APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Following the denial of his motion to suppress, the Defendant-Appellant, Raymond Crepack, was convicted as charged by a Sevier County Circuit Court jury in Count 1 of driving under the influence (DUI by impairment), third offense, T.C.A. § 55-10-401(1); in Count 2 of driving while the alcohol concentration in his blood or breath was 0.08% or more (DUI per se), third offense, id. § 55-10-401(2); in Count 3 of violating the open container law, id. § 55-10-416, and in Count 4 of driving while his license was cancelled, suspended, or revoked for a prior DUI conviction, id. § 55-50-504(a)(1). The trial court merged the conviction for DUI per se, third offense, with the conviction for DUI by impairment, third offense, and sentenced Crepack1 to concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served at 100%, to thirty days for the open container violation, and to six months for the driving on a revoked license conviction. On appeal, Crepack argues: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the investigatory stop, which was based upon reports from an anonymous caller, amounted to an improper seizure without independent corroboration of his “poor driving,” and (2) the sentence for his DUI, third offense, conviction is excessive. After review, we remand the case for entry of corrected judgment forms in Counts 1 and 2 as specified in this opinion. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

A tenured teacher serving as an assistant principal was transferred to teach at an alternative school after the local director of schools learned that the teacher did not hold an administrator’s license. On appeal, the teacher asserts that the transfer was arbitrary and capricious where the director of schools did not comply with the law concerning when assistant principals are required to hold administrator’s licenses. Following a trial, the trial court dismissed the teacher’s complaint, ruling that the director of school’s belief that the teacher was required to hold an administrator’s license was reasonable. We conclude that the director of schools’ actions and beliefs were not reasonable under the circumstances; as such, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal arises from an action to terminate a testamentary trust, the only assets of which were non-income producing real estate. The trial court ruled that the trust terminated by operation of law pursuant to the terms of the trust following the death of the primary beneficiary, the father of the residuary beneficiaries, and it ordered the clerk of the court to prepare a deed transferring the real estate to the seven beneficiaries. The trustees appealed, contending they have the sole discretion to determine the manner of distribution, which includes the option of selling the real estate to one of the trustees and then distributing the net proceeds from the sale to the beneficiaries. We affirm the trial court’s determination that the trust terminated by its own terms upon the death of the primary beneficiary. Although we agree with the trustees’ argument that they had the discretion to distribute the assets in kind or sell the assets and distribute the net proceeds to the beneficiaries, the record reveals they failed to do so in a timely manner. Because the trustees failed to “proceed expeditiously” to distribute the trust assets to the beneficiaries, as Tenn. Code Ann. § 35-15-817(b) requires, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A pro se plaintiff filed suit over the seizure of his bank account. The defendants all moved to dismiss under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12, and the trial court granted the motions. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Marvin Readus, was convicted in the Davidson County Criminal Court of aggravated kidnapping while employing a firearm, aggravated rape, and aggravated assault, and he received an effective sentence of life plus fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition requesting DNA analysis of evidence pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Laura L. Beasley, pled guilty in the Sumner County Criminal Court to vehicular homicide by intoxication, a Class B felony, and two counts of vehicular assault, Class D felonies, with the sentences to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed sentences of ten years, three years, and three years, respectively, to be served consecutively in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the length of sentences imposed, the imposition of consecutive sentences, and the denial of an alternative sentence. After review, we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court.

A father’s parental rights to two children were terminated on the grounds of abandonment by incarceration, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody, and upon a determination that terminating the father’s parental rights would be in the best interest of the children. Father appeals; finding no error, we affirm

Appellant was previously terminated from his employment with the Shelby County Fire Department. After the Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board upheld Appellant’s termination, judicial review followed in the Shelby County Chancery Court, which affirmed the Merit Board’s decision. In his appeal to this Court, Appellant contends that the decision upholding his termination should be reversed due to a violation of his due process rights. We agree and reverse.

Susie Plunk (“Employee”) alleged that she sustained a compensable injury in the course and scope of her employment with Professional Home Health Care Services (“Employer”). Employer filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that Employee’s claim should be dismissed for lack of service of process or insufficient process. The trial court granted Employer’s motion finding that Employer was not served with process, Employer had sufficiently raised failure of service of process as a defense, and Employer had not waived that defense by participating in the litigation. Employee has appealed that decision. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We reverse the decision of the trial court and remand the case for a trial on the issues.

The Petitioner, Willie Jones, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2014 convictions for second degree murder and being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm and his effective twenty-nine-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, William Franklin Robinette, appeals the denial of his petition for postconviction relief, which petition challenged his 2012 Greene County Criminal Court jury convictions of solicitation to commit first degree murder, claiming that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief.

This appeal concerns the dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficient process, and insufficient service of process of a lawsuit regarding the administration of two trusts of which appellant, Joseph Peter Meersman, Jr., was a beneficiary. Appellant first had summons issued and attempted service by mail on March 1, 2016. The case remained dormant for over a year before the appellant filed additional documents. The appellees subsequently filed motions to dismiss, basing the motions primarily on insufficient service of process. The trial court granted each defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that there was insufficient process, insufficient service of process, and the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants due to the insufficient service of process. We affirm.  

