APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A jury convicted the defendant, William Darelle Smith, of first degree (premeditated) murder, and he was sentenced to life in prison.  On appeal, this court affirmed the denial of the motion for a new trial.  The defendant appealed a single issue to the Tennessee Supreme Court: that his right to an impartial jury was compromised because the trial court did not hold a hearing after the discovery, during jury deliberations, that a juror was not only acquainted with one of the State’s witnesses but had sent the witness a communication through Facebook complimenting her on her testimony.  The Tennessee Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had erred in refusing to hold a hearing and remanded the case.  After a hearing during which the juror and the witness testified regarding the nature of both their relationship and the communication, the trial court again denied the defendant a new trial.  The defendant appeals.  We conclude that the State sufficiently rebutted any presumption of prejudice raised by the juror’s extrajudicial communication or by his concealment of his acquaintance with the witness, and accordingly we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an interlocutory appeal regarding the trial court’s denial of the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit following a shooting that occurred on December 24, 2011, outside Club Fathom in Chattanooga, a youth outreach ministry operated by two of the defendants. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court denied their motions, and the defendants sought and were granted an interlocutory appeal. We determine that the court erred in failing to grant summary judgment to the defendants regarding the plaintiffs’ negligence claims. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court. We remand the case for entry of summary judgment regarding the plaintiffs’ negligence claims and for a determination regarding the remaining lease issue.

Father brought suit against Son in general sessions court for repayment of certain alleged debts. After Father’s case was dismissed, he appealed to circuit court, which also dismissed Father’s claims after a trial.  Based on the record on appeal, sufficient facts exist to support the trial court’s determination, and the decision of the trial court is affirmed.

This is a termination of parental rights appeal brought by the incarcerated father. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence to support termination of the father’s parental rights on the statutory grounds of abandonment and confinement under a sentence of ten years or more. The court further found that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children. The father appeals. We affirm.

An employee injured her shoulder while working for her employer and failed to make a meaningful return to work. The Claims Commission awarded the employee 55% permanent partial disability. The employer appealed, arguing that the award is excessive 1 because the Commissioner erred in assessing an 11% anatomical impairment rating and in applying a five times multiplier. We modify the Commissioner’s judgment, and affirm as modified.

The Petitioner, Grover D. Cowart, appeals the habeas corpus court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, or, in the alternative, motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that (1) the judgments of conviction in Case No. 50934 are void; (2) the judgment of conviction in Count 1 of Case No. 50934 is too “indefinite nd ambiguous” to run consecutively to his conviction in Case No. 49900; (3) the judgments of conviction in Counts 2 and 3 in Case No. 50934 are too “indefinite, uncertain, and ambiguous” to run consecutively to Count 4 in Case No. 49900; and (4) the sentences in Case No. 50934 are expired. Discerning no error, we affirm the summary dismissal of the Petitioner’s petition.

This is an irreconcilable differences divorce case. The trial court entered a final judgment of divorce that incorporated the parties’ mediated marital dissolution agreement. Shortly thereafter, Husband filed a motion to set aside or to alter or amend the final judgment, claiming he was under duress when he entered into the marital dissolution agreement and also claiming that the trial court was required to conduct a hearing before entering the final judgment. The trial court disagreed and denied Husband’s motion. We affirm.

The Defendant, William Bryan Gatlin, was convicted by a Marshall County Circuit Court jury of possession of marijuana with the intent to sell and possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver, Class E felonies, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor.  See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(a)(4) (possession of a controlled substance) (Supp. 2012) (amended 2014), 39-17-425 (possession of drug paraphernalia) (2014).  The trial court merged the possession of marijuana convictions.  The Defendant was sentenced to serve two years for the merged possession of marijuana conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for possession of drug paraphernalia.  The sentences were imposed consecutively to each other and to any unexpired sentence.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a knock-and-talk encounter and a warrantless entry into his apartment and that the judgments should be reversed because without the illegally obtained evidence, the remaining evidence is insufficient to support his convictions.  We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves various financial issues relative to a divorce. Husband appeals the trial court’s determination of several factual findings relative to alimony, including Wife’s ability to secure employment, Husband’s ability to earn in the future, the award of attorney’s fees to Wife, and the value of several marital assets divided in the property division, including the value of an LLC jointly owned by the parties. Wife also appeals the trial court’s determination of value and the division of the parties’ joint interest in the LLC, which the trial court awarded to Husband without assigning a value. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Antonio Williams (“the Petitioner”) pleaded guilty to three counts of possession with intent to sell a Schedule II controlled substance within a drug-free zone and agreed to a revocation of probation on a prior sentence. Pursuant to his plea agreement, the Petitioner received a total effective sentence of ten years to be served at 100%. In this appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in finding: (1) that his plea was intelligently and voluntarily made; and (2) that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Angel Geovanna Hurtado, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of three counts of aggravated child abuse, one count of reckless aggravated assault as a lesser-included offense of aggravated child abuse, and one count of aggravated child neglect.  The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-five years for her convictions.  In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court committed plain error by failing to grant a mistrial given the “significant problems that arose during trial revealing the existence of potential new witnesses and exculpatory evidence”; (2) the trial court erred by permitting the State to elicit testimony about and argue that evidence of domestic violence established the Defendant’s guilty knowledge, under a theory of criminal responsibility, of the child abuse and neglect of the victim by her live-in boyfriend; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, including a challenge of material variance between the proof and the State’s election of offenses.  Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.  However, we must remand for entry of a corrected judgment in count two to reflect the proper conviction of reckless aggravated assault.

