APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Armard Reeves, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief, alleging that he was deprived of an impartial jury based on juror misconduct and that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to pursue this issue in a motion for new trial and on direct appeal. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Larry Eugene Haynes, appeals the Sevier County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation for his forgery and misdemeanor theft convictions and ordering him to serve the remainder of his effective six-year sentence in confinement. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering his sentence into execution. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Bryant Williamson was convicted of one count each of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and unlawful employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to an effective sentence of life plus ten years. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions. After a thorough review of the record and briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Elijajuan Smith, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for his burglary of a business and vandalism convictions and ordering him to serve his effective four-year sentence in confinement. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This Court suspended attorney James Carl Cope pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 22.3, based on his federal felony conviction for insider trading and referred the matter to the Board of Professional Responsibility (“Board”) to initiate proceedings to determine his final discipline. A hearing panel (“Panel”) imposed a final discipline of twenty-five months’ suspension, retroactive to the date of his initial suspension by this Court, which was on October 25, 2016. Neither the Board nor Mr. Cope appealed this judgment. The Board petitioned this Court for an order enforcing the Panel’s judgment. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 15.4(b) and (c), we determined that the punishment imposed by the Panel appeared inadequate and proposed that it be increased. Mr. Cope subsequently requested oral argument, which we granted. We now consider whether the punishment imposed by the Panel is appropriate under the circumstances of this case and is in uniformity with prior disciplinary decisions in this state. Following a thorough review of the record and the law, we conclude that it is not. Therefore, we modify the Panel’s judgment to impose the twenty-five-month suspension prospectively from the filing of this opinion.

This appeal concerns the termination of two parents’ parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Stewart County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Joshua H. (“Father”) and Amie H. (“Mother”) to their minor children Justice and Alijah (“the Children,” collectively). After a trial, the Juvenile Court found the ground of severe abuse with respect to both parents. The Juvenile Court also found that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. Mother and Father appeal to this Court. Neither parent contests grounds for termination, but both parents challenge the Juvenile Court’s finding that termination of their parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. We find by clear and convincing evidence, as did the Juvenile Court, that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court.

The defendant, Paul Flannigan, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence imposed for his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, aggravated rape, and aggravated burglary. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Adam C. Butler, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2015 conviction of vandalism of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Mainor Celin Avilez Canales, was convicted after a jury trial of aggravated sexual battery and sentenced to serve twelve years in prison. The Defendant appeals, contending that the jury instructions did not adequately specify the mens rea of the offense and that the trial court improperly enhanced the sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Teddie Elijah Fason, entered guilty pleas to burglary, theft of property valued at more than $1,000, vandalism, and evading arrest, and he was sentenced to serve four years on probation. The Defendant appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation and its judgment ordering him to serve his sentences in confinement. After a thorough review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Leonard Ross, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary denial of his pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence for his 1993 convictions for especially aggravated robbery, attempted second degree murder, and burglary and his effective thirty-five-year sentence. The Defendant contends that the trial court court erred by summarily dismissing his motion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Fred E. Smith, Jr., is appealing the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted.

The trial court ordered the Appellant to pay its employee for the full twelve hours of a work shift excused due to the employee’s jury service. For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and order that the case be dismissed.

The State of Tennessee appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s imposition of an eleven months, twenty-nine days’ confinement at 75% service for theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1000. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103 (2014) (theft); 39-14-105 (2014) (amended 2017) (grading of theft). On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred by sentencing the Defendant pursuant to the amended version of the grading of theft statute that became effective after the commission of the offense. However, we have concluded that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the issue because no appeal of right lies for the State pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 or Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-402. As a result, we dismiss the appeal.

This action involves a claim filed against the State of Tennessee with the Tennessee Claims Commission. The Commissioner ultimately dismissed the claim with prejudice for failure to advance the case to disposition. The claimant filed a motion for relief from the judgment pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.1 The claimant then filed a notice of appeal before the Commissioner ruled upon the motion. We dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This case involves an order of protection sought by the petitioner against the respondent, who is the petitioner’s husband, on behalf of the petitioner and her three minor children. The trial court initially granted an ex parte order of protection and scheduled the matter for hearing. Following a subsequent bench trial, the trial court extended the ex parte order of protection for a period of one year, but it made no findings of fact or conclusions of law regarding the allegations in the petition or whether the petitioner had met her burden of proof. The petitioner timely appealed. Because the trial court failed to make adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law, we hereby vacate the trial court’s order and remand for entry of sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding whether the ex parte order of protection should be dissolved or an order of protection, not to exceed one year, be entered pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-605 (2017).

This is a slip-and-fall case. An employee of a catering company fell, injuring herself when leaving a private residence after dark as she attempted to traverse an outside staircase. The employee brought suit against the homeowners, and the homeowners filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the homeowners’ motion, concluding that the homeowners did not owe the employee a duty of care. Our review of the record has revealed that material, disputed facts remain which render this case inappropriate for summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse and remand. 

The Appellant, Jenaline Fisher, is appealing the trial court’s denial of her motion to correct an illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted.

The petitioner, Mark D. Moraca, appeals the denial of his motion to expunge the records of his 1994 convictions for simple possession of amphetamine and simple possession of cocaine. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Andrew Young Johnson, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, which petition challenged his 1998 convictions of attempted first degree murder and felony reckless endangerment. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of coram nobis relief.

This appeal involves a breach of contract action in which the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant and later dismissed a motion to alter or amend its judgment. The plaintiff appeals the denial of her motion to alter or amend the judgment. We dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

This appeal arises from a Petition to Terminate Parental Rights filed by the foster parents. The Department of Children’s Services removed the child from the mother and father’s custody and placed the child in the custody of the foster parents because, shortly after the child was born, the child tested positive for drugs. On the petition of DCS, the juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected based on the finding that the parents committed severe child abuse. Thereafter, DCS filed a Petition to Terminate Parental Rights based, in part, on the records provided by the case worker. Subsequently, DCS determined that the case worker had falsely reported that the parents were noncompliant with the permanency plan. Following an inquiry that revealed the parents were in substantial compliance with the permanency plan and that all drug tests were negative, DCS dismissed its petition with court approval. Thereafter, the foster parents commenced a new and independent action to terminate mother and father’s parental rights; the petition also named DCS as a respondent. The foster parents subsequently filed a motion to compel joinder of DCS as a co-petitioner on the ground that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(h)(1)(D) mandated that DCS file a petition to terminate parental rights if a juvenile court has made a finding that the parents committed severe child abuse. DCS opposed the motion on the ground that it had the discretion not to pursue termination of parental rights if a compelling reason existed. The trial court denied the motion, and the case proceeded to trial on the foster parents’ petition. Following trial, the court found that the foster parents proved severe child abuse by clear and convincing evidence; however, the court determined that termination of the parents’ rights was not in the child’s best interests and dismissed the petition. This appeal followed. Having determined that the foster parents failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parents’ rights was in the child’s best interests, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Montez Maxwell, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief alleging he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner entered guilty pleas to attempted second degree murder and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which he received an effective sentence of sixteen years. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the postconviction court.

Geoffrey Cale Vermilyea (“Husband”) sued Jessica Lynn Vermilyea (“Wife”) for divorce. After trial, the Chancery Court for Dickson County (“Trial Court”) entered its Final Decree of Divorce on June 13, 2017 (“Final Decree”) declaring the parties divorced, distributing the marital assets, denying Wife’s request to relocate to Canada with the parties’ minor child (“Cale”), denying Wife alimony, and entering a Permanent Parenting Plan with regard to Cale. Wife appeals the Final Decree raising issues regarding the Trial Court’s order denying Wife’s request to relocate to Canada with Cale and denying her an award of alimony. We find and hold that the Trial Court did not err in finding that it was not in Cale’s best interest to relocate to Canada and, therefore, denying Wife’s request to relocate. We further find and hold that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wife alimony. We, therefore, affirm the Final Decree.

A mother’s parental rights were terminated on the ground of abandonment by willfully failing to visit her daughter. Mother appeals, arguing that the petition initiating the proceeding did not include the notice required by Rule 9A of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure; that the record did not contain clear and convincing evidence that she abandoned her child; and that termination was not in the child’s best interest. Upon our review, we conclude that the proof does not clearly and convincingly establish the ground of abandonment by failure to visit. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the petition.