APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Plaintiffs, a husband and wife, filed suit against St. Thomas Hospital alleging claims for ordinary negligence and a derivative loss of consortium. The complaint alleged that St. Thomas was liable for injuries Plaintiffs sustained as a result of the hospital’s employees’ failure to properly support the wife as they attempted to transfer her from a bariatric stretcher to her automobile. St. Thomas moved to dismiss the claim on the grounds Plaintiffs failed to comply with the pre-suit notice and good faith certificate filing requirements of the health care liability statute set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-26-121 and -122. Plaintiffs responded that the complaint was not subject to the filing requirements because it sounded in ordinary negligence, not health care liability. The trial court held that Plaintiffs’ action is a health care liability action subject to the filing provisions of the health care liability statute and dismissed Plaintiffs’ claim with prejudice, finding it undisputed that Plaintiffs failed to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-26-121 and -122. Plaintiffs appeal. Having applied the clear language of the health care liability statute to Plaintiffs’ complaint, we conclude that the allegations contained therein meet the definition of a health care liability action as defined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-101(a)(1) and that Plaintiffs were required to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-26-121 and -122. Therefore, we affirm.

The issue presented in this case is whether the trial court erred in its calculation of child support when it omitted from the calculation support due from Larry W. Shipe, Jr. (Father) during a period of time when he was incarcerated. We hold that the Child Support Guidelines, Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-02-04-.04(3)(a)(2)(ii)(I) (2008), which provide that “incarceration shall not provide grounds for reduction of any child support obligation,” mandate that incarceration does not absolve an individual from his/her obligation to pay child support. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for a recalculation of Father’s child support arrearage.

This case arises from a contract for home improvement services. After the work was completed and Homeowners failed to pay the contract price, Contractor filed a civil warrant and was awarded a judgment in general sessions court. Homeowners failed to timely appeal the judgment to circuit court. They subsequently filed a petition for writ of certiorari and supersedeas in circuit court contending Contractor was not duly licensed and the Home Improvement Contractor’s Act prevented Contractor from recovering on the contract. Homeowners subsequently filed a complaint asserting a claim under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The circuit court denied the petition for writ of certiorari and dismissed the complaint as res judicata. We affirm.

Rachel L.S. (“Mother”) and Brandon M.R. (“Step-father”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Paul P. (“Father”) to the minor child Kiara S. (“the Child”). After a trial, the Circuit Court for Sevier County (“the Trial Court”) entered its order dismissing the petition after finding and holding, inter alia, that Mother and Step-father had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate Father's parental rights for abandonment by willful failure to visit or for abandonment by willful failure to support. Mother and Step-father appeal the dismissal of their petition. We find that the evidence in the record on appeal does not preponderate against the Trial Court's findings, and we affirm.

This case involves a residency dispute relevant to a child’s enrollment in a Wilson County public high school. After school officials determined that the child was not a resident of Wilson County, they informed her parents that the child could not attend high school in the county school system. The parents filed suit in chancery court seeking injunctive relief related to the child’s enrollment in school and participation in athletics. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court determined that the child lived in Wilson County and enjoined the local board of education from interfering with the child’s enrollment. The trial court also declared that the child should be afforded the same opportunities as other students as it relates to participation in athletics. On appeal, we affirm.  

In this divorce action involving the dissolution of a marriage of relatively short duration, the husband appeals the trial court's distribution of the marital estate, particularly the award of the marital residence and a 1969 Ford Mustang automobile to the wife. In order to more nearly return the parties to the positions they were in prior to the marriage, we modify the distribution of the marital estate to award the 1969 Ford Mustang automobile to the husband. We also modify the trial court's judgment concerning the marital residence to extend the wife's deadline for refinancing the debts associated with the marital residence to one year following the issuance of mandate by this Court. We affirm the trial court's judgment in all other respects.

This appeal arises from an action for divorce wherein the trial court awarded alimony to the plaintiff wife, whom the court determined to be economically disadvantaged due to her inability to maintain employment. The husband has appealed the spousal support award, asserting that the trial court erred in its analysis of the applicable statutory factors. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Coffee County Board of Education filed suit against the City of Manchester and the City of Tullahoma to recover certain tax revenue the Board alleges it was owed pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-4-306. The trial court held that the Board of Education lacked capacity to bring the suit and dismissed the petition. The Board of Education appeals asserting that the authority to sue to recover the funds is necessarily implied from the General Assembly’s grant of express powers and duties to the Board. We agree. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-2-203(b)(5), the General Assembly has granted the Board the power to “[e]mploy legal counsel to advise or represent the board.” We find that this provision vests the Board with the authority to file suit to recover the funds at issue. Therefore, we must reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the lawsuit.  

