APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Montez Deontay Ridley, was convicted by Davidson County jury of aggravated robbery and received a sentence of nine years’ imprisonment. State v. Montez Deontay Ridley, No. M2015-01607-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 359091, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 24, 2017)(no perm. app filed). He appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on the failure to cross-examine the victim concerning his inconsistent description of the gun used in the robbery. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Alejandro Avila-Salazar, Petitioner, appeals the dismissal of what the post-conviction court determined to be his second petition for post-conviction relief (the “2018 Petition”). The State concedes that the post-conviction court “improperly dismissed” the 2018 Petition and asks this court to remand the case to the post-conviction court for a ruling on Petitioner’s claims “based on the evidence received at the hearing already afforded.” We hold that the amended judgment of conviction correcting an illegal sentence in the original judgment by imposing a new, more punitive sentence that includes community supervision for life was a separate judgment for the purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-102, that the 2018 Petition presented an issue that had not been previously litigated, that the 2018 Petition was the first post-conviction challenge to the new judgment, and that the post-conviction court erred in finding the 2018 Petition was a second petition. We reverse and remand for a determination on the merits of the claims raised in the 2018 Petition.

Following a bench trial, Robert D. Cameron, III, Defendant, was convicted of driving under the influence (“DUI”) and DUI per se. On appeal, Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his Motion to Suppress the video recording of his traffic stop, the blood test results, and the results of his field sobriety tests. The trial court found reasonable suspicion for the stop and probable cause for the ensuing arrest. Finding no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, G’wayne Kennedy Williams, a/k/a Kenney Williams, was convicted by a jury of three counts of rape, eight counts of rape of a child, three counts of aggravated statutory rape, three counts of statutory rape by an authority figure, three counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, eleven counts of incest, eight counts of aggravated sexual battery, and two counts of violating the sex offender registry. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of sixty-four years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for rape and rape of a child; (2) that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of the Defendant’s prior bad acts; (3) that admission of the victim’s complete hospital record was improper given that the records contained hearsay statements and that the record was prepared for purposes of prosecution; (4) that the trial court erred by qualifying a witness as an expert in sexual assault nurse examination; (5) that the trial court erred by not declaring a mistrial after the State attempted to enter a recording of the victim’s forensic interview into evidence without having provided the interview to the defense before trial; (6) that the trial court erred by failing to sever the sex offender registry charges; and (7) that the trial court erred in its application of enhancement and mitigating factors in sentencing. Following a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support five counts of rape of a child, five counts of aggravated sexual battery, and five counts of incest. In addition, some of the convictions for incest, aggravated statutory rape, statutory rape by an authority figure, and sexual battery by an authority figure were improperly merged. We remand the case for resentencing and the entry of new judgments. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Steven Dale Davidson, Jr., was convicted by a jury of voluntary manslaughter and vehicular homicide. Thereafter, the trial court merged the counts and imposed an effective ten-year sentence, to run consecutively to a previous sentence for which probation had been revoked due to the convictions in this case. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by excluding the complete police interview of a defense witness and in its consideration during sentencing of enhancement and mitigating factors. Upon review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

John P. Russell, Defendant, appeals the trial court’s denial of his “Motion to Receive Jail Credits and Time at Liberty.” Because Defendant’s Notice of Appeal was not timely filed and the interest of justice does not warrant waiver, we dismiss the appeal.

During a hearing on a party’s motion for a protective order, the trial court summarily found the party to be in contempt of court and sentenced her to spend ten days in jail after she described members in the gallery as pedophiles and abusers of her children.  The party appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment and sentence.

The Defendant-Appellant, Jeffrey Wooten, was convicted as charged by a Knox County jury of three alternative counts of first degree felony murder; first degree premeditated murder; two counts of especially aggravated burglary; especially aggravated robbery; two counts of aggravated robbery; two counts of attempted especially aggravated kidnapping; two counts of carjacking; two counts of evading arrest; two counts of employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; aggravated burglary; and automobile theft, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment without parole plus forty-eight years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting portions of a 911 call; that there was insufficient evidence to support the Defendant’s convictions; that the trial court erred in allowing evidence of an alleged offense in Georgia during the penalty phase; and that the trial court erred in imposing partial consecutive sentencing. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand this case for entry of judgment forms for each count of the indictment.

