APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Charles Thomas Johnson, was convicted by a Lincoln County Circuit Court jury of possession of heroin with the intent to sell, possession of heroin with the intent to deliver, possession with the intent to sell 0.5 gram or more of cocaine, and possession with the intent to deliver 0.5 gram or more of cocaine, Class B felonies. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417 (2018). After the appropriate merger, the trial court imposed consecutive terms of twelve years for possession with the intent to sell heroin and eight years for possession with the intent to sell cocaine, for an effective twenty years’ confinement. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his effective sentence consecutively to a conviction in an unrelated case. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss pursuant to State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999), based on lost or destroyed evidence, and (3) the trial court erred by denying his request for alternative sentencing and by imposing consecutive service. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Donte Anton Davis, Defendant, was indicted by a Coffee County grand jury for violation of the Sex Offender Registry. Defendant entered a guilty plea, and the trial court sentenced Defendant as a career offender to serve six years in confinement. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal and argues that his sentence was excessive and that the trial court failed to include specific findings to support its denial of the mandatory minimum sentence. The State argues that the trial court exercised proper discretion and sentenced Defendant appropriately. After a thorough review of the record, we find no error in the judgment of the trial court.

This is the second appeal by a father of the termination of his parental rights to his two minor children. The trial court determined that termination of the father’s rights was in the best interest of the children after finding he failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the children and abandoned them by engaging in conduct that exhibited a wanton disregard for their welfare. In the first appeal, we vacated the judgment of the trial court because its findings of fact failed to comply with the mandate in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(k) and remanded for the trial court to make additional findings of fact on two grounds—abandonment by wanton disregard and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of or financial responsibility for the children—and on whether termination of the father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests See In re Nakayia S., No. M2017-01694-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 4462651, at *5–6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2018). In this appeal, the father contends the court improperly based its decision on one child’s out of court allegations of abuse, and he asserts that he manifested ability and willingness to assume custody by complying with the permanency plan requirements. We have determined that the child’s statements were properly admitted under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803, and the preponderance of the evidence is not against the trial court’s findings, which amount to clear and convincing evidence of the elements necessary to terminate the father’s parental rights. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights.

In this parental termination case, the trial court found two statutory grounds for termination of a father’s parental rights: severe child abuse and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also found that termination of the father’s parental rights was in his child’s best interest. Because the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the grounds for termination and the best interest determination, we affirm. 

The Petitioner, Alberto Conde-Valentino, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, seeking relief from his convictions of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery and resulting effective sentence of life in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, filed by Nedra R. Hastings (“Petitioner”), seeking to recuse a special judge in this case involving child support matters. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Petitioner, and finding it fatally deficient, we dismiss the appeal.

On March 4, 2011, Charles Meriweather, Defendant, entered negotiated pleas of guilty to two Class B felony drug offenses and was sentenced to consecutive terms of twelve-years. The effective twenty-four-year sentence was also ordered to be served consecutively to a federal sentence. The judgments provided that the sentences would be served in a “community based alternative” and required Defendant to report to the community corrections officer within seventy-two hours of his release from federal custody. Defendant was arrested in 2018 on drug and weapons charges. Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered Defendant to serve his sentences in the Department of Correction. Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering his sentences to be served. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a healthcare liability action. In these proceedings, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendants in January 2018. The Trial Court issued summonses the following day, and the plaintiff’s attorney took the summonses to serve through private process instead of through the local sheriff’s department. Service was subsequently completed on the defendants’ registered agent eighty-nine days after issuance of the summonses. The defendants filed an answer raising as an affirmative defense that the defendants had not been properly served with process pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 4. The returns for the original summonses were not filed with the Trial Court until January 2019. The plaintiff filed a motion to strike the defendants’ affirmative defense alleging that the defendants had not sufficiently pled it pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 8.03. Thereafter, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 4.01(3) and 12.02(4)-(5), alleging intentional delay of process, insufficient service of process, and insufficient process. The Trial Court denied the plaintiff’s motion to strike the affirmative defense and granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The plaintiff appeals. Upon a review of the record, we affirm the Trial Court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion to strike but reverse the Trial Court’s grant of the defendants’ motion to dismiss.