The parties initiated divorce proceedings in 2012. Trial dates were set and then continued a number of times until August 2017, when the trial court issued an order stating that the trial would take place on October 31, 2017, and that there would be no more continuances. Neither the husband nor his attorney appeared for the trial, and the wife proceeded to present evidence in support of her case. The trial court granted the wife a divorce, designated her the primary residential parent, divided the marital property, awarded her child support, and awarded her attorney’s fees. The husband moved to have the divorce decree set aside based on excusable neglect, inadvertence, or mistake. The trial court denied the husband’s motion, and the husband appealed. On appeal, the husband challenges the trial court’s refusal to set the decree aside. He also alleges the trial court erred in dividing the marital property, finding he was voluntarily underemployed for purposes of calculating his child support obligation, and awarding the wife her attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

This appeal represents the third time, each after a trial on the merits, that we have addressed the facial constitutionality of Tennessee’s lethal injection protocol. In both prior appeals, we upheld the particular protocol at issue. In this most recent litigation, the death-sentenced inmates challenge Tennessee’s current three-drug protocol, which calls for the administration of midazolam followed by vecuronium bromide and potassium chloride. The trial court dismissed the inmates’ complaint for declaratory judgment. This Court, upon its own motion, assumed jurisdiction over the appeal. After our review of the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the inmates failed to carry their burden of showing availability of their proposed alternative method of execution—a onedrug protocol using pentobarbital—as required under current federal and Tennessee law.  For this reason, we hold that the inmates failed to establish that the three-drug protocol constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or article I, section 16 of the Tennessee Constitution. This holding renders moot the majority of the other issues before us. The expedited appellate procedure has not denied the inmates due process, and they are not entitled to relief on their remaining issues. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Decedent died intestate leaving her mother, Esther Pearson, as her sole heir. Appellant is Decedent’s sister and Ms. Pearson’s daughter. Appellant appeals the trial court’s determination that the Disclaimer Ms. Pearson signed was ineffective. Appellant also appeals the trial court’s denial of her Motion to Intervene. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

We granted this Rule 9 interlocutory appeal in this healthcare liabilty action to consider whether termination of representation by plaintiff’s prior legal counsel a few weeks before the expiration of the statute of limitations in this healthcare liability action constitutes sufficient extraordinary cause to excuse (1) plaintiff’s failure to wait at least sixty days to file the complaint after providing pre-suit notice as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121; and, (2) plaintiff’s failure to file a Certificate of Good Faith with the complaint as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122. We find and hold that the Trial Court did not err in finding and holding that termination of representation by plaintiff’s prior legal counsel a few weeks before the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations does constitute the type of extraordinary cause sufficient to excuse plaintiff’s failure to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-26-121 and 29-26-122. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court’s orders denying the motions to dismiss.

The Defendant, Patricia Ann Bingham, a.k.a. Patricia Ann Starnes, appeals her jury conviction for aggravated robbery, for which she received a sentence of ten years’ incarceration. In this direct appeal, the Defendant alleges the following errors: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction, arguing that the State failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that she personally assaulted the victim or directed her co-defendant during the robbery and that the State failed to prove that either she or her co-defendant used a deadly weapon to accomplish the robbery; and (2) that trial court failed to properly supervise the jury’s viewing of the surveillance video footage and that admission of the entire surveillance video was error because all of the angles contained on the recording were not properly authenticated. Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Rubin P. Pena, was convicted by a Rutherford County Circuit Court jury of vehicular homicide by reckless conduct, a Class C felony, three counts of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony, and leaving the scene of an accident resulting in a death, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-213 (2014) (amended 2015) (vehicular homicide by reckless conduct), 39-13-102 (reckless aggravated assault) (2014) (amended 2015), 55-10-101 (leaving the scene of an accident resulting in a death) (2014). The Defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender and received a six-year sentence for vehicular homicide by reckless conduct and concurrent four-year sentences for each reckless aggravated assault conviction. The Defendant also received a two-year consecutive sentence for leaving the scene of an accident resulting in a death, for an effective sentence of eight years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his vehicular homicide by reckless conduct and reckless aggravated assault convictions and (2) the trial court erred during sentencing by applying certain enhancement factors. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Christopher M. Hooten, appeals the denial of his petition for post conviction relief from his convictions of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, aggravated robbery, and tampering with evidence. On appeal he contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner also appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis based upon newly discovered evidence. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Jamaal Austin, was convicted by a jury of one count of first degree felony murder; one count of first degree premeditated murder; one count of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony; two counts of attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony; one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; and one count of employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -13-202, -13-402, -13-403, -14-403, -17-1324(b). The trial court then merged the first degree premeditated murder conviction into the first degree felony murder conviction. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of life imprisonment plus twenty-four years. On appeal, the defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) that the trial court erred in denying his severance motion; (3) that his convictions violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy; (4) that the trial court failed to fulfill its duty as the thirteenth juror; and (5) that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing partial consecutive sentences. Following our review, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction for especially aggravated robbery. We vacate that conviction and modify it to aggravated robbery. The case is remanded to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing on the modified conviction, entry of an amended judgment form reflecting the modification, and entry of corrected judgment form in Count 1 reflecting the trial court’s merger of the first degree premediated murder conviction into the first degree felony murder conviction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court in all other respects.

Pro se Petitioner, Martrell Holloway, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his “Ex Parte Injunction and/or Show Cause Order” and “Motion to Alter and Amend Judgment Dated August 16, 2017 Denying ‘Ex Parte Injunction and/or Show Cause Order.’” On appeal, he argues that his original convictions are invalid because the trial court clerk failed to file-stamp his judgments of conviction in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(e) and Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 58. The State contends that the Petitioner’s appeal is not properly before this court, and despite the lack of jurisdiction, the Petitioner is not entitled to relief on the merits of his claim. Upon review, we agree with the State and dismiss this appeal pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

This is a health care liability case. The trial court granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment on Appellant’s res ipsa loquitur claim under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-115(c). Appellant appeals. Because Appellant presented sufficient evidence at the summary judgment stage to create a dispute of fact, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.