APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant-Appellant, William Robert Goodwin, appeals from the order of the Knox County Criminal Court revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. In this appeal, the Defendant concedes that he violated his probation; however, he contends the trial court abused its discretion in ordering confinement because his probation violations were minor, he had established a stable life and work history, and he had compelling family reasons to remain on probation. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Michael Andrew Lethco, was convicted of aggravated sexual battery for which he received a nine-year sentence. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and asserts the State elicited improper testimony from the victim regarding other instances of abuse which prejudiced the defendant. Upon our thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Adayse Gaddy, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2015 guilty plea to possession with the intent to sell or to deliver less than one-half gram of cocaine, for which he is serving a
ten-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, James Walter Grooms, Jr., appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, which petition challenged his conviction for two counts of aggravated assault, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Petitioner, Giovoanne Treymane Johnson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. More specifically, he argues that trial counsel rendered deficient performance by failing to file a motion to sever his trial from that of his co-defendant and for failing to challenge the admission of his co-defendant’s inculpatory statement. Having reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Randy Champion, of one count of especially aggravated robbery, two counts of attempt to commit second degree murder, two counts of employment of a firearm, one count of attempt to commit especially aggravated robbery, and one count of attempt to commit aggravated robbery. For these convictions, the trial court ordered an effective sentence of twenty-four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to prove his identity as a perpetrator of the offenses, that the trial court improperly denied his motion for severance, and that the State presented inconsistent theories of prosecution at trial. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This action involves the trial court’s establishment of a permanent parenting plan for a child born to the unmarried parties. Allan Bradley Flynn (father) appeals the trial court’s decision ordering a permanent parenting plan giving him less than 80 days per year parenting time. Megan Marie Stephenson (mother) appeals the court’s decision to change the child’s surname to Flynn. The trial court made no findings of fact supporting its ordered parenting plan, which it referenced as providing “standard visitation.” The trial court made no reference to the governing statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-106 (2017), nor any of the factors provided in the statute. We vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand with instructions to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. We hold that father failed to carry his burden of proving that a name change will further the best interest of the child, and consequently we reverse the trial court’s judgment ordering the child’s name changed.

Defendant, Robert Jason Allison, was indicted for two counts of delivery of marijuana; possession with intent to distribute over ten pounds of marijuana in a drug-free school zone; possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; and two counts of money laundering. Following a jury trial, at which Defendant represented himself, he was convicted as charged. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed partial consecutive sentencing resulting in an effective 25-year sentence. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that: 1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for money laundering; 2) the indictment conflated two subsections of the money laundering statute; 3) the trial court failed to instruct the jury on all of the elements of money laundering; 4) Defendant’s convictions for money laundering violate double jeopardy; 5) the money laundering statute is unconstitutionally vague; 6) Defendant was deprived his right to a speedy trial; 7) the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of his warrantless arrest; 8) the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of a search warrant; 9) the trial court erred in finding that Defendant waived his right to the assistance of counsel at trial; 10) the trial court abused its discretion in ordering consecutive sentencing; and 11) Defendant’s fines are excessive. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we find no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Anthony T. Tollis, entered a plea of nolo contendre to sexual exploitation of a minor. The Defendant reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) as to whether the search of the Defendant’s computer was lawful based on the search warrant. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The only child of the decedent contests the validity of her father’s will on the grounds that the decedent lacked testamentary capacity, and the will was the result of his step-daughter’s undue influence. When the step-daughter, who was designated as the executrix and sole beneficiary, filed a petition to admit the will to probate, the daughter filed a will contest. Following discovery, the step-daughter filed a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the will contest. The motion was properly supported by a statement of undisputed facts that principally relied on the affidavit of the attorney who prepared the decedent’s will and attended the execution of the will. The attorney’s affidavit stated that the decedent was of sound mind when he executed his will and that the step-daughter, who was the sole beneficiary of the will, was not involved in the preparation of the will and was not present when the will was executed. The motion for summary judgment was also supported by the affidavit of a nurse who cared for the decedent at the veterans’ home and who also witnessed the execution of the will. The nurse testified that he was responsible for the day to day care of the decedent for three years and interacted with him on a daily basis. He also testified that he witnessed the genuine love and affection the decedent and his step-daughter shared, that the decedent wanted to leave everything to her, and that the decedent “was of sound mind and memory when he signed his Will in my presence.” The daughter filed a response to the motion; however, she failed to make specific citations to the record, as Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.03 requires, of facts that would support her contentions of lack of testamentary capacity or undue influence. She also filed medical records concerning the decedent’s medical history; however, the records were not authenticated. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment based on the finding that there was no genuine dispute of material facts and the step-daughter was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We affirm.

Pro se Petitioner, Jonathan David Schelfe, appeals from the denial of his motion for correction of an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Following our review, we affirm.

The issue in this appeal is whether the Tennessee court had personal jurisdiction over the Defendant. A Luxemburg company contracted with a French citizen to provide the citizen with a certain number of flight hours on the company’s private jets; the contract provided that, if the company did not have a jet available, it would procure a private jet from a third party. After providing a jet for the citizen to travel from Luxemburg to Turks and Caicos, the company did not have a jet available to return the citizen to his home, so the company engaged a charter aircraft company based in Tennessee to fly the citizen home in one of the Tennessee company’s jets. When the Luxemburg company did not pay for the flight, the Tennessee company filed this breach of contract action against the Luxemburg company and the French citizen in Rutherford County Chancery Court. The French citizen moved to dismiss the action against him on the ground that the Tennessee court lacked personal jurisdiction over him; the motion was granted. The Tennessee company appeals, contending that the court had personal jurisdiction over the French citizen because the Luxemburg company acted as the citizen’s agent and its contacts with Tennessee were thereby imputed to him for jurisdictional purposes. We conclude that the trial court correctly determined that it did not have personal jurisdiction over the French citizen and accordingly affirm the judgment granting the motion to dismiss.  

The defendant, Randy Earl Edwards, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his 10-year sentence for the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, filed by Deborah Russell (“Plaintiff”), seeking to recuse the trial judge in this case which involves a foreclosure action. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Plaintiff, and finding no error in the Trial Court’s order denying recusal, we affirm.

The Defendant, Gary Lee Bragg, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; possession of burglary tools, a Class A misdemeanor; and two counts of drug possession, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 39- 14-403 (2018); 39-14-701 (2018), 39-17-418 (2018). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender to twelve years for each aggravated burglary conviction and to eleven months, twenty-nine days for each misdemeanor conviction. The court ordered consecutive service of the aggravated burglary sentences, for an effective twenty-four-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support one of the aggravated burglary convictions and (2) the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Richard Williams, Defendant, was indicted on two counts of attempted first degree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder where the victim suffered serious bodily injury, and two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted on all counts as charged and received a total effective sentence of thirty-six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant-Appellant, Nathaniel A. Rhodes, entered guilty pleas to one count of TennCare fraud in case number 15-CR-1060 and to one count of sale of Alprazolam in case number 15-CR-1061, with the trial court to determine the range, length, and manner of service of his sentences following a sentencing hearing. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 71-5-2601(a)(5)(A), 39-17-417. Thereafter, the trial court imposed two consecutive ten-year sentences in confinement. On appeal, Rhodes argues that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. After reviewing the record in this case, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand the case for entry of corrected judgments as specified in this opinion.

The petitioner, James Bostic, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged the revocation of the community corrections placement for his 2014 guilty-pleaded conviction of the sale of cocaine. In this appeal, the petitioner claims entitlement to post-conviction relief on grounds that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at the community corrections revocation hearing. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Petitioner, Jonathon D. Brown, was convicted by a Robertson County jury of aggravated rape, especially aggravated kidnapping, and theft of property over the value of $1,000, for which he received an effective sentence of sixty years’ incarceration. Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, which was denied following an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner appeals, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to adequately meet with Petitioner given the severity of the charges and trial counsel’s failure to secure a land survey to “further buttress his venue argument.” After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this appeal arising from a suit on an indemnity agreement, the indemnitee plaintiff moved for summary judgment. In response, one of the named indemnitors claimed that she could not determine if the signature on the agreement was hers. Another named indemnitor claimed that he was not sure if the signature on the agreement was his but conceded that it could be. And neither purported indemnitor recalled signing the indemnity agreement. The trial court determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact and granted summary judgment. On appeal, the purported indemnitors claim that, because the authenticity of their signatures was in dispute, summary judgment was improper. Alternatively, if summary judgment was appropriate on the issue of liability, the purported indemnitors claim that the trial court erred in its award of damages by including certain unpaid bond premiums and attorney’s fees. We affirm.   

The defendant, Trenton Ray Forrester, aggrieved of his Henderson County Circuit Court jury convictions of aggravated burglary and theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $2,500, appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the propriety of the fully-incarcerative, six-year effective sentence. We affirm both the conviction and the accompanying sentence. Because, however, the trial court failed to consider the defendant’s ability to pay when setting the amount of restitution, we reverse the restitution order and remand the case for a new restitution hearing.

A Fayette County jury convicted the defendant, Rickey Driver, of violating the requirements of the sexual offender registry due to his failure to report during 2016. The trial court imposed a six-year sentence which was suspended after 120 days of service. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Following our review of the record and pertinent authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and expenses to the defendants following the entry of an agreed order granting a voluntary nonsuit to the plaintiff.

I concur in the majority opinion’s result with regard to Batten’s entitlement to the severance package and with regard to the award of attorney’s fees to Bank. However, I must dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to Attorney Edge on Batten’s negligent misrepresentation claim. As discussed by the majority, the alleged representation at issue in this case was that Attorney Edge was unaware of anything that would affect Batten’s ability to receive his negotiated severance benefits if he tendered his resignation in December 2009. According to Batten, Attorney Edge’s representation was false because Attorney Edge was at that time aware of several facts that could undermine Batten’s ability to receive the severance package.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s reconsideration and granting of summary judgment motions that had initially been denied by another judge. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.