APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

We granted this appeal to determine whether the Court of Appeals may exercise discretion and decline to award appellate attorney’s fees when the marital dissolution agreement at issue contains a provision entitling the prevailing party to an award of such fees. In this case, Husband and Wife were parties to a marital dissolution agreement that was incorporated into their final divorce decree (“the Parties’ MDA”). The Parties’ MDA contained a provision for the award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in any subsequent legal proceedings. Following a post-divorce proceeding that resulted in the trial court granting relief and awarding attorney’s fees to Wife, Husband appealed. Wife also prevailed on appeal and sought an award of appellate attorney’s fees from the Court of Appeals under a statutory provision and under the Parties’ MDA. Exercising its discretion, the Court of Appeals declined to award the requested fees under the statute. The Court of Appeals erroneously failed to separately consider an award of the requested fees under the Parties’ MDA. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

This is a declaratory judgment case. Decedent, mother to the parties, died testate, leaving a holographic will that divided her real property between her two sons, David Alsup/Appellant and William Alsup/Appellee. The probate court admitted the will to probate. Following completion of the probate proceeding, William obtained a survey dividing the property as provided for in Decedent’s will. David refused to accept the survey procured by William, and William then filed this action to quiet title and for ejectment. David filed an answer but did not file a counterclaim or a countervailing survey. William moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Emmett Lamon Roseman, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2013 Marshall County Circuit Court convictions of possession of marijuana with intent to sell, sale of 0.5 grams or more of crack cocaine, delivery of 0.5 grams or more of crack cocaine, and three counts of failure to appear, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty years. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Petitioner’s convictions were affirmed by this court on direct appeal and no Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 11 application for permission to appeal was filed. The Petitioner filed an untimely petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and requesting that he be allowed to file a delayed Rule 11application. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing his petition because the statute of limitations should be tolled under due process. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm.

Defendant, Melvin King, was convicted by a Knox County jury of first degree murder, aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, reckless aggravated assault, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated animal cruelty. He was sentenced to an effective life sentence. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support dual convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and attempted especially aggravated robbery, that the trial court improperly allowed the State to admit autopsy photographs into evidence, and that the trial court improperly gave the jury an instruction on flight. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, because the trial court did not enter judgment forms disposing of each count of the indictment, we remand the matter to the trial court for entry of a separate judgment form for each count of the indictment.

This divorce case involves a marriage of eight years’ duration. Because the parties had reached an agreement with regard to the division of certain marital assets, the trial court was requested during a bench trial to divide the parties’ retirement and pension accounts, or the marital portion thereof, and other limited marital assets and liabilities. The trial court considered the relevant statutory factors and apportioned the remaining assets and liabilities 60% to the wife and 40% to the husband. The trial court also awarded the husband $1,000.00 in attorney’s fees and $180.42 in court reporter fees. The husband has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Defendant, James Courtney Shane, was convicted by a Weakley County Circuit Court jury of facilitation of robbery, a Class D felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II offender to five years in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to his sentence in a federal case. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of his identity and argues that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Kelvin Winn, was convicted of first degree felony murder and received a life sentence. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to: (1) obtain an enhanced version of the surveillance video of the gas station; (2) proffer actual evidence of the Petitioner’s height to the jury; (3) submit the Petitioner’s clothing to be tested for blood; and (4) investigate the State’s jailhouse informant for possible impeachment evidence. The Petitioner asserts that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s deficient performance because, absent these deficiencies, the jury would not have convicted the Petitioner. Discerning no error in the post-conviction court’s decision, we affirm.

The appellant, Lewis Bonding Company, appeals the denial of its “Petition to Allow Lewis Bonding Company to Use Real Property as Security Collateral,” arguing the trial court abused its discretion by denying the appellant’s request to pledge real property to underwrite bonds in lieu of a cash deposit with the clerk of court. The State contends the trial court’s denial of the petition was a proper use of its broad discretion to regulate bondsmen. Following our review of the record and pertinent authorities, we agree with the State and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jose Ramon Gonzalez-Perez (“Father”) appeals the March 7, 2016 order of the Juvenile Court for Shelby County (“the Juvenile Court”) finding him in contempt for non-payment of child support. Father raises several issues including whether Father can be held guilty of contempt when benefits Father receives pursuant to 33 U.S.C.A. § 901 et seq., the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, are exempt from “all claims of creditors and from levy, execution, and attachment or other remedy for recovery or collection of a debt . . . ” under § 916 of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act; whether the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act preempts inclusion of Father’s benefits from the calculation of child support; and whether Father was guilty of contempt for non-payment of child support. We find and hold that although the benefits Father receives are exempt from levy, execution, attachment, etc., Father may be found guilty of contempt; that the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act does not preempt the inclusion of the benefits Father receives from the calculation of child support; and that Father had the present ability to pay child support and willfully failed to do so making Father guilty of contempt. We, therefore, affirm the March 7, 2016 order of the Juvenile Court finding Father in contempt for non-payment of child support.