This appeal involves a conservatorship proceeding between two sisters with regard to their mother. The appealing sister argues that the trial court’s order was deficient in several respects and that the trial court abused its discretion in naming the other sister as conservator, rather than a public guardian. Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

Appellant filed a detainer action against Appellee, seeking possession of commercial property. The lawsuit was premised on Appellant’s assertion that Appellee breached the commercial lease, under which it purportedly leased Appellant’s property. Appellee, however, is not a party to the lease. As such, the judgment for breach and for back rents entered against Appellee is of no force or effect. Vacated and remanded.

The Appellant appeals the entry of an order of protection that was entered against him. Because that order of protection has expired, we dismiss the appeal as moot.

Under the majority’s decision, qualified Tennessee voters can now vote by absentee mail ballot if voters, in their discretion, determine they have underlying medical or health conditions that make them more susceptible to contracting COVID-19 or if they are vulnerable to greater health risks should they contract COVID-19, or if they care for someone with such a condition.1 I concur in part because I welcome this result as to those plaintiffs, and I agree with much of what the majority has to say about the rest. This cascade of agreement includes: the presumption of constitutionality afforded to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 2-6-201(5)(C) and (D); the application of the Anderson-Burdick standard of review; the moderate burden on the right to vote of those plaintiffs who do not have (or care for someone with) an underlying condition; and the lack of persuasiveness of the Defendants’ evidence of voter fraud. And yet I must dissent.

A medical center employee sued the medical center under the Tennessee Public Protection Act (“the TPPA”) asserting that his employment was terminated because he refused to remain silent about the medical center’s failure to enact policies to safeguard its employees from workplace violence. The medical center moved to dismiss the employee’s complaint for failure to state a claim, and the trial court granted the motion. We conclude that the employee’s complaint satisfies the TPPA’s “illegal act” requirement because it alleges the violation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act’s general duty clause and describes activities that implicate important public policy concerns. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal.

We assumed jurisdiction over these appeals pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-3-201(d)(1) (2009 & Supp. 2019) and Rule 48 of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court and ordered expedited briefing and oral argument. The issue we must determine is whether the trial court properly issued a temporary injunction enjoining the State from enforcing its current construction of the eligibility requirements for absentee voting stated in Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-6-201(5)(C) and (D) (2014 & Supp. 2019). The injunction temporarily mandated the State to provide any eligible Tennessee voter, who applies to vote by mail in order to avoid transmission or contraction of COVID-19, an absentee ballot in upcoming elections during the pendency of pandemic circumstances. The injunction further mandated the State to implement the construction and application of Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-6-201(5)(C) and (D) that any qualified voter who determines it is impossible or unreasonable to vote in-person at a polling place due to the COVID-19 situation shall be eligible to check the box on the absentee ballot application that ‟the person is hospitalized, ill or physically disabled and because of such condition, the person is unable to appear at the person’s polling place on election day; or the person is a caretaker of a hospitalized, ill or physically disabled person,” and have that absentee voting request duly processed by the State in accordance with Tennessee law. At oral argument before this Court, the State conceded that, under its interpretation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-6-201(5)(C) and (D), persons who have underlying medical or health conditions which render them more susceptible to contracting COVID-19 or at greater risk should they contract it (“persons with special vulnerability to COVID-19”), as well as those who are caretakers for persons with special vulnerability to COVID-19, already are eligible to vote absentee by mail. We hold that injunctive relief is not necessary with respect to such plaintiffs and persons. We instruct the State to ensure that appropriate guidance, consistent with the State’s acknowledged interpretation, is provided to Tennessee registered voters with respect to the eligibility of such persons to vote absentee by mail in advance of the November 2020 election.

