APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant was arrested for driving under the influence, reckless endangerment with a motor vehicle, reckless driving, driving on a suspended license, and violation of the implied consent law. The arresting officer recorded his pursuit and stop of the defendant’s vehicle using video recording equipment installed in his patrol vehicle, but the video recording was subsequently lost. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the State’s failure to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence would deprive her of a fair trial. Following a pre-trial evidentiary hearing, the trial court conducted an analysis under State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999), and dismissed several of the charges. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the charges. State v. Merriman, No. M2011-01682-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 524474, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 17, 2012). We granted the State permission to appeal. We apply a de novo standard of review and determine that, based on this record, the trial court did not err by finding that it would be fundamentally unfair to require the defendant to go to trial without the video recording. We also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in choosing dismissal as an appropriate remedy for the State’s loss of the video recording.

The Defendant, Alina Donegan, appeals as of right from the Dickson County Circuit Court’s order revoking her probation and requiring her to serve the remainder of her sentence in confinement. In September 2011, the Defendant pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, a Class C felony; one count of possession of less than .5 grams of methamphetamine, a Class C felony; and one count of promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, a Class D felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-103, -17-417, -17-433. The trial court imposed an effective six-year sentence and suspended the sentence to probation upon the Defendant’s "successful entrance into and completion of the drug court" program. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court violated her right to due process by not allowing her to present witnesses at the revocation hearing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Polk County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Davis Bradley Waldroup, Jr., for two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of first degree murder, and one count of attempted first degree murder. These charges stemmed from an altercation Appellant had with his wife and her best friend at his trailer on Kimsey Mountain. A jury convicted Appellant of one count each of aggravated kidnapping, especially aggravated kidnapping, voluntary manslaughter, and attempted second degree murder. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of thirty-two years. On appeal, Appellant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of aggravated kidnapping, that the trial court erred in denying his motion for change of venue, erred in allowing the introduction into evidence of a photograph of one of the victim’s injuries, and erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. After a thorough review of the record on appeal, we affirmed the judgments of the trial court. Appellant filed a Rule 11 application, pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of Appellant Procedure requesting an appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court. On April 2, 2012, the Tennessee Supreme Court granted the application and remanded the case to this Court for reconsideration in light of the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012). After reconsidering the facts and circumstances of the case at hand with regard to our supreme court’s decision in White, we conclude the we must reverse the convictions for aggravated kidnapping and especially aggravated kidnapping and remand for a retrial on these two counts. We affirm all other judgments of the trial court.

A Sullivan County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Jeffrey Scott Gold, of aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect, Class A felonies, for which he received concurrent terms of twenty-two-years’ imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in (1) granting the State’s motion to depose a prospective witness to preserve that witness’s testimony for trial; (2) denying his motion for judgment of acquittal as to the aggravated child neglect conviction; and (3) imposing an excessive sentence. Following a thorough review, we reverse and vacate the aggravated child neglect conviction. In regard to the other issues, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Anthony D. Mathis, appeals the sentencing decision of the Washington County Criminal Court revoking his probationary sentence. The defendant pled guilty to facilitation of the possession of a Schedule II controlled substance for resale, a Class C felony, and was sentenced, as a Range II offender, to six years. However, the trial court suspended the sentence and ordered the defendant to serve eight years probation. Thereafter, a violation report was filed charging the defendant with multiple violations of the terms and conditions of his probation. Following a hearing, the trial court found that the defendant had left the county without permission in violation of the probationary agreement. The court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the six-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant contends that the court erred in that revocation. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the revocation of probation.

This appeal concerns a settlement agreement in a divorce. The parties purportedly had reached an agreement regarding the division of their property. An order, proposed by the wife, was signed by counsel for both parties and entered by the trial court. The husband later filed a pro se notice of appeal containing allegations that he did not agree to the terms of the settlement and that it is incomplete. We remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

Sharon Lynn Puckett (“Wife”) sued Bobby Wayne Puckett (“Husband”) for divorce. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its order on October 4, 2012 finding and holding, inter alia, that Husband was entitled to a divorce on the grounds of Wife’s inappropriate marital conduct, that Wife was guilty of perjury, and that Wife was in contempt of court both for selling property during the pendency of the divorce in violation of the restraining order and for possessing a cell phone in court. Wife appeals raising the sole issue of whether the Trial Court erred in refusing to grant her motion for recusal. We hold that Wife failed to show any grounds justifying recusal, and we affirm.

