APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Jeffrey Cochran, was convicted by a McMinn County Criminal Court jury of aggravated kidnapping, for which he is serving a nine-year sentence. See T.C.A. § 39- 13-304(a)(5) (2018). On appeal, he contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying, in part, his motion to suppress, (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a continuance, (3) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, and (4) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Rodger E. Broadway, Petitioner, sought relief from his 2003 convictions for first degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated rape, which were the result of guilty pleas, claiming that trial counsel told him he could not file for post-conviction relief and that the trial court deprived him of his fundamental right to represent himself. The post-conviction court found that the petition was not timely filed and that Petitioner was not entitled to due process tolling and summarily dismissed the petition. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm.

William E. Blake, Jr., Petitioner, claims that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because he received ineffective assistance of counsel and because the jurors in his trial were not impartial and were influenced by their fear of the victim’s family. Following a hearing on the merits, the trial court dismissed the Petition. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is an appeal from a final order of absolute divorce. The trial court granted the divorce based on a finding that both parties committed inappropriate marital conduct. The wife appeals. We dismiss the appeal.

In this case involving termination of the father’s parental rights to his children, the trial court found that several statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further found that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The father has appealed. Having determined that clear and convincing evidence did not support the trial court’s finding of the statutory abandonment ground of failure to support, we reverse the trial court’s judgment with respect to this ground. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of the father’s parental rights.

Mother appeals the trial court's decision to award equal parenting time after making no findings regarding her allegations of abuse by Father. Because the trial court stated that there was no evidence of abuse in the record despite the plethora of relevant testimony by both parties, we are unable to ascertain the trial court's reasoning.  We therefore vacate the trial court's judgment and remand for further findings.

Because the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This appeal involves an action brought by the State of Tennessee for alleged violations of Tennessee’s statutes regarding the unauthorized practice of law and the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The State of Tennessee claimed that the defendants improperly solicited clients who were in the process of making funeral arrangements for their recently deceased children. Following a trial, a jury returned a verdict unanimously finding in favor of the State of Tennessee and assessing civil penalties against the defendants. Accordingly, the trial court entered judgment against the defendants. The defendants appeal. We affirm and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Kyndra Abernathy (“Petitioner”) petitioned the trial court for an order of protection against Icker Derek Barile (“Respondent”), alleging that he sexually assaulted her. After a hearing at which each party proceeded pro se, the trial court issued a one-year protective order, finding that Respondent engaged in sexual penetration without Petitioner’s consent and continued after she told him to stop. Respondent appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by considering irrelevant and inadmissible evidence and that its decision was against the weight of the evidence. We affirm.

A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, Priscilla Ann Barnett, of one count of first degree premediated murder, one count of felony murder during the perpetration of aggravated child abuse, and two counts of aggravated child abuse. The trial court merged the murder convictions and imposed an effective sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions; (2) the trial court erred in denying her request for funds to retain a mental health expert; and (3) the trial court erroneously imposed consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

After counsel for the plaintiff partnership filed a claim for attorney fees in the counsel’s firm’s own name, limited partners of the partnership sought a right of intervention to oppose the firm’s claim. The trial court denied the limited partners’ efforts to intervene. We reverse the trial court’s conclusion that intervention was not appropriate, vacate the award giving relief to the firm, and remand the case for further proceedings with the limited partners’ participation as intervening parties.

The Petitioner, Michelle Shoemaker, is appealing the trial court’s summary dismissal of her habeas corpus petition. After reviewing the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, the court finds that this is an appropriate matter for affirmance under Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The mother appeals the trial court's order terminating her parental rights, arguing that it erred in denying her motion to continue the trial and in considering hearsay evidence in its best interests analysis. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court's order terminating mother's parental rights.

A loan was secured by a deed of trust on the borrower’s real property. When the borrower repaid the loan in full, the bank paid a fee to record a deed of release. The bank then sought reimbursement of the fee from the borrower. The borrower filed a putative class action suit, alleging that Tennessee law prohibited the bank from seeking reimbursement of the recording fee. The trial court dismissed the complaint, concluding that federal regulations preempted the borrower’s claims. We affirm.

The Petitioner-Appellant, Jacob Scott Hughes, appeals from the denial of his petition seeking post-conviction relief from his convictions of first-degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse, for which he was sentenced, respectively, to life and twenty-five years’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively, as a result of the death of the sixteenmonth- old daughter of his girlfriend. State v. Jacob Scott Hughes, No. M2016-01222- CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 3724457, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 29, 2017), no perm. app. filed. In this appeal, the Petitioner argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to pursue plea negotiations, failure to obtain a forensic pathologist to provide expert testimony, and failure to prevent a reference to the phrase, “Hammer Skin” during trial. 1 Upon our review, we affirm.

The Defendant, Kirsten Janine Williams, was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated burglary. She received an effective 15-year sentence to be served at 100-percent. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her convictions, arguing that there was no proof she ever held a gun, that the victim was free to leave, and that she entered the victim’s residence with consent. Following our review of the record and applicable authorities, we find the evidence sufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions and affirm.

The Petitioner, Bryant Jackson Harris, appeals the Hawkins County Criminal Court’s denial of his post-conviction petition, seeking relief from his convictions of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and aggravated burglary and resulting effective sentence of life in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Nicholas J. Walden, appeals the trial court’s order revoking his probationary sentence for theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000 and ordering him to serve his original four-year sentence in confinement. Following our de novo review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Cocke County jury found Defendant, Richard William Phillips, guilty of aggravated statutory rape. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erroneously “set[] a one-hour deadline for the jury to continue deliberations” and gave supplemental jury instructions after the jury foreperson indicated that the jury was deadlocked. Defendant claims that the trial court’s remarks had a coercive effect on the jury’s decision-making. After a thorough review of the record, arguments of counsel, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Marshall County Circuit Court jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Kevin Dewayne Stinnett, of possession of heroin with the intent to sell or deliver, possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, simple possession of methamphetamine, simple possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of eighteen years’ incarceration. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-417(a)(4), -418(a), -425(a)(1). On appeal, Stinnett argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to continue his trial; and (3) the trial court erred in imposing partially consecutive sentences and in denying an alternative sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.