APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Maegan Davis, the Defendant, pled guilty to one count of driving under the influence and one count of driving under the influence per se and reserved a certified question. In her appellate brief, the Defendant states the following questions for appeal: “(1) Was the initial stop of the [D]efendant supported by probable cause that the [D]efendant had committed an offense?”; “(2) When the [D]efendant was detained, was that detention supported by probable cause that the [D]efendant had committed the offense of driving under the influence of an intoxicant?”; and “(3) Should the blood taken from the [D]efendant be suppressed as the fruit of an illegal seizure pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 7 of the Tennessee Constitution where the [D]efendant was detained for more than ninety (90) minutes without being given a field sobriety test?” After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we dismiss the Defendant’s appeal because she failed to properly certify her questions of law in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) and State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1988).

This appeal involves the plaintiff’s filing of a complaint for unjust enrichment and conversion against his business partner’s spouse after the plaintiff discovered that his partner converted partnership funds for personal use. The trial court dismissed the complaint following a bench trial. We affirm.

Freeman York, Petitioner, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition to restore his driving privileges. Petitioner asserts that the revocation period of his license has expired and that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his petition. Petitioner also argues that the trial court failed to properly set out its factual findings and legal conclusions in its order. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we conclude that the trial court set out sufficient factual findings and conclusions of law in its written order. We also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the petition for reinstatement of driver’s license. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Raymond Thomas Sweatt, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of robbery and carjacking and resulting effective twenty-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel, which resulted in his guilty pleas being unknowing and involuntary. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Rachris R. Thomas, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court denying the petition.

Petitioner, Raphael Love, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After a review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we determine Petitioner has failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In a pending divorce proceeding, Wife filed four separate contempt petitions against Husband. After a court appearance on Wife’s third and fourth petitions, without taking evidence and without finding Husband in contempt, the trial court ordered that Husband be taken into custody and confined in jail for a period of thirty days. A mittimus subsequently issued, and Husband appealed. For the reasons stated herein, the trial court’s order is reversed and the issued mittimus is vacated.

This appeal arises from a breach of contract action. Premier Imaging/Medical Systems, Inc. (“Premier”) contracted with Coffey Family Medical Clinic, P.C. (“CFMC”), an organization formed by Dr. D. Bruce Coffey, M.D. (“Dr. Coffey”), for a five year servicing contract (“the Contract”) under which Premier would provide service for a CT Scanner (“the Scanner”). Pioneer Health Services of Oneida (“Pioneer”) and Dr. Coffey later entered into an agreement whereby Pioneer assumed certain obligations, apparently including the Contract. At CFMC’s request, Premier began billing Pioneer. Pioneer eventually stopped making payments under the Contract. Premier sued CFMC in the Circuit Court for Scott County (“the Trial Court”) to recover on the remainder of the Contract. CFMC argued that Pioneer became a substituted obligor under a theory of novation. After trial, the Trial Court held that CFMC failed to prove novation, awarded Premier $89,166.60 for the twenty months remaining on the Contract, and granted prejudgment interest of ten percent from the end of the Contract for a total of $105,534.70. CFMC appeals. We hold, inter alia, that the Trial Court did not err in holding that CFMC was unable to meet its burden of proving that novation, implied or otherwise, occurred. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

This post-divorce appeal concerns the mother’s filing of a petition to find the children dependent and neglected based upon the father’s behavior during his co-parenting time. The juvenile court granted the petition and ordered supervised visitation. The father appealed to the circuit court for a de novo hearing, held approximately one year later. The circuit court dismissed the petition, finding that the children were no longer dependent and neglected. The mother appeals. We affirm

A jury convicted the Petitioner, Edgar Ray Bettis, of first degree murder, second degree murder, and unauthorized use of a vehicle, and he received an effective life sentence. After his convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal, the Petitioner sought postconviction relief on the grounds that trial counsel was ineffective in: (1) failing to evaluate the Petitioner’s competency; (2) failing to file a motion to suppress the Petitioner’s statement; (3) allowing a substitute medical examiner to testify; (4) failing to object to photographs entered into evidence; and (5) failing to secure a forensic pathologist to counter the State’s expert. After a thorough review of the record and law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

This interlocutory appeal involves a health care liability action. Plaintiff gave potential defendants written notice of his malpractice claim. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c). Plaintiff then filed his complaint. In doing so, he relied upon a 120-day extension of the one year statute of limitations as provided for in § 29-26-121(c). Each defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint. By an order entered April 1, 2015, the trial court granted the joint motion to dismiss of three of the defendants. The court’s order concluded that plaintiff’s complaint was time-barred. Plaintiff did not appeal the court’s judgment and, with the passage of time, it became final. Meanwhile, the motions to dismiss of the other defendants, all of which were essentially based upon the same ground as that of the joint motion of the dismissed defendants, were awaiting resolution by the trial court. Before this could happen, however, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his complaint. Nine months later, plaintiff sent a new pre-suit notice. Four months after that, plaintiff filed a second health care liability action against the same defendants, including those dismissed by the trial court in its April 1, 2015 order. All defendants again moved to dismiss the complaint. The trial court denied the motions. Later, the trial court decided that its April 1, 2015 dismissal order was incorrect. It concluded that plaintiff’s first complaint was not time-barred because, according to the court, plaintiff provided proper pre-suit notice. On the defendants’ further motions, the court granted them permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal pursuant to the provisions of Tenn. R. App. P. 9. We did likewise. We now reverse the judgment of the trial court denying defendants’ motions to dismiss.

This case involves a dispute concerning the validity of an oral agreement to rescind a written commercial lease agreement. In May 2011, the plaintiff company entered into a written lease, agreeing to rent a commercial building to the defendant company for a set term of three years and nine months. The lease provided for the first nine months of tenancy without rental payments, setting rental payments at $2,250.00 per month for the remainder of the initial term. At some time during the latter part of 2011, the two companies’ respective presidents purportedly met and mutually agreed to terminate and rescind the lease. The presidents’ agreement was never memorialized in writing, however, and the lease contained a provision that prevented any oral modification to the contract. Neither company thereafter acted in accordance with the lease until November 24, 2015, when the plaintiff’s new president contacted the defendant in writing, demanding thirty-six months of unpaid rent in addition to a five-percent late fee pursuant to the lease, for a total of $85,050.00. The defendant did not tender any payment to the plaintiff as requested. On May 17, 2016, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Knox County Chancery Court (“trial court”), alleging unpaid rent and requesting an award of rent payments, late fees, and reasonable attorney’s fees. The defendant filed an answer, asserting, inter alia, that the lease was invalid as a result of the oral rescission by mutual agreement in 2011. Upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, awarding a monetary judgment in the amount of $92,208.75, representing an $81,000.00 balance of unpaid rent, $4,050.00 in late fees, and $7,158.75 in reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses. The defendant filed a motion to alter or amend judgment, which the trial court denied. The defendant has appealed. Having determined that the lease did not prohibit an oral rescission by mutual agreement, we reverse the grant of summary judgment to TTL. Having also determined that a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether TTL’s former president possessed the authority to orally rescind the lease, we affirm the denial of summary judgment to J&S and remand for evidentiary proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Defendant, Gary Ray Weldon,1 was convicted by a Campbell County jury of one count of solicitation of a minor to engage in aggravated statutory rape, and he was sentenced to one year in confinement. He appeals, arguing that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Christopher Lee Stewart, appeals the Jefferson County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. The State has filed a motion to affirm the trial court’s order pursuant to Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the order of the trial court.

