APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

We granted review in this health care liability action to decide whether the trial court erred by failing to apply this Court’s analysis in Estate of French v. Stratford House, 333 S.W.3d 546 (Tenn. 2011), in determining whether it was necessary for plaintiffs to provide pre-suit notice and a certificate of good faith under the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act (“THCLA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-101 et seq. We hold that the Tennessee Civil Justice Act of 2011, which amended the THCLA, statutorily abrogated our decision in Estate of French by providing that “[a]ny such civil action or claim is subject to [the THCLA] regardless of any other claims, causes of action, or theories of liability alleged in the complaint.” Because it is undisputed that the plaintiffs in this case failed to provide pre-suit notice or file a certificate of good faith, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice is reinstated.
 

This appeal involves two employees‘ claims of racial discrimination and retaliation pursuant to the Tennessee Human Rights Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-101, et seq. After a five-day jury trial, the jury found in favor of both employees on their claims of racial discrimination and retaliation for engaging in protected activity. The jury awarded one employee $2,600,000 and the other employee $2,042,000 in back pay, benefits, and compensatory damages. The trial judge granted the employer‘s motion for remittitur of the jury verdict and suggested remittitur of the awards to $1,225,933.33 and $676,000, respectively. The plaintiffs accepted the remittitur under protest. The employer appeals, claiming that the trial court should have granted its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the plaintiffs failed to establish essential elements of their claims. Alternatively, the employer argues that a new trial is necessary due to erroneous jury instructions. The employees argue that the trial court erred in reducing the jury verdict. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant, Juan Villa, was found guilty by a Bradley County Criminal Court jury of aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-15-402 (2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-three years' confinement at 100% service as a violent offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial, and (3) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Father, the primary residential parent with substantially more parenting time, sought to relocate to Wisconsin with the parties’ minor son. After learning that Father was about to relocate, Mother filed a petition in opposition to the relocation alleging that she had not received notice of Father’s intent to relocate as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108(a) and contending that relocation was not for a reasonable purpose and not in the child’s best interest. After a hearing on the issue of notice, the trial court found that Mother received certified mail from Father more than 30 days prior to commencing this action, but it did not contain notice of Father’s intent to relocate; thus, the court allowed Mother’s challenge to the relocation to proceed. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108(g). Following a two-day trial on Mother’s petition, the court found that the testimony of Father and his wife was not credible, that Father did not have a reasonable purpose to relocate, and that relocation was not in the child’s best interest. The court also entered an order prohibiting Father from relocating with the child and designating Mother as the primary residential parent. Father appealed, contending that the trial court erred when it found that Mother had not received notice of his intent to relocate, and that the relocation did not have a reasonable purpose and was not in the child’s best interest. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects.

This is an unemployment compensation case. The employee filed a claim for benefits following her termination from her employer. The Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development granted the claim. The Appeals Tribunal reversed the decision, finding that the employee was ineligible for benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-7-303(a)(1)(A). The Board of Review upheld the reversal. The employee filed a petition for judicial review, and the trial court reversed the decision. The employer and the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development appeal. We affirm the trial court.

In this termination of parental rights case, Mother appeals the trial court’s findings of the following grounds for termination: abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home; abandonment by an incarcerated parent; abandonment by willful failure to visit; abandonment by willful failure to support; substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; and the persistence of conditions. Mother also appeals the trial court’s conclusion that termination was in the children’s best interest. We reverse as to the trial court’s findings of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and abandonment by an incarcerated parent. We vacate the trial court’s findings of abandonment by willful failure to support and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans due to the trial court’s failure to make specific findings of fact. We affirm the trial court’s findings of abandonment by willful failure to visit and persistence of conditions. We also affirm the trial court’s finding that termination is in the best interest of the children. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of Mother’s parental rights.

The Defendant, Brenda Woods, was convicted by a McNairy County Circuit Court jury of three counts of procuring an illegal vote. See T.C.A. §2-19-117 (2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to two years to be served on community corrections. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions; (2) her convictions violate double jeopardy; (3) the trial court erroneously admitted irrelevant evidence; and (4) the prosecutor made improper statements during closing argument. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, we dismiss this appeal.

The Defendant, Donna Marie Chartrand, was charged in the Circuit Court for Gibson County with conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, promotion of the manufacture of methamphetamine, felony possession of drug paraphernalia, and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(a)(1) (Supp. 2012) (amended 2014) (manufacture of methamphetamine); 39-12-103 (2014) (conspiracy); 39-17-433(a)(1) (2014) (promotion of methamphetamine manufacture); 39-17-425(b)(1) (Supp. 2012) (felony possession of drug paraphernalia); 39-17-425 (Supp. 2012) (misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia). In this interlocutory appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search of her home, arguing that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause. We reverse the order of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings in which the evidence obtained pursuant to the invalid warrant is suppressed.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, we dismiss this appeal.

The Defendant, Alison Briars, pleaded guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to cruelty to animals, a Class A misdemeanor, with the length and manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. See T.C.A. § 39-14-202 (2014). The court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with sixty days’ confinement and the remainder to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court (1) erred in denying judicial diversion and (2) abused its discretion by not sentencing her to full probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Gary Mitchell Hestand, was convicted by a Clay County jury of assault upon a law enforcement officer, a Class A misdemeanor, and resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended to supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred by refusing to grant a new trial based on destroyed evidence; (2) the trial court erred by not allowing the Defendant to deploy a taser for demonstrative purposes; (3) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (4) the trial court erred by not setting reasonable time limits for the length of the trial days; and (5) the trial court abused its discretion in not dismissing a biased juror for cause. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial courrt.

