APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises from a judicial determination of the fair value of dissenters’ shares in a corporation. In 2002, King Solomon’s Palace, Inc., (“KSP”) a corporation created in 1986 for the purpose of establishing a hotel in Pigeon Forge, announced its pending merger into another company, National Parks Resort Lodge Corporation (“Plaintiff”). Johnny Jess Davis (“Davis”) was the majority shareholder of KSP. Dissenters Antonio Perfetto and David L. Donohue (“Defendants”) each held 50 shares of KSP common stock. Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Chancery Court for Sevier County (“the Trial Court”) seeking a judicial determination of the fair value of Defendants’ shares. After a trial, the Trial Court awarded Defendants $186,913 for their shares and $122,876 in attorney’s fees and costs. The Trial Court found, in part, that Davis had manipulated and withheld financial information to Defendants’ detriment. Plaintiff appeals to this Court, arguing, among other things, that the evidence preponderates against the Trial Court’s findings regarding Davis’s conduct. Defendants raise an additional issue arguing that the Trial Court set the value of their shares lower than it should have under the evidence. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

This appeal involves a parent’s obligation to pay college expenses for her son. After the parties’ divorce proceeding, various orders and parenting plans were entered reflecting the parties’ agreement to share equally their children’s college expenses at the University of Tennessee. The trial court found that the parties subsequently reached an agreement that resulted in the oldest child deferring his enrollment for one semester, but that the agreement did not terminate or excuse the parties’ existing obligation to share college expenses upon enrollment. The trial court found the mother in civil contempt for refusing to pay the college expenses and awarded a monetary judgment to the father for the unpaid expenses. We affirm.     

Kendall M. was born in January 2016; she tested positive for amphetamines at birth and was placed in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit where she was diagnosed with Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome and suffered from withdrawal symptoms. Upon her release from the hospital, she was placed with foster parents, in whose care she has remained. A proceeding to have her declared dependent and neglected was initiated by the Department of Children’s Services and permanency plans developed in May and October of 2016. In March of 2017 the Department filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Kendall’s Mother on the grounds of abandonment by an incarcerated parent and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; following a hearing, the court granted the petition and terminated Mother’s rights on both grounds. Mother appeals the termination of her rights on the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans and the holding that termination of her rights was in the best interest of Kendall. Upon our review, we conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of her rights on both grounds, and the finding that termination of Mother’s rights is in Kendall’s best interest; accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Ronald Wayne Gilbert, appeals his Sevier County Criminal Court jury convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault, challenging both the trial court’s denial of his motion to strike the victim’s testimony and his motion to dismiss based upon the failure to preserve certain evidence. We affirm the convictions and sentence but remand for correction of a clerical error in the judgment.

This appeal arises from three post-divorce petitions for criminal contempt against Father in which Mother asserts over 200 separate counts. The principal issues on appeal pertain to the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. Following a three day trial on the first petition, Father was found to be in criminal contempt of 60 counts. After Mother filed her second petition in which she alleged 133 additional counts of contempt, the parties appeared in court to announce a settlement pursuant to which Father would plead guilty to 10 unspecified counts with the remaining counts to be dismissed. Without advising and questioning Father before accepting a plea as Tenn. R. Crim. P. 11(b) requires, the trial court approved the agreed order, finding Father in criminal contempt of 10 unspecified counts. After Mother filed her third petition for criminal contempt, Father filed a “Motion to Alter or Amend and/or Rule 60.02 Motion to Set Aside Most of the Criminal Contempt Findings and Holdings in this Cause,” contending all but two of the 60 initial convictions were constitutionally flawed. As for the first 58 convictions, Father argued the notice of criminal contempt failed to specifically state essential facts concerning each ground as required by Tenn. R. Crim. P. 42(b). With regard to Father’s guilty plea to 10 additional counts, Father contended the plea and sentence were fatally flawed because the trial court failed to ascertain whether Father’s guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered as Tenn. R. Crim. P. 11(b) requires. The trial court vacated 55 of the 60 initial convictions, finding the notice of criminal contempt failed to state essential facts as required by Tenn. R. Crim. P. 42(b); however, the order that followed held Father in criminal contempt for sending a text to Mother at 10:11 a.m. on June 20 for which Father had been acquitted following trial. The court also set aside Father’s guilty plea to 10 of the 133 additional counts in the second petition because the court failed to advise and question Father before accepting a plea as required by Tenn. R. Crim. P. 11(b). The trial court also ruled, over Father’s objections, that Mother could prosecute Father on all 133 counts in the second petition. In this appeal, Father contends the trial court violated the constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy by (1) finding Father guilty of a count of criminal contempt for which he had been acquitted following trial, and (2) allowing Mother to prosecute her second 05/29/2018 - 2 - petition. Because double jeopardy prohibits a prosecution after an acquittal on the same count, we vacate Father’s conviction for criminal contempt for sending a text to Mother at 10:11 a.m. on June 20. As for allowing Mother to prosecute all 133 counts in her second petition, the agreed order, in which Father pled guilty to 10 counts, failed to specifically identify any of the counts for which Father pled guilty or any of the counts for which he was acquitted; therefore, jeopardy did not attached to any of the 133 counts. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision allowing Mother to prosecute the 133 counts in her second petition.

