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Anna Lue Mckamey v. Red Kap Industries 03S01-9505-CH-00053 This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellant suffered a stroke while working on an assembly line. Substantial disability resulted, which she alleges is compensable as being accident- related. The trial judge disagreed, and she appeals. Our review is de novo, with the presumption that the judgment is correct unless the evidence otherwise preponderates. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Mrs. McKamey is 49 years old, with limited skills and education. Her assembly-line job involved the sewing of shirt collar stays, which may be fairly described as repetitive and monotonous. On May 12, 1992, while working the 7: a.m. to 3:3 p.m. shift, she suffered a stroke shortly before the end of her shift which resulted in total vocational disability. She alleges that, like all other employees, she was expected to make production, with its attendant pressures and tensions, which caused or contributed to the stroke. Causation is the dispositive issue. The proof revealed that Mrs. McKamey had been suffering from hypertension for years and had been regularly taking medication for that disease since 1988. She had smoked cigarettes since age 14; at the time of her stroke, she smoked more than twenty per day. Responding to a hypothetical question, Dr. John Purvis, a neurosurgeon, testified that the sewing of hundreds of collar stays during a regular shift could be a contributory factor to the cerebral accident, depending upon a resolution of certain factors, those being arteriosclerosis and hypertension, the former being aggravated or caused by smoking which "played a part" and contributed to her pre-existing condition. The inducing causes of her stroke was the rupture of a blood vessel. After reviewing a videotape of the assembly-line workers, Dr. Purvis testified as -2- Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge Originating Judge:Hon. Frank V. Williams, III	Knox County	Workers Compensation Panel	06/25/96
01S01-9601-CC-00022 01S01-9601-CC-00022		Supreme Court	06/24/96
Gene v. Aaby, 03S02-9507-CH-00073		Supreme Court	06/24/96
01S01-9510-CC-00173 01S01-9510-CC-00173 Originating Judge:Donald P. Harris		Supreme Court	06/24/96
01S01-9412-FD-00155 01S01-9412-FD-00155		Supreme Court	06/24/96
03C01-9506-CR-00181 03C01-9506-CR-00181	Hamilton County	Court of Criminal Appeals	06/24/96
01S01-9601-CC-00022 01S01-9601-CC-00022		Supreme Court	06/24/96
State of Tennessee v. Maurice Lydell Purdy W2000-00460-CCA-R3-CD Authoring Judge: Judge Gary R Wade Originating Judge:William B. Acree	Obion County	Court of Criminal Appeals	06/23/96
03C01-9503-CR-00061 03C01-9503-CR-00061 Originating Judge:William R. Holt	Cocke County	Court of Criminal Appeals	06/21/96
O1C01-9503-CC-00100 O1C01-9503-CC-00100 Originating Judge:W. Charles Lee	Marshall County	Court of Criminal Appeals	06/21/96
01C01-9507-CC-00239 01C01-9507-CC-00239	Williamson County	Court of Criminal Appeals	06/20/96
Clarence W. Lee v. K-Mart Corporation 03S01-9512-CH-00130 This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff claims to have suffered an injury by accident cognizable under the workers' compensation law when, on August 7, 1992, after 3 years of continuous employment, he was summarily relieved of his duties as manager of the K-Mart store in Hixson, Tennessee, demoted, and transferred to another store in Paris, Illinois. He alleged that he thereby sustained a sudden emotional injury resulting in total disability and unsoundness of mind. The defendant admitted that it removed the plaintiff from its Hixson store and transferred him to a smaller store at a reduced salary. It denied that the plaintiff gave notice of a work-related injury, and averred that he filed an age- discrimination claim against it without alerting the court or the defendant that he was of unsound mind. In course, the case was heard on the motion of the defendant for summary judgment, alleging the bar of the Statute of Limitations, TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5- 6-21, and the further allegation that the claim of emotional stress was not a compensable injury. The underlying facts are not disputed. Mr. Lee's difficulties began with his departure from company policy in disposing of defective or damaged merchandise which was to be destroyed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Instead, he secreted these goods in a locked trailer, later donating them to charitable, fund raising causes. A portion of the funds realized from the sale of the damaged or defective merchandise went into a "flower fund" controlled by Mr. Lee which he used to provide gifts and trips to certain employees. Upon the belated discovery of this scheme, Mr. Lee was interviewed extensively and warned that he should expect stringent disciplinary action. He was then 5 years of age, had been manager of the Hixson store for 12 years, and had relocated 17 times. Mr. Lee was on vacation when the investigation began of his disposal of 2 Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge Originating Judge:Hon. Howell N. Peoples	Hamilton County	Workers Compensation Panel	06/20/96
