APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises from an action for grandparent visitation. The child’s father died when she was seven weeks old, and when the mother denied visitation to the paternal grandmother, the paternal grandmother filed a petition for grandparent visitation. After a trial, the court determined that the mother opposed visitation, the presumption of substantial harm was not overcome, and grandparent visitation was in the child’s best interests. The court ordered grandparent visitation the third weekend of each month, Thanksgiving break in odd years, every Christmas break, and every summer break. The court also gave the grandmother four of the parental rights found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-101(a)(3)(B)—the right to educational records, the right to be free from derogatory remarks, the right to be notified of medical emergencies, and the right to be notified of extracurricular activities and the opportunity to participate in or observe them. The mother filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, and the grandmother filed a response and a motion to strike the hearsay contained in mother’s motion. Grandmother also requested attorney’s fees in connection with her motion to strike hearsay. The trial court entered an “amended” order that was substantively the same as its original decision granting grandparent visitation, and it ordered the mother to pay the grandmother’s attorney’s fees in connection with the grandmother’s motion to strike hearsay. On appeal, the mother asks this court to determine (1) whether the trial court erred “by awarding appellee grandmother a visitation schedule which is essentially a ‘tweaked’ parenting plan, along with the rights of a parent under Tennessee law,” and (2) whether the trial court erred by awarding the grandmother her attorney’s fees in opposing the mother’s motion to amend. We have determined that the extensive visitation schedule impermissibly interferes with the mother’s parental rights under the Tennessee Constitution, and therefore, it is not “reasonable” under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306(c). We have also determined that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-101(a)(3)(B) is inapplicable in actions for grandparent visitation; therefore, the grandmother is not entitled to any of the rights listed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306. Further, we have determined that the trial court erred by awarding attorney’s fees to the grandmother because we find no contractual or statutory basis for the award. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is vacated and this matter is remanded with instructions for the trial court to establish a grandparent visitation schedule that comports with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306(c) and minimizes interference with the mother’s fundamental constitutional rights

A delinquent taxpayer’s property was sold at a tax sale on January 22, 2014. The taxpayer subsequently conveyed her interest in the property to a third party that redeemed the property within the one-year statutory redemption period. The proceedings were stayed a year and a half due to the redeeming party’s bankruptcy; after the stay was lifted, the trial court held a hearing on the tax-sale purchaser’s motion for additional costs and then entered an order finalizing the redemption. In that order, the trial court ruled that the redeeming party was required to, among other things, pay interest on the price paid by the tax-sale purchaser at the tax sale for the entire period between the tax sale and entry of the final order. The redeeming party appeals, arguing that the statute only allowed interest to be charged from the date of the tax sale through the date the redemption process began. We agree, and we therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

The defendant, Michael White, appeals the denial of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence imposed for his 2005 Marshall County Circuit Court jury convictions of rape. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of relief.

A Sullivan County jury convicted the Petitioner, Bashan Murchison, of nine counts of felony drug offenses. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of fifty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, this court affirmed the judgments and sentence. See State v. Bashan Murchison, No. E2014-01250-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 659844 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Feb. 12, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016). The Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition claiming that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel, and the post-conviction court denied relief following a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that his counsel was ineffective. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Melvin Dwayne Dunn, Jr., was convicted by a jury of nine counts of burglary; one count of attempted theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000; one count of evading arrest; and one count of possession of burglary tools. He was sentenced as a career offender and received an effective sentence of thirty-six years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his attempted theft conviction. He also argues that the trial court erred in admitting statements made by the Defendant during bond negotiations. After thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant publisher of an allegedly defamatory newspaper article concerning plaintiff. The article was based upon a one-onone, private interview between the public information officer for the White County Sheriff’s Office and a newspaper reporter. The court determined that the interview given by the public information officer constituted an “official action” of government that the article fairly and accurately reported. As such, the court concluded that any alleged defamatory statements included in the article were privileged under the common-law “fair report privilege.” Plaintiff appealed, arguing in part, that the fair report privilege does not apply. Because we conclude that the interview did not constitute an official act of government, we reverse the grant of summary judgment.