The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Lori D.F.P. (“Mother”) to the minor child Bryce F. (“the Child”). After a trial the Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Child after finding and holding, inter alia, that grounds had been proven by clear and convincing evidence to terminate Mother’s parental rights for abandonment by willful failure to pay child support pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i); for failure to substantially comply with the permanency plan pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2); and for severe child abuse pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4), and that the termination was in the Child’s best interest. Mother appeals to this Court. We find that the evidence does not preponderate against the Juvenile Court’s findings made by clear and convincing evidence, and we affirm.

The petitioner, Mike Settle, appeals from the denial of his sixth petition for writ of habeas corpus, which challenged his 2001 guilty-pleaded convictions of felony escape, especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and two counts of aggravated assault. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The plaintiff in this interlocutory appeal filed a complaint asserting health care liability claims against the original defendants, at which time she included a certificate of good faith in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-122. The original defendants asserted comparative fault against non-party health care providers. The plaintiff waived compliance by the original defendants with section 29-26-122(b), which required the defendants to file a certificate of good faith regarding the non-party health care providers. The plaintiff thereafter amended her complaint to add the named non-party health care providers as new defendants but did not file a new certificate of good faith. The new defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint. The trial court denied the motions and granted this interlocutory appeal. We reverse.

The Defendant, Boyce Turner, was indicted by the Washington County Grand Jury on two counts of driving under the influence (“DUI”), two counts of DUI 4th offense, evading arrest, resisting arrest, and driving on a revoked license. The Defendant refused law enforcement’s request to submit to a blood test to determine his blood alcohol content, and his blood was taken, without a warrant and over his objections, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-406(f)(2) (2012). The trial court subsequently granted the Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of his blood alcohol content test, concluding that the Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated. In this appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred in granting the Defendant’s motion to suppress because the Defendant consented to the test by driving on the roads in Tennessee and exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Katius J. Williams, was indicted on one count each of aggravated burglary, aggravated rape, and aggravated robbery. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-402, -13-502, -14-403. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary, aggravated rape, and the lesser-included offense of theft of property valued at $500 or less. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-103, -105. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective forty-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) that the trial court erred by making “no findings as to why maximum sentences were appropriate”; and (3) that the total effective sentence was excessive. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Marcus Terry aka Marcus Benson aka Torian Benson, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, which petition challenged his 1997 Shelby County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded conviction of escape. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from divorced parents’ child custody dispute. After Mother was arrested twice for driving under the influence, Father requested that he be designated as the primary residential parent and that Mother have supervised parenting time only. Without making any specific factual findings, the trial court found that there had been a “substantial and material change in circumstances” since the prior custody order, and the trial court designated Father as the primary residential parent. Mother’s parenting time was decreased by 196 days, her decision-making authoritywas removed, and she was ordered to pay child support to Father. Because the trial court’s order fails to comply with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand.

The defendant, Albert Jackson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempted voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony; aggravated assault, a Class C felony; employing a firearm during the commission of a felony, a Class C felony; reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony; and felon in possession of a handgun, a Class E felony. He was sentenced to an effective term of twenty-four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Frederick O. Edwards, appeals the Weakley County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by treating his Rule 36.1 motion as a petition for post-conviction relief and further asserts that he has presented a colorable claim for relief. We agree that the trial court’s treatment of the Petitioner’s motion to correct an illegal sentence as a petition for post-conviction relief was error, but because we conclude that the Petitioner has not presented a colorable claim, the trial court’s order denying relief is affirmed.

Patient brought a health care liability action against his eye surgeon, alleging that the surgeon’s negligence in performing a LASIK procedure resulted in several eye injuries. The trial court granted a directed verdict for the surgeon, finding the patient failed to present evidence establishing the standard of care and causation. Because we find the evidence was sufficient to create an issue for the jury, we reverse and remand to the trial court.

Defendant appeals a judgment holding that he ran a stop sign, contending that the court did not have subjectmatter or in personam jurisdiction over the matter, and that the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County lacked standing to bring the action. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The defendant, Andrew Barry Diebold, entered pleas of guilty to possession of marijuana with the intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell and possession of drug paraphernalia. He was sentenced, respectively, to two years as a standard offender, to serve ninety days, with one year and nine months of unsupervised probation, and to ninety days at 75%. As a condition of his pleas, he reserved as a certified question if the warrantless search of his backpack by a law enforcement officer was illegal. The search was made by the defendant’s father, who was a lieutenant with the Brownsville Police Department, as the backpack was in the passenger side of the father’s truck, which the defendant had been operating. We conclude that the certified question is not dispositive of the case and, therefore, dismiss the appeal.

A hearing panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility determined that an attorney failed to act diligently in his representation of a client and suspended the attorney from the practice of law for forty-five days. The trial court affirmed the suspension. After careful consideration, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this detainer action, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the loan servicing company. Discerning no error, we affirm.