APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Curtis Taylor, of voluntary manslaughter, attempted first degree murder, possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony, and use of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court imposed an effective thirty-five-year sentence. The Petitioner appealed, and this court affirmed the convictions and sentence. See State v. Curtis Taylor, No. W2013-01820-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 4244024 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Aug. 7, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 18, 2014). The Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition, claiming he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the postconviction court denied relief. The Petitioner appeals the denial, maintaining that his counsel was ineffective. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant, John Anthony Meyer, III, pleaded guilty to theft of property valued at $1,000 or less, in exchange for the dismissal of his remaining indicted counts and an agreed sentence of eleven months twenty-nine days of incarceration. Then Defendant subsequently filed a pro se motion to “modify/vacate sentence,” specifically asking the trial court to “vacate the part of his sentence ordering the forfieture [sic] of $8,000.00 because it was not part of his plea agreement.” The trial court correctly ruled that it was without jurisdiction to hear the motion because the motion was filed more than 30 days after the judgment of conviction became final and, in the interim, the Defendant had filed a notice of appeal with this court. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we choose to treat the Defendant’s motion as a timely petition for post-conviction relief, and we remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the Tennessee Post-Conviction Procedure Act. T. C. A. § 40-30-101, et seq.

This is an appeal from a divorce proceeding. While the case was pending, the trial court ordered the parties to sell commercial property they owned. After a two-day bench trial, the trial court divided the parties’ remaining marital estate. The wife appeals, arguing that the trial court denied her due process by ordering the sale of the commercial property and erred in dividing the marital estate. For the following reasons, we vacate and remand for further proceedings.

Defendant, Richard Gleason, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual battery. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent sentences of 12 years’ imprisonment. Defendant raises ten issues in this appeal as of right. Defendant asserts that: 1) the trial court erred by not requiring the State to provide him a bill of particulars; 2) the trial court erred by not excluding the narrative portion of a medical report admitted as an exhibit; 3) the trial court erred by allowing the victim’s mother to testify about a prior consistent statement of the victim; 4) the trial court erred by not permitting evidence of domestic violence between the victim’s mother and the victim’s mother’s boyfriend; 5) the State made improper statements during closing argument; 6) Defendant’s due process rights were violated by a pre-indictment delay; 7) the State’s election of offenses was overly vague and insufficient; 8) the trial court erred by considering non-statutory factors in sentencing Defendant; 9) the evidence at trial was insufficient to support Defendant’s convictions; and 10) Defendant is entitled to relief for cumulative error. Having reviewed the entire record, we conclude that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence statements made by the victim to her mother. The two times hearsay evidence was admitted were through a medical report and also during the mother’s testimony during trial. The statements should have been excluded as hearsay, and it was error for the trial court to allow the statements. We conclude, however, that both errors were harmless and did not affect the outcome of the trial. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. Husband/Appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting a divorce and in enforcing the parties’ Marital Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”). The basis of Husband’s argument is that the parties’ marriage is void as bigamous because Wife/Appellee was married at the time the parties married. The trial court held that Wife’s Chilean marriage was void ab initio, thus rendering the parties’ marriage valid. As such, the trial court granted Wife a divorce and enforced the MDA. Husband appeals. We vacate the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to Wife under the MDA due to a lack of findings concerning the amount and reasonableness thereof. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed.

This is a termination of parental rights case, wherein mother and stepfather petitioned to terminate father’s parental rights as to his two minor children on the grounds that he had abandoned the children by failing to visit and by failing to support them. Additionally, mother and stepfather petitioned that stepfather be allowed to adopt the children. The trial court denied the termination petition, finding that father had not willfully abandoned the children because mother had thwarted his attempts to visit and support them. On appeal, we find that father did willfully abandon the children. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a determination of whether termination of father’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children. The trial court’s decision regarding stepfather’s petition to adopt the minor children must await the trial court’s determination on remand as to whether or not termination of father’s parental rights is in the best interest of the children.

