APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellants, a doctor and a medical clinic, challenge a final order of the Tennessee Commissioner of Health imposing monetary fines and costs. The order followed the investigation and prosecution of numerous violations of state statutes and regulations governing pain management clinics. After review of an initial decision from an administrative law judge, the Commissioner’s Designee found three additional violations and increased the assessment of civil penalties and costs issued in the initial ruling. Appellants argue that the new violations were not supported by substantial and material evidence and were arbitrary and capricious under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. Further, they argue that the increase in penalties and costs was arbitrary and capricious. Because the decision appealed was supported by substantial and material evidence and neither arbitrary nor capricious, we affirm.

The Madison County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Jamarian Cortez Jordan, for aggravated robbery, and a jury convicted Defendant as charged. The trial court sentenced Defendant to ten years’ incarceration with an eighty-five percent release eligibility. On appeal, Defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred by failing to suppress Defendant’s confession, (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, (3) that Defendant did not have a fair and impartial jury, (4) that the trial court erred in refusing to allow Defendant’s mother to testify at trial as to Defendant’s disability, (5) that Defendant should have received the minimum sentence, and (6) that the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion for new trial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant-Appellant, Deangelo Love, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree felony murder and criminal attempt aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s challenge under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to bolster a witness’s testimony with a prior consistent statement; (3) whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s request for an alibi instruction; and (4) whether the Defendant is entitled to relief under the cumulative error doctrine. After a thorough review of the relevant facts and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Torrance Johnson, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis in which he challenged his 1997 conviction for first-degree felony murder in the perpetration of a robbery. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The Defendant, Chad Everette Henry, pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and driving under the influence (“DUI”). Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of twelve years for the voluntary manslaughter conviction and eleven months and twenty-nine days with forty-five days’ confinement for the conviction of DUI, second offense. The Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court imposed an improper sentence and that his plea to DUI was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The grandparents of a minor child filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of the child’s biological mother. Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights, determining that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish two statutory grounds for termination: (1) abandonment by failure to visit and (2) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of or financial responsibility for the child. The trial court also determined by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed. Following our thorough review of the record, we modify the trial court’s judgment to include a determination of clear and convincing evidence of the additional statutory ground of persistence of the conditions leading to the child’s removal from the mother’s custody. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

The Petitioner, Robert Simmons, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner maintains that he timely filed his petition and is entitled to a hearing. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of the petition.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s grant of a directed verdict in favor of the plaintiffs concerning their claim for surreptitious recording of their conversations, namely wiretapping. We affirm.

The Appellant, Joseph R. Patton, pled guilty in the Wilson County Criminal Court to three counts of soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor and three counts of sexual battery by an authority figure. Pursuant to the plea agreements, the trial court was to determine the length and manner of service of the sentences. After a sentencing hearing, the Appellant received a total effective sentence of fifteen years to be served in confinement. On appeal, he contends that his sentence is excessive and that the trial court erred by denying his request for alternative sentencing. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal concerns a dispute over an easement agreement (“the Agreement”). In 1995, Samir F. Mishu and Faud E. Mishu, d/b/a M&M Investments (“M&M”), conveyed the eastern parcel of certain land it owned to Excellent Properties, L.P. (“Excellent”). The parties also entered into the Agreement, which provided for a future easement that would connect their properties. The easement’s precise location and dimensions were undefined. Years passed, both properties put in curbing without cuts on their boundaries, and the easement went unutilized. In 2015, Downey Oil Company, Inc. (“Downey”), then lessee of the western parcel, sought for the first time to construct and use the easement. Slyreal Properties, Inc. (“Slyreal”), then owner of the eastern parcel, refused. Downey and M&M (“Plaintiffs,” collectively) brought suit against Slyreal, Pinnacle Bank and Hugh Queener, trustee (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). Defendants asserted adverse possession and abandonment. After a trial, the Trial Court ruled for Defendants. Plaintiffs appeal. We find and hold, inter alia, that Defendants failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the easement was extinguished by adverse possession or that it was abandoned by Plaintiffs. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court, and remand for a determination of the easement’s location and dimensions.

A Trousdale County jury convicted the defendant, Jerry A. Thigpen, of assault, a Class A misdemeanor. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days in confinement. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motions to recuse; the State committed prosecutorial misconduct; trial counsel was ineffective; the imposed sentence was excessive; the court reporter should have disqualified herself; the indictment was fatally erred; the jury was biased; trial counsel colluded with the State and the trial court; and the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. The defendant also argues he was denied the right to counsel on appeal. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Richard L. Jerger, Jr., appeals the order of the Bradley County Criminal Court revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his six-year sentence in confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Mario Hernandez Castillo, appeals the denial of his petition for postconviction relief in which he challenged his convictions for first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and theft of property valued at less than $500, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, Petitioner contends that he is entitled to a new post-conviction hearing based upon the unconstitutional delay in the post-conviction proceedings and the inadequacy of interpreter services. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Marty Lynn Ray, was convicted of four counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and sentenced to an effective ninety years in confinement. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-522. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion for a mistrial after the victim testified about a number of instances of sexual abuse exceeding the nine counts of the indictment; and (2) declining to dismiss a prospective juror for cause based upon her level of English proficiency. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The plaintiffs in this construction defect action appeal the trial court’s dismissal of their case with prejudice for failure to comply with the court’s orders. They also allege error concerning the trial court’s refusal to recuse itself, the disqualification of counsel, and the decision to report counsel’s conduct to the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility. We vacate the order of dismissal with prejudice and direct entry of dismissal without prejudice. We affirm the court’s order in all other respects.

