APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves the foreclosure sale of improved real property located in Erwin, Tennessee. The plaintiff lender filed a complaint seeking a foreclosure deficiency award in the amount of $53,489.59, plus interest and reasonable attorney's fees, pursuant to the promissory note. The defendant debtor asserted as an affirmative defense that the lender had purchased the property during a foreclosure sale for a sum materially less than the fair market value. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the fair market value of the property was $158,900.00, an amount the lender had purportedly been offered by an employment relocation company prior to the foreclosure sale. The lender had purchased the home at foreclosure for $95,000.00. Finding the foreclosure sale price to be materially less than the fair market value, the trial court ruled that the debtor had successfully overcome the statutory presumption, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 35-5-118, that a foreclosure sale price is equal to fair market value. The court entered a deficiency judgment in favor of the lender in the amount of $9,659.62. The lender appeals. Discerning no reversible error concerning the award, we affirm. However, having determined that the promissory note provided for reasonable attorney's fees to the lender in the event of default, we remand for an evidentiary hearing on the amount of reasonable attorney's fees to be awarded for work performed during trial.

A Madison County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jerry Crawford, Jr., of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to thirty years in prison. The Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence, and this Court affirmed the trial court's judgments. See State v. Jerry Crawford, Jr., No. W2012-02729-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 296014, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Jan. 28, 2014), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. In 2015, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court appointed counsel who filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief alleging that the Petitioner had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court held a hearing on the petition and denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred when it denied his petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court's judgment.

In 2000, the Petitioner, Charles R. Blackstock, pleaded guilty to one count of especially aggravated kidnapping and two counts of rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to three consecutive twenty-five year sentences. This Court affirmed the consecutive sentencing on appeal, but modified the total effective sentence to seventy-one years. State v. Charles R. Blackstock, No. E2000-01546-R3-CD, 2001 WL 969036, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Aug. 27, 2001), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. In 2013, the Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, which was denied. The Petitioner appealed, and this Court affirmed. Charles R. Blackstock v. State, No. E2013-01173-CCA-R3-HC, 2014 WL 1092812, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Mar. 19, 2014), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. In 2015, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilty plea hearing and also during the habeas corpus proceeding. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that his counsel during the habeas corpus proceeding was ineffective. He further contends that the post-conviction court erred when it did not “mention[] the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” After a thorough review, we affirm the post-conviction court's judgment.

The Petitioner, Loice E. Pittman, appeals as of right from the Coffee County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief.  The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing his petition for having been untimely filed.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on the four minor children—Joseph F., Johnathon S., Sarah S., and Larry S. (“the Children”)—of the respondent mother, Elizabeth F. (“Mother”). In January 2011, Mother voluntarily placed all four Children in the custody of Ernest S., the biological father of the younger three children. Ernest S. passed away on June 27, 2011, while Mother was living in Oregon. Upon motion of Ernest S.'s minister and family friend, Betty Shirley, the Grainger County Juvenile Court granted temporary custody of the Children to Ms. Shirley on June 28, 2011. Ms. Shirley gave physical custody of the Children to the petitioners on July 8, 2011. The petitioners filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and to adopt the Children on that same day. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that statutory grounds existed to terminate the parental rights of Mother upon its finding by clear and convincing evidence that Mother (1) had abandoned the Children by willfully failing to provide financial support, (2) was guilty of severe abuse, and (3) was mentally incompetent to care for the Children. The court further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the Children's best interest. Mother has appealed. We affirm the trial court's judgment terminating Mother's parental rights in all respects.

An Anderson County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, David William Lowery, as charged of three counts of aggravated child abuse.  See T.C.A. § 39-15-402(a)(1) (Supp. 2007).  The trial court imposed concurrent twenty-five-year sentences with a release eligibility of one hundred percent for each count.  See id. § 40-35-501(i) (Supp. 2008).  Lowery’s sole issue on appeal is that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions.  Upon review, we affirm Lowery’s convictions but remand the case for entry of corrected judgments in counts 1, 2, and 3 to reflect that he was charged with and convicted of three counts of aggravated child abuse and that these convictions are Class A felonies.    