This appeal involves a request for visitation by the maternal grandparents. The paternal grandmother had been awarded legal custody when the petition was filed. Before the trial, the children were adopted by the paternal grandmother. The trial court granted visitation pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-302. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Defendant, Frank Edward Small, was convicted by a Sullivan County Circuit Court jury of robbery, a Class C felony, and home improvement fraud, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-401 (2014) (robbery), 39-14-154 (2010) (amended 2012, 2017) (home improvement fraud). He received a Range I, effective five-year sentence to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to review the victim’s medical records. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, William S. Vanwinkle, pleaded guilty in case numbers F-72538 and F- 74515 to initiating a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine, see T.C.A. § 39-17-435, and in case number M-75892 to shoplifting, see id. § 39-14-146. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the twenty-year effective sentence imposed in this case is excessive and that the trial court erred by denying all forms of alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is the third appeal in this declaratory judgment action. The action seeks a determination of whether a discharged attorney is entitled to compensation for his services in connection with a tort action that settled after his discharge. After a bench trial, the trial court determined that the discharged attorney’s right to compensation was governed by a retainer agreement with the client, as modified by a subsequent letter agreement. The retainer agreement entitled the attorney, upon discharge, to compensation calculated at a reasonable hourly rate or one third of any offer made to settle the case, whichever was greater, plus expenses. Because no bona fide settlement offer was made before the attorney was discharged and the attorney provided insufficient evidence of the time he spent on the case, the trial court declared that the discharged attorney was not entitled to compensation. The trial court also awarded sanctions against the attorney for discovery abuse. Upon review, we discern no reversible error. So we affirm.

Defendant, Willie Jermaine Cunningham, appeals from the dismissal of several attempts to receive relief from an “illegal sentence” under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Because Defendant has failed to state a colorable claim for relief, we affirm the dismissal of the motion for relief.

The defendant, Jasper Vick, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. The defendant contends his sentences are illegal because the court clerk failed to sign his original and superseding indictments. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Michael C. Carter, was charged via presentment with one count of failure to appear, one count of being a habitual traffic offender, one count of failure to provide law enforcement evidence of financial responsibility, one count of operating a motor vehicle on a public road with a false registration, and one count of failure to dim headlights within 500 feet of an oncoming vehicle. Defendant pled guilty and was sentenced to an effective sentence of four years in incarceration. Defendant appeals to this Court, arguing that the trial court improperly denied alternative sentencing. After a complete review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I join the majority in affirming the Defendant’s convictions for two counts of attempted second degree murder, two counts of unlawful employment of a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony, and seven counts of reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon. I write separately to dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not err by admitting exhibit 13, the photograph showing the Defendant pointing two handguns at the camera, into evidence.

In June 2004, an employee sustained a work-related injury. After the employee sued her employer and its insurer for workers' compensation benefits, the parties settled the case. The trial court approved the settlement and, in part, ordered the defendants to pay the employee's reasonable and necessary authorized future medical expenses. In 2016, the employee moved to compel the defendants to provide medical treatment recommended by the employee's authorized treating physician; she also sought a finding of civil contempt and an award of attorney fees. The trial court ordered the defendants to provide the requested medical services and denied the motion for contempt. The defendants then authorized the employee's requested medical treatment. At a later hearing, the trial court awarded the employee her attorney fees under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6- 204(b)(2) (2005). The defendants appeal the trial court's award of medical benefits and attorney fees. After careful review, we hold that the issue of medical benefits is moot and the trial court erred in awarding the employee her attorney fees.

