APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Eric D. Crenshaw, pleaded guilty to theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony, evading arrest, a Class E felony, theft of property valued at $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor, possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and driving on a revoked license, a Class B misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103 (2014) (theft), 39-16-603 (2014) (evading arrest), 39-17-425 (2014) (unlawful drug paraphernalia), 55-50-504 (2012) (driving on a revoked license). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Defendant would receive concurrent sentences as a Range I, standard offender, with the length and the manner of service of the sentences to be determined by the trial court. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve six years for the felony theft conviction, two years for the evading arrest conviction, eleven months, twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor theft conviction, eleven months, twenty-nine days for the possession of drug paraphernalia conviction, and six months for the driving on a revoked license conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying him alternative sentencing and (2) imposing excessive fines for his felony theft and evading arrest convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Shawn Christopher Sales, pleaded guilty in the Rutherford County Circuit Court to robbery, and the trial court sentenced him as a career offender to serve fifteen years with release eligibility at 60%. The trial court ordered that the Petitioner serve 163 days in confinement and the remainder of his sentence on community corrections. The trial court later revoked the Petitioner’s community corrections sentence and ordered that he serve his sentence in confinement. This Court affirmed the revocation on appeal. State v. Shawn C. Sales, M2013-01510-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 806316 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Feb. 28, 2014), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. The Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, contending that his judgment is void because his sentence is illegal. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition finding that the Petitioner had failed to satisfy the procedural requirements and had failed to prove he was entitled to habeas corpus relief. After review, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment.

This appeal concerns a post-divorce modification of child custody. Randall Charles Harrell (“Father”) filed a petition against his ex-wife Chassity Necole Harrell (“Mother”) in the General Sessions Court for Wilson County (“the Trial Court”) to modify the permanent parenting plan concerning the parties’ two minor children. Father sought to be designated primary residential parent based, in part, upon Mother’s alleged drug abuse and instability. After a hearing, the Trial Court found a material change in circumstances, designated Father the primary residential parent, and entered a new parenting plan accordingly. Mother appeals to this Court, arguing, among other things, that the Trial Court erred in finding a material change of circumstances and in considering the unsworn testimony of the children. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in its entirety.

Petitioner, Andre Davis, was convicted of voluntary manslaughter by a Shelby County jury and sentenced to fourteen and one-half years in incarceration. His first appeal was denied. State v. Andre Davis, No. W2007-01442-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 4831230, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 2008), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2009). Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief which led to the grant of a delayed appeal based on trial counsel's failure to file a motion for new trial. Petitioner was permitted to file a motion for new trial. The motion was denied, and Petitioner was again denied relief on appeal. Andre Davis v. State, No. W2011-00373-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 5970932, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 29, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 10, 2013). Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief again. After a hearing, the petition was denied. On appeal, Petitioner challenges the post-conviction court's denial of relief. After a review, we determine Petitioner has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Mark Tiger, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-102 (2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to five years' confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and (2) the trial court erred during sentencing. We affirm the Defendant's conviction.

Petitioner, Eric O’Neil Turner, pled guilty to three counts of aggravated statutory rape, a Class D felony, with an agreed sentence of nine years for each count with one conviction to be served consecutively to the others for an effective eighteen-year sentence as a persistent offender. The sentence was suspended with time served, and Petitioner was immediately released on probation. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance and that Petitioner’s guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Following a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court

The Defendant, James Patterson, was found guilty by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of attempt to commit aggravated rape, a Class B felony, and two counts of assault, Class A misdemeanors. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-502 (2014) (aggravated rape), 39-12-101 (2014) (attempt), 39-13-101 (2010) (amended 2013) (assault). The trial court merged the assault convictions and sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of ten years for attempted aggravated rape and eleven months, twenty-nine days for assault, all to be served on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his attempted aggravated rape conviction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court

Appellant, Heather Renee McCollum, stands convicted of first degree premeditated murder and arson, for which she received consecutive sentences of life in prison and five years, respectively. Challenging her convictions and sentence alignment, she raises the following issues in this appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support her convictions; (2) whether her arson conviction should be set aside based upon the “physical facts” rule; and (3) whether the trial court erred in aligning her sentences consecutively. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is the third appeal involving liability on personal guaranties securing the debt of a transportation company. On remand after our second opinion, the trial court found that the transportation company and the lender, through the actions of its president, entered into a conspiracy to violate the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) and violated the duty of good faith and fair dealing, thereby relieving the guarantors of their liability under the continuing guaranties. Specifically, the trial court found that the guarantors were “consumers” under the TCPA, that the guarantors suffered an ascertainable loss due to the transportation company's deceptive acts, and that a violation of the TCPA can be a predicate tort for a civil conspiracy claim. Now, we reverse the trial court's finding that the transportation company's acts affected trade or commerce within the meaning of the TCPA. Accordingly, we also reverse the trial court's determination that the guarantors should be released from their guaranties.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Governor, all state appellate court judges, the Tennessee Republican Party, and the Tennessee Democratic Party in which she alleges, inter alia, that the Tennessee Plan and statutes providing for the appointment of special and senior judges violate her state and federal constitutional rights. The defendants filed motions to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff lacked standing and failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. The trial court granted the motions to dismiss, and Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint.  