Defendant, Bruce Wayne Sutton, pled guilty to attempted initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine and received a sentence of nine years and six months.  As part of his plea agreement, Defendant reserved two certified questions of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A) with regard to the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search of a residence.  Upon our review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that based upon his disclaimer of interest in the property, Defendant was without standing to complain about the search.  Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Kevin Scott Burris’ (“the Defendant”) community corrections officer filed an affidavit, alleging that the Defendant had violated the conditions of community corrections. Following two hearings, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s community corrections supervision and ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. After a review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant-Appellant, William Sappington, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of theft of property with the value of more than $10,000 but less than $60,000, a Class C felony. T.C.A. § 39-14-103, 105(a)(4). The sole issue presented for our review in this appeal as of right is whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal concerns visitation in a post-divorce setting. Claire Nicola Bell (“Mother”) and Timothy John Bell (“Father”) are parents of the two minor children at issue, ages eleven and seven at trial (“the Children”). Mother and Father divorced in 2012. Both parents were named “co-primary residential parents” and each parent received equal visitation time with the Children. Later, as the arrangement grew contentious, Mother filed a petition for modification seeking to be named exclusive primary residential parent. Father, in turn, filed a counter-petition seeking the same designation. A hearing was conducted before the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). Afterward, the Trial Court named Father primary residential parent and awarded him increased visitation time with the Children. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

The petitioner, James Johnson aka Guy Bonner, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition apparently challenged his 2012 Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of burglary, theft of property valued at $500 or less, and resisting arrest. Because the petitioner has established sufficient facts to make a threshold showing that he complied with the “mailbox rule,” he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing at which he must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he delivered his petition to the appropriate prison official for mailing before the expiration of the statute of limitations. Thus, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of the timeliness of the petition for post-conviction relief.

The Appellant, Mack Jeffery Thompson, filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1.  The trial court denied the motion, and the Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal.  Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion but remand the case for correction of a clerical error on the judgment of conviction.

The defendant, Torian Dillard, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. The defendant contends his sentences are illegal because the State failed to provide proper notice of its intent to seek enhanced punishment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35-202(a). The defendant also argues the trial court improperly relied on two prior theft convictions in classifying him as a career offender. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur in the majority’s determination that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s judgment (1) finding a material change in circumstances; (2) holding that “the best interest of the children [is] that [Mr. Bell] be the Primary Residential Parent;” and (3) awarding father 215 days of residential parenting time with the balance of days awarded to mother.

Charles Steven Blocker (“Employee”) sustained a compensable injury to his cervical spine in November 2010.  Surgery was required to treat the injury.  He was able to return to work for Powell Valley Electric Cooperative (“Employer”) after that injury.  His claim for workers’ compensation benefits was settled.  Employee suffered a second, gradual injury to his cervical spine in January 2013.  He was unable to return to work after that injury.  He brought suit in the Chancery Court for Claiborne County against Employer and the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Second Injury Fund (“the Fund”).  The parties stipulated that Employee was permanently and totally disabled.  The only issue presented to the court was apportionment of the permanent total disability benefits between Employer and the Fund.  The trial court found that the second injury had caused a 9% permanent partial disability without reference to the prior injury.  Benefits were apportioned 9% to Employer and 91% to the Fund.  The Fund has appealed, contending that the trial court incorrectly apportioned the award.  The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51.  We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

A Shelby County jury found the defendant, Roy Robinson, guilty of aggravated assault and second degree murder. The trial court imposed an effective twenty-year sentence to be served at one hundred percent, and the defendant appealed. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his second degree murder conviction, arguing he shot his victim in self-defense. The State asserts sufficient evidence exists to support the second degree murder conviction. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Charis Lynn Jetton, pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-211, 39-17-1324(a). For her respective crimes, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of seven years and three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erroneously denied her request for alternative sentencing as to the voluntary manslaughter conviction. Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the defendant’s seven-year sentence to be served in confinement.

The principal issues in this divorce action arise from the parties’ antenuptial agreement. The trial court declared the parties divorced, classified the bulk of the assets as Husband’s separate property, divided the modest amount of assets that were classified as marital property, and awarded Wife alimony in futuro of $8,000 per month and alimony in solido of $500,000. Both parties appeal. Wife contends the court erred in classifying the bulk of the assets as Husband’s separate property and that the alimony awarded to her is insufficient. She also requests an award of attorney fees incurred on appeal. Husband contends that all of the income he earned during the marriage is his separate property, that all assets he acquired with that income is his separate property, and that the antenuptial agreement prohibited the trial court from considering the value of his separate property in awarding alimony to Wife. We affirm the trial court in all respects. We also find that Wife is entitled to recover reasonable and necessary attorney fees incurred on appeal.

This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. The trial court's final decree of divorce included a division of marital property but failed to adjudicate the issue of alimony. A subsequent order states that the parties “agreed that [Wife’s] claim for alimony in futuro and rehabilitative alimony . . . are dismissed.” The appellate record contains no transcript or statement of the evidence for our review as required by the Tennessee Rules of Appellant Procedure. Accordingly, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding. Affirmed and remanded.

The Defendant, Donald Gwin, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated rape, a Class A felony; aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. He was sentenced to an effective term of thirty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in ruling that his prior sexual battery conviction, similar to that for which he was on trial, could be introduced if he opened the door to its admissibility; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial after the jury heard that he wore an ankle bracelet for monitoring as part of the sex offender registry; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial after a local newspaper printed an article about his case; and (4) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated robbery. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Homeowners filed suit for breach of contract and fraud and/or negligent representation against the owners of a restoration business who performed repairs on their house after a fire.  When the defendants failed to respond to or appear at the hearing on the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs.  The defendants then filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 motion and affidavits stating that they did not receive notice of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment.  The trial court held a hearing on the Rule 60 motion and denied the motion.  Because there is no transcript or statement of the evidence regarding the hearing on the summary judgment motion or on the Rule 60 motion, we must accept the trial court’s findings of fact.  We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ Rule 60 motion.