APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a divorce action involving the classification of the parties’ separate and marital property and equitable division of the marital assets. Because we are unable to discern whether the trial court classified the wife’s retirement accounts as marital or separate property prior to its division of the marital estate and because the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact regarding several items of property prior to the distribution, we hereby vacate the trial court’s distribution of marital property. We remand this matter to the trial court for entry of sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the classification, valuation, and ultimate distribution of the parties’ marital property.

Father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights on the ground of wanton disregard for the child’s welfare prior to the father’s incarceration. We affirm.

Decedent’s daughter filed a notice of will contest, challenging a will that disinherited her and her sisters. According to the contestant, decedent attempted to revoke the will by directing an unnamed person to destroy it in her presence. But the unnamed person allegedly tricked decedent and destroyed another document instead. A beneficiary under the will and the administrator of the estate filed a joint motion to dismiss the contest for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The beneficiary and the administrator argued that the statutes applicable to revocation of wills required that the will actually be destroyed for an effective revocation. The circuit court granted the motion and dismissed the will contest. Upon review, we conclude that the enactment of Tennessee Code Annotated § 32-1-202 did not abrogate the common-law rule that fraud will not defeat revocation of a will. So the contestant did state a claim for relief.

This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on the minor child, Amarria L. (“the Child”), of Patricia L. (“Mother”). The Child was placed in protective custody on November 8, 2014, after Mother left the Child unsupervised at a homeless shelter. On July 7, 2016, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother. DCS alleged as a basis for termination the statutory grounds of (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, (2) abandonment by an incarcerated parent, (3) substantial noncompliance with the reasonable requirements of the permanency plan, and (4) persistence of the conditions leading to removal of the Child. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition upon its determination by clear and convincing evidence that DCS had proven the statutory grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and substantial noncompliance with the reasonable requirements of the permanency plan. The court further determined by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The dispositive issue in this case is whether Tennessee may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over the defendants. The plaintiff, a Tennessee company, filed this action against the defendants in Davidson County Chancery Court for breach of contract and unjust enrichment arising from security services it provided to facilitate the transfer of gold worth millions of dollars from Africa to Hong Kong. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for, inter alia, lack of personal jurisdiction, contending a Tennessee court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over them because their contacts with the forum were too attenuated. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case. The plaintiff appealed, arguing the defendants’ apparent agent had numerous and substantial contacts with the forum sufficient to establish specific personal jurisdiction in Tennessee. The defendants assert the individual with whom the plaintiff entered into a contract was an independent contractor, not an agent of the defendants, and that the defendants have not had sufficient contacts with Tennessee to subject them to the jurisdiction of a Tennessee court. The defendants also raise a separate issue, contending the trial court erred in denying their motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. We have determined that the individual with whom the plaintiff principally communicated regarding the contract and services rendered by the plaintiff was an apparent agent of the defendants. Having applied the two-step analysis enunciated in State v. NV Sumatra Tobacco Trading Co., 403 S.W.3d 726 (Tenn. 2013), we have also determined that the nature and quality of the apparent agent’s contacts, along with those of an officer of the defendant entities, were purposeful and of sufficient quantity with Tennessee to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement. Furthermore, the defendants failed to establish that it would be unreasonable or unfair for Tennessee to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over them as it pertains to issues deriving from or connected with the controversy that established jurisdiction. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s ruling that Tennessee does not have specific personal jurisdiction over the defendants. We affirm the trial court in its denial of the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for breach of contract. Accordingly, we reverse in part, affirm in part and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

