APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal of a post-divorce order reinstating Father’s alimony obligation and denying Father’s petition to terminate child support. Father brought a petition to terminate his alimony and child support obligations after discovering that his ex-wife was living with a third party. Additionally, he argued that his twenty-one year old daughter was not severely disabled and his child support obligation should be terminated. The trial court suspended Father’s alimony obligation for the duration of his ex-wife’s cohabitation but reinstated the alimony obligation as the cohabitation had ceased by the time of trial. The trial court also determined that the child was severely disabled and ordered child support to continue. Father appealed. We affirm.

Defendant, Steven William Miller, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve his original sentence in confinement. Upon our review of the record, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Defendant’s probation and ordering Defendant’s sentence into execution. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Tenn. R. App. P. 12 petition for review of the decision of the Tennessee Regulatory Authority to revoke Tennessee Wastewater Systems, Inc.’s Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity. Determining that the revocation of the CCN satisfies the requirements of law, is supported by substantial and material evidence, and is an appropriate and reasonable exercise of the TRA’s authority and discretion, we affirm the decision.

This appeal involves the interpretation of a marital dissolution agreement. Pursuant to the agreement, the husband and wife agreed to waive any interest in the other party's retirement account upon the dissolution of the marriage. The husband failed to effectuate the change to his retirement account. Upon his death, the wife refused to sign documentation waiving her right to the benefits. The administrator of the estate filed suit. The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the wife. The administrator appeals. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and direct entry of summary judgment in favor of the administrator.

This appeal arises from post-divorce efforts to modify a permanent parenting plan. The father filed a petition to modify child support and subsequently amended his petition to include a request to modify the residential parenting schedule. The mother filed a counter-petition, seeking to limit the father to supervised visitation. After a hearing, the trial court dismissed the father’s petition to modify the residential parenting schedule because the father failed to prove a material change of circumstance. The court, however, found that the mother did prove a material change of circumstance and that modification of the residential parenting schedule to restrict the father to supervised visitation was in the best interest of the child. The trial court also modified child support and awarded the Mother one-half of her attorney’s fees. Both parties appeal the trial court’s decision. The father appeals the trial court’s findings with regard to material changes of circumstance, child support, and the award of attorney’s fees. The father also appeals the trial court’s decision to limit his pretrial discovery. The mother appeals the trial court’s award of only half of her attorney’s fees and decision to divide the costs of supervised visitation between the parties. Upon reviewing the record, we affirm the trial court’s decision and remand this case for a determination of the amount of Mother’s reasonable attorney’s fees on appeal.

John E. Houston (“Employee”) alleged he sustained a compensable injury to his back in June 2013. He initially sought medical treatment through his health insurer and told his doctors his injury occurred in the course of his employment at Conagra (“Employer”). When Employee submitted a claim for short-term disability benefits and FMLA leave through Employer, however, he stated his condition was not related to his employment. He ultimately had back surgery on August 22, 2013. On September 13, 2013, Employee gave notice of what he alleged to be a work-related injury to Employer by means of a letter from counsel. Employer denied the claim, based in part on the lack of timely notice. The trial court found Employee’s application for short-term disability benefits provided notice that Employer had an injured employee, and, had Employer conducted an investigation at that time, it would have become aware the injury was work related. The court determined notice, therefore, was timely. It awarded permanent partial disability benefits and entered judgment accordingly. Employer has appealed from that judgment. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We reverse the judgment.

An officer with the Davidson County Sheriff’s Department was terminated for dishonesty and related charges after he filed official reports alleging that he had been attacked by another officer and lost consciousness during training exercises. The Department investigated the officer’s claims and found that they were exaggerated and that his dealings with claims representatives and other personnel were hostile and dishonest. After a disciplinary hearing, the Department decided to terminate the officer. An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) determined that the officer should be reinstated with only a ten-day suspension. The Civil Service Commission adopted the ALJ’s initial order as its final order with a few changes. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) filed a petition for review in chancery court, and the court held that the decision of the Civil Service Commission that the officer had not committed the conduct at issue was not supported by substantial and material evidence. The chancery court reversed the decision of the Commission as to the officer committing the misconduct and remanded to the Commission for a determination of the appropriate disciplinary sanction. We affirm the decision of the chancery court.

In this divorce action, Tyler David Mashburn (Father) argues that the trial court erred by including certain provisions in the permanent parenting plan, i.e., (1) a requirement that his residential parenting time with the parties’ son be supervised; (2) a provision prohibiting Father’s girlfriend from staying overnight during Father’s parenting time; (3) a provision that Father shall have no additional residential parenting time for holidays or vacations unless Victoria Hope Mashburn (Mother) agrees; and (4) a provision that all major decisions regarding the child shall be made exclusively by Mother. We modify the plan by deleting all of these provisions. Furthermore, we reverse the trial court’s decision to award Mother attorney’s fees of $5,000.

Following a jury trial in Shelby County, Defendant, Dariun Bailey, was convicted of second degree murder, aggravated assault, and reckless endangerment. He received concurrent sentences of twenty-two years for second degree murder, three years for aggravated assault, and two years for reckless endangerment. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the State violated Brady v. Maryland by failing to notify him of the gunpowder residue kit and having the kit tested. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In 2014, the Petitioner, Misty Ellis, pleaded guilty to robbery, and the trial court imposed the sentence agreed to by the parties of six years at 100%. In 2015, the Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, contending that her release eligibility percentage was illegal because it was in direct contravention of the release eligibility statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-501. The habeas corpus court dismissed the Petitioner’s petition for failure to comply with habeas corpus statutory filing requirements. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred when it dismissed her petition because she complied with the filing requirements and because her agreed-to sentence is illegal. The State counters that the habeas corpus court properly dismissed her petition because the judgment form does not show any illegality in the Petitioner’s plea-bargained sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s dismissal of the Petitioner’s petition for habeas corpus relief.

Petitioner, Terry Jamar Norris, appeals the denial and dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, specifically asserting that the post-conviction court incorrectly dismissed his premature petition with prejudice and that his underlying McLaughlin/Huddleston issue is meritorious. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying and dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief.

In 2011, a Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Trinidad Martinez Flores, of multiple offenses involving the possession and sale of more than 300 pounds of marijuana. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to fifty-six years of incarceration. This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentence on appeal. State v. Trinidad Martinez Flores, No. M2012-00285-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 3497644, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, July 11, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 13, 2013). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his trial counsel represented him ineffectively. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends his trial counsel failed to adequately represent him, noting that the Board of Professional Responsibility subsequently disbarred trial counsel for fraudulently billing the state. On appeal, we conclude that, considering the weight of the evidence, counsel’s representation did not prejudice the Petitioner. As such, the Petitioner is not entitled to relief.

The defendant, Marlin C. Goff, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence imposed for his 2005 convictions of rape of a child and failure to appear. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In this post-divorce action, the mother sought modification of the father’s child support obligation due to a material change of circumstances. The trial court increased the father’s child support obligation but declined to order such modification effective as of the date the mother filed her petition to modify. The mother has appealed. Having determined that the trial court erred in failing to modify the father’s child support obligation effective as of the date of the petition’s filing, we reverse the trial court’s judgment in that regard and remand for entry of a modified judgment retroactive to the date the mother filed the petition. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

Defendant, Milta Blanchard, filed a motion under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 alleging that the judgments against him were illegal because he was out on bond in one of his cases when he was arrested on the three other cases. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion and vacated three of the judgments against him. The trial court determined that the judgment for the offense for which Defendant was on bond was not illegal as it occurred first in time. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in correcting his illegal sentences on the concession of the State without first appointing counsel, holding a hearing, or providing him the opportunity to withdraw his plea. After review of the record and the briefs, we conclude that the trial court lacked authority to grant Defendant’s motion and that the judgments against Defendant should be reinstated.

This case arises from a contract dispute. The parties orally contracted for Appellees to perform grading and other work on Appellant's property for the price of $2,500.00. After Appellees began the work, Appellant requested additional work. The parties did not discuss any additional payment for this work. After the work was complete, Appellees sent Appellant an invoice for $9,073.00. Appellant told Appellees he would not pay that amount and sent them a cashier's check marked “pd in full” for $1,500.00, which was the balance due on the original $2,500.00 price. Appellees marked through the “pd in full” notation on the check, cashed the check, and then notified Appellant that they considered the check to be a credit against the total amount owed.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this pain management case, the employee received pain management treatment for more than ten years for a work-related injury pursuant to a judgment entered in November 2003. In April 2015, the employee’s treating physician advised him that he was retiring and moving to Florida, prompting the employee to contact his employer’s insurance carrier, who provided him with a panel of pain specialists two days later. The treating physician then made a referral to a different clinic to continue the employee’s treatment, so the employee declined to select a doctor from the panel while the insurance carrier declined to authorize the referred clinic. The employee filed a motion in the Circuit Court for Giles County, seeking to compel the insurance carrier to authorize treatment by the clinic. The trial court granted the motion and awarded attorney’s fees and travel expenses for a trip to Florida by the employee to see his previous physician. The insurance carrier has appealed, asserting that the trial court erred by granting the employee’s motion. We reverse in part and affirm in part the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal is from a final decree of divorce. The wife challenges several of the trial court’s rulings regarding the grounds for the divorce, the division of marital property, the parenting plan, the calculation of child support and educational expenses, and attorney’s fees. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.     

Defendant, Cedric Jones, appeals his convictions for three counts of aggravated rape, one count of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of aggravated kidnapping and his total effective sentence of thirty-seven years. Defendant argues (1) that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) that the trial court erred when it revoked his bond for failure to appear; (3) that the trial court erred when it denied his motions for recusal; (4) that the trial court erred when it did not allow Defendant to represent himself at trial; (5) that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument; and (6) that the trial court erred during sentencing. Upon our thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Knox County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, LaQuinton Brown, of two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony; two counts of employing a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony, a Class C felony; and two counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony. After a sentencing hearing, the appellant received an effective twenty-two-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; that the trial court erred by allowing the State to play a video showing him with a handgun because the video violated Rules 404(b) and 608(b), Tennessee Rules of Evidence; and that the trial court erred by imposing the maximum sentences in the range, by ordering consecutive sentencing, and by denying his request for alternative sentencing. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a post-foreclosure action in which the lender seeks to recover a deficiency judgment, interest, and the costs of collection. In their answer, the borrowers asserted that the loan was a nonrecourse debt; thus, they were not liable for the deficiency. Alternatively, they asserted that the property sold at foreclosure for an amount materially less than its fair market value. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the loan was a full recourse debt as to both borrowers. This determination was based on the finding, inter alia, that all parties intended the borrowers to be personally liable. The trial court also concluded that the lender was entitled to a deficiency judgment, finding that the borrowers failed to overcome the rebuttable presumption that the foreclosure sale price was equal to the fair market value of the property at the time of the foreclosure sale. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 35-5-118. The trial court awarded the lender a judgment of $640,783.41, plus interest and attorney’s fees, against the borrowers jointly and severally. As the foregoing indicates, our review is benefited by the trial court’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 findings of facts and conclusions of law, which disclose the reasoned steps by which the trial court reached its ultimate conclusion and enhance the authority of the trial court’s decision. Having reviewed the trial court’s findings of fact in accordance with Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d), we have concluded that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings and that the trial court identified and properly applied the applicable legal principles. For these reasons, we affirm.

The Defendant, Felicia Jones, was arrested without a warrant for driving under the influence (DUI) and possession of drug paraphernalia. The Defendant consented to a bench trial in Sullivan County General Sessions Court and was found guilty of both offenses. The Defendant then appealed to the Sullivan County Criminal Court. On appeal, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges against her, arguing that the affidavit of complaint filed after her arrest was void, that prosecution had never commenced in this matter, and that the applicable statute of limitations had expired. The trial court granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss, and the State now appeals. The State contends that the fact that the affidavit of complaint was sworn before a notary public rather than a qualified judicial officer was a mere technical defect that had “no impact on validity.” Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Curtis Dwayne Staggs, appeals the Lawrence County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and aggravated robbery and resulting effective sentence of life plus twelve years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to raise the statute of limitations as a defense against his aggravated robbery charge and because counsel failed to request a jury instruction cautioning the jury to evaluate the weight and credibility of a witness’s testimony in light of the witness’s agreement with the State. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this appeal as of right by the State, the State challenges the ruling of the trial court dismissing the case as barred by the misdemeanor statute of limitations. Because no document in the record qualifies as a valid arrest warrant and no other event occurred to timely commence the prosecution in this case, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.