This post-divorce appeal concerns the husband’s motion to reduce spousal support and the wife’s request to set permanent child support for their disabled daughter. The court reduced the spousal support obligation based upon a material change in circumstances but found that it was without jurisdiction to enter an order of permanent child support. The wife appeals. We affirm.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, James B. Cobb, was convicted of driving under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor. He received a sentence of eleven months and twentynine days, suspended after forty-eight hours of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in excluding a defense expert’s curriculum vitae from evidence; (3) the State made improper closing argument; and (4) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s oral request for a jury instruction on character witnesses. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Josh A. Danoff, was indicted by the Montgomery County Grand Jury for contributing to the delinquency of a minor, aggravated statutory rape, and three counts of rape based upon alternative theories of the same offense. Upon motion of the State, the trial court dismissed one count of rape prior to trial. Defendant was convicted by a jury of the remaining counts as charged. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve three years for his aggravated statutory rape conviction, eight years for each rape conviction, and 11 months and 29 days for his contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The trial court merged the rape convictions and aggravated statutory rape conviction into one conviction of rape and ordered Defendant’s sentences to be served concurrently, for a total effective sentence of eight years. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; that the trial court committed plain error by allowing hearsay testimony; and that the trial court erred by failing to grant probation or split confinement. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we find no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Damarkus Lowe, appeals his jury conviction for first degree murder, for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment. In this direct appeal, the Defendant alleges the following errors: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, challenging the evidence establishing premeditation and criminal responsibility, and alleging that the accomplice testimony was not sufficiently corroborated; (2) that admission of a packet of letters sent to the police anonymously, which contained a note from the anonymous source and three letters allegedly authored by the Defendant that he mailed from jail to his associates, was improper because the letters were not properly authenticated, contained inadmissible hearsay, violated his confrontation rights, and were more prejudicial than probative; (3) that recorded jail calls containing inadmissible hearsay were erroneously admitted in violation of his confrontation rights; (4) that testimony regarding his “street name” of “D-Ru” was irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative; (5) that the trial court acted in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), when it failed to compel the State to disclose the name of a jailhouse informant who claimed to have information related to the victim’s murder; and (6) that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its closing argument by improperly vouching for several witnesses’ credibility requiring plain error relief. Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellants appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee, medical doctor. The trial court found that Appellant’s petition for declaratory judgment sounded in health care liability and was barred by the statute of limitations. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-116(a)(1). Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

The Petitioner, Corey Gray, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his untimely petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of four counts of attempted first degree premediated murder, four counts of aggravated assault, four counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and one count of felony evading arrest and resulting effective sentence of 104 years in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by determining that due process did not require tolling the statute of limitations. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant appeals the trial court’s entry of default judgment as a discovery sanction against it. Because there is insufficient evidence of contumacious conduct on the part of Appellant to justify default, we reverse the trial court’s entry of default judgment on liability. We vacate the trial court’s award of damages on the jury verdict, but affirm the award of attorney’s fees as an initial discovery sanction.

The Appellant, Grady Dewayne Carroll, filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, and the Madison County Circuit Court summarily denied the motion. On appeal, the Appellant contends that his effective four-year sentences for his reckless endangerment and felony evading arrest convictions are illegal because the trial court used a prior juvenile adjudication for aggravated robbery to sentence him as a Range II, multiple offender. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of the motion.

This interlocutory appeal involves a health care liability action. Plaintiff gave written presuit notice of her claim to all potential defendants. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c) (Supp. 2013). Later, she filed a complaint against the same defendants. In doing so, she relied upon the 120-day extension of the one-year statute of limitation as provided for in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c). Each defendant filed a motion to dismiss. Prior to a hearing on those motions, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her complaint. Plaintiff subsequently served each defendant with new pre-suit notice and later re-filed her complaint in reliance on the one-year savings statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105, and the 120-day extension pursuant to § 29-26-121(c). Defendants moved to dismiss the second complaint. The trial court denied defendants’ motions. In doing so, the court took “judicial notice” of the practice of some attorneys in the Second Judicial District of providing their adversaries with “blank” authorizations. The court ultimately held that the medical authorizations in the first pre-suit notice were not only HIPAA compliant, but “overly” so. The trial court concluded that, because the first pre-suit notice was, according to the court, valid, the first-filed complaint was timely filed. Upon the request of the defendants, the court granted them permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal pursuant to the provisions of Tenn. R. App. P. 9. We likewise granted defendants permission to file a Rule 9 discretionary appeal. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the plaintiff’s suit with full prejudice.

Mother appeals the trial court’s decision to terminate her parental rights to two children on the grounds of (1) substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan and (2) persistence of conditions. She further challenges the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the children. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

While I understand my learned colleagues’ desire to bring finality and stability to the lives of these children who so desperately deserve it, I must unfortunately conclude that this case cannot be resolved based upon the order entered by the trial court. I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.