APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Aaron Long, appeals the denial of his request for judicial diversion by the Fayette County Circuit Court. The defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his request for diversion by improperly relying on two previous misdemeanor convictions for which he served no jail time. After our review, we affirm the trial court’s denial and imposition of an effective three-year sentence of supervised probation. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Kristie Lea Crafton, Defendant, was sentenced to drug court after she violated the terms of probation. After she was expelled from drug court, the trial court revoked her probation and ordered Defendant to serve her sentence in confinement. We affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Charles Burrow, of three counts of second degree murder, one count of first degree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, one count of aggravated criminal trespass, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus six years. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. The defendant also contends the jury’s verdicts are inconsistent and requests plain error review of improper statements by the prosecutor. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case for corrected judgment forms in Counts one, two, three, four, and five.

A husband and wife were divorced after being married for nineteen years. The trial court divided the marital estate and awarded the wife alimony in futuro. The husband appealed, claiming the trial court erred in classifying a camper as marital property and in awarding the wife long-term spousal support. We affirm the trial court’s judgment and award the wife her reasonable attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

The Defendant, Timothy Leron Brown, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony while having prior felony convictions, theft of property valued less than $500, and failure to appear. The Defendant received an effective sentence of life plus thirty-one years. On appeal, the Defendant challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence of his convictions for first degree premeditated murder and theft, (2) the trial court’s denial of his motion to sever the offenses for trial, (3) the admission of bad act evidence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b), (4) the admission of evidence that the murder victim was a police informant, (5) the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress his cell phone records obtained pursuant to a judicial subpoena, (6) the trial court’s denial of his motion to exclude cell tower evidence as unreliable expert proof, (7) the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search of his cell phone, (8) the admission of text messages from the Defendant’s cell phone, (9) the admission of photographs from the Defendant’s cell phone, and (10) the trial court’s imposition of partial consecutive sentences. We conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the Defendant’s theft conviction, and we, therefore, reverse and dismiss the theft conviction. We also conclude that the trial court erred in failing to sever the offenses and that the error was not harmless as to the Defendant’s conviction for first degree premeditated murder. Accordingly, we reverse the Defendant’s conviction for first degree premeditated murder and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial. We otherwise affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Petitioner, Anthony Blake Wisdom, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of aggravated robbery and resulting fourteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Bill Shannon Wilson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his Campbell County Criminal Court jury convictions of rape of a child. In this appeal, the petitioner reiterates his claim that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel and that the cumulative effect of the errors of his counsel, when combined with errors committed by the trial court and this court, deprived him of the right to a fair trial. Because the petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to post-conviction relief, we affirm.

Ricky Armstrong (“Employee”) alleged that he injured his lower back, neck, and left shoulder in the course and scope of his employment with Armstrong Hardwood Flooring Company (“Employer”). The trial court determined that Employee was permanently and totally disabled. Employer’s appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Demario Lawon Fisher, pled guilty to attempted especially aggravated robbery, two counts of attempted first degree murder, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony in exchange for a total effective sentence of twenty-five years. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. The post-conviction court denied relief, and upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this action to recover for property damage sustained as a result of flooding and seeking injunctive relief, the trial court held that the statutes of limitations and repose barred Plaintiffs’ claims for nuisance and negligent construction of a levee, that Plaintiffs did not prove certain elements of their claims for negligence or willful and wanton conduct, and that no civil conspiracy existed; the court granted summary judgment to Defendants. Plaintiffs appeal. Upon review, we reverse the grant of summary judgment with respect to the nuisance and negligence claims, and remand the case for further proceedings; we affirm the judgment with respect to the civil conspiracy claim.

The pro se appellant, a state inmate, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Davidson County Chancery Court (“trial court”). Averring that correction facility officials had wrongfully withheld back pay due to him for thirty-seven days of work he missed in his prison employment program pending his ultimately successful appeal of a disciplinary action, the petitioner requested that the trial court direct prison officials to tender $1,475.37 in back pay plus interest. The prison officials, represented by the Tennessee Attorney General’s office, filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the petitioner had waived this action in the trial court by previously filing a claim with the Division of Claims Administration (now known as the Division of Claims and Risk Management) and that the petitioner was not entitled to back pay under the applicable program procedures. In an order entered upon the pleadings, the trial court dismissed the petitioner’s action upon finding that the applicable procedures did not entitle the petitioner to back pay. The petitioner then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which the trial court denied. The petitioner has appealed. Having determined that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this action, we vacate the trial court’s order and dismiss this case.   

On March 26, 2018, the Defendant, Kevin Gantt, pleaded guilty to soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to two years at 30% in the Department of Correction and required that he register as a sex offender. The Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred in sentencing him to the maximum sentence of two years and in denying his request for judicial diversion. After thorough review, we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court.

