APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a will contest in which the contestants have appealed from a jury verdict and judgment in favor of the will.

The majority has reached the correct result in this case. I have prepared this separate opinion for two reasons. First, we should state clearly that the contestants’ trial counsel should not be faulted for requesting the trial court to use a Tennessee Pattern Jury Instruction that the Tennessee Supreme Court had disapproved only one month before trial. Second, we should conclude without equivocation that the record contains material evidence upon which the jury could have determined that the beneficiary had clearly and convincingly rebutted the presumption of undue influence arising from her confidential relationship with Mrs. Haney.

This appeal involves a personal injury action in which the plaintiff sought to file a separate suit against previously unknown defendants in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 (1994). The Fifth Circuit Court for Davidson County granted the new defendants’ motions for summary judgment on the ground that the complaint was filed one day late. The plaintiff asserts on this appeal that the trial court erred by failing to extend the time for filing his amended complaint by three days in accordance with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 6.05. We have determined that Tenn. R. Civ. P. 6.05 does not extend the deadline for taking the actions required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 and, therefore, affirm the trial court.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court awarded petitioner/appellant's attorney a reasonable attorney's fee.

This case involves the ownership of the mechanical royalty rights to a catalogue of songs written by the appellant, Earl Montgomery. The appellee, Kayla Nicole Nunley, contends that her late husband, Billy Gene Nunley, purchased the right to collect those royalties from Mr. Montgomery in 1975. Mr. Montgomery testified that he never sold the rights, and that he did not even know Mr. Nunley. He claims that the Nunleys were guilty of converting the funds derived from his ownership rights.

This is a dispute over a contract to provide garbage and industrial waste collection in three Wayne County cities. The contractor sued the three cities for failing to prevent a rival contractor from providing the same services to some residents of each city and sued the rival contractor for inducing a breach of contract, for misrepresentation, and for interference with business relations. After a bench trial the Chancery Court of Wayne County dismissed the complaint. We affirm.

This appeal arises from the liquidation of an insolvent captive insurance company. TheCommissioner of Commerce and Insurance, acting as the insurance company’s liquidator, filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking to avoid an $800,000 transfer made by the insurance company to pay off an outstanding bank loan. The bank moved to dismiss the commissioner’s petition because the challenged transfer occurred outside of the avoidance period in Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-9-317(a)(2)(B) (1994). The trial court granted the motion, and the commissioner has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s decision.

The defendant, Opryland USA, Inc., has appealed from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Lucille Beske in the amount of $125,000 for personal injuries sustained in a fall on the premises of defendant. The jury awarded plaintiff $200,000, but the Trial Judge suggested a remittitur of $75,000 which was accepted by the plaintiff without protest. The Trial Judge also awarded plaintiff judgment for $1,404.50 discretionary costs.

This appeal involves a suit to determine ownership of an 18.5 acre tract of land located in Lincoln County, Tennessee. The facts are as follows.

Plaintiff, New Life Corporation of America (New Life), appeals from the order of the trial court which granted summary judgment to defendant, Thomas Nelson, Inc. (Nelson).

Gloria Jean Woolfork (“plaintiff”) filed suit in the Circuit Court of Madison County against Phillip H. McNeil and R. Brad Martin, d/b/a Jackson Inns, Ltd.,1 seeking damages for her personal injuries allegedly caused by defendant’s negligence. The case was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff. Although defendants have raised several issues on appeal, the pivotal issue in this case is whether the trial court properly performed his function as a thirteenth juror in denying defendants’ motion for a new trial. After reviewing this record, we are of the opinion that he did not, and we reverse and remand this case for a new trial.

This cause came to be heard upon the Rule 3 appeal by appellant Larry Russell from the Order of the trial court dismissing his claim against appellee Dailey for failure to state a claim and lack of jurisdiction.

In this divorce proceeding, the plaintiff, Syble B. Stephenson, has appealed from a judgment entered by the Trial Court on April 11, 1995, overruling a motion to alter or amend a judgment previously entered on November 14, 1994, dealing with distribution of marital property and indebtedness thereon, child support arrearage, future child support and medical expenses, visitation and possession of a list of personal belongings.

This case came to be considered by the Court upon a grant of a Rule 9 application for permission to appeal an interlocutory Order of the trial court.

The appellant, Thomas Hebron, appeals the dismissal by the trial court of his “Petition for Habeas Corpus/Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.” The appellant is currently serving a sentence of life imprisonment pursuant to a conviction on August 24, 1984, for first degree murder. On November 21, 1985, this court affirmed his conviction. State v. Hebron, No, 84-231-III (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1986). In 1987, the appellant unsuccessfully sought federal habeas corpus relief. Subsequently, on March 6, 1989, he filed his first petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Following appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition. Finally, on February 22, 1994, the appellant filed the instant pro se petition, alleging an erroneous jury instruction on premeditation and deliberation, in violation of the supreme court’s opinion in State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530 (Tenn. 1992). On March 15, 1994, the trial court appointed counsel to represent the appellant and, on May 18, 1995, conducted a hearing. At the hearing, the trial court treated the petition as one seeking post-conviction relief. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-108 (1990). The trial court then concluded that the petition was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102 (1990), and, moreover, failed to state a ground for relief of  constitutional magnitude, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-105 (1990).

We agree.