The defendant, Gregory Cook, appeals the order of the trial court revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his original
four-year sentence in confinement. Upon review of the record, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the defendant violated the terms of his probation, and the imposed sentence is proper. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Javon Jolarry Spivey, of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated burglary, employment of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony, and robbery. After merging the first degree premeditated murder and felony murder convictions, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of life plus thirty-seven years. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce a video and still photograph of him the police found on YouTube without proper authentication. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Board of Professional Responsibility hearing panel decided that an attorney should be suspended for one year for violating Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct 3.3 (candor toward the tribunal), 3.5(a) (impartiality and decorum of the tribunal), 8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 8.4(d) (conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice). The attorney appealed, and the trial court affirmed. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Chad Jeremy Kilgore, appeals the trial court’s order imposing confinement after finding a violation of his probation. In December 2016, the Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of forgery of over $1,000 in exchange for an effective threeyear sentence, suspended, and the trial court placed him on probation for two years and eleven months. In February 2019, a probation violation warrant, the Defendant’s third, was issued alleging multiple violations, including a new arrest. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation, ordering him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation and when it ordered him to confinement. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In 2016, the Petitioner, Henry Darnell Talley, pleaded guilty to attempted first degree murder, reckless aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, being a convicted felon in possession of a weapon, employing a weapon during the commission of a dangerous felony, and violation of a protective order. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirty-three years. The Petitioner appealed his sentence as excessive, and this court affirmed. State v. Henry Darnell Talley, No. M2016-01632-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 1830100, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, May 5, 2017), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2017). In 2017, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Tommy Lynn Rutherford, appeals his convictions for second degree murder and tampering with evidence, for which he received an effective thirty-seven-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder and that he is entitled to a new trial due to the short amount of time during which the jury deliberated before returning the guilty verdicts. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner’s father, Paul Williams, appeals on behalf of the Petitioner, Elijah Paul Williams, from the Carroll County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the habeas corpus court erred in dismissing his petition without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing. Upon review, we affirm.

Defendant, William K. Lawrence, Jr., was convicted of first-degree murder during the attempt to perpetrate a robbery. The trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends: 1) that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; 2) that the trial court erred by excluding the testimony of Timothy Harlan; and 3) that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on all lesser-included offenses. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 2018, the Defendant-Appellant, Whitney S. Phillips, entered a guilty plea to several drug related offenses and received an effective sentence of ten years under the supervision of the Community Corrections Program, after service of eleven months and twenty-nine days imprisonment. In 2019, following a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s community corrections sentence and imposed the original ten-year term of confinement. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion. Upon review, we affirm.

The defendant, Edward Spencer III, was indicted for one count of aggravated burglary and one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Following a bench trial, the defendant was convicted of both offenses as charged. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II offender and imposed an eight-year split confinement sentence, with the defendant to serve one year in jail followed by seven years of community corrections. On appeal, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. The defendant also contends the sentence of eight years was excessive. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant homeowner appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the purchaser bank in an unlawful detainer action. Because the homeowner presented specific evidence to show a genuine dispute of material fact as to the whether certain mandatory provisions of the deed of trust were complied with prior to foreclosure, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves a forcible entry and detainer action regarding a parcel of real property that was purchased at a foreclosure sale. The purchaser at foreclosure brought this detainer action against the previous owners of the property. The General Sessions Court ruled in favor of the purchaser, as did the Circuit Court pursuant to a de novo appeal. Although the prior owners now appeal to this Court to raise certain grievances, we affirm.

The Petitioner, William Edward Arnold, Jr., appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction and error coram nobis relief from his convictions for one count of aggravated sexual battery and three counts of rape of a child, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty-five years. After a careful and laborious review of the entire record, we are compelled to reverse the denial of post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the Petitioner’s convictions and sentences are reversed and vacated, and this case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial and for any necessary pre-trial motions.