I agree with all of Judge McMullen’s well-reasoned opinion except the determination that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the audio recording of the 911 call to be played in its entirety before the jury.

The Defendant, Aaron Dale Dodson, was convicted by a jury of one count of first degree felony murder; one count of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony; and one count of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202, -304, -403. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his felony murder and especially aggravated robbery convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Third-party defendants in a lawsuit moved to disqualify the trial judge, asserting that the judge is a material witness in the case and demonstrated bias and prejudice against one of the parties in another case; the trial court denied the motion and the parties filed an expedited interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Upon a thorough review of the petition for recusal appeal and supporting materials, we affirm the decision of the trial court denying the motion for recusal and remand for further proceedings.

Shalonda Weems, Defendant, was indicted in a two-count indictment for aggravated child neglect and felony murder in connection with the starvation death of her six-month-old child. The jury found Defendant guilty of aggravated child neglect and reckless homicide. Defendant filed a Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(e) Motion for Judgment of Acquittal (“the Motion”) as to both counts. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the Motion in part, set aside the guilty verdict for aggravated child neglect, and entered a judgment of acquittal. The court denied the Motion as to the reckless homicide verdict and entered a judgment of conviction. The State appeals claiming that the trial court erred in granting the Motion. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment of acquittal for aggravated child neglect.

The Petitioner, Antonio M. Crockett, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his jury conviction for first-degree felony murder. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges the following grounds of ineffective assistance of trial counsel: (1) failure to impeach a witness; (2) failure to assert a proper basis for severance pretrial or renew the motion to sever at trial; (3) failure to request a jury instruction; (4) failure to object to the State’s articulating multiple theories during its closing argument; (5) failure to object to the prosecutor’s inflammatory comments during the State’s rebuttal argument; (6) failure to develop and present evidence of the disproportionality of a mandatory life sentence. The Petitioner also argues that his mandatory life sentence is unconstitutional and that he was deprived of a fair trial on the basis of cumulative error. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this post-divorce proceeding, the mother filed a petition to modify time sharing arrangements between the mother and the father with regard to the minor children of the parties. The parties have been divorced since 2010. The mother also requested a modification of the father’s child support obligation and asked that the father pay for onehalf of the children’s past and future medical expenses.

This is the second appeal concerning the petition filed by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) in the Claiborne County Juvenile Court (“Juvenile Court”) to terminate the parental rights of Ed P. (“Father”) to the children, Mahaley P. and Morgan P. (“the Children”). During the first appeal as to Father, this Court reversed the statutory ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan and remanded for the Juvenile Court to make additional findings of fact and conclusions of law related to the two remaining grounds and as relevant to the best interest analysis. See In re Mickeal Z., No. E2018-01069-COA-R3-PT, 2019 WL 337038 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2019). On April 4, 2019, the Juvenile Court entered an order making additional findings of fact and conclusions of law. Father appeals the April 4, 2019 order of the Juvenile Court terminating his parental rights to the Children upon its determination that DCS had proven by clear and convincing evidence the statutory grounds of persistent conditions and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the Children and that the termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In this parental termination case, the juvenile court found two statutory grounds for termination of a mother’s parental rights: substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan and persistence of conditions. The juvenile court also found that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in her child’s best interest. Because the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the grounds for termination and the best interest determination, we affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Trumaine Winters, of first-degree murder and aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison for the murder conviction plus twelve years for the robbery conviction. The Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentence to this court, and we affirmed the convictions but remanded for resentencing. State v. Trumaine Winters, No. W2007-00529-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 2901616 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, July 24, 2008), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 13, 2015). The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for improperly
cross-examining key witnesses and for not objecting to prosecutorial misconduct. The post-conviction court denied the petition after a hearing. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights, arguing that one ground for termination was not proven and that the trial court’s ruling as to that ground did not reflect its independent judgment and did not include sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm five grounds for termination and vacate the ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to parent the children. We also affirm the trial court’s finding that termination is in the child’s best interest. As such, we affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights.