With respect to those plaintiffs and persons who do not have special vulnerability to COVID-19 or who are not caretakers for persons with special vulnerability to COVID-19, we hold that the trial court erred in issuing the temporary injunction. Accordingly, we vacate the temporary injunction. Recognizing that absentee ballots already have been cast for the August 6, 2020 election consistent with the trial court’s temporary injunction, and mindful of the goal of avoiding alterations to election rules on the eve of an election, the absentee ballots of all Tennessee registered voters who timely requested and submitted an absentee ballot by mail for the August 6, 2020 election pursuant to the trial court’s temporary injunction and which absentee ballots otherwise meet the requirements of the absentee voting statutes shall be duly counted. These cases are remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This opinion is not subject to rehearing under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 39, and the Clerk is directed to certify this opinion as final and to immediately issue the mandate.

Under the majority’s decision, qualified Tennessee voters can now vote by absentee mail ballot if voters, in their discretion, determine they have underlying medical or health conditions that make them more susceptible to contracting COVID-19 or if they are vulnerable to greater health risks should they contract COVID-19, or if they care for someone with such a condition.1 I concur in part because I welcome this result as to those plaintiffs, and I agree with much of what the majority has to say about the rest. This cascade of agreement includes: the presumption of constitutionality afforded to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 2-6-201(5)(C) and (D); the application of the Anderson-Burdick standard of review; the moderate burden on the right to vote of those plaintiffs who do not have (or care for someone with) an underlying condition; and the lack of persuasiveness of the Defendants’ evidence of voter fraud. And yet I must dissent.
 

We assumed jurisdiction over these appeals pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-3-201(d)(1) (2009 & Supp. 2019) and Rule 48 of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court and ordered expedited briefing and oral argument. The issue we must determine is whether the trial court properly issued a temporary injunction enjoining the State from enforcing its current construction of the eligibility requirements for absentee voting stated in Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-6-201(5)(C) and (D) (2014 & Supp. 2019). The injunction temporarily mandated the State to provide any eligible Tennessee voter, who applies to vote by mail in order to avoid transmission or contraction of COVID-19, an absentee ballot in upcoming elections during the pendency of pandemic circumstances. The injunction further mandated the State to implement the construction and application of Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-6-201(5)(C) and (D) that any qualified voter who determines it is impossible or unreasonable to vote in-person at a polling place due to the COVID-19 situation shall be eligible to check the box on the absentee ballot application that ‟the person is hospitalized, ill or physically disabled and because of such condition, the person is unable to appear at the person’s polling place on election day; or the person is a caretaker of a hospitalized, ill or physically disabled person,” and have that absentee voting request duly processed by the State in accordance with Tennessee law. At oral argument before this Court, the State conceded that, under its interpretation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-6-201(5)(C) and (D), persons who have underlying medical or health conditions which render them more susceptible to contracting COVID-19 or at greater risk should they contract it (“persons with special vulnerability to COVID-19”), as well as those who are caretakers for persons with special vulnerability to COVID-19, already are eligible to vote absentee by mail. We hold that injunctive relief is not necessary with respect to such plaintiffs and persons. We instruct the State to ensure that appropriate guidance, consistent with the State’s acknowledged interpretation, is provided to Tennessee registered voters with respect to the eligibility of such persons to vote absentee by mail in advance of the November 2020 election.

With respect to those plaintiffs and persons who do not have special vulnerability to COVID-19 or who are not caretakers for persons with special vulnerability to COVID-19, we hold that the trial court erred in issuing the temporary injunction. Accordingly, we vacate the temporary injunction. Recognizing that absentee ballots already have been cast for the August 6, 2020 election consistent with the trial court’s temporary injunction, and mindful of the goal of avoiding alterations to election rules on the eve of an election, the absentee ballots of all Tennessee registered voters who timely requested and submitted an absentee ballot by mail for the August 6, 2020 election pursuant to the trial court’s temporary injunction and which absentee ballots otherwise meet the requirements of the absentee voting statutes shall be duly counted. These cases are remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This opinion is not subject to rehearing under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 39, and the Clerk is directed to certify this opinion as final and to immediately issue the mandate.
  