In this health care liability action, the defendant doctor filed an unopposed motion for summary judgment. After the motion was granted, he filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-122, requesting the court to compel the plaintiff or his counsel to provide the court with a copy of the expert’s signed written statement that was relied upon in executing the certificate of good faith that accompanied the complaint. The trial court denied the motion, holding that the matter should have been raised in the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment or a motion for discretionary costs. Upon our review of the statute, we do not find a requirement that the request for the expert witness’ statement be made in the manner held by the trial court; accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further consideration of the defendant’s motion.

This is a divorce case. The trial court entered a final decree of divorce designating Husband as the primary residential parent for the parties’ minor child and concluding that Husband is not under-employed for purposes of calculating child support. Because the trial court did not make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law as required under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01, we vacate the trial court’s judgment as to the issues raised on appeal.

An inmate in state custody who was being housed in a county jail filed suit under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act to recover for injuries he suffered while on a work detail. The trial court dismissed the suit, holding that Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-2-123(d)(2) grants counties that allow inmates to work on road details and other projects immunity from liability for injuries. The inmate appeals, contending he was not in the class of inmates defined in section 41-2-123 and, consequently, that the county’s immunity was removed. Concluding that section 41-2-123(d)(2) controls over the provisions of the Tort Liability Act, we affirm the trial court’s judgment that the county was immune and its dismissal of the suit.

A Dickson County jury convicted the Defendant, Michael Lee Hogan, of two counts of the sale of cocaine, one count of the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine and one count of the sale of more than .5 grams of cocaine. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Career Offender to an effective sentence of forty-five years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of casual exchange; and (2) the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Petitioner, John R. Jackson, of two counts of facilitation of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, one count of facilitation of theft of property valued over $500, and one count of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, this court affirmed the judgments and sentence. See State v. John R. Jackson, No. M2013-00696-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 2039761 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, May 16, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2014). The Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition, and the post-conviction court denied relief following a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, his convictions are based on illegal evidence presented at trial, and the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during opening and closing statements. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Lindsey Brooke Lowe, of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of first degree felony murder, and two counts of aggravated child abuse, all arising from the Defendant’s smothering to death her newborn infant twins. The trial court merged the alternative counts of first degree murder as to each victim and sentenced the Defendant to two terms of life imprisonment for the murders and two terms of twenty-five years for the aggravated child abuse convictions, all to be served concurrently. On direct appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the Defendant’s convictions and sentences. We granted the Defendant’s application for permission to appeal in order to address the following issues raised by the Defendant: (1) whether the Exclusionary Rule Reform Act, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-6-108 (“the ERRA”), violates the Tennessee Constitution’s Separation of Powers Clause; (2) whether the trial court erred by relying on the ERRA to deny the Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence gathered at her house pursuant to a search warrant that did not conform with the technical requirements of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 41; (3) whether the trial court erred by ruling inadmissible certain expert testimony proffered by the defense during the hearing on the Defendant’s motion to suppress her statement to Detective Malach; (4) whether the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion to suppress her statement; and (5) whether the trial court erred by prohibiting the Defendant’s expert witness from testifying at trial about the reliability of her responses to Detective Malach’s questions. We also directed the parties to address the additional issue of whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule adopted by this Court in State v. Davidson, 509 S.W.3d 156, 185-86 (Tenn. 2016), should be expanded to include clerical errors made by the issuing magistrate when the search in question is otherwise constitutional. We hold that the ERRA represents an impermissible encroachment by the legislature upon this Court’s authority and responsibility to adopt exceptions to the exclusionary rule and, therefore, violates the Tennessee Constitution’s Separation of Powers Clause; that the exclusionary rule should not be applied to suppress evidence gathered pursuant to a search warrant that is technically defective under Rule 41 due to the magistrate’s simple and good-faith clerical error of incorrectly indicating on one of three copies of the warrant that it was issued at 11:35 “PM” while correctly indicating on the other two copies that it was issued at 11:35 “AM”; that the trial court did not err in ruling inadmissible the defense expert’s testimony at the hearing on the Defendant’s motion to suppress her statement, although the trial court should have allowed defense counsel to proffer the testimony in a question and answer format; that the trial court did not err in ruling that the Defendant was not in custody at the time she made her statement to Detective Malach, rendering moot any claimed defects in the administration of Miranda warnings prior to her statement being made; and that the trial court did not commit reversible error in ruling inadmissible at trial certain proffered expert testimony by a defense witness. In sum, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions and sentences. 

