APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

After a thirty year marriage,1 Waymon Frederic Axley (Husband) and Beverly Anne Mallette Axley (Wife) were divorced by final decree entered by the trial court in August 1994.2 This appeal concerns the trial court’s award to Wife of $1,500 per month as alimony in futuro and, as additional alimony, $177.62 per month for 36 consecutive months to continue Wife on Husband’s health insurance through his employer. Wife seeks an increase in the award as well as her attorney’s fees for services rendered in this appeal. She frames the issues as follows:

This is a domestic relations case with an unusual twist. On May 3, 1994, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Chancery Court of Chester County seeking a divorce from defendant on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. At the same time, plaintiff filed a marital dissolution agreement (“agreement”) executed by the parties on May 2, 1994. The agreement provided that the parties would have joint custody of their two minor children, then ages 13 and 15, with the children residing with plaintiff. No child support was to be paid by either party. In addition, the agreement did not make any allowances for alimony and purported to divide the real and personal property between the parties. Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the time the parties executed the agreement, but defendant was not. Shortly thereafter, defendant employed counsel and on June 3, 1994, filed a motion to set aside the agreement. In her motion defendant contended that she was forced to sign the agreement under duress and fear of bodily harm. She also contended that the agreement did not adequately provide for the care and maintenance of the parties’ minor children or make an equitable settlement of the 2 parties’ property as required by T.C.A. § 36-4-103(b) (1991). Defendant’s motion asked the court to set the agreement aside and allow the parties to proceed with the divorce as if the agreement had never been executed.

This matter arose out of a personal injury action brought against Fayette County 2 Board of Education by plaintiff, Joyce Ann Neal, as parent and next of kin of Brandon Neal, a minor. Brandon, age eleven, was injured while playing basketball when his finger became caught in the goal. Reasoning that the goal was neither dangerous nor defective and that Brandon caused his own injuries through his misuse of the goal, the trial court held in favor of the school board. On appeal, plaintiff contends that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's determination that the goal was not dangerous or defective. Plaintiff further alleges that the trial court erred in failing to find that the school board was negligent. For the reasons stated below, we find these contentions to be without merit; therefore, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The defendant, Danny R. Morris, was convicted at a jury trial of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to a term of confinement of twelve years in the Department of Correction.

This action was brought against Michael McCommon and Memphis Light, Gas, and 2 Water (MLG&W) for personal injuries sustained when McCommon, an employee of MLG&W, struck plaintiff with his vehicle. McCommon was dismissed from the suit prior to trial. Following a bench trial, the lower court held that plaintiff's negligence was greater than that of the defendant and that plaintiff proximately caused her own injuries. Because we do not find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's determination, we affirm the judgment dismissing plaintiff's case.

The Chancery Court of Davidson County dismissed the appellant’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari to review the Parole Board’s denial of parole. We affirm because we find that the petition in the lower court does not contain any  allegations which show that the Board acted illegally, arbitrarily, or in excess of its jurisdiction.

This is an appeal by petitioner, Harlan White, from the trial court’s order dismissing his petition for declaratory judgment on the ground that petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

This is an action for misrepresentations and inducement of breach of contract relating to the trial and settlement of a personal injury case. The original plaintiffs and a co-defendant have sued the other defendants for misrepresenting or concealing material facts which (1) induced the plaintiffs to settle their original claim for less than its worth, and (2) induced the defendants’ insurance company not to represent the other defendant. The Circuit Court of Putnam County granted summary judgment to the defendants. We affirm.

This is an action for misrepresentations and inducement of breach of contract relating to the trial and settlement of a personal injury case. The original plaintiffs and a co-defendant have sued the other defendants for misrepresenting or concealing material facts which (1) induced the plaintiffs to settle their original claim for less than its worth, and (2) induced the defendants’ insurance company not to represent the other defendant. The Circuit Court of Putnam County granted summary judgment to the defendants. We affirm.

This is an appeal by plaintiff/appellant, Evelene N. Stein, from a judgment dismissing five of the seven claims alleged by Ms. Stein against defendant/appellant, Davidson Hotel Company ("Davidson").

The captioned defendant has appealed from a partial judgment which resolved some, but not all, of the issues in this divorce case. The judgment is not a final judgment appealable as of right, and is subject to revision by the Trial Court at any time before all issues are determined. T.R.A.P. Rule 3(a).

