APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Kevin Harding, was convicted of one count of facilitation of possession of marijuana, a Schedule VI drug, with the intent to sell, a Class A misdemeanor, one count of possession of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony, one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and one count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant to a four-year sentence for facilitation of possession of marijuana with the intent to sell, a seventeen-year sentence for possession of cocaine for resale, a sentence of 11 months and 29 days for possession of drug paraphernalia, and an eight-year sentence for possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The court ordered the possession of cocaine for resale and possession of drug paraphernalia sentences to be served concurrently, and the sentence for possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony to run consecutively to the sentence for possession of cocaine for resale, for an effective sentence of twenty-five years. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred when it failed to define the charge of simple possession of cocaine for the jury; that the trial court committed plain error in sentencing the defendant to serve four years for facilitation of possession of marijuana with the intent to sell; and that the trial court committed plain error in failing to require the State to elect the felony to serve as the underlying felony for possession of a firearm and failing to define “dangerous felony” for the jury. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court for possession with the intent to sell cocaine, reverse the judgment for facilitation because the sentence was outside the appropriate class range, and reverse the judgment for possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The case is remanded for resentencing on the facilitation conviction and for a new trial on the possession of a firearm charge.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Following a hearing, the trial court found clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of the parental rights of both the mother and the father on the statutory grounds of abandonment based on failure to provide a suitable home, failure to substantially fulfill the requirements of the permanency plans, and persistence of conditions. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1)-(3), 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii), 37-2- 403(a)(2). The court further concluded that termination was in the best interest of the children. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i). The mother and father appeal. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The petitioner, Mitchell Ford, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. At trial, the petitioner was convicted of arson and aggravated burglary, Class C felonies, and was sentenced to two fifteen-year terms to be served concurrently. On appeal, he argues that he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to challenge the identification of the petitioner by the State’s witnesses and failed to challenge a juror who knew the victim and the petitioner and his family. Following a review of the record, we conclude that the petition was properly denied and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Larry W. Anderson, pled guilty to one count of aggravated burglary and one count of evading arrest in a motor vehicle with a risk of death or injury to others and was sentenced by the Davidson County trial court to serve ten years as a Range III, persistent offender. Subsequently, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in Lauderdale County, alleging that his sentence was void because of the State’s failure to give notice of intent to seek enhanced punishment and because the original trial court did not enter judgment until more than forty-five days after Petitioner had entered his guilty plea. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Upon review of the record, we find that the Petitioner has failed to state a cognizable claim and affirm the decision of the habeas corpus court dismissing the petition.

The petitioner, Andre Kimbrough, was convicted of second degree murder, a Class A felony. He now appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that the statute of limitations for filing a petition for post-conviction relief should be tolled because trial counsel did not give the petitioner adequate notice that his direct appeal was denied or notice that trial counsel did not apply for permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court. After reviewing the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

This is an appeal from the denial of a post-judgment motion. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s lawsuit. At the hearing on the motion, the plaintiff agreed to dismissal of his lawsuit. The trial court entered an order dismissing the lawsuit and assessing court costs against the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed a timely motion to alter or amend, asking the trial court to reconsider the award of court costs; this was denied. The plaintiff filed a second motion to alter or amend, again seeking reconsideration of the award of court costs; this request for reconsideration was denied as well. The plaintiff now appeals the trial court’s order on the second post-judgment motion. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A registered nurse sustained a compensable injury to her neck. The trial court found that she was permanently and totally disabled as a result of the injury. Her employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by failing to cap the award at oneand- one-half times the impairment rating pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A). In the alternative, the employer asserts that the trial court erred by awarding permanent total disability benefits. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted Harold D. Doss, Jr., of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and especially aggravated kidnapping. The jury convicted Johnathan Lamar Hathaway of first degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and especially aggravated kidnapping. The trial court merged Defendant Doss’s convictions for first degree felony murder and second degree murder and ordered Defendant Doss to serve an effective sentence of life plus thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court ordered Defendant Hathaway to serve an effective sentence of life in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant Doss asserts that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to sever; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (3) the trial court erred when it admitted hearsay evidence; (4) the trial court erred when it permitted the State to amend the indictment during the trial; (5) his dual convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and especially aggravated robbery violate his right to due process; and (6) the trial court improperly imposed consecutive sentences. Defendant Hathaway asserts that: (1) there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions; (2) the trial court improperly allowed the State to present “unreliable evidence” of cellular telephone tower technology through a Tennessee Bureau of Investigation agent; (3) the trial court erred when it permitted the State to amend the indictment during the trial; (4) there was juror misconduct; and (5) the trial court applied the incorrect law governing circumstantial evidence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.
 

