APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendants appeal a summary judgment entered in favor of the Plaintiffs for the enforcement of a settle ment agreement.

Demetreous Flengas, the husband, and Kimberly Denise Flengas, the wife, were granted an absolute divorce in September 1994 in Hamilton County. Shortly thereafter, the Trial Court entered its memorandum opinion and order which directed the division of the parties' assets and liabilities. It is from this order that the husband appeals.

The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the Wife/Appellant is entitled to post judgment interest on a judgment of $50,000 awarded her by the decree of divorce entered December 28, 1992.

The captioned petitioners filed their “Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Verified Complaint” seeking review of the action of the City Council of Gallatin in regard to the zoning of certain property and for injunctive relief. From an adverse judgment in the Trial Court, one of the petitioners, Phyllis Hovenden, has appealed, presenting the following issues for review:

Two persons injured in a one-car accident sued the driver of the car in which they were riding. After obtaining an essentially worthless judgment against the unknown driver of another car, the passengers perfected this appeal to take issue with the trial court’s decision to permit their driver to rely on a “phantom automobile” defense even though she had not included this defense in her answer. The majority has determined that the trial court properly permitted the driver to assert this defense and to amend her pleadings to conform to the proof. While I concur with the majority’s decision under the circumstances of this case, I have prepared this separate opinion to avoid leaving a mistaken impression that the driver’s answer complied with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.03. It did not; however, the error does not undermine the jury’s verdict in this case.

For a second time we address this matter which concerns Appellant Ron Christian's eligibility for assistance from the petroleum underground storage tank fund, established in T.C.A. § 68-215-110. The Tennessee Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Board (Board), an appellee in this action,1 found Christian ineligible for assistance due to his failure to reestablish fund eligibility by, inter alia, failing to conduct a site check of his property. Upon review in the chancery court, the Board's decision was upheld. For reasons hereinafter set forth, we affirm.

This case involves the application and interpretation of certain provisions of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) as enacted by the states of Missouri and Tennessee, T.C.A. §§ 36-6-201 to 36-6-225 (1991), as well as the Federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA). 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A (1994). The courts of this state first became involved with this tragic set of complicated circumstances when Lisa Ann Dangler (“petitioner”), a resident of Missouri, filed suit in the Circuit Court of Maury County, Tennessee (“Tennessee trial court”) seeking to have that court enroll a foreign judgment from the state of Missouri and to enforce a writ of habeas corpus issued by the Circuit Court of Barry County, Missouri (“Missouri trial court”), which had as part of a divorce proceeding in that court in 1983 awarded petitioner custody of the parties’ minor child. Named as 1Although the child’s father was named a respondent, the only truly active respondents in this case are the paternal grandparents of the child. 2 respondents are Eugene Edward Dangler (?father”) and the child’s paternal grandparents, Patricia G. Dangler and Edward C. Dangler (by name or ?respondents”).1 The court below held that it had jurisdiction of this case pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-6-201 and proceeded to award custody to the paternal grandparents, giving petitioner visitation rights. On appeal, petitioner has presented three issues for our consideration (1) whether the trial court erred in engaging in a “best interest of the child evaluation” in reaching a decision as to custody, absent a showing of substantial harm to the child; (2) whether the trial court erred in holding that the order of habeas corpus from the Missouri court was unenforceable in this state; and (3) whether petitioner is entitled to attorney’s fees in connection with this litigation.