The captioned executrix has appealed from a non-jury judgment of the Chancery Court that a will dated April 6, 1989 is the true, whole and last will and testament of Jennie Mai Jackson, deceased.

This appeal involves a prison inmate’s efforts to be paroled. After the Tennessee Board of Paroles declined to parole him, the inmate filed a petition for common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking review of the board’s decision. The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and the inmate appealed to this court. We have determined that the board has not demonstrated that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, and therefore, we vacate the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.

The captioned plaintiff has appealed from the non-jury dismissal of its suit to enforce restrictions and has presented the following issues for review:

In this property confiscation case, the Court must decide whether a direct  appeal was timely and whether the Governmental Tort Liability Act's1 twelve-month statute of limitations set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-20-305(b) applies to bar plaintiff's claim for damage to and loss of personal property seized by police officers employed by defendant, the City of Columbia. For the reasons explained below, we hold that the appeal was timely and that plaintiff's claim is controlled by the three-year statute of limitations contained in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-3-105 and is, therefore, not barred.

We granted the application of Terry E. Wood, the defendant, for permission to appeal in order to resolve an issue of first impression in Tennessee: whether the return of a sealed presentment 1 engages an accursed person's speedy trial rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 9 , of the Tennessee Constitution. After a thorough examination of the reocrd and careful consideration of the issue, we conclude, for reasons appearing below, that the reutnr of a presentment, whether sealed or unsealed, whether the accompanying capias is executed or unexecuted, is a formal accusation that engages constitutional speedy trial provisions. Thus, we must apply the criteria of Barkery.Wingo 2 and state b. Bishop 3 to determine whether the thirteen-year delay in this case deprived the appellant of this constitutional speedy trial rights. We find that there was no such deprivation and affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

This case presents a question of first impression in Tennessee: whether or not a legal malpractice claim is assignable. We have determined that soundpublic policy reasons militate against allowing assignment of legal malpractice actions. We, therefore, reverse the Court of Appeals and dismiss the complaint.

This suit was filed by Plaintiffs Giles E. Roberson and his wife Hazel B. Roberson against Defendants Mary Margaret (Darwin) Wasson and Pug Martin, individually , and D/B/A Century 21 Pug Martin Realty. The Plaintiffs sought to have the Court declare that a strip of land approximately 18 feet in width, titled in the name of Mrs. Wasson, which lay between separate tracts owned by them (see appendix) "to have been abandoned and to be non-existent." The complaint was later amended to advance the theory of adverse possession, and still later to add as parties Defendant Stephen N. Snyder and wife Barbara L. Snyder, who had purchased the property from Mrs. Wasson.

We granted this appeal to determine whether a party with a derivative claim - loss of consortium - is entitled to challenges under the peremptory jury challenge statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 22-3-105.

We conclude that the clear and unambiguous language of the jury challenge statute provides additional peremptory challenges to a party with a derivative claim,1 and that a new trial is required because the denial of that statutory right constitutes prejudice to the judicial process. In the interest of judicial economy, since a new trial is required, we have also decided that under comparative fault principles, the recovery of a spouse claiming loss of consortium will be reduced in proportion to or barred by the fault of the physically injured spouse. We, therefore, affirm the Court of  Appeals’ decision reversing and remanding for a new trial.

I concur in the dissent of Justice White.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The appellant, Barry Hughes, challenges, by extraordinary appeal, the trial court's judgment affirming the district attorney general's denial of his application for pretrial diversion. The appellant sought to divert two counts of official oppression, one count of official misconduct, and one count of fabricating evidence. The charges stem from allegations that, while performing his duties as a police officer, he planted cocaine in a civilian's car. We affirm.

This is a medical malpractice case. Plaintiffs, Lisa and Ricky Prince, are  husband and wife. Lisa Prince ("Plaintiff") was injured during out-patient surgery, allegedly as a result of improperly administered anesthetic.  Initially, the suit was brought against Coffee Medical Center, Dr.  Ramprasand (the surgeon), and Michael Cruz (the nurse anesthetist).  Dr. Ramprasand and Cruz settled with Plaintiffs and were dismissed prior to this action. Plaintiff alleges on appeal that Coffee Medical Center ("CMC") was negligent in failing to establish adequate anesthetic policies and procedures and in failing to enforce its own anesthesia policies and procedures. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of CMC and Plaintiff has appealed. For the reasons stated below, we reverse.