APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Wesley Dawone Coleman, appeals his conviction for first degree premeditated murder, for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in excluding lay testimony regarding an unwritten code followed by prison inmates and the possible risks of violating the code. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal arises from a divorce action in which the wife was granted a partial default judgment after the husband failed to enter an appearance or file a responsive pleading to the complaint, and failed to file a response or appear at the hearing on the wife’s motion for a default judgment. After receiving the order granting the partial default judgment, the husband retained counsel and filed a motion to set it aside pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(1) and (5), seeking relief for “excusable neglect” and for “any other reason justifying relief.” Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to set aside the partial default judgment upon a determination that the husband’s conduct precipitating the default was willful. The court also set a final hearing to try the remaining issues, including child support for the parties’ minor child and property division. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court valued the marital estate at well over one million dollars; however, the total did not include the present value of the wife’s pension plan, which was classified as marital property and awarded to the wife. Excluding the unknown value of the wife’s pension, the court awarded 60% of the marital assets to the wife and 40% to the husband. This decision was based in part on the court’s finding that in addition to being the sole wage earner for the family, the wife was primarily responsible for the children and the home while the husband “dissipated marital assets” through stock trading. The husband appeals, contending the trial court erred by (1) failing to set aside the partial default judgment; (2) failing to make an equitable division of the marital estate by not determining the value of the wife’s pension plan, designating the husband’s stock trading losses as a dissipation of marital assets, and awarding the wife a greater share of the marital estate, despite the fact that the husband was the economically disadvantaged spouse; and (3) failing to award the husband his attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court in all respects.

Following a reversal and remand of this case for the post-conviction court to make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law, Steven Tyler Nabi v. State, M2017-00041-CCA-R3-PC, 2018 WL 1721869, at *5-6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 9, 2018), the post-conviction court denied relief a second time. On appeal, the Petitioner, Steven Tyler Nabi, argues that his guilty pleas were not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Madison County Grand Jury indicted Cameron Martin, Defendant, for four counts of convicted felon in possession of a handgun. After the trial court denied his motion to suppress, Defendant pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to one count of possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, reserving a certified question of law. The trial court sentenced Defendant to five years as a Range I standard offender and dismissed the remaining counts. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a boundary line dispute. Duane and Jean Southerland (“Plaintiffs”) sued Danny M. Howell (“Defendant”) in the Chancery Court for Van Buren County (“the Trial Court”) seeking declaratory judgment as to a boundary line and damages for the removal of a fence. The Trial Court found that Plaintiffs successfully established their claim of adverse possession over the disputed area. Defendant timely appealed to this Court. Defendant argues, among other things, that Plaintiffs cannot prevail because they did not own or adversely possess the property for a period of 20 years. We, as did the Trial Court, hold that, in keeping with Tennessee law, the requisite time period may be established by successive possessions. The unrefuted proof at trial was that Plaintiffs and their predecessors in title maintained actual, continuous, and exclusive possession of the disputed area for over 20 years. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

The Defendant, Mario Myers, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony; aggravated assault, a Class C felony; reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony; and intentionally evading arrest in a motor vehicle and creating a risk of death or injury to innocent bystanders or other third parties, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101 (2018) (criminal attempt), 39-13-202 (2018) (version effective prior to January 1, 2019) (first degree murder), 39-13-102 (aggravated assault) (Supp. 2012) (amended 2013, 2015, 2018), 39-13-103 (Supp. 2012) (amended 2013) (reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon), 39-16-603(b)(1), (b)(3) (2010) (amended 2016) (intentionally evading arrest in a motor vehicle and creating a risk of death or injury to innocent bystanders or other third parties). The trial court sentenced the Defendant, a Range I offender, to twenty-five years for attempted first degree murder, six years for aggravated assault, two years for reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, and four years for intentionally evading arrest in a motor vehicle and creating a risk of death or injury to innocent bystanders or other third parties. The court ordered that the sentences for attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault were to be served consecutively, for an effective thirty-one-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) he was incompetent at the time of the trial and has been denied due process because a competency evaluation was never performed, and (3) the trial court erred in excluding him from the courtroom during the sentencing hearing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, George Franklin, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of one count of second degree murder and nine counts of attempted second degree murder and resulting effective sentence of 102 years in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective at sentencing and that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose a witness’s statement. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

Defendant, Patrick Bumpus, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary. The State concedes that the trial court erred by summarily denying the motion. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing.

This appeal arises from a divorce proceeding. The only issues raised on appeal relate to the trial court’s awards of alimony and child support. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

This case involves the enrollment of a foreign judgment in Tennessee. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, effectively enrolling the foreign judgment, rendered in Florida, pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution and Tennessee’s Uniform Foreign Judgment Enforcement Act. On appeal, the defendant argues that the granting of summary judgment was improper because the Florida court lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant. Because we conclude that genuine issues of material fact remain unresolved, the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff is vacated and remanded for further proceedings.

This case involves an appeal to the Davidson County Chancery Court (“trial court”) of an administrative zoning decision denying an application for a special exception permit. In January 2018, the petitioner, Venture Holdings, LLC (“Venture”), filed an application with the respondent, the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, acting by and through the Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals (“the Board”), for a special exception permit to build a waste transfer station at a particular location. Following an administrative hearing, the Board denied Venture’s application upon finding that Venture had failed to meet the applicable requirements set forth by the Zoning Code for Metropolitan Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro Code”). Venture, through a petition for writ of certiorari, appealed the Board’s decision to the trial court, alleging that the Board’s decision was not supported by substantial or material evidence and was illegal, arbitrary, and capricious. Following a hearing, the trial court found substantial and material evidence to support the Board’s decision and affirmed the Board’s denial of Venture’s application. Venture timely appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.       

