APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Plaintiffs sued four individual defendants and three religious institutions for invasion of privacy; malicious harassment; assault; intentional infliction of emotional distress; negligence; negligent hiring, training, supervision and retention; and civil conspiracy. The trial court dismissed all of plaintiffs’ causes of action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We affirm the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims against two of the religious institutions for failure to state a claim for vicarious liability. We also affirm the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims for invasion of privacy; malicious harassment; intentionalinfliction of emotionaldistress;negligence;negligenthiring,training,supervision and retention; and civil conspiracy. However, having liberally construed the complaint as we must at this stage of the pleading process, we find the complaint states a cause of action for assault against the individual defendants and one of the religious institutions. Therefore, we must reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ allegation of assault and affirm the court in all other respects.
 

A jury found appellant, Jerome Antwaune Perkins, guilty of possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, with intent to sell or deliver. He pleaded guilty to the accompanying charge of driving on a revoked license, third offense. He was sentenced to fifteen years as a multiple offender for the drug conviction and the agreed-upon concurrent eleven months, twenty-nine days for the driving conviction. In this appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence underlying the drug conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

A jury convicted the defendants, Markreo Quintez Springer and William Mozell Coley, of first degree (felony) murder; second degree murder, a Class A felony; and especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. On appeal, the defendants launch challenges against: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the admission of a witness’s recorded prior inconsistent statement; (3) the chain of custody for DNA evidence; (4) the admission into evidence of a recording of the defendants discussing the events in the back of a police vehicle; (5) the exclusion of a recorded statement from a deceased witness; (6) the admission of testimony regarding threats against a witness made by one of the defendants; and (7) the trial court’s refusal to grant a severance. After a thorough review of the record and issues raised, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Darrell Ray Beene (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of one count of robbery and one count of criminal attempt to commit especially aggravated kidnapping. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective term of forty-two years’ incarceration. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and his consecutive sentences. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.
 

In 2011, the Coffee County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Edward Kilcrease, for aggravated burglary, employment of a firearm during commission of a dangerous felony, possession of a firearm during commission of a dangerous felony, aggravated assault, and vandalism. Prior to trial, the State dismissed the charges of employment of a firearm during commission of a dangerous felony and possession of a firearm during commission of a dangerous felony and amended the aggravated assault charge to simple assault. A jury convicted Appellant of attempted aggravated burglary and vandalism. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence presented by the State at trial is insufficient to support his conviction for attempted aggravated burglary. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction for attempted aggravated burglary because proof that Appellant actually completed the criminal offense does not render the evidence insufficient to sustain a conviction for an attempt of the same offense. Consequently, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
 

Michael Warren Fuller (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant to thirty years’ incarceration. Following a hearing on the Defendant’s motion for new trial, the trial court reduced the Defendant’s sentence to twenty-eight years. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. He also contends that his sentence is improper. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction. We remand, however, for the trial court to sentence the Defendant pursuant to the 2005 Amendments to the Tennessee sentencing statutes.
 

Appellant, Deaundra Brooks, entered guilty pleas to two counts of robbery and received the agreed-upon sentence of five years on each count. The parties requested a sentencing hearing for determination of sentence alignment and alternative sentencing. Following the hearing, the trial court aligned the sentences concurrently but denied alternative sentencing and ordered appellant to serve the sentences in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant now appeals the denial of alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

The Defendant, Amanda Hope McGill, appeals as of right from the Sullivan County Circuit Court’s judgment concluding that it did not have jurisdiction over her motion to modify her sentence. Because the Defendant filed her motion well past the 120-day time limit imposed by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, and because the Defendant was housed in a facility under contract with the Tennessee Department of Correction, we agree with the trial court that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the Defendant’s request for concurrent sentencing or placement in the Community Corrections Program. Therefore, the judgment is affirmed.

The trial court vacated an arbitration award in favor of Petitioner/Appellant Morgan Keegan & Company, Inc., on the basis of “evident partiality” and remanded the matter for rearbitration before a different panel. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

This case involves a plaintiff who fell outside the Memphis International Airport and sued the Airport Authority for negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant Airport Authority, finding, based on the undisputed facts, that the plaintiffs and their witnesses are unable to identify what caused the fall. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.