The Tennessee Supreme Court remanded this matter to the trial court for a more definite statement as to the grounds for remittitur. The Court specifically noted that “the trial court’s failure to indicate the reasons for its suggested remittitur leaves us unable to determine whether the evidence preponderates against the remittitur and, consequently, unable to conduct a proper appellate review of the trial court’s remittitur decision.” The trial court responded, inter alia, that the plaintiff had improved his ability to lift and engage in repetitive activities, and that this proof, along with the plaintiff’s success at rehabilitation, strong work ethic, and desire to support his family, led the court to find that the plaintiff “will have some future income over the next 38 years which is the basis for reducing the loss of earning capacity from $1,455,000 to $1,100,000.” We find that a preponderance of the evidence does not support the decision of the trial court to remit the judgment to $1,100,000, and we, therefore reverse the judgment. We further find that based on the proof in the record that the judgment for loss of earning capacity damages should be remitted to $1,334,647. We, therefore, remit the jury’s verdict for loss of earning capacity damages to $1,334,647.

This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her two minor children. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the statutory ground of the persistence of conditions which led to removal. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the children. We affirm the trial court.

This appeal arises from the decision of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County Electric Power Board to terminate a Nashville Electric Service (“NES”) cable splicer/working foreman. The foreman allegedly approved fraudulent timesheets for a Metropolitan Nashville Police Department officer, who performed traffic control at NES jobsites for a private contractor. After NES preferred charges against the foreman and suspended him without pay, the board referred the matter to an administrative law judge (“the ALJ”) for adjudication. Following a two-day administrative hearing, the ALJ made numerous findings of fact and conclusions of law in a 55-page report. The ALJ found that the foreman’s job description did not include verifying the accuracy of the timesheets, NES had not trained the foreman on how to verify the accuracy of the timesheets, and a majority of the inaccurate timesheets could be explained by NES’s common practice of rounding up hours at the end of an officer’s shift. Although there was evidence that the officer overstated his hours, the ALJ found the evidence was insufficient to establish the foreman knowingly approved any false timesheets. Accordingly, the ALJ recommended that the charges of termination be denied and that the foreman be reinstated without back pay. After reviewing the ALJ’s report, the board rejected his recommendation and approved NES’s termination of the foreman. However, the board did not make its own findings of fact or express disagreement with the ALJ’s findings. After the foreman filed his petition for judicial review, the trial court reviewed the administrative record and heard arguments of counsel. In its final order, the trial court concluded that “NES’s lack of proof and the apparent acceptance of time-approval practices combine here to demonstrate a lack of substantial and material evidence to uphold the Board’s decision to terminate.” Thus, the trial court reversed the board’s decision, adopted the ALJ’s Report in toto, and directed that the foreman “be reinstated, without backpay.” On appeal, the board contends the trial court applied incorrect principles of law and reweighed the evidence. We disagree. The Charter of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County requires the Electric Power Board to reduce its findings to writing when taking disciplinary action against an employee. In this case, the board rejected the recommendation of the ALJ without making alternative findings of fact to support or explain its reasoning. Thus, the only findings of fact, credibility determinations, and conclusions of law in the administrative record are those of the ALJ. Because the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial and material evidence, we conclude that NES failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the foreman knowingly approved false timesheets for the police officer. We also conclude that a reasoning mind could not have reached the same conclusion as the board under a proper application of the controlling legal principles. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

This is an action to recover damages for a purported buyer’s breach of a contract to purchase improved residential real property. The trial court awarded Sellers damages calculated as the difference between the contract price and the amount for which the home sold one year after the breach. It also awarded Sellers and both realty companies prejudgment interest. On appeal, Appellant asserts the trial court erred in its determination of damages. He contends that, under the circumstances, an appraisal of the property performed at the time of breach demonstrates a substantially greater real market value than the sales price. Appellant also appeals the trial court’s calculation of the amount of prejudgment interest awarded to Sellers and the realty companies. Because the trial court made no findings of fact with respect to the fair market value of the property at the time of breach, we remand this matter for further findings and, if necessary, recalculation of the damages and prejudgment interest awarded to Sellers. We also remand this matter to the trial court to recalculate the amount of prejudgment interest to be awarded to the realty companies.

The Petitioner, Johnny Peterson, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted.

The Petitioner, Taboris Ramon Jones, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his jury conviction for possession with intent to sell 0.5 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, that his sentence is unconstitutional, and that he was deprived of a fair trial on the basis of cumulative error. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the post-conviction court.