APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Thomas Hebron, appeals the dismissal by the trial court of his “Petition for Habeas Corpus/Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.” The appellant is currently serving a sentence of life imprisonment pursuant to a conviction on August 24, 1984, for first degree murder. On November 21, 1985, this court affirmed his conviction. State v. Hebron, No, 84-231-III (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1986). In 1987, the appellant unsuccessfully sought federal habeas corpus relief. Subsequently, on March 6, 1989, he filed his first petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Following appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition. Finally, on February 22, 1994, the appellant filed the instant pro se petition, alleging an erroneous jury instruction on premeditation and deliberation, in violation of the supreme court’s opinion in State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530 (Tenn. 1992). On March 15, 1994, the trial court appointed counsel to represent the appellant and, on May 18, 1995, conducted a hearing. At the hearing, the trial court treated the petition as one seeking post-conviction relief. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-108 (1990). The trial court then concluded that the petition was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102 (1990), and, moreover, failed to state a ground for relief of  constitutional magnitude, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-105 (1990).

We agree.

Appellant, Catherine Ward, was convicted of promoting prostitution, a Class E felony, by a jury. The trial court found that appellant was a standard offender and imposed a Range I sentence consisting of a fine of $3,000 and confinement for one year in the Department of Correction.

I dissent. I agree with the majority opinion that the twelve-hour detention without allowing bond under the policy stipulated by the parties to exist constituted punishment. In this respect, I believe that the policy would result in serious violations of an arrestee's statutory and constitutional rights, from illegal detention through illegal denial of bail into fundamental violation of due process. However, I do not believe that the Double Jeopardy Clause of either the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article I, Section 10 of the Tennessee Constitution is implicated in this case.

This case arises from the termination of appellant, Carl Nelson, as employee, officer and director of B & M Printing Company. The pertinent facts are as follows: In 1968, Nelson, together with appellees, Harold E. Martin and Jack W. Gammon, formed a partnership named B & M Printing Company for the purpose of engaging in the commercial printing business. In 1969, the three partners converted the partnership into a corporation and were issued 100 shares each of the corporation's stock. There were no other shareholders in the corporation. Nelson, Gammon and Martin were all employed by the corporation and acted as the corporation's only officers and directors. The presidency of the corporation was initially rotated between the three parties every year, but at the time of Nelson's termination, Martin was the president and had been for several years. The parties received no compensation for their duties as officers and directors, but did receive salaries, commissions based on individual sales, and bonuses as employees of the corporation. In addition, the parties received rent money from the corporation through their partnership, BCJ Enterprises, which owned the property on which B & M Printing Company was located

This Court granted the appellant's Rule 9 interlocutory appeal to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the appellant's petition for the writ of certiorari to review the district attorney general's denial of pretrial diversion. The appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion. The state contends that the trial court properly affirmed the district attorney general's decision to deny pretrial diversion. Since this Court finds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.