APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, Ricky Duvil Lunsford, of attempted voluntary manslaughter and employing a deadly weapon during the commission of a dangerous felony. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it: (1) failed to properly instruct the jury; (2) excluded an email from the Defendant to the victim about the decline of their marriage; (3) prevented the Defendant from testifying about the victim's prior aggressive tendencies; and (4) excluded evidence of the victim's prior domestic assault charge. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury as to self-defense. We reverse the judgments of conviction and remand for a new trial.

The Defendant, Nicholas Grace, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-402. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Alexander K. Carney, pled guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class C felony; possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, for which he received an effective sentence of five years in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to his sentence for a conviction in a separate case. As a condition of his guilty plea, the defendant attempted to reserve a certified question of law regarding the legality of the traffic stop that led to the discovery of the drugs. Because we agree with the State that the certified question of law is not dispositive of the case, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

George Lambert ("Lambert") sued John Arnold Fitzgerald ("Fitzgerald") in connection with money that Lambert gave to Fitzgerald to invest alleging claims for, among other things, fraud, intentional misrepresentation, violation of the Tennessee Securities Act of 1980, and unjust enrichment. After trial and a hearing on a motion to amend, the Chancery Court for Rhea County ("the Trial Court") entered its order awarding Lambert a judgment against Fitzgerald for $33,840.28 in principal, pre-judgment interest, and attorney‘s fees pursuant to a promissory note, and dismissing Lambert‘s remaining claims. Lambert appeals to this Court raising issues with regard to the dismissal of his claims for fraud, intentional misrepresentation, violation of the Tennessee Securities Act of 1980, and unjust enrichment.

The petitioner, Tiffany Amos, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of relief from her theft and criminal impersonation convictions, arguing that she received ineffective assistance of counsel and that her guilty pleas were unknowingly and involuntarily entered. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This appeal arises from a default judgment entered in a divorce action, wherein the wife was granted, inter alia, a permanent order of protection against the husband. The husband sought to have the permanent order of protection provision contained in the parties' divorce decree set aside, asserting that the statutory scheme pertaining to orders of protection did not provide authority for entry of a permanent, open-ended order of protection. The trial court entered an order denying relief to the husband and affirming its entry of a permanent order of protection. Husband timely appealed. Determining that the trial court was without statutory authority to enter a permanent order of protection with no time limitation, we vacate that portion of the trial court's order.

This is a grandparent visitation case. Sven Hadjopoulos (“Grandfather”) and Mary Lou Hadjopoulos (“Grandmother”) (“Grandparents,” collectively) filed a petition seeking visitation with their minor granddaughter (“the Child”). Alexandra Sponcia (“Mother”) and Christopher Sponcia (“Father”) (“Parents,” collectively) opposed the petition and the requested visitation. After a trial, the Chancery Court for Greene County (“the Trial Court”) found that substantial harm likely would come to the Child should visitation with Grandparents cease. The Trial Court, therefore, ordered grandparent visitation. Parents filed an appeal to this Court. We hold that the Trial Court’s final judgment is insufficient in a number of ways detailed herein, including its lack of a required best interest determination. We vacate the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for the Trial Court to enter a new, clarified final judgment in this case consistent with this Opinion.

The petitioner, Alonza Grace, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief, arguing that his guilty plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered because he was under the influence of prescription medication. He further contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a forensic evaluation to determine his competency and in failing to investigate alleged missing evidence. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Paul David Childs, appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief.  The Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel.  Specifically, the Petitioner alleges that trial counsel was ineffective (1) for failing to “adequately inform” the Petitioner about “his rights regarding a preliminary hearing” and failing to request a preliminary hearing; (2) for failing to impeach the victim with an alleged prior inconsistent statement; (3) for preventing the Petitioner from testifying at trial; (4) for failing to sufficiently prepare for the trial, failing to present any witnesses at trial, and pursuing a “highly questionable” trial strategy; and (5) for advising the Petitioner to waive his right to appeal his conviction.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Lona Parker, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Petitioner, Dalton B. Lister, appeals the Bradley County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree felony murder, attempt to commit aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery and his effective life sentence. The Petitioner contends that the State destroyed evidence, withheld exculpatory evidence, and concealed the existence of an agreement with a codefendant, and that the cumulative effect of the misconduct deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, from the denial of a motion for recusal filed by Richard Darrell Trigg ("Former Husband") in the parties' post-dissolution proceedings. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Former Husband, and finding no error in Trial Court's ruling, we affirm.

Following a borrower’s default on a loan agreement, Regions Bank (“Regions”) accelerated the loan and filed this lawsuit against the loan’s guarantors to collect the amounts due. After Regions sold the collateral securing the loan, it sought a judgment for the remaining deficiency. This is the second appeal of this case to this Court. Although the trial court awarded Regions a deficiency judgment prior to the first appeal, we vacated that award upon concluding that Regions had failed to provide sufficient notice to the guarantors prior to its disposition of the collateral. We observed that under Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-9-626, a secured party that has not complied with the commercial code’s collection, enforcement, disposition, and acceptance requirements can only recover a deficiency if it proves that compliance with the relevant provisions would have yielded a smaller amount than the secured obligation, together with expenses and attorney’s fees. Because the trial court did not make any findings on this issue, we remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the amount of the deficiency, if any, under Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-9-626. On remand, the trial court entered a deficiency judgment against the guarantors in the amount of $1,210,511.51. Both sides now appeal from this judgment, asserting various issues. Because Regions did not present any evidence that it would have received less than the total amounts due to it had it provided proper notice, we reverse the trial court’s determination that Regions is entitled to a deficiency. We further reject the guarantors’ assertions that they are entitled to a surplus.