The Appellant, John Wesley Cantrell, Jr., pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to possessing one-half gram or more of cocaine with intent to sell and selling less than one-half gram of cocaine and received ten- and three-year sentences, respectively, to be served on supervised probation. Subsequently, the trial court revoked his probation. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve his ten-year sentence in confinement. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this post-divorce action, the husband filed a petition to terminate or modify $2,000.00 in monthly transitional alimony that had been previously awarded to the wife as part of the marital dissolution agreement incorporated into the divorce decree.  Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the wife was cohabiting with her fiancé and had failed to rebut the statutory presumption, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-121(g)(2)(C), that she was either providing support to or receiving support from a third person and no longer needed the amount of alimony previously awarded.  The trial court suspended the husband’s transitional alimony obligation retroactive to October 2015, the month when he had begun to deposit payments into an escrow account at the court’s direction.  The court also awarded to the husband attorney’s fees and expenses in the amount of $19,331.50.  The wife has appealed.  Having determined that the wife failed to rebut the statutory presumption, we affirm the suspension of the husband’s transitional alimony obligation.  However, having also determined that the evidence does not support a finding that the wife had the ability to pay the husband’s attorney’s fees, we reverse the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to the husband.  We decline to award attorney’s fees incurred on appeal to either party.

In this termination of parental rights case, P.T. and K.T., great aunt and uncle of the child at issue in this case, filed a petition to terminate the rights of N.D. (mother) with respect to her child, D.T. Mother did not appear for trial. She had previously filed a second request for a continuance, which the trial court had denied. At trial, P.T. and K.T. alleged the following grounds for termination: (1) four independent conditions or occurrences constituting severe child abuse; (2) mental incompetence; (3) two separate instances of abandonment by failure to support; (4) two separate instances of abandonment by failure to visit; and (5) failure to assume by act or omission, legal/physical custody or financial responsibility of the child. The court found clear and convincing evidence of all ten grounds. By the same quantum of proof, the court also found that termination is in the child’s best interest. Mother appeals. We affirm.

I concur in the result reached by the majority and with its analysis, except in one respect. In my view, Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-121 does not authorize an award of attorney fees in these circumstances.

Petitioner, Robert Edward Fritts, was convicted of first degree murder and received a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. See State v. Robert Edward Fritts, No. E2012-02233-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 545474, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 10, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 19, 2014). Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. Id. Petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief on the basis of a multitude of allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief after a hearing. After a complete review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an appeal from an order changing the Child’s surname from that of Mother alone to the double last name of Mother and Father, respectively. The juvenile court determined that the Child’s last name should be changed based on a standardized policy of the court because the parents could not reach an agreement. Mother appeals. We reverse.

Petitioner, Charles Elsea, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction DNA analysis on unprocessed specimens relating to his October 10, 1997 conviction for first degree murder. Because we hold that even favorable DNA results from the unprocessed specimens do not create a reasonable probability that Petitioner would not have been prosecuted or convicted or would have received a more favorable verdict or sentencing, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Husband appeals the trial court’s decision regarding wife’s monthly need for spousal support and its division of the parties’ marital assets.  Wife asserts that the trial court erred in failing to hold that husband dissipated marital assets.  We affirm the decision of the trial court and conclude that wife is entitled to an award of her attorney fees on appeal.

This case involves a dispute between owners of adjacent property. Plaintiffs sued Defendant for erecting a gate and steel posts, which they alleged impeded access to a deeded joint roadway. The court ordered Defendant to remove the gate and steel posts and awarded plaintiffs punitive damages. We reverse the award of punitive damages because the court did not find by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant acted with the requisite intent to justify such an award. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.

The Defendant, Larry E. Orozco, was convicted of two counts of attempted second degree murder, two counts of unlawful employment of a firearm during an attempt to commit a dangerous felony, and seven counts of reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to an effective term of thirty-one years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence in violation of Tennessee Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b); (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (3) his sentence was erroneous and excessive. After a thorough review of the record and briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this action, the trial court terminated the respondent father’s parental rights to his children, following its finding that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish the statutory grounds of (1) severe child abuse, (2) substantial noncompliance with the reasonable requirements of a permanency plan, and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the children. The court also determined by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the best interest of the children. The father has appealed solely the best interest determination. Discerning no error regarding the statutory grounds for termination found by the trial court or the court’s best interest analysis, we affirm.