Melvin Burkett vs. State 01C01-9605-CC-00202 Originating Judge:Allen W. Wallace	Humphreys County	Court of Criminal Appeals	06/20/96
The Petitioner, Relying In Part Upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-Cc-00267 02C01-9612-CC-00463	Lake County	Court of Criminal Appeals	06/20/96
Glenn H. Hall v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. and Insurance Company of The State of Pennsylvania 01S01-9510-CH-00175 This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded the employee, Glenn Hall, workers' compensation benefits for the total loss of hearing in his left ear. On appeal the employer asserts that the employee failed to notify the employer of the injury as required by the workers' compensation statute. We affirm the trial court's finding that the proper notice was given. I. Mr. Hall testified that on June 22, 1993 his left ear began hurting after an explosion occurred in the department where he worked. Explosions are not uncommon in that department, and Mr. Hall customarily wore ear plugs to protect his ears from the noise. At the time of the accident, however, Mr. Hall had removed the ear plugs because he was shutting down the process to investigate a problem. Mr. Hall told a co-worker that his ear was hurting and went to see his supervisor. He told the supervisor that his ear hurt, and the supervisor referred Mr. Hall to the company nurse. The company nurse was not called to testify but the forms generated by Mr. Hall's visit to the nurse were introduced as business records. The records show that Mr. Hall had an inner ear infection, was out of the antibiotic he had been taking, and was referred to the company doctor. The records do not reflect that Mr. Hall claimed his ear problems were work-related. Neither do the doctor's notes from that same day reflect that Mr. Hall was claiming a work-related injury. Mr. Hall, however, - 2 - Authoring Judge: Ben H. Cantrell, Special Judge Originating Judge:Hon. Robert E. Corlew, III,	Rutherford County	Workers Compensation Panel	06/20/96
01C01-9507-CC-00232 01C01-9507-CC-00232	Williamson County	Court of Criminal Appeals	06/20/96
Donna F. Peace v. Southern Home Carpet, Inc. 03S01-9512-CH-00134 This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issue on appeal is whether the Chancellor correctly denied the motion of the appellant that her award of benefits should be paid in lump sum. The husband of appellant suffered a fatal heart attack on February 1, 1995. For his death, she sought workers' compensation benefits as the sole surviving beneficiary, and the settlement of her claim, $382.79 weekly for 4 weeks, was approved by the Chancellor who declined to approve a lump sum payment. Accrued benefits were $8,2., timely paid. The plaintiff is 45 years old, a high school graduate, and is currently employed as a dental assistant, earning net pay of $1,3. monthly. She has no children and is the sole support of her disabled mother for whose care she pays $866.67 monthly. Her disposable income from all sources (inclusive of her mothers' SSI of $4.) is $3,358.76. The balance owing on her home mortgage is $45,., which she proposed to discharge; her monthly living expenses, including a mortgage payment and the expenses of her mother's care, are about $2,9.. The Chancellor observed that this is not a case where periodic payments are not needed as a substitute for wages. See Ponder v. Manchester Housing Auth., 87 S.W.2d 282 (Tenn. 1994). TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-279 authorizes lump sum payments of awards, with instructions to the trial court to consider the best interest of the employee together with his ability to wisely manage and control the award. The Chancellor expressly found that a lump sum would not be in the best interest of the plaintiff, whose ability to manage a large sum was questionable since she could not account for 25% of the accrued payments and has failed to file income tax returns for the last five (5) years. We fully concur in the Chancellor's judgment and find no abuse of discretion. Henson v. City of Lawrenceburg, 851 S.W.2d 89, 813-14 (Tenn. 1993). The judgment is affirmed at the costs of the appellant. Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge Originating Judge:Hon. H. David Cate	Knox County	Workers Compensation Panel	06/20/96
Appeal, The Petitioner, Relying In Part Upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508- 02C01-9612-CC-00464	Lake County	Court of Criminal Appeals	06/20/96