The Appellant, Shane Evans Vincent, pled guilty in the Giles County Circuit Court to facilitation of aggravated child abuse, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years to be served as six months in jail followed by supervised probation. Subsequently, the trial court revoked his probation and ordered that he serve the remainder of his twelve-year sentence in confinement. The Appellant filed a motion for new trial “on the violation of his probation,” the trial court denied the motion, and the Appellant filed a notice of appeal in this court. The State argues that we should dismiss the appeal because the Appellant’s motion for new trial and notice of appeal were untimely. The Appellant concedes that a probation revocation proceeding is not a “trial”; therefore, his motion for new trial did not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. We conclude that the appeal should be dismissed.

On December 3, 2018, the Defendant, Juan Dewayne Hall, entered an Alford plea to the offense of possession with intent to deliver over 26 grams of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance. As a condition of his plea, the Defendant expressly preserved two certified questions of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, stemming from his denied motion to suppress. After thorough review, we conclude that the certified questions do not meet the requirements of Rule 37(b)(2)(A) and State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1988), and, as a result, this court is without jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

A Knox County jury convicted the defendants, Alfred Maron Williams, Eric Martel Abrams, and Jamie Paul Click, of twelve counts of conspiracy to possess with the intent to sell heroin within 1000 feet of a drug-free school zone. The trial court merged these twelve convictions into one conviction for each defendant. The jury additionally convicted Defendant Williams of multiple other drug and firearms-related offenses. The trial court sentenced Defendant Williams and Defendant Click to effective sentences of twenty-five years of incarceration each, and it sentenced Defendant Abrams to twentyone years of incarceration. All three defendants appeal. Defendants Williams and Click contend that the trial court erred when it failed to hold a pretrial hearing to determine whether a conspiracy existed. All three defendants contend that the evidence is insufficient to sustain their convictions for conspiracy. Defendant Click additionally contends that the trial court erred when it allowed him to be convicted of the common law crime of conspiracy. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Kavaris Lequan Kelso, was indicted on one count each of aggravated burglary, premeditated first degree murder, and first degree felony murder. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202, -14-403. The Defendant was convicted as charged after a jury trial, and the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of life plus six years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (2) the trial court erred by declining to instruct the jury on duress. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

On April 21, 2016, the Defendant, Christopher Caldwell, was convicted of three felony offenses in Davidson County and sentenced to fifteen years in Community Corrections. On October 20, 2016, he was convicted in Sumner County of two felony offenses and sentenced to twelve years in Community Corrections, consecutive to the Davidson County sentences. The Defendant violated the terms of his Davidson County sentence and was ordered to serve one year and then return to Community Corrections. More than eight months later, after learning that the Defendant had also violated the terms of his Sumner County sentence and had been ordered to serve that sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction, the Davidson County trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his Davidson County sentences in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Because the Davidson County trial court’s original disposition of the Community Corrections violation was final, and no additional warrant alleging a new violation of Community Corrections had been filed, the Davidson County trial court lacked jurisdiction to order the service of the Davidson County sentences in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The State concedes this point. Accordingly, we reverse and vacate the Davidson County trial court’s June 21, 2019 order requiring service of the Defendant’s Davidson County sentences in the Tennessee Department of Correction.

The Appellant, Anton Carlton, is appealing the trial court’s summary dismissal of his third post-conviction petition. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted.

This appeal concerns healthcare liability. A husband and wife filed an action against six medical care providers alleging negligence in the medical treatment of the wife. The defendants moved to dismiss the suit on the basis of noncompliance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E), which requires that pre-suit notice include a HIPAA1 compliant medical authorization allowing a healthcare provider receiving a notice to obtain complete medical records from every other provider that is sent a notice. The plaintiffs’ authorization allowed each provider to disclose complete medical records to each named provider but did not state specifically that each provider could obtain records from each other. The trial court held that the authorization failed to substantially comply with the statute’s requirements. The plaintiffs appealed. We hold that Plaintiffs’ method of permitting Defendants access to Mrs. Combs’s medical records substantially complied with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)E). We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

A person who is injured because of an unfair or deceptive act or practice that affects the conduct of any trade or commerce has a cause of action under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977 (“the Act”), Tennessee Code Annotated sections 47- 18-101 to -132 (2013 & Supp. 2019). We granted review to determine whether the Act applies to the business aspects of a health care provider’s practice. The plaintiffs were injured in car accidents and received hospital medical services. The hospitals did not bill the plaintiffs’ health insurance companies but filed hospital liens against the plaintiffs’ claims for damages arising from the accidents. The hospital liens were for the full amount of the hospital bills with no reduction for the plaintiffs’ health insurance benefits. The plaintiffs sued the hospitals, asserting the filing of undiscounted hospital liens was an unlawful practice under the Act. The trial court dismissed the case, ruling that the plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Act did not apply to a claim in which the underlying transactions involved medical treatment. We hold that the Act applies to health care providers when they are acting in their business capacities. The plaintiffs, who were consumers of medical services, may state a claim under the Act against the hospitals for conduct arising out of the hospitals’ business practices. We reverse and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

This pro se appellant appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his lawsuit. We affirm.

The defendant, Antonio Benson, was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, the defendant contended that the proof at trial fairly raised the issue of whether or not he killed the victim in self-defense and that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed that self-defense should have been charged and concluded that the error was not harmless. The intermediate court therefore reversed the defendant’s conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. We granted this appeal to clarify the gatekeeping function of a trial court when assessing whether self-defense has been fairly raised by the proof and to consider the quantum of proof necessary for a court to charge a jury on selfdefense. We hold that self-defense was not fairly raised by the proof in this case because the defendant was not lawfully defending himself when he killed the victim. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.