This appeal arises from the grant of a Rule 60.02 motion to set aside a final judgment. The plaintiff, acting pro se, filed a motion to revive or renew a judgment against the defendant. Due to inclement weather, the plaintiff was unable to attend the hearing on her motion. The trial court dismissed her motion with prejudice and released the underlying judgment. Subsequently, the plaintiff obtained counsel and filed a Rule 60.02 motion to set aside the trial court’s order. The trial court granted her motion and reinstated the original judgment. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

Petitioner, Kenneth D. Sanders, appeals the order of the trial court denying his motion to vacate his guilty plea and/or motion to alter and amend the judgment in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during his guilty plea proceedings.  The trial court treated the motion as a petition for post-conviction relief and found that it was filed beyond the statute of limitations.  On appeal, Petitioner argues that: (1) Petitioner is actually innocent; (2) The District Court [sic] lacked subject matter jurisdiction; (3) The sentence is an illegal sentence; (4) Petitioner’s guilty plea was not knowingly and intelligently made; and (5) Petitioner was deprived of his rights guaranteed him by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.  After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In September 2014, the Madison County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Elahu Hill, Jr., for simple possession of marijuana, tampering with evidence, and violation of the open container law. Following a trial, the jury found the Defendant guilty of simple possession of marijuana and tampering with evidence, for which he received an effective five-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for tampering with evidence and that his five-year sentence for tampering with evidence was excessive. Upon review, we affirm the Defendant's conviction and sentence for simple possession of marijuana. However, we reverse and vacate the Defendant's conviction for tampering with evidence because we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction.

Petitioner, Sidney T. Cason, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because we determine that Petitioner has failed to file a timely notice of appeal or provide reason as to why the timely filing of the notice of appeal should be waived, the appeal is dismissed.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, from the Trial Court=s denial of a post-judgment motion to recuse in a breach of contract case. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by the Defendant, Keith Celebrezze (ADefendant@), we affirm the Trial Court.

This is a declaratory judgment action. Appellant's application for a permit to erect a sign was denied by Appellee, the Memphis and Shelby County Office of Construction Code Enforcement. Appellant petitioned the trial court to declare that Code Enforcement was estopped from denying the permit. As grounds for estoppel, Appellant cites a letter issued to the Appellant five years earlier by an assistant county attorney when Appellant sought advice on erecting multiple signs at its location. After a hearing, the trial court granted the Appellees' motion for involuntary dismissal. We affirm and remand.

This case involves the modification of a permanent parenting plan naming Mother the primary residential parent. Father petitioned to be named the primary residential parent after Mother moved with the child out-of-state without providing prior notice. After a one-day hearing, the trial court found a material change in circumstance and that naming Father the primary residential parent was in the best interest of the child. Although conceding she failed to give notice of the move, Mother argues there was no material change in circumstance and a change in primary residential parent was not in the best interest of the child. We affirm.

This appeal involves a long-term ground lease and leasehold financing. After numerous assignments to successor tenants and several foreclosures, Citizens National Bank (“the Bank”) became the successor tenant under the ground lease. After a fire at the property, the Bank notified the landlord that it intended to surrender the leased property and cease paying rent, according to its interpretation of a separate agreement executed by the parties. The landlord denied that the Bank was entitled to unilaterally surrender the leased property and cease paying rent. The landlord filed a detainer warrant in general sessions court and, after an adverse ruling, appealed to circuit court. The circuit court concluded that the separate agreement did not limit the Bank's liability under the ground lease, as the Bank claimed. Accordingly, the circuit court entered a judgment against the Bank for approximately $130,000 for unpaid rent, taxes, and attorney's fees. The Bank appeals, challenging the circuit court's interpretation of the separate agreement and its award of damages beyond the sum of $25,000. We affirm.