We granted permission to appeal in this case in order to determine whether the exclusionary rule should be applied to a blood sample drawn from an individual pursuant to a search warrant because the arresting officer failed to leave a copy of the warrant with the individual. The Defendant, Angela Faye Daniel, was arrested for driving under the influence. The arresting officer obtained a search warrant and transported the Defendant to a medical facility for a blood draw. The officer failed to give the Defendant a copy of the search warrant. The trial court granted the Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant on the basis of the exclusionary rule set forth in Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 41. The State sought and was granted an interlocutory appeal, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We hold that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, a good-faith exception should be applied to Rule 41’s exclusionary rule. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment below and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.  

Plaintiffs/Appellants sued Defendants/Appellees for nuisance and trespass claims over a dispute in the change of water flow onto Appellants’ property due to modifications, namely the installation of a pipe, on Appellees’ property. Appellants voluntarily non-suited the case twice, and ultimately filed the instant complaint almost five years after the filing of their original complaint. Appellees moved for summary judgment on both claims. In a three-part ruling spanning thirteen months, the trial court granted summary judgment and determined (1) that the pipe was a permanent nuisance and, therefore, any nuisance claim was time-barred; (2) that the trespass was a permanent trespass and, again, time-barred; and (3) that Appellants could not establish causation as to the trespass claim. We affirm the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment.  

This appeal arose from a divorce action filed by the husband. The parties entered into a mediation agreement in December 2014, wherein the parties agreed, inter alia, that the husband would pay to the wife $1,200 per month in alimony, that the husband’s alimony obligation would cease if the wife were cohabitating with a person of the opposite sex, and that the wife would be designated as the primary residential parent for the parties’ minor child. Following execution of the mediation agreement, the husband’s employment hours were decreased by his employer. The wife subsequently filed a “Motion to Restore Payment Agreement,” in which she alleged that the husband had failed to adhere to his financial responsibilities pursuant to the mediation agreement. The husband thereafter filed a response to the wife’s motion, alleging that a material change in circumstance had occurred subsequent to the mediation agreement. The trial court entered a judgment on February 25, 2016, enforcing the mediation agreement but determining, due to the husband’s decrease in income, that a material change in circumstance had occurred since the mediation agreement was entered into by the parties. The trial court further found that the wife had been cohabitating with a person of the opposite sex. Nonetheless, the trial court determined that the wife remained the economically disadvantaged spouse following the divorce and reduced the husband’s alimony responsibility to $500 per month. The trial court further determined that it was in the best interest of the child for the wife to be the primary residential parent of the child. The husband subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend the trial court’s judgment and a motion to terminate his alimony obligation, both of which were denied by the trial court. Husband timely appealed. Having determined that the trial court erred by failing to cease Husband’s alimony responsibility, in compliance with the enforced mediation agreement, upon its finding that the wife was cohabitating with a person of the opposite sex, we reverse the alimony award. We affirm the remaining aspects of the trial court’s judgment. Because the husband’s payment history regarding alimony is unclear from the record, we hereby remand for a determination by the trial court regarding whether Husband owes Wife alimony incurred prior to February 25, 2016, or whether Husband is owed reimbursement of alimony paid past February 25, 2016.

The parents of two children adopted a parenting plan in which Mother was designated the primary residential parent and parenting time was split equally; a special provision in the parenting plan prevented either parent from relocating with the children without the other parent’s permission. Mother subsequently informed Father of her intent to relocate to another state with the children. In response, Father filed a petition in opposition to removal and to modify the parenting plan. The court denied Mother’s relocation, holding that the provision in the parenting plan superseded the application of the parental relocation statute; the court further determined that the parties were spending substantially equal time with the children and that relocation was not in the children’s best interest. Mother appeals. We conclude that the court erred in holding that the provision in the parenting plan prevented Mother from relocating; that the court did not make sufficient findings of fact to support its holding that the parents were spending substantially equal time with the children; and that the finding that relocation is not in the best interest of the children is supported by the evidence. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment in part, affirm in part, and remand the case for further proceedings.   