A mother and father’s parental rights to two children were terminated on the grounds of abandonment, persistence of conditions, failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody, and upon a determination that terminating the parents’ rights would be in the best interest of the children. Each parent appeals; we reverse in part as to certain statutory grounds but affirm the termination of the parental rights of each parent.

concur with the majority’s opinion except as to the holding that the ground as to the “failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody” was not satisfied as to Mother. This Court is split on this issue, and I agree with the line of cases that hold that the parent has to be able and willing rather than just either of the two. See In re Amynn K., No. E2017-01866-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 3058280, at *12-14 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018). I would affirm the Trial Court’s determination “that the Petitioners have proven by clear and convincing evidence that the Mother has demonstrated an unwillingness to assume custody of the minor children.” I agree with the Trial Court that Mother’s “sobriety was only very recently established, and her continued success in her sobriety is questionable . . . .” Mother’s unwillingness to assume custody satisfies this requirement of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). I concur in all the rest of the majority’s opinion including termination of Father’s and Mother’s parental rights. Given this Court’s recurring clear and irreconcilable split as to this question of statutory interpretation, I request the Tennessee Supreme Court accept and resolve this issue once it has the opportunity to do so.

Defendant, Jessica M. Thompson, appeals from the trial court’s revocation of her probation. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a petition filed by a former wife alleging that the former husband breached their marital dissolution agreement. Wife sought $10,000 in damages to property that husband had allegedly damaged in the manner in which the property was stored. The trial court awarded Wife $7,820 in damages. Husband appeals, asserting that the court erred in adopting the values stated in the marital dissolution agreement in assessing Wife’s damages and in not holding that Wife failed to mitigate her damages. Wife asserts that she was entitled to attorney’s fees in accordance with the enforcement provision of the MDA. We affirm the award of damages and reverse the denial of Wife’s application for attorney’s fees.    

A Rutherford County jury convicted Defendant, Jonathan Montgomery, of driving under the influence (“DUI”) per se, DUI with blood alcohol content over .08 percent, DUI, sixth offense, and driving on a revoked license. The trial court sentenced Defendant to three years with a thirty percent release eligibility for DUI and to a concurrent sentence of six months for driving on a revoked license. On appeal, Defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Fayette County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Kenneth D. Rudd Sr., of rape and incest. The Appellant was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to a total effective sentence of seventeen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his convictions and the length of the sentences imposed by the trial court. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Harvey Lee Webster, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his motion filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. He alleges that his sentences are illegal because his concurrent sentences had to run consecutively because he was on probation at the time of the offenses. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a wrongful death healthcare liability action against two defendants, a hospital and an emergency room physician. Following extensive discovery and scheduling orders, the physician defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, and the hospital joined in the motion. The trial court granted each defendant partial summary judgment by dismissing 17 claims alleging the defendants breached standards of care. When the hospital filed its motion to summarily dismiss the remaining claims against it, the plaintiff filed a response and a motion to substitute his physician expert witness for a different expert witness. The defendants opposed the motion, and the trial court denied the motion to substitute the plaintiff’s expert witness. The court also summarily dismissed all remaining claims against the hospital, leaving only the claims against the emergency room physician for trial. Upon motion of the plaintiff, the court certified the summary dismissal of all claims against the hospital as a final judgment pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. This appeal followed. We have determined that the trial court erred in certifying the order as a final judgment under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02 because, inter alia, any decision we make regarding the adjudicated claims against the hospital may encroach upon the unadjudicated claims to be tried against the emergency room physician. Moreover, there is no basis upon which to conclude that an injustice may result from the delay in awaiting adjudication of the entire case. Therefore, there is a just reason for delaying the expedited appeal of the summary dismissal of all claims against the hospital. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order certifying the judgment as final under Rule 54.02 and remand for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Jerome Perkins, appeals the Trousdale County Circuit Court’s summary denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking relief from his conviction of possession of one-half gram or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver and resulting fifteen-year sentence. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.