APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Kevin E. Trent, was convicted in 2015 upon his guilty plea of vehicular homicide by intoxication, a Class B felony.  See T.C.A. § 39-13-213 (2010).  The Defendant pleaded guilty as a Range I, standard offender and agreed to an eight-year sentence.  The manner of service of his sentence was reserved for the trial court’s determination.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by imposing incarceration rather than an alternative sentence.  We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for the entry of an amended judgment reflecting the sentence of split confinement of time served and the remainder on probation.  Upon remand, the trial court is to determine the appropriate conditions of probation. 

The Petitioner, Patrick Lewis LaForce, appeals as of right from the Cumberland County Criminal Court’s order summarily denying his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. The State has filed a motion to affirm by memorandum opinion the judgment of the trial court. Following our review, we conclude that an opinion in this case would have no precedential value and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Defendant, Edward Dean, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony; employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a Class C felony. He was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I offender to twelve years at 30% for the attempted second degree murder conviction, ten years at 100% for the employment of a firearm conviction, and six years at 30% for the unlawful possession of a firearm conviction. The trial court ordered that the sentences be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of twenty-eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his attempted second degree murder and unlawful possession of a firearm convictions and argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to police, in limiting the testimony of a defense witness physician, in failing to give the jury an instruction on diminished capacity, and in failing to give sufficient weight to mitigating factors in sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments in Counts 1 and 2 but reverse the judgement in Count 3.

The Petitioner, Ercil K. Gates-Rayford, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted.

The Defendant, Floyd Pete Lynch, was convicted by a Hancock County Criminal Court jury of violating the sexual offender registry, a Class E felony.  See T.C.A. § 40-39-208 (2018).  He received a sentence of four years’ confinement.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Brandon Blount, Petitioner, was convicted of one count of aggravated burglary acting in concert with two or more other persons and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony after a jury trial. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of eleven years. Petitioner’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Brandon Blount, No. W2015-00747-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 3131355 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 26, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 26, 2016). Petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appeals, arguing that the post-conviction court improperly denied post-conviction relief. Because we determine that Petitioner has failed to establish that trial counsel was ineffective, we affirm the judgment of the criminal court.

We granted permission to appeal in order to clarify the procedure circuit courts must follow when an original defendant in general sessions court appeals an adverse general sessions judgment to circuit court but then fails to appear for the de novo circuit court trial to prosecute his appeal.  In this case, when the defendant/appellant failed to appear in circuit court to prosecute his appeal, the circuit court dismissed the appeal and remanded the case to the general sessions court for execution of the general sessions judgment.  We hold this was error.  Under Tennessee Code Annotated sections 27-5-106 and -107, the circuit court should have instead entered its own default judgment against the defendant/appellant in the amount of the general sessions judgment, subject to execution in the circuit court, and assessed costs against the defendant/appellant and his sureties.  We also hold that, after the circuit court dismissed the appeal and remanded to general sessions court, the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction under Rules 59 and 60 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure to grant the defendant/appellant’s timely motion to set aside its prior order.  The decision to grant or deny the defendant/appellant’s post-judgment motion was within the circuit court’s discretion.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.  

Mother sought a judgment for child support arrears tracing back to January 2010. Relief was denied when it was determined that a prior order suspending child support in January 2010 had been a final order. Having determined that the order suspending child support was not a final order and was entered in error, we hereby reverse the dismissal of the case and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal arises from an action filed by Robert F. Clark (“Plaintiff”), seeking a declaratory judgment and damages against Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company (“Tennessee Farmers”). Plaintiff applied for a homeowner’s insurance policy with Tennessee Farmers upon his purchase of improved real property. The effective date of the policy was to begin on May 29, 2013, the original date of the closing for the sale of the property. The closing of the real property was rescheduled to an earlier date. A leak occurred after the actual closing on the property but before the date of the original closing and the stated effective date of the homeowner’s insurance policy. Determining that Tennessee Farmers had not been notified of the change and that Plaintiff had signed an authorization for work on the property, the Trial Court granted Tennessee Farmers’ motion for summary judgment. We affirm the Trial Court’s finding that the leak occurred prior to the effective date of the policy. However, we reverse the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment upon our determination that genuine issues of material fact exist to preclude summary judgment on other issues.

This is a healthcare liability action resulting from the death of a child. The defendants moved to dismiss the action for failure to comply with the notice requirements set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). The trial court agreed with the defendants and dismissed the action without prejudice. The plaintiffs appeal the dismissal to this court. We affirm.

The Petitioner, James Snipes, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, seeking relief from his conviction of first degree felony murder and resulting life sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that he is entitled to a second post-conviction evidentiary hearing due to post-conviction counsel’s deficient performance at the first hearing. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the
post-conviction court.

