancery Court of Chester County seeking a divorce from defendant on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. At the same time, plaintiff filed a marital dissolution agreement (“agreement”) executed by the parties on May 2, 1994. The agreement provided that the parties would have joint custody of their two minor children, then ages 13 and 15, with the children residing with plaintiff. No child support was to be paid by either party. In addition, the agreement did not make any allowances for alimony and purported to divide the real and personal property between the parties. Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the time the parties executed the agreement, but defendant was not. Shortly thereafter, defendant employed counsel and on June 3, 1994, filed a motion to set aside the agreement. In her motion defendant contended that she was forced to sign the agreement under duress and fear of bodily harm. She also contended that the agreement did not adequately provide for the care and maintenance of the parties’ minor children or make an equitable settlement of the 2 parties’ property as required by T.C.A. § 36-4-103(b) (1991). Defendant’s motion asked the court to set the agreement aside and allow the parties to proceed with the divorce as if the agreement had never been executed.
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge Tomlin
Originating Judge:Judge Joe C. Morris |
Chester County | Court of Appeals | 05/09/96 | |
State of Tennessee v. Danny R. Morris - Dissenting
01C01-9506-CC-00206
I respectfully dissent.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Joe B. Jones
Originating Judge:Judge Allen W. Wallace |
Humphreys County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 05/09/96 |