In this post-divorce dispute, Father argues that the trial court erred in failing to make him the primary residential parent because of Mother’s alleged failure to facilitate a close relationship between Father and the child. The trial court found a material change in circumstances, but concluded that a change in the primary residential parent was not in the best interest of the child. We affirm because the evidence does not preponderate against the decision of the trial court. 

The defendant, Adrian Marcel Newbill, was convicted by a Marshall County Circuit Court jury of the possession of 26 grams or more of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, with the intent to sell/deliver, a Class B felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. The defendant raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction, and (2) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Two children came into the custody of the Department of Children’s Services in July 2012 after members of their extended family made allegations that their parents were abusing them. The children were adjudicated dependent and neglected, and subsequently, the Department instituted proceedings to terminate the parental rights of both parents. After a hearing, the court held that the parents had willfully abandoned their children by failure to support, substantial non-compliance, and persistence of conditions. Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court.

The Defendant, Willie Nolan, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of attempted reckless endangerment, aggravated assault, reckless aggravated assault, felony reckless endangerment, and vandalism. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -13-102, -14-408. After merging the attempted reckless endangerment conviction into the aggravated assault conviction, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twenty-seven years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to enter as substantive evidence the unsigned statement of a witness in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(26); and (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions for aggravated assault, reckless aggravated assault, and felony reckless endangerment. After careful review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Morgan Moore, entered guilty pleas to first degree murder and criminal responsibility for first degree murder for his involvement in the murders of his parents. He received concurrent sentences of life in prison. He thereafter filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief alleging that trial counsel failed to properly inform him of the nature and consequences of his guilty pleas, specifically, the length of a life sentence, and that as a result, his guilty pleas were not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal follows. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Jacob Dale Gormsen, pled guilty to one count of driving under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-401 (2010). He reserved a certified question challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. The defendant asserts that his encounter with law enforcement was not consensual and that law enforcement had no probable cause or reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigatory stop after discovering him unconscious in a running vehicle on the road. We conclude that the interaction between the defendant and the officer began as a consensual police-citizen encounter and that the officer possessed reasonable suspicion at the point that the interaction became an investigatory stop. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the motion to suppress.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Tasha Briggs, of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell, a Class E felony, possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, a Class E felony, and possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class D felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the convictions for possession of a controlled substance and sentenced the appellant to an effective four-year sentence to be served as three years in confinement followed by one year on probation. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding the mens rea for the offense of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed and that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Based upon the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that the trial court committed reversible error regarding the instruction and that the case must be remanded for a new trial on the charge of possessing a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony. Moreover, upon remand, the trial court is to enter a single judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.

Appellee Avenue Bank (“the Bank”) filed suit against the Appellant Guarantee Insurance Company (“GIC”), alleging breach of contract with respect to a “Funds Held Agreement” entered into between the parties. Pursuant to the parties' agreement, the Bank agreed to disburse proceeds of a letter of credit to GIC. In turn, GIC agreed to hold the funds in a separate “Funds Held Account” and disburse the funds to pay unpaid premiums and certain claims that might become payable pursuant to policies of workers' compensation insurance. The agreement further provided that upon the resolution of all workers' compensation claims filed within the applicable statute of limitations period, GIC would, upon request of the Bank, return to the Bank any funds remaining in the Funds Held Account. Following the resolution of all claims filed within the limitations period, the Bank demanded the repayment of the remaining balance. GIC failed to comply with this demand. In its answer, GIC alleged that it was unable to perform in light of a Delaware court order concerning the liquidation of a third-party, Ullico Casualty Company (“Ullico”). It contended that the terms of the Delaware order barred disbursement of the funds at issue. The Bank ultimately moved for judgment on the pleadings by asserting that the undisputed facts showed that it was entitled to relief. The trial court granted the motion and concluded that the facts admitted by GIC's answer established the Bank's right to recover on its breach of contract claim. In doing so, the trial court rejected GIC's arguments that Ullico's liquidation and/or the Delaware court order had any effect on its performance. We affirm.

The defendant, Eliot Russell, was convicted of one count of attempted rape of a child, a Class B felony, and one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. The trial court imposed twelve-year sentences for each conviction and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively for an effective sentence of twenty-four years. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for attempted rape of a child and that the trial court erred in imposing a twenty-four year sentence. Following our review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a Title IV-D child support case. Father/Appellant appeals the trial court's modification of his child support obligation on grounds that: (1) the Juvenile Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to modify the Circuit Court's child support order; and (2) the trial court erred in applying the Child Support Rules and Regulations in calculating Appellant's monthly child support obligation. Appellant also appeals the trial court's award of attorney's fees in this case. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Brandon Leon Forbes, was convicted of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony; and vandalism of property valued at $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-103, -105, -403, -408. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender to a total effective sentence of twenty-four years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during voir dire; (3) that juror misconduct occurred during the course of his trial; (4) that the trial court erred in determining the length of his sentences; and (5) that the trial court erred in imposing partial consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Timothy A. Baxter, appeals as of right from the Madison County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends that his petition stated cognizable claims for habeas corpus relief because it alleged numerous violations of his constitutional rights, ineffective assistance of his trial and appellate counsel, “pervasive governmental misconduct,” and insufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court and remand the case for treatment of the petition as one for post-conviction relief and further proceedings consistent with the Post-Conviction Procedure Act.

The defendant, Andre Bernard Easley, appeals his Benton County Circuit Court jury conviction of introduction into or possession of drugs in a penal institution, claiming that the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.