Appellant, Myron Tyrone Harrison, entered a guilty plea to sale of a Schedule II controlled substance and received a seven-year suspended sentence. Subsequently, his probation officer filed probation violation warrants alleging that: (1) appellant had tested positive for cocaine on a drug test; (2) he had failed to obtain employment; and (3) he was arrested for public intoxication and failed to report the arrest. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked appellant’s probation and ordered execution of his sentence. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

This appeal is from an order of the trial court denying a petition to terminate the parental rights of the appellant, Willie G., to his three minor children. Because the judgment of the trial court is not adverse to the appellant, we lack jurisdiction to entertain this appeal.

Appellant, John D. Pruitt, entered guilty pleas to vandalism of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1,000, burglary, felony escape, and theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. Pursuant to the terms of the guilty plea, appellant received an effective six-year sentence, and the State dismissed the remaining charges against him. The parties submitted the issue of alternative sentencing to the trial court for determination. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the effective six-year sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). Appellant contends that the trial court did not properly consider his request for split confinement. Following our review, we discern no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

The Petitioner, Ernest N. Bowen, appeals the Bedford County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his three convictions for selling a Schedule II controlled substance and one conviction for one possessing a Schedule II controlled substance for resale and resulting effective fifteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner claims that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel, which resulted in his pleading guilty unknowingly and involuntarily. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

The defendant, Ronald McMillan, appeals from his Davidson County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded conviction of aggravated assault, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and by ordering that he serve his six-year sentence consecutively to a previously-imposed eight-year sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Timothy Shane Hixson, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court jury conviction of aggravated robbery, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the exclusion of certain evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm.
 

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee sought permanent partial disability benefits for an injury to her hip and lower back. Her employer agreed that her hip injury was compensable, but denied that she had suffered a permanent disability. It also denied that her alleged back injury was compensable. The trial court found for the employee, and awarded permanent disability benefits for both injuries. Her employer has appealed, arguing that the medical evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Hoyte Mitchell Hobbs, appeals from his Warren County Circuit Court guilty-pleaded conviction of attempted second degree murder, claiming that the trial court erred by imposing a fully incarcerative sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Knox County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Ricky Wayne Davis, Jr. charging him with two counts of felony evading arrest, reckless endangerment, misdemeanor possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, failure to provide evidence of financial responsibility, and failure to use a seat belt. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of one count of evading arrest, misdemeanor possession of marijuana, failure to provide evidence of financial responsibility, and violation of the seatbelt law. He was found not guilty of one count of evading arrest and reckless endangerment, and the trial court dismissed the charge of possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced Defendant to two years of probation for felony evading arrest and eleven months, twenty-nine days of probation for misdemeanor possession of marijuana, to be served concurrently. The trial court also imposed a fine of ten dollars for the seat belt violation and a fine of one-hundred dollars for failure to provide evidence of financial responsibility. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence found in his vehicle; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for felony evading arrest. After a thorough review, we reverse the conviction for misdemeanor possession of marijuana. All other judgments are affirmed.

The defendant, Shirley Mason, appeals her Bedford County Circuit Court jury conviction of the sale of less than .5 grams of a substance containing cocaine base, claiming that racial discrimination tainted the jury selection process in her case and that the trial court erred by refusing to strike the State’s notice seeking enhanced punishment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Jerome Williams, appeals the Wayne County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. In this appeal, the petitioner claims entitlement to habeas corpus relief on the basis that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter his 1986 conviction of aggravated rape because the indictment failed to allege an offense. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

This appeal involves jurisdiction as to a parentage petition and related issues. The mother of the subject child lives in New York and the father lives in Tennessee. The child lives with the mother in New York. The mother filed this parentage petition in Tennessee. The Tennessee juvenile court entered an order establishing the father’s parentage and adjudicating child support, the designation of the primary residential parent, and the allocation of the parties’ residential parenting time. The mother appeals, challenging in part the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to adjudicate custody and child support. We affirm the juvenile court’s final order on the father’s parentage. We vacate the final order on the designation of primary residential parent and the allocation of residential parenting time, as the Tennessee court did not have jurisdiction over these issues under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. We hold that the Tennessee court had jurisdiction to adjudicate child support, but vacate its final order on child support because the determination is based in part on the adjudication of the primary residential parent and the allocation of residential parenting time.