This is an appeal of an order terminating a mother’s parental rights. The trial court found that three grounds for termination were proven against the mother and concluded that terminating her rights was in the minor child’s best interests. Although we vacate one ground for termination due to the trial court’s failure to consider all required elements of the statutory ground, we otherwise affirm the termination order.

The Petitioner, Jawaune Massey, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of first degree felony murder, one count of especially aggravated robbery, one count of possessing twenty-six grams or more of cocaine for resale, one count of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, and one count of maintaining a dwelling where controlled substances are used or sold and his resulting effective sentence of two consecutive life terms.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the Petitioner’s wearing a stun vest at trial.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant, Shermond Dewayne Dillard, Jr., of aggravated robbery, for which he received a
ten-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court should have granted a new trial based on the admission of irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial testimony and improper closing argument by the State. The defendant also contends the trial court erred in sentencing him. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from the divorce of Susan Smith Rawls (“Wife”) and Daniel Wexler Rawls (“Husband”). Wife sued Husband for divorce in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). After a trial, the Trial Court, inter alia, divided the marital estate and awarded Wife alimony and child support. Husband appeals to this Court raising a host of issues. However, Husband’s brief is non-compliant with the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Appeals and the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure to such a degree that his issues are waived. Wife raises an additional issue of her own as to whether Husband is obligated, either by an oral contract he allegedly entered into or through promissory estoppel, to pay the college expenses of one of the parties’ adult children. The evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s finding that Husband never committed to pay these college expenses. Wife also requests an award of attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. We decline to grant such an award. We affirm the Trial Court.

This appeal follows the trial court’s entry of an order of dismissal. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

This is an appeal from the judgment in a personal injury action in which the plaintiff sought to recover damages incurred in a motorcycle accident. Following the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the defendant’s discovery requests, the trial court sanctioned the plaintiff by prohibiting him from introducing a portion of the defendant’s deposition testimony at trial. The case was tried before a jury with the sanctions in place, and the jury returned a verdict in the defendant’s favor. This appeal followed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

I join the majority in affirming the defendant’s conviction of aggravated robbery and ten-year sentence, but I write separately to dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not err by allowing testimony about the stolen rental car.

This is a constructive trust case. The plaintiff, who had recently purchased a twelve-acre tract of real property, filed a complaint for ejectment against the defendants, his uncle and cousin by marriage, who were residing in and claiming ownership of a block house and a two-acre parcel of the twelve-acre tract. The defendants, however, requested—and the trial court ultimately imposed—a constructive trust in favor of defendant uncle against the two-acre parcel and the block house. Finding that the plaintiff purchased the entire twelve acres with notice that the defendant uncle had a beneficial interest in the two-acre parcel and block house, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Elizabeth Lynn Schmitz, appeals her convictions by a Dickson County jury of attempted theft of property over $500 and hindering a secured creditor. The trial court sentenced Defendant to two-years for hindering a secured creditor and a concurrent term of eleven months and twenty-nine day for the misdemeanor theft, suspended to probation. On appeal, Defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support either conviction when the evidence demonstrated that the subject property of both offenses was her own car. Defendant also claims the trial court gave incomplete instructions to the jury. After a full review, we conclude that Defendant is entitled to relief as to the attempted theft of property conviction because Defendant cannot be convicted of attempted theft of something she owned, and we vacate the conviction as to that count. As to the remaining count of hindering a secured creditor, we confirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant challenged the trial court’s ruling that determined when interest began to accrue on a promissory note. Appellant argues that the trial court issued a sua sponte ruling without allowing additional evidence to be presented. Because Appellant failed to meet its burden to show reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s ruling.

The pro se Petitioner, Joshua P. Holt, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

A Putnam County grand jury indicted the defendant for possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver, possession of a Schedule IV controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver, and simple possession of a Schedule II controlled substance. After trial, a jury convicted the defendant of all counts. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless search of his girlfriend’s vehicle. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the indictments against the defendant.

The Defendant, Christopher Ray Rickman, pleaded guilty to the offense of possession with intent to deliver .5 grams or more of methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance. As a condition of his plea, the Defendant expressly preserved a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, stemming from his denied motion to suppress. After thorough review, we conclude that the certified question does not meet the requirements of Rule 37(b)(2)(A) and State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1988), and, as a result, this court is without jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The decedent’s daughter filed suit to set aside conveyances of her father’s property made pursuant to a durable power of attorney. The trial court granted summary judgment in the petitioner’s favor, holding that the decedent lacked the mental capacity to enter into any legal agreement on the date the durable power of attorney was executed. Because we conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to this question, we reverse the entry of summary judgment and remand for such further proceedings as may be necessary and consistent with this opinion.