This is a termination of employment case. Appellant Shelby County Board of Education appeals the trial court’s decision to reinstate a tenured teacher whose employment was terminated for inefficiency. The trial court found that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of inefficiency. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

Appellant appeals the trial court’s determination that Appellee, who was born in 1992, is an heir-at-law of the Decedent, who died intestate. Appellant argues that the Appellee, as a child born out of wedlock, was required to file a claim against decedent’s estate within the statutory period in order to inherit. However, the Decedent is listed on Appellee’s birth certificate. Under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 68-3-305(b) (1992), in order for his name to be listed on Appellee’s birth certificate, the decedent would have signed an “affidavit . . . acknowledging paternity.” With the enactment, in 1994, of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 27-7-113, such “affidavits” were deemed “voluntary acknowledgment[s] of paternity,” which constitute a “legal finding of paternity.” It is undisputed that the decedent’s estate consists only of real property. Because the inclusion of decedent’s name on Appellee’s birth certificate evinces the execution of a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity that constitutes a legal finding of paternity, Appellee’s portion of the estate vested, upon decedent’s death, in Appellee pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 31-2-103 and the laws of intestate succession, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 31-2-104. Affirmed and remanded. 

This is a divorce case. Wife appeals the trial court’s order concerning the division of property and award of various fees and expenses. Because the trial court did not enter an order on Wife’s motion for reimbursement of certain fees and expenses, the judgment of the trial court is not final and appealable as of right. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.  

The Petitioner, Wesley Dawone Coleman, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Circuit Court for Obion County. He was convicted of aggravated burglary, theft over $500, and evading arrest, and received an effective sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the cumulative effect of counsel’s errors denied his constitutional right to a fair trial. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Victor Clark (“the Petitioner”) was indicted for two counts of attempted second-degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, one count of reckless endangerment, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous offense. After a jury trial, the Petitioner was acquitted of both counts of attempted second-degree murder but convicted of all other charges. In this post-conviction proceeding, the Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief. Upon review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Paul Williams el, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Relief, challenging his conviction for a second or subsequent offense of driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license. The habeas court summarily dismissed the Petition. On appeal, we conclude that the Petition failed to meet the procedural requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-107. Additionally, the Petitioner's claim is based on a complete misreading of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-50-504 and is without merit. The judgment of the habeas court is affirmed.

In December 2012, the Maury County Grand Jury indicted Brandon Waire (“the Defendant”) on three counts of sale of cocaine over .5 gram within a drug-free zone.  Following a trial, a jury convicted the Defendant as charged, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective eight years’ incarceration.  On appeal, the Defendant asserts that he is entitled to relief from his convictions because:  (1) the trial court erroneously denied the Defendant’s motion for mistrial after the State’s confidential informant testified that he had served prison time with the Defendant; (2) the Defendant’s right to a fair trial was violated when the State failed to preserve video evidence of statements made by the confidential informant in violation of State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999); (3) the trial court erred when it failed to exclude the State’s late-disclosed witness from testifying; and (4) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Derrick Rice, appeals as of right from the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief wherein he challenged his convictions for first degree premeditated murder and attempted first degree murder. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in the following ways: (1) general sessions counsel failed to consult with the Petitioner regarding a plea offer from the State and to explain the consequences of declining that offer; (2) trial counsel failed to investigate and subpoena witnesses; (3) general sessions counsel and trial counsel failed to adequately communicate with the Petitioner; and (4) trial counsel failed to adequately investigate and prepare the case for trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this post-divorce matter, numerous issues arose after the former wife, the primary residential parent, sought to relocate with the minor child. The trial court allowed the wife to relocate with the child to Pennsylvania and adopted her proposed parenting plan with certain modifications. On the issues raised in this appeal, the trial court ruled in the husband's favor. The wife appeals. We affirm.