We granted an extraordinary appeal to consider a trial court’s refusal to dismiss a petition to terminate parental rights. Following their divorce, the child’s father filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the mother. The mother moved to dismiss for lack of standing. In response, the father amended his petition to add his mother, the child’s grandmother, as an additional petitioner. The mother renewed her motion to dismiss. We reverse the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss because both the father and his mother lack standing. 

The Appellant, Michael Bonsky, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of second degree murder, attempted second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of sixty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by drafting its own jury instruction regarding diminished capacity; (2) whether the trial court erred by admitting evidence regarding the Appellant‘s presence at a casino and committing a robbery in Mississippi within hours of the instant offenses; (3) whether the trial court erred by admitting a recording of the telephone call one of the victims made to 911; (4) whether the trial court erred by admitting the Appellant‘s statement into evidence; (5) whether the trial court erred by not allowing an expert witness to testify regarding the Appellant‘s level of intoxication and his ability to form the requisite intent; (6) whether the trial court erred in sentencing the Appellant; and (7) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the Appellant‘s convictions. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court‘s instruction to the jury regarding diminished capacity was error and that the error was not harmless; therefore, the Appellant‘s convictions are reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial.

In this divorce action, Husband contends the trial court erred by granting Wife a divorce on the grounds of Husband’s inappropriate marital conduct despite the fact he was found guilty of, inter alia, three counts of rape of a child while the divorce was pending. Husband also takes issue with the classification of property, the division of marital property, and the award of alimony to Wife. We affirm the trial court in all respects.

In this case, the jury eschewed the charge of first degree murder and convicted the defendant of the lesser included offense of second degree murder. I write separately because I thought it worth pointing out why this circumstance did not cause the instructional error to be harmless.

Inmate brought petition under Tennessee Public Records Act seeking review of the District Attorney General’s handling of his request that he be furnished copies of records relating to his prosecution. The trial court held that the Attorney General did not deny the request but, rather, that the petitioner failed to advance the costs of copying the records and, accordingly, was not entitled to relief. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Saidrick T. Pewitte, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The issue on this appeal is the enforceability of an arbitration agreement. Tim and Pamela Adams (Plaintiffs) bought a mobile home from CMH Homes, Inc. (Defendant). As part of the transaction, Plaintiffs signed an arbitration agreement after they were told by Defendant’s sales manager that they “had to sign the papers in order to get the home moving.” This statement was false, although the manager testified that he was unaware of its falsity at that time. Plaintiffs alleged fraudulent inducement with respect to the arbitration agreement. After a hearing, the trial court ruled that Plaintiffs established their fraudulent inducement claim. As a consequence, the court set aside the arbitration agreement. Defendant appeals. We affirm.

The surviving spouse in this wrongful death action appeals the trial court's dismissal of him as a plaintiff. The decedent and surviving spouse had one child together, who was eighteen months old at the time of the decedent's fatal automobile accident in October 2010. The decedent and surviving spouse were living apart, and the child had been residing solely with the decedent. On November 18, 2010, the surviving spouse, acting on behalf of the decedent, the child, and himself, filed the instant action in the Monroe County Circuit Court (“trial court”) against the seventeen-year-old driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident and her parents, who were the owners of the vehicle. Also in November 2010, the Monroe County Juvenile Court granted custody of the child to the maternal grandmother.

James Brooks began working for Healthcare Horizons, Inc. in October 2013. He was required to sign a confidentiality and non-solicitation agreement (CNSA). The CNSA provides that disputes regarding the agreement would be settled by binding arbitration; there were exceptions – claims requesting equitable or injunctive relief were to be resolved by litigation in Knoxville. In March 2014, Healthcare Horizons terminated Brooks. He subsequently accepted a position with a new firm founded by John Graham, the former president of Healthcare Horizons. Graham had also executed a CNSA while working for Healthcare Horizons. His agreement provided that all disputes arising out of that agreement would be settled exclusively by binding arbitration. In November 2014, Healthcare Horizons filed a complaint against Brooks, alleging a breach of his CNSA and misappropriation of trade secrets. Brooks filed a motion to compel arbitration or, in the alternative, to stay the case pending resolution of an ongoing claim of Healthcare Horizons against Graham. The trial court denied Brooks’ motion. He appeals. We affirm.

Amy Chan (Wife) and Henry Chan (Husband) were granted a divorce in 2005, and the division of their marital assets was reserved for a future hearing. Some ten years later, in 2015, the trial court entered an order decreeing a division as outlined in a proposal by Wife. Husband appeals, maintaining that the trial court had previously ruled from the bench that the assets would be divided based upon a proposal filed by him. We affirm.

In this divorce action, Wife contends the trial court erred in the division of marital property and by declining to award her alimony. Wife also contends the trial court erred by permitting her counsel of record to withdraw, denying her recusal motion, and denying her requests for disability modifications. We affirm the trial court in all respects. We also find Wife’s appeal frivolous and remand for the trial court to award Husband his reasonable and necessary fees and expenses incurred on appeal.

This is a divorce case. On appeal, Vincente Acosta (Husband) argues that the trial court erred in reopening the proof shortly after the conclusion of a nonjury trial. The court did so for the purpose of receiving additional evidence on the subject of spousal support. Husband also argues that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay Kity Sonia Acosta (Wife) alimony in futuro of $1,500 per month. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in reopening the proof and thereafter awarding Wife spousal support in futuro. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.