The Defendant, Joel W. Allen, was convicted by a Benton County Circuit Court jury of driving under the influence, “DUI,” fifth offense, a Class E felony; simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; and operating a vehicle after being declared a habitual motor vehicle offender, a Class E felony. He was sentenced to an effective term of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his DUI conviction and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Christopher Gatewood, is charged in the Hamilton County Criminal Court with rape of a child. See T.C.A. § 39-13-522 (2014). The State contends in this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9 that the trial court erred in granting the Defendant’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of the alleged victim’s statements to a nurse practitioner on Confrontation Clause grounds. We affirm the order of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jonathan Eugene Goodwin, appeals as of right from the Carter County Criminal Court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence and order of incarceration for the remainder of his six-year sentence. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering execution of his sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this unjust enrichment claim, Plaintiff/Appellee Victor Cole filed a lawsuit alleging, inter alia, a claim for unjust enrichment against Defendant/Appellant Joe Caruso. A jury determined that Mr. Cole had been unjustly enriched. Upon our review, we conclude that Mr. Cole failed to provide any evidence that Mr. Caruso was unjustly enriched, thereby failing to establish a prima facie claim. Because Mr. Cole failed to provide any evidence regarding one of the elements of unjust enrichment, the trial court erred in denying Mr. Caruso’s motion for directed verdict.

The Appellant, Julie A. Morgan (Moran), appeals from the Unicoi County Criminal Court’s denial of her “motion to set aside disposition and/or retired status of traffic citation for mistake and to reset for further consideration.” On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court should have treated her motion as a petition for post-conviction relief or applied Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 “for post[-]judgment relief.” Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Ralph Alan Stanley, was convicted of aggravated assault after a jury trial and was sentenced to ten years of supervised probation. The Defendant appeals his conviction, asserting that he is entitled to a new trial because the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. He also contends that the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress, in allowing evidence of text messages and other bad acts, in allowing evidence produced in violation of the rules governing discovery, and in limiting crossexamination regarding a prior conviction. The Defendant also requests relief under a theory of cumulative error. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the Defendant is not entitled to a new trial, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, George Timmons, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective (1) for failing to present a defense based on the Petitioner’s “mental instability”; and (2) for failing to properly advise the Petitioner that he would be sentenced as a repeat violent offender to life without the possibility of parole upon his conviction at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Malcolm Orlando Witherow, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2011 conviction for first degree premeditated murder and his life sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Tracy Lebron Vick, pleaded guilty to second degree murder and received a forty-year, Range II sentence to be served at 85%. Nineteen years after his sentencing, he filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 alleging that his sentence was illegal because 100% service was statutorily mandated but that the trial court imposed 85% service in his case. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion on the basis that it failed to state a colorable claim. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Lawrence County jury convicted the Defendant, Rebecca Michelle Robinson, of vehicular homicide by intoxication, reckless endangerment, and failure to exercise due care while operating a motor vehicle. The trial court sentenced her to an effective sentence of eight years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied her an alternative sentence and ordered that she serve her sentence in confinement. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

In this appeal, the State challenges the trial court’s decision to apply the amended version of Code section 39-14-105, which provides the grading of theft offenses, to modify the class of the defendant’s conviction offense and the corresponding sentence following the revocation of the defendant’s probation. No appeal right lies for the State pursuant to either Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3, Code section 40-35-402, or Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 under the circumstances in this case. Because we have concluded that the trial court exceeded its authority by the application of the amended version of Code section 39-14-105, however, we have elected to treat the improperlyfiled appeal as a petition for the common law writ of certiorari. Accordingly, we vacate the order of the trial court and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Petitioner, Robert C. Clanton, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Lavonte Dominique Simmon, appeals as of right his jury convictions for first degree premeditated murder and two counts of aggravated assault. On appeal, the Defendant alleges the following errors: (1) that the Defendant was deprived of his right to present a viable defense when the trial court permitted Charles Maples to assert the privilege against self-incrimination and, thereafter, refused to allow defense counsel to withdraw so that defense counsel could testify about Mr. Maples’ past statements; (2) that the trial court improperly denied the Defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment after the State failed to preserve exculpatory evidence in the form of Mr. Maples’ testimony; (3) that the trial court should have granted the Defendant’s motion to suppress his statement to the police in light of testimony that the Defendant suffered a brain injury causing intellectual impairment, that the Defendant invoked his right to counsel, and that the Defendant did not voluntarily waive his Miranda rights; (4) that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce numerous photographs of weapons, weapons-related items, and ammunition found during the search of the home where the Defendant was apprehended; (5) that the evidence was insufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions because the State failed to prove that the Defendant was the person who shot the murder victim or that the Defendant acted with premeditation; and (6) that the trial court should have instructed the jury on diminished capacity.Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In a prior appeal, this Court remanded to the trial court for reconsideration of its marital property division. The trial court affirmed its previous award and awarded an additional sum to former wife as her equitable portion of the parties’ marital property. The trial court, however, declined to calculate post-judgment interest on the additional award as of the effective date of the divorce, pursuant to this Court’s holding in Watson v. Watson, 309 S.W.3d 483 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). On appeal, former wife argues that Watson did not deprive the trial court of discretion to calculate post-judgment interest as of the earlier date. We affirm.