Defendant, Trimon Pruitt, was indicted by the Madison County Grand Jury for first degree murder. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced Defendant to 24 years’ imprisonment with 100 percent release eligibility. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends: 1) the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction; 2) the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a statement made by Defendant; 3) the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Defendant. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we find no error. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Mandon Rogers, Defendant, was convicted of attempted first degree murder (resulting in serious bodily injury), employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Defendant claims the evidence was insufficient to show that he intended to kill the victim or that the victim suffered serious bodily injury and that, if the attempted murder conviction is reversed, his conviction for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony should also be reversed. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Bruce Milton Miller (“Husband”) and Lucinda Miller Miller (“Wife”) were divorced in December of 2017. The parties entered into a Mediation Agreement, a Marital Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”), and a Permanent Parenting Plan in connection with the divorce. In February of 2018, Husband filed a Rule 60 motion seeking to reform the parties’ MDA. The Trial Court entered its order on May 24, 2018, reforming the MDA based upon mutual mistake and awarding retroactive child support. Wife appeals to this Court raising issues regarding the reformation of the MDA and the amount of retroactive child support awarded. We find and hold that no proof was presented of a mutual mistake, and therefore, the Trial Court erred in reforming the MDA. We further find and hold that Wife waived her issue as to retroactive child support. We, therefore, vacate that portion of the Trial Court’s May 24, 2018 order reforming the MDA and affirm the portion awarding retroactive child support.

The Defendant, Rad Mandela Kellar, appeals as of right from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his request for judicial diversion. The Defendant pled guilty to possession of not less than ten pounds, one gram of marijuana nor more than seventy pounds of marijuana with intent to sell, and he was sentenced to two years of unsupervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying judicial diversion. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court held that Appellant failed to meet her burden to prove her claims of assault and battery. Appellant appealed. Due to the deficiencies in Appellant’s appellate brief, we do not reach Appellant’s substantive issues and dismiss the appeal.  

The Defendant, Robert William Ward, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of attempted first degree murder with serious bodily injury, a Class A felony, and possession of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101 (2018) (criminal attempt), 39-13-202 (2014) (first degree murder), 40-35-501(k)(5) (2014) (amended 2015, 2016) (sentencing for attempted first degree murder with serious bodily injury), 39-17-1324 (2014) (firearms possession). He received an effective thirty-five-year sentence, to be served consecutively to his sentence in another case. On appeal, he contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his attempted first degree murder with serious bodily injury conviction, (2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the Defendant’s prior conduct, (3) the court erred in failing to strike hearsay testimony from the record, (4) the court erred in admitting a State’s witness’s prior statement, (5) the court erred in limiting his cross-examination of a State’s witness, (6) cumulative trial error requires relief, and (7) his attempted first degree murder sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a case arising out of the Teacher Tenure Act. A tenured middle school teacher sought review of a decision of the board of education upholding his termination for inefficiency, incompetence, and neglect of duty. The chancery court affirmed the board’s decision, sustaining the teacher’s termination. Teacher appealed to this Court. We reverse the chancery court’s findings with respect to neglect of duty. However, we affirm the chancery court’s findings with respect to inefficiency and incompetence, and thereby affirm the teacher’s termination.

The pro se Petitioner, Peter D. Billington, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

In appealing a non-final order, Appellant asks this Court to adopt a jurisdictional exception to the final judgment rule that would allow an immediate appeal of a trial court’s decision to grant a motion under Rule 60.02 where the trial court purportedly lacked jurisdiction to do so. We decline to adopt a per se exception to Rule 3(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure where the trial court grants a Rule 60.02 motion. We likewise decline to suspend the finality requirement in this particular case. As such, this appeal is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Jocelin Williams, of firstdegree, premeditated murder of Delvin Brown, the victim in this case. She was also convicted of murder during the perpetration of robbery, especially aggravated robbery, and theft of property valued over $500. The trial court merged the murder convictions and imposed an effective sentence of life plus twenty years’ imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress a statement which was given while she was alleged to have been impaired; and (2) whether the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to support her convictions of first-degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. Upon our review, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Nicos Broadnax, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that trial counsel’s admitting that the Petitioner was guilty of robbery in opening statement was “ineffective and prejudicial.” Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Shawna N. Henson, was indicted by a Campbell County grand jury for tampering with evidence and possession of drug paraphernalia in Case No. 17592, and for theft over $500 in Case No. 17593. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-103; 39-16-503; 39-17-425. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant pled guilty to all three charges. The trial court sentenced her as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective term of nine years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant challenges her sentence as inconsistent with the purposes and principles of sentencing under Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-35-102 and 103. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Marick Pettis, pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and identity theft and received a total effective sentence of ten years. Thereafter, the Appellant filed a “Petition for Suspension of Sentence,” which was denied by the trial court. The Appellant appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.