In this post-divorce appeal, Father asserts the trial court erred in failing to find a material change of circumstance had occurred such that he should be designated the child’s primary residential parent. Father also asserts the trial court erred in awarding Mother her attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court in all respects.   

Eddie Williams, Jr., the Defendant, appeals the summary denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. He claims that the trial court improperly used his prior petit larceny conviction to enhance his sentence. Because this claim has previously been rejected by this court on multiple occasions and because the Defendant’s motion failed to state a colorable claim, we affirm the trial court’s summary denial of the motion.

The dispositive issue in this wrongful death action is whether the pro se complaint filed by the decedent’s surviving spouse tolled the statute of limitations. The defendants, a hospital and a physician, filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the complaint was a nullity because the surviving spouse was asserting claims in a representative capacity and the complaint was not signed by a licensed attorney. It is undisputed that the decedent was survived by three heirs, the surviving spouse and two children of the decedent. The trial court denied the motion concluding that, although the pro se complaint could not assert the claims of the children, the surviving spouse could properly assert his own claims. The trial court also held that the initial complaint was sufficient to toll the statute of limitations and the claims of the children were not time barred because a licensed attorney signed and filed an amended complaint that related back to the original filing pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15. Following a jury trial, the defendants were found liable and damages were awarded. The hospital appealed. We conclude the claims asserted by the surviving spouse were brought in a representative capacity on behalf of the decedent and were not his individual claims. Filing a complaint on behalf of another constitutes the practice of law and “[p]roceedings in a suit by a person not entitled to practice law are a nullity.” Bivins v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 910 S.W.2d 441, 447 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). Because the complaint filed by the surviving spouse was a nullity, it did not toll the statute of limitations and no other complaint was filed within the statute of limitations. Therefore, the trial court erred in denying the hospital’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations defense. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions to dismiss all claims and vacate all judgments against the hospital. 

A Maury County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Brian Pillow, of three counts of selling .5 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free zone.  The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by requiring the Appellant to expose his tattooed arms to the jury and by admitting photographs of his tattoos into evidence.  Additionally, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his convictions.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this divorce case, Carl Shane Merkel (Husband) contends that the trial court erred in its division of the marital estate, its award of child support made retroactive to the date that Starla Merkel (Wife) filed her complaint, and its monetary award to Wife's father, Terry McKeel, who was allowed by agreed order to intervene as an indispensible party. The award to McKeel was based on the trial court's finding that Husband owed McKeel $15,343.45 for unpaid loans made during the marriage by McKeel to Husband. We find no error in the division of the marital estate and the trial court's child support order. We hold that the issue of Husband's debt to McKeel was properly raised in McKeel's cross-claim and that the trial court had jurisdiction to dispose of this claim under the factual scenario reflected in the record. Wife raises the issue of whether there is evidence supporting the trial court's order decreeing that Chris Allen, a friend of hers, could not be in the presence of the two children born to Husband and Wife. We agree and modify the trial court's judgment to remove the prohibition barring Allen from having contact with the children. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

In 1994, a Henry County jury convicted the Petitioner, Teresa Deion Smith Harris, of first degree felony murder, and she was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Petitioner appealed, and this Court affirmed the Petitioner's conviction and sentence. State v. Teresa Deion Smith Harris, No W2012-00540-CCA-R3-CD, 1996 WL 654335, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Nov. 12, 1996), perm. app. granted (Tenn. June 8, 1998). The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the Petitioner's conviction and sentence but found that there existed some harmless error in sentencing. State v. Harris, 989 S.W.2d 301, 316 (Tenn. 1999). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief and two previous petitions for writ of error coram nobis. All of these petitions were denied, the Petitioner appealed, and this Court affirmed their denial. In this, her third, petition for writ of error coram nobis, the Petitioner alleged that she had received newly discovered evidence in the form of an affidavit from a doctor who said that her attorney was cavalier about the charges the Petitioner faced and seemed to not want to talk to the doctor about the Petitioner's case. The coram nobis court summarily dismissed the petition, finding it was filed outside the statute of limitations and that the evidence presented by the Petitioner was not newly discovered and was available to her before her 1994 trial. On appeal, the Petitioner, proceeding pro se, contends that the coram nobis court erred when it dismissed her petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing. After a thorough review, we affirm the coram nobis court's judgment.