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence three statutory grounds for termination of parental rights: abandonment by willful failure to support and by willful failure to visit and persistence of conditions. The court also found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Upon our review of the record, we affirm.

The driver of a delivery truck was injured when the delivery truck collided with a utility truck. The trial court determined that the utility company was 70% at fault and the delivery driver was 30% at fault. The court awarded the delivery driver $105,000 in damages. On appeal, the utility company argues that the trial court erred in including future medical expenses in its calculation of damages and that the delivery driver failed to mitigate his damages. We find no error in the trial court’s award of damages and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Defendant, Derek Cunningham, appeals from the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Because Defendant has failed to state a colorable claim for relief, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion.

The mother of a three-year-old child appeals the trial court’s ruling that she committed severe child abuse under Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-102(b)(27). The Department of Children’s Services (the “Department”) received a referral from a Memphis hospital after determining that the child had suffered a fractured femur along with other injuries that were not usually caused by normal childhood play. Following its initial investigation, the Department determined that the injuries were the result of abuse by the mother’s boyfriend. Subsequently, the Department filed a petition against the mother and her boyfriend to declare her children dependent and neglected and the victims of severe child abuse. A juvenile court magistrate and the juvenile court judge each found the children dependent and neglected and that the mother committed severe child abuse by failing to protect the child from her boyfriend’s abuse and failing to timely seek medical attention for the child. Following an appeal, the circuit court made the same findings. The mother appeals the determination that she committed severe child abuse. We affirm.

This a declaratory judgment action in which the plaintiff sought to reform a deed that included an incorrect description of the property at issue. The plaintiff alleged that a mutual mistake had occurred and that the parties to the transaction intended to encumber a 2-acre tract of land, not a 0.7-acre tract of land as described in the deed. The plaintiff claimed that the land had also been improperly released. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants appeal. We affirm.

Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of father, J.M., with respect to his children, O.M. and K.M. The court held clear and convincing evidence exists to terminate father’s parent rights on the ground of abandonment by an incarcerated parent, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1), and for failure to manifest an ability to parent, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(g)(14). By the same quantum of proof, the court held that termination is in the children’s best interest. Father appeals. We affirm

The Petitioner, Joseph Mark Whitmore, appeals from the Putnam County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in failing to find that trial counsel was ineffective in advising him that he could withdraw his guilty plea within thirty days of his sentencing hearing and in failing to adequately represent him at sentencing. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Shannon James Keener, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to rape and received a ten-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant claims that his sentence is excessive and that the trial court erred by refusing to grant his request for alternative sentencing. Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Timothy Wayne Johnson, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his motion filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, in which Defendant alleged that his split confinement sentence was illegal because the judgment form designated his confinement in the Tennessee Department of Correction, rather than the local jail or workhouse. Having reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion.

This is an appeal from an order granting the defendants’ Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02 motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Because the plaintiff did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the order as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

The Defendant, Ryan Kevin Thomas, was indicted for first degree premeditated murder; first degree felony murder; and theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1000; a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202, -14-103, -14-105 (2010). Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and of the charged offenses of first degree felony murder and theft. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-210 (2010). The trial court later merged the second degree murder conviction into the first degree felony murder conviction and imposed a total effective sentence of life. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s convictions for first degree felony murder and second degree murder; (2) the trial court erred in admitting an autopsy photograph; (3) the trial court erred in excluding hearsay testimony from a proposed witness for the defense; and (4) the trial court erred in approving the jury’s verdict as the thirteenth juror.1 Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Phillip Harris, Petitioner, was convicted of one count of attempted second degree murder, five counts of misdemeanor reckless endangerment, and one count of unlawful employment of a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony, for which he received a total effective sentence of fourteen years and six months to serve in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, but the post-conviction court denied relief following a hearing.  On appeal, Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to discuss trial strategy with Petitioner and inform Petitioner of the proof to be presented by the defense at trial. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal illustrates the, not uncommon, choice of law problems that can arise when an unmarried couple begins cohabitation in one state and then moves to another state and one of the cohabitants dies. After meeting and living together in California, the cohabitants moved to Tennessee, where they lived together for a number of additional years. When one of the cohabitants died, the other sought a declaratory judgment against the decedent’s children and the trustee of a trust created by the decedent that, among other things, the cohabitants’ relationship entitled the surviving cohabitant to support in the form of “palimony” as allowed by California law. The children and the trustee moved for summary judgment, which was granted. On appeal, the surviving cohabitant argues that the trial court erred in not applying California law to an agreement for support that was made in California. We conclude that, under our choice of law rules, Tennessee law applies.  

This action involves a multistate taxpayer suit concerning an assessment against four Comcast entities doing business in Tennessee for the payment of additional franchise and excise tax liabilities for cable television and internet receipts from Tennessee subscribers. Comcast filed suit against the Tennessee Department of Revenue, alleging that the assessments improperly attributed the cost of performance of various earnings producing activities to Tennessee. Following a hearing, the trial court determined that Comcast failed to correctly identify its earnings producing activity, thereby requiring judgment for the Department. The court alternatively ruled that the activities underlying the licensing costs for video content took place in Tennessee, supporting the assessment for cable television receipts. The court entered judgment against Comcast. We affirm.