APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises out of a settlement agreement between the parties that resolved the
distribution of the decedent’s estate’s assets. Under the settlement agreement, Appellant
agreed to receive $1,800,000.00 from a joint brokerage account in his name and the
decedent’s name. Appellant alleged that he was entitled to $1,800,000.00 outright and was
not required to pay the capital gains taxes associated with the disbursement of such funds.
Appellant also alleged that he was entitled to post-judgment interest on the $1,800,000.00.
The trial court concluded that Appellant was responsible for the capital gains taxes
associated with the disbursement and that Appellant was not entitled to post-judgment
interest on the same. Discerning no error, we affirm.

After a jury trial, the Defendant, Jerry Rommell Gray, was convicted of felony murder,
attempted especially aggravated robbery, and attempted aggravated robbery. The
Defendant received a total effective sentence of life plus fifteen years. In this delayed
appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by (1) ordering that additional
fingerprints could be taken from the Defendant on the first day of trial; and (2) allowing an
expert to testify regarding the conclusions of a non-testifying expert. Upon review, we
respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Russell Davis, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary
dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of
Criminal Procedure 36.1. Specifically, the Defendant argues that his sentence is illegal
because the State failed to file timely and proper notices of enhanced punishment and
because he was improperly classified as a Range II offender. After review, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.

This appeal concerns a claim of retaliatory discharge. Heather Smith (“Smith”), then an
at-will employee of BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee, Inc. (“BlueCross”), declined to
take a Covid-19 vaccine. Smith emailed members of the Tennessee General Assembly
expressing her concerns and grievances about vaccine mandates. BlueCross fired Smith
after it found out about her emails. Smith sued BlueCross for common law retaliatory
discharge in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). For its part,
BlueCross filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. After a hearing, the Trial
Court granted BlueCross’s motion to dismiss. Smith appeals. We hold that Article I,
Section 23 of the Tennessee Constitution, which guarantees the right of citizens to petition
the government, is a clear and unambiguous statement of public policy representing an
exception to the doctrine of employment-at-will. Smith has alleged enough at this stage to
withstand BlueCross’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. We reverse the Trial
Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

In April 2018, Petitioner, Adarion C. Morris, pleaded guilty in three separate cases and received an effective sentence of six years to be served on community corrections. However, after two community corrections violation warrants were filed, one in June 2018 and another in August 2018, the trial court held a hearing, revoked Petitioner’s community corrections sentence, and re-sentenced Petitioner to forty-eight years in the Department of Correction. This court affirmed the trial court’s revocation and sentence imposed on appeal. See State v. Adarion C. Morris, No. M2018-02034-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2019), no perm. app. filed. Petitioner subsequently filed a post-conviction petition alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when entering his guilty pleas, which rendered his pleas unknowing and involuntary. He also alleged counsel was ineffective at the revocation hearing and re-sentencing for not challenging the legality of the original community corrections sentence. After a hearing, the post-conviction court concluded Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims regarding the guilty pleas were untimely and that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim relative to the revocation and re-sentencing was without merit. Petitioner appeals, arguing that he is entitled to due process tolling of the limitations period for his claims regarding his guilty pleas. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Douglas Wayne Woods, was convicted by a Sullivan County Criminal
Court jury of two counts of perjury, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 39-16-
702(a)(1) (2018) (subsequently amended). The trial court imposed an effective sentence
of eleven months and twenty-nine days on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends
that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of
the trial court.

A decedent’s estate sued his girlfriend for the proceeds of his life insurance policy, items from his home that were missing or damaged, and money withdrawn from his credit union account. The trial court found for the estate on the basis of fraud, conversion, and undue influence. The girlfriend appealed. We affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand.

I concur in the Court’s judgment reversing the Court of Criminal Appeals, and I agree with much of the majority opinion’s analysis, including its determination that the trial court did not err in ordering Johnny Cavin to pay restitution. I also agree with the majority’s conclusion that the restitution order here was final and appealable, but I reach that conclusion by way of a slightly different analysis. I write separately to explain how my reasoning differs from that of the majority. While the majority asks whether the trial court’s judgment satisfied the statutory requirements for restitution orders, I would focus instead on whether the record shows that the trial court thought it was finished with the case. In my view, the restitution order here was final because nothing in the record or on the face of the order suggests that the trial court believed there was more to be done, not because it did everything it was supposed to do.