Customer of a restaurant who was injured when she fell on a concrete ramp leading into the restaurant brought suit against the restaurant, alleging that the ramp constituted a dangerous condition and that the restaurant failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid injuries to customers. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant on the grounds that the ramp did not constitute a dangerous condition and that the owners did not have notice that the ramp constituted a dangerous condition. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

 The Petitioner, Yovonda S. Chambers, pled guilty to one count of identity theft and agreed to allow the trial court to determine sentencing. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State entered a nolle prosequi as to a second count of identity theft. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to four years to be served on intensive probation. The Petitioner timely filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. The Petitioner appeals the post-conviction court’s denial, claiming that her attorney failed to adequately investigate the case, discuss the case with the Petitioner, and properly prepare for sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and relevant authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.
 

A Davidson County Grand Jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Lam Hoang Nguyen, of sexual battery, for which he was sentenced to 18 months probation after service of 10 days in confinement. In this appeal, Nguyen argues (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for sexual battery; and (2) he was denied a fair and impartial trial due to jury bias. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Ex-wife appeals from a trial court’s adoption of a report by the clerk and master that her ex-husband had fully satisfied a judgment for unpaid pension payments arising from the parties’ 1996 divorce and the determination that she is not entitled to recover attorney’s fees incurred in the underlying case and other proceedings. The clerk and master found that an October 2001 judgment for an unpaid arrearage in pension payments had been satisfied and the ex-wife did not timely file an objection. The trial court adopted the clerk and master’s report and entered judgment accordingly. The court also ruled that the ex-wife was not entitled to recover attorney’s fees in this or other proceedings including those specified in the 2003 bankruptcy court agreed order. Although the ex-wife waived any objection to the report of the clerk and master, and thus, the trial court’s adoption of that report is affirmed, we have determined that the reference to the clerk and master was limited to determining the ex-husband’s pension obligations under the October 2001 chancery court judgment. Whether the sums owed by the ex-husband for attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $13,904.44 identified in the 2003 bankruptcy court agreed order were not specified as issues in the order of reference to the master. Because the ex-husband’s obligations to pay to the ex-wife the attorney’s fees and costs specified in the 2003 bankruptcy order were not identified in the order of reference, the ex-wife’s failure to timely file an objection does not constitute a waiver of that issue. We have also determined that whether the sums owing under the 2003 bankruptcy order are a legal obligation of the ex-husband is a question of law, not a question of fact, and the failure to timely object to the master’s report does not constitute a waiver of an issue of law. The 2003 bankruptcy order expressly states the ex-husband owes the sum of $13,904.44, plus interest, to the ex-wife for her attorney’s fees and costs, and he is collaterally estopped from denying the debt specified in the 2003 bankruptcy order. Therefore, we have concluded that the ex-wife is entitled to recover $13,904.44, plus interest. Accordingly, we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant-Appellant, Gregory D. Valentine, entered best interest pleas to twenty counts of identity theft, six counts of criminal simulation, one count of forgery, one count of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, one count of money laundering, and one count of filing a false police report in exchange for an effective sentence of twelve years and eight months, with service of thirty-two months at seventy-five percent in confinement at the county jail followed by service of ten years at thirty percent on state probation. Shortly after entry of these judgments, Valentine filed three pro se motions to set aside his pleas, which the trial court denied without a hearing. Valentine appealed, and this court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. See State v. Gregory Darnell Valentine, No. M2010-02356-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 3263117 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 10, 2012). On remand, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and again denied the motions. On appeal, Valentine argues that the trial court erred in denying his motions to set aside his best interest pleas. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves the application of the medical malpractice statute of limitations. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant doctor, finding that the statute of limitations defense was not waived by her failure to raise it in her first pre-answer motion, that the defense was sufficiently pleaded, and that the undisputed facts in the record supported a finding that the statute of limitations had expired at the time of filing the initial complaint. Affirmed and remanded.