The petitioner, Michael Martez Rhodes, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In a best interest plea agreement, the petitioner pled guilty to two counts of attempted aggravated sexual battery, Class C felonies, and received two four-year sentences. The trial court subsequently ordered that the sentences be served consecutively in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the petitioner contends that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to the ineffectiveness of trial counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective because he “pushed” the petitioner to accept the guilty plea even though the petitioner maintained that he did not commit the acts for sexual gratification, an element of the offense. Following review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Husband filed a petition to terminate his alimony obligation, asserting that he sold his dental practice following the entry of the final divorce decree for health reasons,as a result of which he was unable to pay alimony because his only income was social security benefits. The trial court found that husband’s retirement constituted a material and substantial change of circumstances, but declined to modify his obligation. Husband appeals the denial of his petition and wife appeals the denial of her request for attorney fees. We affirm the decision in part, reverse in part and remand for further consideration.

Defendant, Ronnie Corral, was indicted in a 16-count indictment for five counts of attempted first degree murder; five counts of aggravated assault; three counts of facilitation of attempted aggravated robbery; one count of aggravated robbery; one count of attempted aggravated robbery; and one count of aggravated burglary. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of five counts of facilitation of attempted first degree murder; four counts of aggravated assault; one count of facilitation of aggravated assault; four counts of facilitation of attempted aggravated robbery; one count of aggravated robbery; and one count of aggravated burglary. Defendant’s four convictions for facilitation of attempted aggravated robbery were merged with three of his aggravated assault convictions and his conviction for facilitation of aggravated assault, and his remaining aggravated assault conviction was merged with his aggravated robbery conviction. For his convictions, Defendant received a total effective sentence of ten years. Defendant appeals his convictions and sentences and asserts: 1) the trial court abused its discretion by declining to grant a mistrial after the trial court allowed inadmissible hearsay to be admitted; 2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated robbery and facilitation to commit first degree premeditated murder; and 3) the trial court erred in sentencing Defendant to more than the minimum sentence in the applicable sentencing range. After a thorough review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

Appellant, Wendell Todd Duberry, was convicted of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000 and criminal trespassing. The trial court sentenced him as a multiple offender to eight years for the theft conviction and to thirty days for the criminal trespassing conviction. On appeal, appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred by allowing the State to present evidence of victims not named in the indictment; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (3) his sentence was excessive; and (4) the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

The petitioner, Jamar Ed-Wae Scott, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of first degree murder and attempted robbery. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of relief.

Petitioner, Darius Jones, appeals from the trial court’s judgment which denied postconviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner argues on appeal that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel but only argues one factual allegation of ineffective assistance. Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because trial counsel failed to include in his motion for new trial the ground that the trial court erroneously denied the motion to suppress Petitioner’s statement to police. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mother and Father were divorced and Mother was designated as the primary residential parent of their child in 2003. Father filed a petition several years later seeking to have the designation of primary residential parent changed from Mother to himself. The trial court granted Father’s petition after determining Father had proved a material change in circumstances and it was in the child’s best interest for Father to become the primary residential parent. Mother appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
 

In a bench trial, the Defendant, Victoria Wellington, was convicted of one count of DUI, first offense, and one count of felony evading arrest. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days for the DUI conviction and to two years for the felony evading arrest conviction. The trial court ordered that the sentences be served concurrently and be suspended after nine months, with the remainder to be served on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied her motion to suppress her statements to police. She further contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her conviction for felony evading arrest After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

The petitioner, Kenneth L. Peachman, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his 2007 Montgomery County Circuit Court guilty-pleaded convictions of second degree murder and solicitation of first degree murder, claiming that the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel rendered his guilty pleas unknowing and involuntary.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. 