This is an action by the ex-wife of the decedent to establish a constructive trust to the proceeds of a life insurance policy that are payable as a consequence of the death of the plaintiff’s ex-husband. In the 2011 Final Decree, the ex-husband was ordered to maintain a specified life insurance policy in the amount of $500,000 with the plaintiff to be designated as the sole beneficiary. Following the divorce, the ex-husband allowed the specified policy to lapse; however, he maintained a second life insurance policy that had a death benefit of $250,000 with seventy percent of the death benefits payable to the plaintiff and thirty percent to the decedent’s mother. Following the ex-husband’s death, the plaintiff commenced this action against the decedent’s mother and the insurance company. The decedent’s mother filed an answer in which she claimed the plaintiff had no legal rights to the insurance policy at issue. The decedent’s mother also claimed she had a vested right to her share of the death benefits based on an oral contract. The insurance company deposited the insurance proceeds into court and was dismissed from the case. Thereafter, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, relying principally on the holding in Holt v. Holt, 995 S.W.2d 68 (Tenn. 1999). We affirm, finding the decedent’s mother had no vested interest in the policy.

This is an appeal of a routine detainer action. Nevertheless, in her reply brief, the appellant states this case “is a ‘Tax Event’ and a ‘Pre-Paid’ account exempt from levy defendants are in commercial dishonor for non-acceptance and payment under section 3- 505, 510 of Uniform Commercial Code subject to forfeiture & collection under GAP. Verrina Shields Bey herein ‘Responds To Defendants Brief’ against Counsel for this ‘Tax Event’ to have the court rule in her favor and stop, terminate a attempted illegal, unlawful foreclosure.” Contrary to the appellant’s contentions, the real property at issue was sold at foreclosure, and this is merely a detainer action in which the purchaser of the property, the appellee, is seeking possession of the property. Both the general sessions court and the circuit court of Shelby County ruled in favor of the appellee and entered judgment awarding a writ of possession to the appellee. Due to profound deficiencies in the appellant’s brief and reply brief, we dismiss the appeal.

The Petitioner, Allen Craft, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective (1) for not filing a motion to sever his case from his codefendant; and (2) for failing “to introduce expert testimony which would tend to negate the requisite mental state required for the offense.” Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The issues on appeal involve the proper number of days upon which to base the calculation of child support, the propriety of the award of extraordinary educational expenses under the parties’ permanent parenting plan, and attorney’s fees. Having determined that the trial court erred in its determination of child support and extraordinary educational expenses, we affirm in part, and vacate and remand in part.  

The Defendant, Damarko D. Clay, appeals as of right from his convictions for possession of marijuana with intent to sell, possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. The Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this appeal concerning insurance coverage, Jefferson County Schools (“Plaintiff”) sued its insurers, Tennessee Risk Management Trust and Travelers Indemnity Company (“Defendants”), in the Chancery Court for Jefferson County (“the Trial Court”). Building 8 at Jefferson County High School collapsed during a rainstorm. The Tennessee State Fire Marshal’s Office ordered Plaintiff to implement repairs to prevent a future collapse of both the damaged and undamaged portions. Plaintiff asserted that, pursuant to an “ordinance or law” provision in its insurance policy, Defendants were responsible for coverage for additional work in undamaged portions of Building 8 in order to comply with the Fire Marshal’s directive. Defendants argue in response that the additional work was discretionary and went beyond what the insurance policy covered. After a hearing, the Trial Court entered judgment in favor of Defendants. Plaintiff appeals. We hold that the Fire Marshal’s directive, issued under that office’s authority, qualified as an “ordinance or law.” Defendants were, therefore, required to cover the additional work. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for determination and entry of a monetary judgment in favor of Plaintiff.