Defendant, Jose Lemanuel Hall, Jr., was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison.  On appeal, he argues (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) that the trial court erred in admitting evidence regarding his gang affiliation and gang rank; (3) that the trial court erred in admitting photographs; and (4) that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Reginald Rome, appeals the dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis which alleged newly discovered evidence. The coram nobis court found that due process principles did not require tolling the statute of limitations and that Petitioner had failed to prove that he was without fault in failing to present this evidence at the proper time. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

An “affidavit of complaint” was issued against Lisa Odom for custodial interference. Deputies from the Claiborne County Sheriff's Office visited Ms. Odom for the purpose of taking custody of her child and returning her to Ms. Odom's ex-husband, Scott Odom. Ms. Odom objected to the removal of her child, and William Phipps, Ms. Odom's father, asked to see a warrant prior to the removal of the child. After a prolonged standoff, the deputies called Assistant District Attorney General Amanda Sammons, who explained over a speakerphone that a warrant was not necessary because there was a court order for Ms. Odom to return the child to Mr. Odom. During the course of the phone call, Ms. Odom overheard General Sammons use derogatory language when referring to her. Ms. Odom was ultimately arrested for custodial interference. Nearly a year later, Ms. Odom and Mr. Phipps (collectively the plaintiffs) filed a complaint against General Sammons alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress and civil conspiracy. General Sammons filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

Appellants are ten bail bonding companies that each posted a portion of a defendant’s $1 million bond.  After the defendant failed to appear for trial and absconded from the state, the bond was forfeited.  When the defendant was apprehended almost two years later, some of the Appellants filed separate petitions for exoneration of the forfeited bond.  After a hearing, the trial court denied the petitions.  Upon our review of the record, it appears that three of the Appellants—Neal Watson Bonding, Lucky’s Bonding, and Anytime Bail Bonds—never filed petitions with the trial court; therefore, we dismiss their appeals.  As to the remaining seven Appellants, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of a petition for judicial review for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The petitioner is seeking to recover a motor vehicle he claims to own that was seized due to “illegal alterations to the vehicle’s identification numbers.” It is undisputed that the petitioner was never the registered owner of the vehicle, that he was not in possession of the vehicle when it was seized, and that he did not receive notice of the seizure of the vehicle or the issuance of the notice of forfeiture. More than 60 days after the Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security issued the Order of Forfeiture, which constitutes the Department’s final order, the petitioner filed his petition for judicial review. His primary contention was that the Department of Safety failed to provide him with proper notice of the issuance of forfeiture warrant. The chancery court rejected this contention, concluding that he was not entitled to notice because he was never the registered owner. The court also found the petition for judicial review was untimely filed because administrative orders become final pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(b)(1)(A) if a petition for judicial review is not filed within 60 days from the entry of the order. Concluding that the 60-day limitation period is jurisdictional, the court dismissed the petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We affirm.

Defendant, David Reed, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Defendant argues that the trial court's failure to award post-judgment jail credit for time he spent incarcerated out-of-state prior to the revocation of his probation renders his sentence illegal. Upon our review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a dispute arising from the plaintiff’s attempted exercise of an option to purchase a tract of land. In part, the contract provided that “a fair and equitable price for said property will be established at a later date.” The trial court held that the option was not enforceable because it was too vague with respect to price. The plaintiffs appealed. We affirm. 

Petitioner, Kearn Weston, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to file a pre-trial motion to dismiss the charge based on the loss of a surveillance video. Upon our review, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

This lawsuit centers on allegations that the Plaintiff received improper medical care at the hands of several Defendants. However, the present appeal concerns only the trial court's dismissal of the Plaintiff's claims against a single Defendant, Dr. Jeffrey Kutsikovich (“Dr. Kutsikovich”), a resident physician employed by the University of Tennessee. The trial court was of the opinion that the Plaintiff's amended complaint stated only “tort medical battery claims” against Dr. Kutsikovich and that these claims were barred by the applicable one-year limitation period. On appeal, the Plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in classifying his claims and in determining that they were barred by the statute of limitations. Dr. Kutsikovich contends that the trial court's dismissal was proper, not only for the stated grounds, but also due to waiver under Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-307(b) and the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Having reviewed the record transmitted to us, we conclude that the Plaintiff waived his claims against Dr. Kutsikovich in this case by asserting a claim against the State under the Tennessee Claims Commission Act. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of Dr. Kutsikovich from this case, albeit for a different reason than held by the trial court.

The defendant, Anthony Bailey, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of robbery, a Class C felony, and assault, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of five years in the workhouse for the robbery conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the assault conviction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his robbery conviction, the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the victim's pretrial and in-court identifications, and the trial court erred by enhancing his sentence and by denying his request for probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.