The Defendant, Mitchell Lee Davis, pleaded guilty to burglary, misdemeanor theft, and sale of a Schedule II controlled substance, and the trial court entered the agreed sentence of five years, 180 days of which were to be served in confinement and the remainder to be served on probation. The Defendant's probation officer subsequently filed an affidavit alleging a probation violation. The trial court issued a warrant, and the parties agreed that the Defendant should serve 120 more days followed by reinstatement to probation. The trial court rejected the agreement, revoked the Defendant's probation, and ordered him to confinement. The Defendant did not appeal but then filed a motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, contending that the trial court improperly considered his lengthy criminal history when it revoked his probation. The trial court denied the Defendant's motion. On appeal, the Defendant contends that, after the trial court rejected the parties' agreement for the probation violation, the trial court violated his due process rights by not holding a hearing to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support the probation violation. He further contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation because it based its decision on the Defendant's previous criminal history. After review, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Pro se petitioner, Harold McDuffie, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

In 1998, a jury convicted the Defendant, Billy Locke, for DUI, third offense. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days, 160 days of which was to be served in confinement with the remainder to be served on probation. In 1999, the Defendant pleaded guilty to burglary, evading arrest, assault, and possession of burglary tools, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of three years to run consecutively with any sentence he received for violating his probation for the DUI conviction. Fifteen years later, in January 2015, the Defendant filed a Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that the trial court was required to align his sentences consecutively because he was on probation and thus still “serving” his sentence for the DUI conviction when sentenced for the burglary-related convictions. The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion, and he appealed to this Court. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Appellant, Marcus Traveno Cox, Jr., stands convicted (after merger of duplicate counts) of possession with intent to sell less than .5 grams of cocaine, possession with intent to sell more than one-half ounce but less than ten pounds of marijuana, possession of a Schedule III controlled substance (Lortab), possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony.  The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, appellant argues that the indictment and jury instructions for the possession of a firearm charge were fatally deficient and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.  Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Grady Joe Careathers, pleaded guilty to aggravated assault in exchange for a probation sentence. Shortly thereafter, the Defendant was arrested for violating the Habitual Motor Vehicle Offender Act, a charge to which he pleaded guilty. At the same time, he entered a guilty plea to violating his probation. Over the next five years, the Defendant admitted to violating his probation sentence on several occasions. At his fifth revocation hearing, the trial court revoked his probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. After review, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

The Appellant, Marcus Zeron Jones, is appealing the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1  The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20.  Said motion is hereby granted.

This appeal involves the foreclosure sale of improved real property located in Erwin, Tennessee. The plaintiff lender filed a complaint seeking a foreclosure deficiency award in the amount of $53,489.59, plus interest and reasonable attorney's fees, pursuant to the promissory note. The defendant debtor asserted as an affirmative defense that the lender had purchased the property during a foreclosure sale for a sum materially less than the fair market value. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the fair market value of the property was $158,900.00, an amount the lender had purportedly been offered by an employment relocation company prior to the foreclosure sale. The lender had purchased the home at foreclosure for $95,000.00. Finding the foreclosure sale price to be materially less than the fair market value, the trial court ruled that the debtor had successfully overcome the statutory presumption, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 35-5-118, that a foreclosure sale price is equal to fair market value. The court entered a deficiency judgment in favor of the lender in the amount of $9,659.62. The lender appeals. Discerning no reversible error concerning the award, we affirm. However, having determined that the promissory note provided for reasonable attorney's fees to the lender in the event of default, we remand for an evidentiary hearing on the amount of reasonable attorney's fees to be awarded for work performed during trial.

A Madison County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jerry Crawford, Jr., of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to thirty years in prison. The Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence, and this Court affirmed the trial court's judgments. See State v. Jerry Crawford, Jr., No. W2012-02729-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 296014, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Jan. 28, 2014), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. In 2015, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court appointed counsel who filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief alleging that the Petitioner had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court held a hearing on the petition and denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred when it denied his petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court's judgment.

In 2000, the Petitioner, Charles R. Blackstock, pleaded guilty to one count of especially aggravated kidnapping and two counts of rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to three consecutive twenty-five year sentences. This Court affirmed the consecutive sentencing on appeal, but modified the total effective sentence to seventy-one years. State v. Charles R. Blackstock, No. E2000-01546-R3-CD, 2001 WL 969036, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Aug. 27, 2001), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. In 2013, the Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, which was denied. The Petitioner appealed, and this Court affirmed. Charles R. Blackstock v. State, No. E2013-01173-CCA-R3-HC, 2014 WL 1092812, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Mar. 19, 2014), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. In 2015, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilty plea hearing and also during the habeas corpus proceeding. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that his counsel during the habeas corpus proceeding was ineffective. He further contends that the post-conviction court erred when it did not “mention[] the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” After a thorough review, we affirm the post-conviction court's judgment.