Defendant, Billy W. Locke, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his two
motions to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules
of Criminal Procedure. Following our review of the briefs of the parties, the record, and
the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court pursuant to Court of
Criminal Appeals Rule 20.

A trial court ordered a defendant to pay a set amount of criminal restitution but did not
state payment terms or consider the defendant’s ability to pay. The Court of Criminal
Appeals dismissed the appeal, ruling the restitution order was not a final order because it
did not include payment terms. We hold the restitution order was a final order even though
it did not include payment terms. See State v. Cavin, No. E2020-01333-SC-R11-CD, ___
S.W.3d ____, 2023 WL _________ (Tenn. ______, 2023). The date for payment of the
restitution was, by default, the expiration of the defendant’s sentence based on Tennessee
Code Annotated section 40-35-304(g). The trial court erred by failing to consider the
defendant’s financial resources and ability to pay when setting the amount of restitution as
required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-304(d). We reverse the judgment of
the Court of Criminal Appeals, vacate the trial court’s restitution order, and remand to the
trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Jasmin Lawan Towles, was convicted by a Fayette County Circuit Court
jury of theft of property valued at $1000 or less and sentenced by the trial court to 11
months, twenty-nine days at 75% in the county jail, with the sentence suspended after
service of 100 days and the Defendant placed on probation supervised by community
corrections. The sole issue he raises in this appeal is whether the evidence is sufficient to
sustain his conviction. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur in the Court’s judgment reversing the Court of Criminal Appeals, and I agree with much of the majority opinion’s analysis, including its determination that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider Joseph Gevedon’s ability to pay when setting the amount of restitution.1 I also agree with the majority’s conclusion that the restitution order here was final and appealable, but I reach that conclusion by way of a slightly different analysis. I write separately to explain how my reasoning differs from that of the majority. While the majority asks whether the trial court’s judgment satisfied the statutory requirements for restitution orders, I would focus instead on whether the record shows that the trial court thought it was finished with the case. In my view, the restitution order here was final because nothing in the record or on the face of the order suggests that the trial court had any intention of setting the time for payment, not because the trial court did everything it was supposed to do.

This is a criminal contempt case. Appellant/Father appeals the trial court’s finding that he is guilty of four counts of criminal contempt for violating the trial court’s orders regarding medical treatment for the minor child. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Marcus Johnson, Petitioner, sought habeas corpus relief for the third time after his convictions for one count of felony murder, one count of especially aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated assault.  See State v. Marcus Johnson, No. W2002-00987-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 22080778, at *14 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 4, 2003), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 26, 2004); Marcus Johnson v. State, No. W2007-02664-CCA-R3-PC, 2008 WL 4866817, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 10, 2008), no perm. app. filed.  The petition was dismissed without a hearing after the habeas corpus court determined that Petitioner was merely raising issues that had previously been litigated.  We determine that the habeas corpus court properly dismissed the petition and affirm the judgment of that court. 

Appellants, purchasers of several unimproved lots, filed suit against Appellee title company. Appellants asserted five counts against Appellee based on Appellee’s alleged failure to disclose the existence of a lien lis pendens on the lots. The trial court dismissed all but one of the counts against Appellee and certified its orders of partial dismissal as final pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. We conclude that the trial court improvidently certified its orders as final and dismiss the appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

The primary issue presented is whether a criminal restitution order is a final and appealable
order under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 when the order directs a defendant
to pay a set amount of restitution without payment terms. A trial court ordered the
defendant who had pleaded guilty to burglary and theft to pay $5,500 in restitution during
his probationary period. The Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the appeal, holding that
the restitution order was not a final and appealable order because it lacked payment terms.
We hold that the restitution order was a final order. Tennessee’s criminal restitution statute,
Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-304, allows—but does not require—trial courts
to specify payment terms. Here, the trial court’s restitution order resolved all issues, was
reasonable, and appropriately considered the victim’s pecuniary loss and the defendant’s
ability to pay.