This appeal arises out of the appellant prisoner’s petition for a writ of error coram nobis. The petitioner, convicted of aggravated rape in 1998, asserted in his petition that the State violated his constitutional right to due process of law by withholding exculpatory evidence from the defense in his trial, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Without asking the State for a response to the coram nobis petition and without an evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition in part because it was filed long after expiration of the one-year statute of limitations and demonstrated no reason for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. The Court of Criminal Appeals declined to consider the statute of limitations because the State had not pled it as an affirmative defense, but affirmed the dismissal because the petition did not present newly discovered evidence warranting coram nobis relief. On appeal, we initially clarify that an error coram nobis proceeding is not the appropriate procedural vehicle for obtaining relief on the ground that the petitioner suffered a constitutional due process violation under Brady. As to the petition, we hold that (1) coram nobis petitions with insufficient allegations are susceptible to summary dismissal on the face of the petition, without discovery or an evidentiary hearing; (2) Tenn. R. Civ. P 8.03 does not apply to a petition for writ of error coram nobis; (3) timeliness under the statute of limitations is an “essential element” of a coram nobis claim that must be demonstrated on the face of the petition; and (4) if the petitioner seeks equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, the facts supporting the tolling request must likewise appear on the face of the petition. Applying this standard, we find no error in the trial court’s decision to dismiss the coram nobis petition and affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, Phillip Daniel Morton, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of first degree murder, for which he received a life sentence. See T.C.A. § 39-13- 202. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his (1) petition for writ of error coram nobis and (2) request for a jury charge of voluntary intoxication. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Samantha Gadzo, was indicted for driving under the influence of an intoxicant, driving under the influence per se, reckless driving, violation of the Due Care law, and failure to maintain her lane of travel. See T.C.A. §§ 55-10-401,-401(a)(2),-205; 55-8-136, -123. She filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the traffic stop, arguing that it was not supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the Defendant’s motion, which is the subject of this State appeal. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Curtis Lashun Wren, appeals from the denial of relief from his “Ex Parte Injunction and/or Show Cause Order,” which the trial court treated as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because the pleading, even if treated as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, does not meet the procedural requirements set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-21-105, -106, and/or -107, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, albeit for different reasons.

This is an appeal by the prevailing party of an award of damages in a breach of contract action arising out of a commercial lease agreement. Upon our review, we find no reversible error and accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Tre Desean Bell, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of voluntary manslaughter, see T.C.A. § 39-13-211, for which he received a sentence of six years in continuous confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in (1) denying his request for judicial diversion; (2) imposing the maximum sentence permissible; and (3) imposing a sentence of continuous confinement. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a final judgment entered on March 12, 2018. Because the defendant did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the final judgment as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

Defendant, Patrick Cosby, plead guilty to attempted aggravated robbery with an agreed sentence of six years with the trial court to determine the manner of service. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered Defendant to serve his six-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying alternative sentencing. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Relying on due process grounds, the mother of the parties’ child contends the juvenile court erred by modifying the parenting plan and designating the father as the primary residential parent. The only petition before the court was the father’s petition for contempt. The juvenile court magistrate who presided over the initial hearing informed the mother “that the issue before the Court was whether the mother was in contempt of this Court and upon the Court’s own motion, if she should remain custodian of the child.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the magistrate found “that because of the mother’s lack of compliance and cooperation, she was in Contempt of Court and that custody of the child would be granted to the father. . . .” The mother filed a request for rehearing in the juvenile court, and the juvenile court judge affirmed the magistrate’s order. This appeal followed. Because neither party petitioned the court to modify the existing permanent parenting plan or the designation of the primary residential parent and due process requires, at a minimum, “notice reasonably calculated . . . to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections,” Keisling v. Keisling, 92 S.W.3d 374, 377 (Tenn. 2002) (quoting State v. Pearson, 858 S.W.2d 879, 884 (Tenn. 1993)), it was error for the juvenile court to modify the permanent parenting plan and change the primary residential parent. As a result, we vacate the juvenile court’s order modifying the permanent parenting plan and designating the father as the primary residential parent and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.