We granted permission to appeal in this healthcare liability action to reconsider the summary judgment standard adopted in Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008). The Court of Appeals concluded that the Hannan standard requires reversal of the trial court’s decision granting summary judgment to the defendants on certain of the plaintiffs’ claims. We hereby overrule Hannan and return to a summary judgment standard consistent with Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We hold, therefore, that a moving party may satisfy its initial burden of production and shift the burden of production to the nonmoving party by demonstrating that the nonmoving party’s evidence is insufficient as a matter of law at the summary judgment stage to establish the nonmoving party’s claim or defense. Applying our holding to the record in this case, we conclude that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on all the plaintiffs’ claims at issue in this appeal. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this matter to the trial court for entry of summary judgment on these issues and for any other proceedings that may be necessary.

I was not serving on the Supreme Court in 2008 when Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008) was argued. Had I participated in the Hannan decision, I would have joined in the majority opinion. However, after observing the application of the unique Hannan standard over the past seven years, I conclude that the Hannan standard is unworkable and should be replaced. Although it is often easier to maintain the status quo rather than admit that a mistake was made, we do not have this option. We must change course when we realize we are headed in the wrong direction. 

I concur in all respects with the excellent opinion in this case authored by Justice Clark. I write separately solely to address from a somewhat different perspective some of the points raised by the dissent. The dissent claims that Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008) simply “refined” the summary judgment standard adopted by this Court dating back to 1993 in Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn. 1993). Based in part upon my first-hand experiences in the trenches as a trial court judge, I beg to differ.

In this appeal, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, breach of contract by the insurance carrier. Pursuant to settled law in this state, the plaintiff had one year plus sixty days to institute suit on the policy. This action was filed one year and 134 days after the fire loss. The trial court found the lawsuit was not timely filed. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

The majority opinion accurately recounts the development of this area of the law but ultimately concludes that the summary judgment standard first articulated in Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn. 1993), and later refined in Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008), and other decisions of this Court, must now be overruled. In my view, the principles articulated in Hannan, when interpreted in light of the history of summary judgment in Tennessee, set forth the preferable standard for shifting the burden of proof at summary judgment—one that is fully consistent with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56. By granting Rule 11 review in a case which pre-dated the passage of a statute purporting to set a new standard for summary judgment, by rejecting the well-established doctrine of stare decisis, and by acquiescing to the standard proposed by the General Assembly, my colleagues have preempted the future consideration of an important constitutional issue—whether the General Assembly, by its enactment of Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-16-101 (Supp. 2014), has violated the separation-of-powers doctrine. In the interest of consistent, predictable procedural guidelines of adjudication, I would hold that Byrd, Hannan, and their progeny should be reaffirmed as the standard for summary judgment in Tennessee and should be applied to the facts before us. Moreover, in my assessment, even the federal standard, as adopted in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), does not warrant dismissal on all of the claims. I must, therefore, respectfully dissent.

The petitioner, Ronald Leslie McKnight, appeals the denial of his bid for post-conviction relief from his 2011 Davidson County Criminal Court jury conviction of aggravated burglary, claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Stacey Philander Baldon, appeals the summary denial of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence. Because the petitioner stated a colorable claim for relief under Rule 36.1, which the State concedes, the trial court erred by summarily denying the motion. In consequence, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff and his former wife purchased a house together in 2002. The former wife moved out of the house with all of her belongings in 2009, and the house suffered damage from a fire in 2010. The former wife was a named insured on the house, and each of the insurance checks issued to cover property loss and living expenses was made payable to both Plaintiff and his former wife. The president of the bank that held a mortgage on the house had a separate business relationship with the former wife. According to Plaintiff, the bank president informed him that he could not have any of the insurance proceeds unless one-half was given to the former wife, which proceeds were used to pay down the former wife’s separate and unrelated loan. The bank ultimately foreclosed on the house because the loan became delinquent. Plaintiff filed a complaint against the bank and president asserting conversion, wrongful foreclosure, and other related causes of action. The bank and the president filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff did not file his opposition within the time prescribed by the procedural rules, and the trial court granted the bank and the president’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in some respects and reverse the judgment in other respects. Plaintiff’s deposition transcript that the trial court considered in ruling on the motion for summary judgment raised genuine issues of material fact that precluded summary judgment on several of the causes of action alleged.  

The appellant, Casey Dupra Drennon, pled guilty in the Rutherford County Circuit Court to aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and received a seven-year sentence with credit for 149 days already served and the remainder on supervised probation.  On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by revoking his probation and ordering that he serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.