APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Paula Jean Lacommare, pled guilty to initiation of the manufacturing process of methamphetamine and was sentenced to eight years on probation.  A violation of probation warrant was issued against the Defendant for testing positive for methamphetamine.  Following a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered her to serve her sentence in prison.  The Defendant appeals.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After the trial court denied Wife’s motion to set aside the mediated Marital Dissolution Agreement and Permanent Parenting Plan and entered its order declaring the parties divorced, Wife filed a motion seeking recusal of the trial judge. The judge denied the motion, and Wife timely filed her petition for recusal appeal seeking an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B from the trial court’s denial of her motion. We affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal.

Appellant appeals from the trial court’s decision granting a judgment of possession to the Appellee bank. Because of profound deficiencies in Appellant’s brief, we hold that her arguments are waived. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

Defendant, Randall Kenneth Reed, was convicted by a Hamilton County Jury of four counts of the fraudulent use of a debit card, first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and theft of property less than $500.00. The trial court merged the premeditated murder conviction with the felony murder conviction and imposed a life sentence to be served concurrently with 25 years for especially aggravated robbery and 11 months, 29 days each for theft of property less than $500 and four counts of the fraudulent use of a debit card. The trial court further ordered the sentence to be served consecutively to a probation violation in an unrelated case. On appeal, Defendant argues as follows: (1) that the trial court erred by allowing Milo Geiger to testify that he agreed to take a lie detector test and that Defendant refused to take one; (2) that the trial court improperly admitted photographs of the victim; (3) that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter; and (4) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. After a thorough review of the record, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for a new trial.

The Defendant, Desmond Eugene Davis, pled guilty to aggravated assault and was sentenced to eight years on probation. A violation of probation warrant was issued against the Defendant. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in prison. The Defendant appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Travis Smith, of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and he was sentenced to serve twenty-five years in prison. The Defendant appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court’s decisions regarding the admission of testimony, the sufficiency of the bill of particulars, the timing of the State’s election, the jury instructions regarding the election, the introduction into evidence of a videotape of the victim’s forensic interview, and the State’s alleged failure to turn over exculpatory evidence. The Defendant also asserts he is entitled to relief for cumulative error. Discerning no error, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction.

Defendant, Scarlet I. Martin, was convicted of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (“DUI”) and driving under the influence of an intoxicant with a blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”) greater than .08 (“DUI per se”). She appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions and that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress the results of a warrantless blood draw. After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient and that the blood draw was justified by exigent circumstances. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her case and the award of sanctions against her. The trial court dismissed the action for failure of Plaintiff to comply with the pre-suit notice and certificate of good faith requirements of the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act. Plaintiff also argues that the trial court engaged in judicial misconduct. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment as modified.

This case involves a divorced party’s request to recover unpaid child support and alimony. The petitioner filed her lawsuit in the Shelby County Circuit Court, which denied her request for relief. Although the petitioner appeals, we conclude that the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction over the petitioner’s claims. Because the petitioner’s ex-husband is deceased and the claims at issue are against the ex-husband’s estate, the petitioner was required to file her claims against the estate in the Shelby County Probate Court. We therefore vacate the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

This is a post-divorce child custody and parental relocation case. Father petitioned the trial court to modify the parties’ parenting plan to designate him as the minor child’s primary residential parent and to allow him to relocate the child from Tennessee to Virginia. Mother opposed Father’s petition and filed a counter-petition requesting the court modify the residential parenting schedule to reflect Father’s move to Virginia. The trial court found that a material change in circumstances existed to permit an examination of whether changing the child’s primary residential parent from Mother to Father was in the child’s best interest. After an analysis of the best interest factors set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-106(a), the court concluded that it would be in the child’s best interest to remain in Tennessee with Mother as her primary residential parent. The court also adopted Mother’s proposed residential parenting schedule. The trial court then calculated Father’s retroactive and prospective child support obligations and awarded Mother the attorney’s fees she incurred in defending Father’s petitions and successfully pursuing her own. Father subsequently filed a Rule 59 motion to alter or amend the trial court’s judgment and to reopen the proof in the matter. The trial court denied Father’s request and awarded Mother additional attorney’s fees she incurred in defending the motion to alter or amend. Father has appealed the trial court’s determination that Mother should remain the child’s primary residential parent, the new residential parenting schedule, the court’s application of Tennessee’s parental relocation statute, the calculation of the income of the parties, the calculation of child support, and the award of attorney’s fees. We conclude that the trial court erred in calculating the amount of Father’s monthly gross income. The award of child support is therefore vacated and remanded for reconsideration. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all other respects. We decline both parties’ requests for attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

Victor Dunn (“Employee”), a Tennessee resident, was injured in Iowa while working for Tradesmen International, Inc. (“Employer”).  Employer accepted the injury as compensable but disputed Tennessee’s jurisdiction over the claim, contended that any award of permanent disability benefits should be limited to one and one-half times the impairment rating, and disagreed with Employee’s calculation of his average weekly wage.  The trial court held that it had jurisdiction, that the claim was not “capped,” and that Employee’s proposed average weekly wage was correct. It awarded permanent partial disability benefits of 25% to the body as a whole.  Employer has appealed, arguing that the trial court’s ruling on the average weekly wage issue was incorrect. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51.  We affirm the judgment.