Petitioner, Arnold Stevens, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Petitioner argues that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this probate proceeding, the trial court applied the no contest provision of the will to prevent the beneficiary from inheriting under the will, holding that certain actions and issues raised by the beneficiary triggered the provision. The court also imposed sanctions pursuant to Rule 11.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure against the disinherited beneficiary and her attorney for filing an improper lien on real property of the decedent and in refusing to remove the lien, thereby requiring the estate to seek judicial relief. The beneficiary and her attorney appeal the application of the no contest clause and the imposition of sanctions. Upon our review, we discern no error warranting reversal and accordingly, affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Plaintiff filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 69.04 motion to extend a 2008 default judgment entered against Defendant’s company and Defendant in his personal capacity.  Defendant filed a Rule 60.02(3) motion to set aside the default judgment with respect to himself in his individual capacity, asserting the judgment was void for lack of service. The trial court determined 1) Defendant had been served in the underlying matter, 2) that the judgment in the underlying case was not void, and 3) alternatively, if the judgment was invalid, “exceptional circumstances” justified the court’s refusal to set it aside.  We find that the 2008 default judgment was not void for lack of service and affirm.

In this parental termination case, the petitioners sought termination of the parental rights of mother and the unknown father based upon four statutory grounds, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2018). Following a hearing on the petition, the trial court entered an amended order holding that there was clear and convincing evidence sufficient to terminate the parents’ rights for abandonment based upon their failure to support and failure to visit the minor child. By the same quantum of proof, the court found that termination is in the child’s best interest. The trial court, however, failed to address all of the grounds for termination raised in the petition. The trial court’s judgment was not final. Accordingly, this appeal is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal arises from an action for trespass, injunctive relief, and to quiet title pursuant to a theory of common law adverse possession. The multiple parties are adjoining neighbors and/or affiliated businesses. The centerpiece of this litigation concerns the ownership of a strip of railroad property that is 66 feet wide and comprises 2.9 acres. The railroad removed the track and abandoned the property in 1977, after which all that remained was a berm on which the former track lay. After the track was removed, one of the neighboring owners erected a fence along the center of the entire length of the railroad property. Since that time, the neighboring property owners considered the fence to be the new property line and used the 33 feet of the property on their side of the fence as their respective property. However, the neighboring property owners never paid taxes on the abandoned railroad property. In 2015, one of the three defendants acquired the abandoned property by quitclaim deed from the railroad and removed the fence and leveled the berm in order to install a road to serve a residential development planned for an adjacent 42-acre tract. Thereafter, the owners of two separate adjoining properties filed suit against the three affiliated defendants seeking an injunction and to recover damages caused by flood water that had been diverted onto the plaintiffs’ property due to the removal of the berm. The plaintiffs also asserted claims for trespass and to quiet title to the 33 feet of the former railroad property that adjoined their property. The defendants filed counterclaims alleging that the temporary injunction halted development of the road and caused them to suffer damages. Following a bench trial, the court ruled that the plaintiffs acquired half of the abandoned railroad property through adverse possession. The court also awarded damages against the defendants for removing the fence the plaintiffs used to contain their cattle and for flood damage that resulted from the removal of the berm. The court also ordered the defendants to replace the berm. The defendants appealed. We have determined that Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-110(a) bars the plaintiffs’ claim of adverse possession because it is undisputed that they did not pay taxes assessed on the railroad property for more than 20 years. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s determination that the plaintiffs own half of the railroad property and hold that the defendant who acquired the property from the railroad by quitclaim deed in 2015 is the rightful owner of the entire 2.9-acre tract. We also reverse the award of damages to the plaintiffs for replacement of the fence and restoration of the entire berm; however, we affirm the trial court’s determination that the defendants are jointly and severally liable for diverting water onto the plaintiffs’ property by removing the railroad berm, and remand this claim for the trial court to award damages and/or determine the appropriate measures the defendants should take to remedy the flooding caused by the removal of the berm. Further, the defendants claim for damages resulting from the temporary injunction is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother/Appellant appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by willful failure to visit and abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1), §§ 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) (ii); (2) persistence of the conditions that led to the child’s removal, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3); (3) failure to substantially comply with the reasonable requirements of the permanency plan, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2); and (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility for the child, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(g)(14). Mother also appeals the trial court’s determination that termination of her parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Because the record does not contain an adjudicatory order of dependency and neglect, we reverse the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights on the ground of persistence of conditions. We affirm the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights on all other grounds and on its finding that termination of Mother’s rights is in the child’s best interest.

Defendant, Deddrick Clay, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for especially aggravated robbery and for being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of especially aggravated robbery and found not guilty of the firearm possession charge. Following a sentencing hearing, Defendant was sentenced to serve 22 years incarcerated. Defendant’s sole issue on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.