Corbin B. Scroggins v. Kenneth Ray Ely 03S01-9510-CH-00121 This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issue in this case is whether the trial judge erred in granting a summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's petition for workers' compensation benefits because there is no jurisdiction over this case in Tennessee. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The relevant facts in the case are simple. On or around May 17, 1991, the plaintiff learned that Ely's Trucking, a Knoxville company, had a possible opening for a driver. The plaintiff learned this from another driver, who lived, as did the plaintiff, in Nebraska. The plaintiff called Ely's Trucking Company from his home in Nebraska. Ray Ely, the owner of the trucking company, and plaintiff discussed plaintiff's desire to work for Ely. The plaintiff's testimony, taken by deposition, clearly shows Ely made an offer of employment to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff accepted the offer at his home in Nebraska, where he was when the discussion took place. There was no written contract of employment between the plaintiff and Ely. The only document signed by the parties was a listing of benefits the plaintiff had with Ely's Trucking. This was signed on May 21, 1991 in Knoxville. The injury of which the plaintiff complained did not occur in Tennessee. The Chancellor found there was no jurisdiction to try the case in Tennessee. The evidence supports this finding. There was no contract of employment entered into in Tennessee, nor was the employment principally localized within this state as required by TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-115 to give jurisdiction to this state. The contract was completed in Nebraska when the plaintiff accepted the employment offer from Ely. Tolley v. General Accident Fire & Life Ins. Corp., 584 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1979). We affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand the case thereto with costs assessed to the plaintiff. 2 Authoring Judge: Senior Judge John K. Byers Originating Judge:Hon. Frederick D. Mcdonald	Knox County	Workers Compensation Panel	06/20/96
The Petitioner, Relying In Part Upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-Cc-00267 02C01-9611-CC-00409	Lake County	Court of Criminal Appeals	06/20/96
1996. In The Present Appeal, The Petitioner, Relying In Part Upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, 02C01-9612-CC-00452	Lauderdale County	Court of Criminal Appeals	06/20/96
Eunice Irene Freeman v. Sportswear and Associates and Liberty Mutual Insurance 01S01-9511-CV-00193 This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special 1 Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial judge found the plaintiff had suffered a 65% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole and entered judgment accordingly. The issues raised by the defendant are: 1) Whether the proof preponderates against the trial court's judgment as excessive. 2) Whether the trial court erred in holding that the plaintiff's award was not limited to two and a half times the medical impairment rating. 3) Whether the trial court erred in awarding the plaintiff a lump sum payment. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. There is no dispute that the plaintiff, who is 58 years of age, with a high school education, whose primary job was as a sewing machine operator, was injured in an industrial accident. Further, there is no dispute that the plaintiff sustained a permanent vocational impairment to the body as a whole. The plaintiff submitted the only medical evidence in this case. The physician testified that the plaintiff had sustained a 17% permanent medical impairment to the body as a whole. The plaintiff, her husband and a co-worker testified concerning the plaintiff's condition subsequent to the injury. Each of these witnesses testified to the limitations of the plaintiff's ability to perform work as a result of her injuries. Without question the plaintiff sustained a significant injury in this accident. The trial judge saw and heard the witnesses who testified in court and credited their testimony. Credibility of these witnesses is for the trial judge to find, and we do not, and can not, reweigh the credibility on appeal. On appeal, we review the judgment of the trial court with a presumption of correctness. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). We are required, however, to 2 Authoring Judge: Senior Judge John K. Byers Originating Judge:Hon. Bobby Capers,	Macon County	Workers Compensation Panel	06/20/96
Johnson Controls v. Shelby J. Cotham and Larry Brinton, Director, Second Injury Fund 01S01-9511-CV-00212 Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge Originating Judge:Hon. Donald P. Harris,	Johnson County	Workers Compensation Panel	06/20/96
01C01-9502-CC-00033 01C01-9502-CC-00033 Originating Judge:Gerald L. Ewell, Sr.	Coffee County	Court of Criminal Appeals	06/20/96
Petitioner, Relying In Part Upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-Cc-00267 02C01-9612-CC-00465	Lake County	Court of Criminal Appeals	06/20/96