Jeffrey Walton (“the Petitioner”) was convicted of vandalism over the value of $10,000 and burglary of a building and received an effective sentence of twenty-seven years. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that second and third trial counsel’s performance was deficient because they (1) failed to prepare a trial strategy; (2) failed to investigate the background of Barrow-Agee Laboratories and discover a fatal variance in the indictment; (3) failed to properly cross-examine witnesses; and (4) failed to request jury instructions on the defenses of duress and necessity. The Petitioner asserts that he was prejudiced because absent these deficiencies, he would have likely been convicted of a lesserincluded offense or acquitted of the offenses. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This case involves a dispute over property. The trial court ruled that the defendants’ driveway and air conditioner pads encroached onto the plaintiffs’ property but declined to order their removal. Rather, the trial court awarded the plaintiffs damages and ruled that the encroachments could remain in place. Both parties appealed. We affirm the trial court’s conclusion that plaintiffs’ action with regard to the driveway is not barred by the Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-2-103 statute of limitations. We reverse the trial court’s ruling, however, to note that any action regarding the air conditioners and their placement is barred by the section 28-2-103 statute of limitations. We also reverse the trial court’s ruling allowing the driveway to remain in place.

The Defendant, Heath Bell, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment. The Defendant raises the following five issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress tainted eyewitness identification testimony; (2) whether his due process rights were violated by the State’s withholding of exculpatory evidence of a possible third party perpetrator; (3) whether the trial court erred by not granting his request for a new trial based on the newly discovered exculpatory evidence; (4) whether the evidence was sufficient to establish his identity as one of the perpetrators; and (5) whether the trial court erred by limiting his closing argument. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Raymond Burford, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder and received a life sentence. He appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of relief arguing that trial counsel was ineffective by (1) recalling a witness knowing that she would offer evidence of the Petitioner’s prior bad acts that had not been introduced in the State’s case in chief and (2) failing to adequately research diminished capacity as a defense. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Bedford County jury convicted the Petitioner, Christopher Lee Richardson, of attempted theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, disorderly conduct, possession of a schedule IV controlled substance for sale or delivery, resisting arrest, possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance, and promotion of methamphetamine manufacture. The trial court ordered an effective sentence of twelve years. On appeal, this Court affirmed the convictions and sentence. See State v. Christopher Lee Richardson, No. M2013-01178-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 12651041, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June 12, 2014), no perm. app. filed. The Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition, and following a hearing the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendants, Jarvis Sherrod and Antonio Dodson, were each convicted by a Shelby County Jury of three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated rape, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Sherrod was also convicted of one count of aggravated sexual battery and was sentenced to seventy-three years’ incarceration; Antonio Dodson was sentenced to forty-four years’ incarceration. In Jarvis Sherrod’s appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by: (1) denying his motion to sever his case from that of his co-defendant; (2) denying his right to a speedy trial; (3) improperly admitting a gun into evidence at trial; (4) allowing the victims’ prior consistent statements at trial; and (5) improperly exercising its duty as thirteenth juror. In Antonio Dodson’s appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by: (1) denying his motion to sever his case from that of his co-defendant; (2) finding that the evidence was sufficient to support two of his especially aggravated kidnapping convictions; (3) allowing improper closing argument by the State; (4) allowing the victims’ prior consistent statements at trial; (5) allowing improper expert witness testimony; and (6) denying his motion to dismiss count ten of the indictment for failure to provide sufficient notice of the charge. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Gwendolyn Hagerman, was convicted of five counts of rape of a child and sentenced to an effective sentence of sixty years. Subsequently, she sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief and dismissed the petition. Petitioner appealed. After a review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Petitioner, David E. Breezee, appeals the Benton County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of rape of a child, rape, and two counts of incest and resulting effective thirty-four-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel, that the post-conviction court erred by denying his petition for a writ of error coram nobis, and that he is entitled to a second post-conviction evidentiary hearing due to post-conviction counsel’s deficient performance. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, that the trial court erred by ruling that evidence of the victim’s gang affiliation was irrelevant to the Appellant’s claim of self-defense, that the trial court erred by admitting hearsay text messages into evidence, and that the trial court erred by giving a flight instruction to the jury. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Darryl Lee Davis, the Petitioner, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus claiming that his twenty-five year sentence had expired and that he was being illegally restrained of his liberty. The habeas corpus court found that the Petitioner’s sentence had not expired and summarily dismissed the Petition. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Wayne Sellers (“the Petitioner”) appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2013 Shelby County Criminal Court conviction for aggravated rape, for which he received a sentence of twenty-three years’ incarceration. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to explain the defense strategy to the Petitioner and object to the victim’s in-court identification of the Petitioner. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief.

This is an appeal from the grant of summary judgment, dismissing Appellant’s defamation lawsuit against Appellee. The trial court held that Appellant’s claim sounded in slander. Because Appellant filed her lawsuit more than six months after the offending statements were made, the trial court granted summary judgment on the sole ground that the applicable statute of limitations for slander, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-103, had run. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

This is the second appeal of this case. In the first appeal, this Court vacated the judgment and remanded to the trial court only for a determination of whether mother’s failure to visit the child was willful. On remand, the trial court found that mother’s failure to visit the child was willful. We affirm the trial court’s conclusion that clear and convincing evidence established the ground of willful failure to visit by an incarcerated parent. We also affirm the trial court’s determination that termination is in the child’s best interest. Consequently, we affirm the termination of Mother’s parental rights.

The Appellant, Jaymes Harrison, is appealing the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted.