APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this consolidated appeal, Petitioner, Ronallen Hardy, appeals the summary dismissal of his petitions for post-conviction and error coram nobis relief after being convicted of first degree murder, felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, conspiracy to commit especially aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary and resulting sentence of life without parole. See State v. Ronallen Hardy, M2008-00381-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 2733821, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2009), no perm. app. filed. The trial court merged the murder convictions and this Court merged the conspiracy convictions on direct appeal. Id. After a review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Cortez Lebron Sims, was convicted by a Hamilton County jury of one count of first degree premeditated murder, three counts of attempted first degree murder, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court imposed a sentence of life for the first degree murder conviction as well as concurrent sentences of twenty-five years for each attempted first degree murder conviction and a consecutive sentence of six years for the employing a firearm conviction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by: (1) denying the Defendant’s motion for a change of venue; (2) admitting evidence related to a photographic lineup and an unavailable witness’s prior identification of the Defendant; (3) admitting a gang validation form showing the Defendant’s gang membership; (4) admitting a jail phone call between the Defendant and a third party; (5) admitting evidence of a gun and shell casings that were later determined to be unrelated to this case; (6) admitting a bloody onesie worn by the infant victim in this case; and (7) admitting evidence related to gang violence and an on-going gang feud. Upon our review of the record, we determine that the trial court did not commit reversible error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The dispositive issue in this personal injury action is whether the claims against the defendant trucking company for the tortious acts of its employee/truck driver are time-barred under Abshure v. Methodist Healthcare-Memphis Hospitals, 325 S.W.3d 98 (Tenn. 2010) or saved by the commencement of a new action under Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105, Tennessee’s “savings statute.” After the plaintiffs commenced the new action, the company filed a motion to summarily dismiss the complaint, asserting the plaintiffs’ claims against the employee were procedurally barred before the new action was commenced. The trial court denied the motion because the first action was instituted before the plaintiffs’ right of action against the employee became extinguished by operation of law, and the second complaint was timely filed pursuant to the savings statute. For the same reason, we affirm and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal arose from a dispute between relatives concerning the ownership of improved real property. The property at issue was conveyed in 2000 via warranty deed to a married couple, William and Jewel Nunley, and their adult son, Anthony Gene Nunley, each as tenants in common. Following William Nunley’s death in 2007, Anthony Nunley purchased his mother’s interest in the property, executing a promissory note in the amount of $112,509.00 and a deed of trust secured by title to the property. In 2015, Jewel Nunley and Anthony Nunley executed a document stating that the remaining balance on the note was $37,509.00. Anthony Nunley (“Decedent”) died intestate in June 2016. Decedent’s surviving spouse, Tiny Nunley, filed a petition in the probate division of the Carter County Chancery Court (“probate court”) and was granted letters of administration to act as the personal representative (“Personal Representative”) of Decedent’s estate (“the Estate”). Jewel Nunley filed a claim against the Estate for the balance owed on the promissory note, which was later settled and released by agreement. Personal Representative filed an action in the probate court to reform the deed and quiet title to the subject real property. Two of Decedent’s three adult sisters objected and filed an action in the Carter County Chancery Court (“trial court”) to partition the property. The probate court transferred the reformation action to the trial court, treating Personal Representative’s petition to reform the deed and quiet title as a compulsory counterclaim to the partition action. The plaintiffs asserted that via the 2000 deed, the property was conveyed in part to William Nunley as a tenant in common with his one-third interest in the property then passing to his wife, Jewel Nunley, and their four children, including Decedent, through intestate succession.

In this divorce case, Husband/Appellant appeals the trial’s courts award of $200,000.00 to Wife/Appellee under the parties’ prenuptial agreement. This award was based on the trial court’s finding that Husband’s net worth is at least $400,000.00. In their agreement, the parties waived alimony; nonetheless, Husband sought an award of alimony in the trial court. The trial court held that Husband did not meet his burden to show that he was a public charge so as to overcome his waiver of alimony. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm. 

This appeal concerns the termination of a father’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Macon County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of James H. (“Father”) to his minor daughter Trinity H. (“the Child”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights on the grounds of wanton disregard, severe child abuse, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The Juvenile Court found also that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. Father appeals. With respect to wanton disregard, the Juvenile Court found only that Father committed criminal acts resulting in his incarceration, which by itself is insufficient to establish the ground. We, therefore, vacate the ground of wanton disregard. However, we find that the other two grounds were proven by clear and convincing evidence and, by the same standard, that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. We vacate, in part, and affirm, as modified.  

Appellants, Husband and Wife, filed a complaint for damages, including Wife’s loss of consortium claim, with the Tennessee Claims Commission.  The State filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss Wife’s loss of consortium claim because she did not file notice of her claim with the Division of Claims Administration within the applicable statute of limitations.  The Claims Commission dismissed Wife’s claim for failure to comply with the notice requirement. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-402(b).  Discerning no error, we affirm.

Appellants filed suit against Appellee under the Governmental Tort Liability Act, alleging that Appellee breached its duty to protect Appellant/student, who was injured in a fight on school grounds. The trial court held that Appellants failed to meet their burden to show negligence and denied relief. The appellate record contains no transcript or statement of the evidence for our review as required by the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings. Affirmed and remanded.

This is the second appeal in this divorce case. In Ellis v. Ellis, No. W2017-02287-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 410704 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2019), we vacated the trial court’s award of alimony in futuro to Wife and its award of alimony in solido for Wife’s attorney’s fees. Contrary to our mandate, on remand, the trial court failed to consider Wife’s relative earning capacity in relation to the award of alimony in futuro. Although the trial court affirmed its previous award of alimony in solido, it failed to consider payments Wife made from pendente lite support she received from Husband. Accordingly, we modify the trial court’s award of alimony in futuro to reflect Wife’s earning capacity, and we modify the award of alimony in solido to reflect payments made from pendente lite support.

The pro se petitioner, Jesse L. Dabbs, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Otis Taylor, appeals the order of the trial court revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his original three-year sentence in confinement. Upon review of the record, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the defendant violated the terms of his probation, and the imposed sentence is proper. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This appeal concerns a legal dispute between a landlord and a commercial tenant. The trial court found that the landlord, a recent purchaser of the commercial property, had breached the pre-existing lease. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The issue presented is whether a quitclaim deed should be equitably reformed when reformation would benefit parties with constructive notice of a title defect and harm the rights of creditors with recorded judgment liens. A husband and wife quitclaimed parcels of real property to limited partnerships. The wife was omitted as a grantor on one of the quitclaim deeds even though she and her husband owned the property as tenants by the entirety. Two banks obtained judgments against the husband and wife and recorded the judgments. The property was later sold, and the purchasers and their lender discovered that the property was subject to the wife’s retained ownership interest and the banks’ recorded judgment liens. To remedy the error, the husband and wife signed a quitclaim deed of correction, referencing the wife’s omission as a grantor on the previous quitclaim deed. The purchasers and their lender then filed this declaratory judgment action asking the trial court to hold, based on mutual mistake, that the corrected quitclaim deed reformed the original quitclaim deed, vested ownership in the limited partnership, divested the wife’s interest, and removed the banks’ judgment liens. The trial court denied reformation, finding that there was no mutual mistake by the husband and the limited partnership who signed the original quitclaim deed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. After considering the equities of the parties, we decline to grant reformation of the quitclaim deed because doing so would deprive the banks of their recorded judgment liens and benefit the purchasers and their lender who acquired the property with constructive notice of the wife’s remaining interest in the property and the banks’ recorded judgment liens. Thus, we need not decide whether reformation is an available remedy to correct a quitclaim deed by adding an omitted grantor. We affirm the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, based on different reasoning. 

The Petitioner, Corbyn Davis, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition challenging his convictions for first degree, premeditated murder and possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to provide him discovery in a timely manner, failing to investigate telephone records and social media accounts, failing to move to suppress the murder weapon, failing to present the testimony of a witness, and failing to prepare him for trial. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the Petitioner has failed to show deficiency or prejudice with regard to each claim, and we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Sullivan County General Session Court found the defendant, Fallon Jenkins Moore, guilty of driving under the influence in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55- 10-401. The defendant appealed the judgment to the Criminal Court for Sullivan County and filed a suppression motion, arguing the police did not have reasonable suspicion to justify her initial seizure. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion, and the State appealed, asserting the defendant’s seizure was supported by reasonable suspicion. Upon our review of the record, arguments of the parties, and pertinent authorities, we agree with the State and reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, James Michael Johnson, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his four-year sentence in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In February 2016, the Putnam County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Willie Nathan Jones, for first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder in the death of Rodney Richards and for attempted first degree murder of Stacy Maynard. Following a trial in April 2018, a jury found Defendant guilty of the lesser-included offenses of second degree murder and attempted second degree murder, for which Defendant received an effective sentence of thirty-seven years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred by repeatedly referring to Mr. Richards and Ms. Maynard as “victims” throughout trial; (3) the trial court violated Defendant’s due process rights by preventing him from properly impeaching a State’s witness using the sheriff department’s “Use of Force” and “Critical Incident” guidelines; (4) the State violated Defendant’s right to a fair trial by “continuously commenting on the evidence and credibility during closing arguments”; (5) the trial court erred by failing to suppress Defendant’s statements to police because he was questioned while tired and under the influence and because Defendant’s request for counsel was not honored; (6) the trial court abused its discretion in ordering consecutive sentencing; and (7) cumulative error necessitates a new trial. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, John M. Banks, was convicted of aggravated burglary (Count One), possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony (Count Two), especially aggravated robbery (Count Three), and two counts of aggravated robbery (Counts Four and Five). The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of four years for aggravated burglary, eighteen years for especially aggravated robbery, and eight years for each count of aggravated robbery to run consecutively to a six-year sentence for possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for an effective twenty-four-year sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his two convictions for aggravated robbery, that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statement, and that the trial court erred in sentencing him to eighteen years for his especially aggravated robbery conviction. Upon reviewing the record and applicable law, we reverse Defendant’s conviction for aggravated robbery in Count Five and affirm the remaining convictions and sentences.

The Defendant, Doyle Wayne Mason, Jr., was convicted by a jury of one count each of aggravated sexual battery, solicitation of a minor, and sexual battery by an authority figure; and eleven counts each of statutory rape by an authority figure, incest, and rape. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of fifty-two years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated sexual battery, solicitation of a minor, and rape; (2) a material and prejudicial variance existed between the bill of particulars and the State’s election relative to the aggravated sexual battery count; (3) the court “took on the role of the prosecutor” by questioning the victim and inadvertently conveyed to the jury that the court found the victim credible; (4) the court erred by admitting hearsay evidence that the victim reported the abuse to others; and (5) the sentence imposed by the court was excessive. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Kathy Alexander, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief, seeking relief from her guilty plea to theft of property valued $60,000 or more but less than $250,000, a Class B felony, and her resulting sentence of twenty years as a Range III, persistent offender. On appeal, the Petitioner claims that she received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that her guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Shasta Jackson, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that she received ineffective assistance of trial counsel when counsel advised her to testify at trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The dispositive question in this appeal is whether the post-conviction judge should have recused himself because his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. We answer this question in the affirmative and hold that the post-conviction judge was obligated to recuse himself in this case even though the petitioner failed to file a motion for recusal. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed; the judgment of the post-conviction court is vacated; and this matter is remanded to the trial court for a new post-conviction hearing before a different judge.

The Defendant, Marquiceon Fields, was convicted of one count of rape of a child and was sentenced to twenty-eight years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to require the State to make an election of offenses, that the evidence is insufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction, and that the trial court erred by sentencing the Defendant as a Range II offender. The State concedes that the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant. Based on our review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction but modify his sentence to twenty-five years and remand for entry of an amended judgment.

The estate of the decedent appeals the trial court’s decision to grant the widow’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss the estate’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The complaint, filed in 2019, sought rescission of a quitclaim deed executed by the decedentin 1990 that created a tenancy by the entirety with his wife. The complaint alleged that the decedent executed the deed shortly after the marriage in consideration of and reliance on “a contract” between the spouses. The complaint alleged that the contract obligated the husband “to create a tenancy by the entirety” and, in return, the wife was “obligated to cohabit with him and to provide the love, affection and companionship that was essential for a ‘long and enduring marriage.’” Although the couple remained married until the decedent’s death in 2018—28 years after they married—the complaint alleged that the 1990 deed should be rescinded for the failure of consideration and the failure of a condition subsequent. The complaint additionally asserted that the wife was unjustly enriched by the conveyance and asked that a constructive trust be imposed on the property. The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that it did not allege facts that would give rise to any obligation upon the wife because the deed unambiguously evinced the husband’s intent to convey the property as a gift. The court also found, inter alia, the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations applicable to each claim, the doctrine of gross laches, and the statute of frauds. We affirm.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Gary Thomas Russell, of violating the sex offender residential restrictions and acquitted him of harboring a runaway child. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to six years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction because he was not “alone with a minor” as defined by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-211(k)(2). After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.