Defendant, William Rimmel, III, was indicted by the Marion County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated assault, two counts of reckless endangerment, one count of false imprisonment, one count of vandalism over $2,500, and one count of burglary of an automobile. The charge of false imprisonment was dismissed prior to trial. A jury found Defendant guilty of attempted aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, attempted reckless endangerment, vandalism under $1,000, and attempted burglary of an automobile. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied Defendant’s request for judicial diversion and imposed an effective sentence of two years on probation following service of 11 months and 29 days in confinement. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Defendant’s request for an alternative sentence and in ordering consecutive sentencing, that his convictions should be vacated due to the State’s failure to preserve evidence, and that the trial court gave confusing jury instructions. Based on the record, the briefs, and oral arguments, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a judgment in Count 4 and amended judgment in Count 3, reflecting that those counts were dismissed, and for entry of corrected judgments in Counts 5 and 6.

This case involves a declaratory judgment action to determine whether the plaintiff, then a member of the Clarksville City Council, was entitled to a declaration of rights concerning alleged communications between the Clarksville City Attorney and the local District Attorney General potentially pertaining to plaintiff. The trial court dismissed the action, concluding that the plaintiff was seeking an impermissible advisory opinion because there was no justiciable controversy. Having reviewed the record, we affirm.

This is an appeal regarding the final decree of divorce for this couple. The husband’s inlaws
are included as intervening petitioners. The trial court granted the wife a divorce on
the ground of inappropriate marital conduct, $1250 per month alimony in futuro, and
payment of her attorney fees as alimony in solido.1 Further, the court awarded a judgment
to the intervening petitioners of $297,670, with a lien in their favor upon all the real
property to secure payment of the indebtedness. The husband appeals. We affirm.

This case involves an intrafamily dispute over a home and the alleged indebtedness thereon. The trial court found that the son committed promissory fraud with regard to the conveyance of the home and awarded the mother $180,000.00 in damages as the value of the home at the time of the conveyance. The trial court further dismissed a claim against the daughter related to a loan on the property. Both the son and the mother appeal. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, William Rolandus Keel, appeals the denial of his petition for postconviction relief from his convictions for two counts of rape of a child, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in not admitting relevant evidence consisting of a recorded phone call (“Phone Call Recording” or “recording”) between the victim and her mother, in limiting the Petitioner’s testimony at the remand evidentiary hearing, in finding that the Petitioner received the effective assistance of counsel, and in denying post-conviction relief when the Petitioner is “one hundred percent innocent and [was] wrongfully convicted.” Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Garen Wright, appeals from the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his previously ordered probationary sentence of twenty years in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by not considering alternatives to placing Defendant in custody for the full term. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A wife sought a divorce after a long-term marriage. The trial court granted the wife a default judgment for divorce as a sanction for the husband’s discovery abuses. After a trial, the court also valued and divided the marital estate and awarded the wife alimony in futuro. On appeal, the husband challenges the court’s decisions on multiple grounds. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

An injured truck driver brought suit against his alleged employer seeking to recover worker’s compensation benefits. The alleged employer did not appear at trial, and the trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Eight months later, the alleged employer moved the trial court to set aside the judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02, on the grounds that it did not receive notice of the trial date. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the alleged employer failed to notify the court and the plaintiff of its change of address and that plaintiff would be severely prejudiced if the court set aside the judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant, Randy O. Reynolds, stands convicted by a Dickson County jury of aggravated vehicular homicide (Count 1), vehicular homicide (Count 2), reckless homicide (Count 3), vehicular assault by driving under the influence (Count 4), simple possession of a schedule II controlled substance (Count 5), leaving the scene of an accident (Count 6), evading arrest (Count 7), and driving on a revoked license (Count 8). On appeal, Defendant argues (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the results of his blood alcohol test; (2) the trial court erred in allowing the State to present expert testimony regarding the effects of intoxication; and (3) the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to support his all of his felony convictions, and his misdemeanor evading arrest conviction. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm.