APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This matter involves the grant of summary judgment to defendant, K-VA-T Food Stores Inc. (Food City), in a slip and fall case. Plaintiff, Leah Keirsey, filed an action alleging that, on a rainy day, defendant negligently maintained its premises and failed to warn her of hazardous conditions. Defendant moved for summary judgment arguing that it exercised reasonable care to prevent injury to its customers and warned them of potentially wet conditions; its motion was granted. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Owners of a cat filed a wrongful death complaint against the cat’s veterinarian and animal hospital. The defendants admitted liability for wrongly placing a feeding tube into the cat’s trachea rather than her esophagus, causing the cat to aspirate and die when she was fed through the tube. The trial court found the defendants were not liable because the cat was so ill she likely would not have survived long anyway, and it dismissed the complaint. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for a determination of damages.

A subcontractor brought suit against the general contractor for breach of contract and violations of the Prompt Pay Act. The subcontractor sought both damages, including punitive damages, and reformation of the subcontract based on fraud or mutual mistake. The general contractor counterclaimed for breach of contract. Upon the parties’ agreement, the trial court reformed the subcontract based on mutual mistake. The trial court also granted the general contractor summary judgment on the subcontractor’s claims for fraud and punitive damages. Then, following a bench trial, the court awarded a judgment to the subcontractor on its breach of contract claim and dismissed the general contractor’s counterclaim. The court declined to award the subcontractor a statutory penalty or attorney’s fees under the Prompt Pay Act. We affirm the trial court.

A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant, James Lucas Green, for driving under the influence (“DUI”), fifth offense, violation of the implied consent law, and violation of a habitual motor vehicle offender restriction. The trial court imposed an effective four-year sentence to be served at thirty percent. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for DUI; (2) the trial court improperly overruled his Batson challenge; (3) the trial court erred when it ordered consecutive sentencing; and (4) cumulative error entitles him to relief. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

We granted this appeal to determine whether a person listed as a joint tenant with right of survivorship on checking and savings accounts sufficiently alleged claims for relief against a bank by asserting that the bank removed his name from the accounts without his consent and breached its duty to him as a co-owner of the account by accepting forged signature cards. We conclude that the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to survive the bank’s motion to dismiss because, under Tennessee law: (1) each joint tenant with right of survivorship of a multiple-party account is deemed an owner of the account; (2) all joint tenants have presumptively equal ownership of account funds; (3) a contractual relationship arises between a bank and joint tenants upon the creation of joint tenancy bank accounts; (4) contracts cannot be modified except upon consent of the parties; and (5) no statute affords banks protection from liability for removing a joint tenant’s name from an account without the joint tenant’s consent. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s judgment granting the bank’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Ellen Becker Goldberg, of vandalism of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, misdemeanor assault, and stalking for offenses committed against her neighbor, who suffered from chronic illness and physical disability. The Defendant was sentenced to serve three years of supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove the value of the vandalized property, the mens rea for vandalism, or ownership of the property; that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for assault; that the evidence was insufficient to establish the elements of stalking, particularly in light of the statutory exclusion for constitutionally protected conduct; that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence regarding the value of the vandalized property; and that the Defendant was erroneously sentenced under the incorrect theft statute. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the savings statute in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-112 applies to the revisions to the theft statute in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-105(a). Accordingly, we remand for resentencing and for the correction of errors on the judgment forms. In all other respects, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Petitioner, Willie L. Pegues, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition pursuant to the
Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act. The post-conviction court denied relief on the basis that, although the Petitioner requested various forms of scientific analysis, his claim was not cognizable because he had not requested DNA analysis. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the court erred in dismissing his petition because the scope of the forensic testing authorized by the statute is not limited to DNA analysis. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Keith Lemont Farmer, appeals from the Lake County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his 2012 conviction for attempt to commit first degree murder and his twenty-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred by dismissing his petition. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Stacy Clark (“Employee”) alleged that she injured her back and left knee in the course and scope of her employment with Charms, L.L.C. (“Employer”). The trial court determined that Employee suffered a compensable injury to her left knee and awarded 21 percent permanent partial disability, temporary total disability, medical expenses, future medical expenses, discretionary costs, and attorneys’ fees. The court made no award for the injury to her back. Employer’s appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In this appeal, the wife challenges the trial court’s division of the marital assets and liabilities. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Gerardo Juarez, of two counts of reckless endangerment, one count of attempted voluntary manslaughter, three counts of aggravated assault, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of eleven years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his aggravated assault and attempted voluntary manslaughter convictions. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case for corrected judgment forms in Counts one, four, and five.

The petitioner, Fabian Claxton, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis by the Shelby County Criminal Court, arguing the trial court erred in dismissing the petition because newly discovered evidence exists in his case. After our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

A Madison County grand jury indicted the defendant, Brandon Ramel Cole-Pugh, with aggravated burglary and theft of property over $1,000. Following trial, a jury found the defendant guilty of aggravated criminal trespass, a lesser-included offense of aggravated burglary, and theft of property over $1,000, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of eight years. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his theft of property conviction and requests plain error review of the prosecutor’s closing argument. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we modify the defendant’s theft conviction from a Class D felony to a Class E felony based on the criminal savings statute and impose a sentence of four years’ confinement as a Range II offender. We affirm the judgments of the trial court in all other respects.

The Defendant, Christopher Desmond Simpson, was convicted by a Lawrence County Circuit Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-210 (2018). The Defendant was sentenced to twenty-five years’ incarceration. On appeal, he contends that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his pretrial statement, (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (3) the trial court erred by denying his motion to sequester the jury, (4) the trial court erred by admitting autopsy photographs, (5) the trial court erred during jury instructions, and (6) the trial court erred during sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal concerns a post-divorce effort to modify a residential parenting schedule. Angela Charlene Iveson (“Mother”) filed a petition against ex-husband Jeffrey Wayne Iveson (“Father”) in the Chancery Court for Sumner County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to modify the permanent parenting plan applicable to their minor daughter (“the Child”). The petition proceeded to a bench trial. Afterward, the Trial Court entered an order reducing and restricting Father’s parenting time as well as increasing his child support obligation. Father appeals to this Court, arguing, among other things, that the restrictions placed upon his parenting time are unwarranted and that the Trial Court erred by using his income for the most recent one year rather than a three year average of his income for child support purposes. We find that the Trial Court’s decisions with respect to these discretionary issues have a sufficient evidentiary basis and are consistent with applicable law. Thus, the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

This is an appeal from a final order granting the petition, filed by the appellees, Stephen Teague, M.D., Mark Rasnake, M.D., University Infectious Disease, Lori Staudenmaier, D.O., and UT Family Physicians LaFollette, which sought a permanent restraining order against the appellant, Shane Bruce. The final order denying the pro se appellant’s motion to set aside the judgment, which the Trial Court treated as a motion for new trial, was entered on January 22, 2018. The appellant did not file his Notice of Appeal until November 21, 2018, more than thirty (30) days from the date of entry of the final order. The appellees filed a motion to dismiss this appeal arguing that the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed. We conclude that the appellees’ motion is well-taken and that we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Aggrieved of his Knox County Criminal Court jury conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the defendant, Antonio Thomas appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and arguing that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence certain Facebook messages in the absence of sufficient proof of the authenticity and reliability of the messages. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Charles Montague, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which petition challenged the judgments for his 1993 misdemeanor convictions of possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Daniel Earl Gentry, appeals the Blount County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Sharles Johnson, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury conviction of theft. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to the element of intent. We affirm the jury verdicts but remand the case for the entry of corrected judgments reflecting that the alternative counts of theft are merged.

The Petitioner, Emil John Ford, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered because he was not informed “that he could be on the sex offender registry for life.” Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Timothy Clayton Thompson, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends (1) that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered because of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and (2) that trial counsel failed to adequately prepare for the Petitioner’s sentencing hearing. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Harry Gilley, pled guilty to one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; four counts of burglary of a habitation under construction, Class D felonies; five counts of felony theft of property, Class E felonies; two counts of misdemeanor theft of property, Class A misdemeanors; and one count of vandalism of property, a Class A misdemeanor, stemming from charges in eight indictments. In exchange for his pleas, the Defendant received an effective Range III sentence of fifteen years with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a hearing, the trial court ordered that the Defendant serve his sentence in confinement, which the Defendant appeals. After review, we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court.

This appeal involves the issue of personal jurisdiction over Appellee, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in San Francisco, California. The trial court, on Appellee’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, decided it lacked personal jurisdiction and dismissed the case. Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

The petitioner, Terry Johnson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.