Appellant, Mark A. Crites, was convicted of operating a motor vehicle after being declared a habitual traffic offender, a Class E felony.  See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-616.  The trial court sentenced him as a career offender to serve six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, appellant argues that the assistant district attorney general committed prosecutorial misconduct in her opening statement and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.   

Appellee, Larry Mitchell Brooks, was indicted by the Maury County Grand Jury for one count of driving under the influence, one count of violation of the open container law, one count of violation of the registration law, one count of violation of financial responsibility law, and one count of failure to maintain control.  Prior to trial, Appellee filed a motion to suppress the blood sample evidence on the basis that the State was unable to provide proper chain of custody for the sample.  After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to suppress by written order.  The trial court entered an order of nolle prosequi.  The State filed a notice of appeal on the same day that the order of nolle prosequi was entered.  After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-410 does not require the certificate of the blood draw to include the person who took the blood specimen in order to establish chain of custody and that the evidence at the hearing on the motion to suppress adequately established the chain of custody.  Accordingly, we reverse the grant of the motion to suppress and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Appellant, Kayla Clark, was convicted of two counts of sale of a Schedule III controlled substance and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent sentences of four years each, to be served in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction.  In this appeal, she challenges both the lengths of her sentences and the manner of service. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A man who suffered a blood infection after eating raw summer oysters at a Nashville restaurant filed suit against the restaurant, claiming that the oysters were contaminated because they were kept at an improper temperature. The restaurant owner answered, and among other things he named three companies in the supply chain that furnished the oysters to the defendant restaurant as possibly liable under the doctrine of comparative fault. The plaintiff subsequently died, and his executor was substituted as plaintiff. The executor filed an amended complaint that added the suppliers as defendants, and included claims against all the defendants of negligence, negligence per se, product liability, and breach of warranty. All the parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court denied the defendant restaurant’s motion for summary judgment, but it granted summary judgment to the defendant suppliers on all issues except failure to warn. After studying the voluminous record in this case, we affirm all the trial court’s rulings on the summary motions against the restaurant. We affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the suppliers, and reverse the denial of summary judgment to them for failure to warn.

The defendant, Nathaniel Maclin, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of sexual battery by an authority figure, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Hospital filed an action against TennCare managed care organization (“MCO”) for breach of contract and unjust enrichment when MCO refused to pay Hospital’s standard charges for emergencyservices and follow-up care. Hospital was notpart of MCO’s “provider network” under the TennCare regulations and therefore was “non-contract” provider. MCO alleged Hospital was required to accept as payment the rate TennCare specified in its regulations. MCO filed motion for summary judgment, and the trial court dismissed the portion of the complaint to which the TennCare regulations may apply due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court determined the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”) divested it of jurisdiction because Hospital did not first seek a declaratory order from the Bureau of TennCare regarding the applicability of its regulations to Hospital’s dispute with MCO. Hospital appealed the dismissal of its claims, and we reverse. Because Hospital is not challenging applicabilityor validityof TennCare regulations,UAPA does not divest trial court of jurisdiction.

An employee suffered a work-related injury to his back. The employer acknowledged that the injury was compensable but disputed the extent of permanent partial impairment and the reasonableness of the employee’s decision to take early retirement. The trial court awarded the employee 28% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole, and the employer
appealed, contending that the trial court erred in failing to cap the award at one-and-one-half times the anatomical impairment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d). The employee also appeals, arguing that the trial court erroneously concluded that he was not permanently and totally disabled. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s determination that the employee is permanently and partially disabled. We reverse, however, the trial court’s determination that the statutory cap of one-and-one-half times the anatomical impairment rating does not apply and remand to the trial court for a determination of the employee’s vocational disability consistent with this opinion.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Anthony Henvey aka Anthony Hervey, of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony, and he received an effective sixteen-year sentence. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the attempted murder conviction and that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on self-defense. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the self-defense instruction was erroneous but that the error was harmless. Therefore, the appellant’s convictions are affirmed.