At an earlier time, Ashley Evans (“the petitioner”) filed a petition against Nigel M. Reid (“the respondent”) seeking an order of protection. The trial court dismissed the petition due to “[in]sufficient cause.” In the same order, however, the court found “proof of the need of a restraining order.” Accordingly, the court restrained the respondent from coming about, calling or harassing the petitioner or her family. Several years later, the respondent asked the court to void the restraining order, which, on its face, was still in effect. The court refused. The respondent appeals. We reverse the trial court and hold that (1) the trial court was without jurisdiction to issue the restraining order and (2) the restraining order is, consequently, null and void.

This is an appeal in a divorce case, where Wife appeals the classification and division of marital property and debt, the calculation of the division of the proceeds from the sale of the marital residence, the dismissal of the contempt petition she filed against Husband, and the failure to award her attorney fees. Husband appeals the classification of certain real property and the division of marital debt; he also requests his fees on appeal. We modify the judgment allocating the marital debt and awarding $16,691 to Wife as alimony in solido; we affirm the judgment in all other respects

The defendant, Brandon Harris, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony; reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor; and three counts of assault, Class A misdemeanors. He was sentenced to twenty-five years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the reckless endangerment and each of the three assault convictions. All of the sentences were ordered to be served consecutively for an effective term of twenty eight years, eleven months, and twenty-five days in the Tennessee department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in allowing a voice recognition “expert” to testify; (2) the trial court erred in denying his request for a jury instruction regarding mere presence; (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (4) the trial court erred in imposing excessive and consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this appeal, the Defendant, Ryan Sosa, contends that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and ordering his original sentences for the sale of cocaine into execution because he showed a willingness to abide by the rules of probation and had not had any issues on probation prior to the violations currently at issue. Upon consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, we affirm the trial court’s sentencing decision.

The defendant was indicted on two counts of fabricating evidence and on six counts of making a false report arising out of the disappearance of his wife. A jury convicted the defendant on all counts, and the trial court imposed a sentence of one year in the county jail followed by six years on probation. After a hearing on the defendant’s motion for new trial, the trial court affirmed the convictions for making a false report but dismissed the convictions for fabricating evidence after concluding that no investigation was “pending” when the defendant fabricated evidence. Both the State and the defendant appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeals reinstated the defendant’s convictions for fabricating evidence, dismissed as multiplicitous two convictions for making a false report, and affirmed the remaining convictions and sentences. We granted the defendant permission to appeal. Although we affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals’ reinstatement of the defendant’s convictions for fabricating evidence, we conclude that two of the defendant’s convictions for making a false report should be dismissed because the evidence is insufficient to support these convictions. We also conclude that three of the defendant’s convictions for making a false report are multiplicitous and therefore dismiss two of those convictions. We affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals in all other respects.

Appellant Shelby County appeals a portion of the trial court’s judgment in favor of Appellee, the purchaser of property formerly owned by Shelby County. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded the Appellee property damages, prejudgment interest, and attorney’s fees based on its finding that Shelby County committed inverse condemnation of the Appellee’s property by failing to inform the Appellee of the condemnation proceedings commenced by the City of Memphis. Because the City of Memphis, and not Shelby County, was the condemnor of the property, we conclude that the trial court erred in awarding damages against Shelby County on the theory of inverse condemnation, and further erred in awarding attorney’s fees pursuant to the inverse condemnation statute. Accordingly, we reverse the finding of inverse condemnation and the award of attorney’s fees against Shelby County. Shelby County does not appeal the trial court’s award of property damages or prejudgment interest. That award is, therefore, affirmed. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

This is a termination of parental rights case. After the Appellants filed a termination petition against Biological Parents, Mother filed a counter-claim for malicious use of process, kidnapping, and perjury. The trial court dismissed the termination petition, but failed to rule on Mother’s counter-claim. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for lack of a final judgment.
 

This is an appeal from an administrative decision on unemployment benefits. The appellee Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development held that the claimant employee was “constructively discharged” and was therefore eligible for unemployment benefits. The appellant employer filed a petition for judicial review of the administrative decision. The chancery court affirmed, and the employer appeals. We hold that the doctrine of constructive discharge is inapplicable to proceedings under the unemployment compensation statutes. The facts as found by the administrative tribunal support a holding that the employee voluntarily terminated her employment. For this reason, we conclude that the administrative decision awarding benefits to the employee is not supported by substantial and material evidence and is arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, we reverse.

The issue presented in this case is whether alimony in futuro was properly terminated by the trial court. The parties entered into a marital dissolution agreement, which provided that Husband/Appellee would pay Wife/Appellant alimony in futuro until death, remarriage, or “until a third person not the Wife’s child, moves into the Wife’s residence.” The marital dissolution agreement was incorporated, by reference, into the final decree of divorce. Thereafter,Wife’s mother moved into Wife’s home,and Husband filed a motion to terminate his support obligation based upon the occurrence of the suspending condition. The trial court granted Husband’s petition, finding that the parties’ agreement for alimony in futuro was contractual in nature and that the unambiguous language mandated cessation of Husband’s support obligation when Wife’s mother moved into Wife’s home. Based upon the provision for attorney’s fees in the parties’ marital dissolution agreement, the trial court also awarded Husband his attorney’s fees and costs. Wife appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.
 

The pro se petitioner, Charles Orlando Fields, appeals the Hickman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the sentence he received for his conviction for the sale of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a school zone is illegal. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal on the grounds that the petitioner failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief.

Darren Eugene Fleshman, alias (“the Defendant”), was convicted of theft 1 of property of at least $10,000 but less than $60,000. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to four years, suspended to supervised probation, and ordered him to pay restitution in the amount of $42,815.93. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the following: the trial court’s interpretation of the definition of “owner” under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-106(a)(26) (2006); the sufficiency of the evidence at trial; and the amount of restitution imposed by the trial court. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction. We, however, vacate the trial court’s order of restitution and remand this matter for a new hearing as to the amount and manner of restitution.

The plaintiff, as surviving spouse, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his health care liability action against the defendant doctor who treated the plaintiff’s wife prior to her death and the hospital wherein the treatment occurred. The trial court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment based upon the plaintiff’s failure to strictly comply with the pre-suit notice requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121 (Supp. 2013). We reverse the trial court’s ruling that the plaintiff had to strictly comply with the provisions of the notice requirement and conclude that the plaintiff substantially complied with said requirement. We affirm, however, the trial court’s ruling that the plaintiff could not rely upon the statutory 120-day extension of the statute of limitations due to his failure to properly serve the notice. We therefore affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims as barred by the statute of limitations.

Following a bench trial Defendant, Randall Grainger, was convicted of three counts of knowingly violating a condition of community supervision for life, with each condition violated not in itself constituting a criminal offense, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-526 (a),(b)(1). Each conviction is a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days for each conviction and ordered the sentences to be served concurrently with each other. The trial court suspended all of the effective sentence of eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days except for ten (10) days’ incarceration, followed by eleven (11) months and nineteen (19) days of probation. In his appeal Defendant presents two issues for this Court’s review. First, Defendant asserts that the convictions should be reversed and the charges dismissed because Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-524(d)(1) violates Article II, section 3 of the Tennessee Constitution. Second, Defendant argues that the conviction based upon his failure to successfully complete sex offender treatment violates his right to due process guaranteed by both the United States Constitution and the Tennessee Constitution. After a thorough review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

Petitioner, Timothy Barbee, pleaded guilty to possession of heroin, a Schedule I controlled substance, with intent to sell, and the trial court sentenced petitioner to the agreed-upon term of eight years at thirty percent release eligibility. In his timely petition for post-conviction relief, petitioner asserts that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
 

This case arose out of a contract for the sale of real estate. The contract included a provision requiring the buyer to make “commercially reasonable efforts” to sell the property, and to split any profits with the seller if the property was resold within 36 months. The buyer did not sell the property, and the seller brought suit, raising numerous claims, including breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, violations of the Real Estate Settlement Practices Act (RESPA), the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), the Fair Debt Collection Practice Act, the Consumer Protection Act, RICO, wrongful foreclosure, promissory fraud, civil conspiracy, collusion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, constructive trust, conversion and unjust enrichment. After a hearing, the trial court granted the buyer’s motion to dismiss thirteen of the seller’s claims, denied the motion to dismiss another six of his claims, and certified its order as final for the purposes of appeal under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. We affirm the trial court.