APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this divorce case, the trial court’s judgment ended the twenty-year marriage of Kelley Higgins (“Wife”) and Bobby Higgins (“Husband”). Husband appeals. He challenges the trial court’s classification and division of the parties’ property. He also contends that alimony was improperly awarded to Wife. We affirm.

This case involves a trust. In a previous appeal, this Court remanded for the appointment of a corporate co-trustee as specifically required by the terms of the trust. Thereafter, the defendant existing trustee, who is also a beneficiary, unilaterally appointed a corporate cotrustee and then sought to have the trial court “ratify” her appointment. The plaintiff beneficiary challenged the appointment, claiming that the trustee was not authorized to unilaterally appoint a corporate co-trustee and arguing that the corporate co-trustee who was chosen did not meet the qualifications listed in the trust agreement. After hearing some testimony about the proposed co-trustee, the trial court decided that the plaintiff beneficiary lacked standing to participate in the selection or ratification of a corporate co-trustee. The trial court then granted the defendant trustee’s motion to ratify her appointment of the cotrustee. The plaintiff beneficiary appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

This case was remanded by the Tennessee Supreme Court for reconsideration after ordering that the record be supplemented with a statement of evidence regarding a missing portion of the trial transcript. See Tenn. R. App. P. 24(c). A Wayne County jury convicted the Defendant, Jeremy Keeton, of manufacturing marijuana by growing or cultivating not less than 100 nor more than 499 marijuana plants, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) that he is being denied an "effective appeal" because the record on appeal does not include an official transcript of his cross-examination of a material prosecution witness; (2) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress; (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (4) the trial court erred when it sentenced him by not considering a relevant mitigating factor. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude there exists no reversible error in the judgment of the trial court. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The defendant, Paul Allen St. Clair, was convicted by a jury of one count of the sale of between 14.175 grams and 4,535 grams of a Schedule VI substance identified as marijuana, a Class E felony, and one count of the sale of a Schedule IV drug, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant to four years’ incarceration as a Range II offender on count one and to eight years’ incarceration as a Range II offender on count two, to be served consecutively. The trial court also fined the defendant two thousand dollars for each count and two hundred and fifty dollars to go to the Drug Testing Fund for each count. The defendant appeals, asserting that the trial court improperly weighed the mitigating factors in assigning a sentence within the range. The defendant also contests the fines, which he argues are unconstitutional because they were determined by the trial court rather than the jury. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the length of the defendant’s sentences. However, because the fines were assessed in violation of the Tennessee Constitution, we vacate the fines and remand for further proceedings.

I concur in the majority opinion with regard to the holding that the incarcerative sentences in this case are appropriate. However, I dissent from the holding of the majority that the error by the trial judge in the imposition of the mandatory minimum fines prescribed by statute for the offenses in this case requires plain error review and a remand for a jury determination as to the imposition of these fines.

A McNairy County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Robert Earl Borner, of the delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine. The trial court sentenced the appellant to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting the recording of the transaction; that the trial court erred by failing to enter a judgment of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; that the indictment against him was defective; and that he was denied a jury of his peers. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Barry Hogg, was indicted by the Wilson County Grand Jury for eleven counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, nine counts of criminal exposure to HIV, nine counts of aggravated statutory rape, and one count of sexual battery. Prior to trial, the State dismissed one count of sexual battery, two counts of criminal exposure, and three counts of aggravated statutory rape. A jury found Appellant guilty of the remaining counts, including eleven counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation, seven counts of criminal exposure of another to HIV, and six counts of aggravated statutory rape. As a result of the convictions, the trial court sentenced Appellant to twelve years at one hundred percent incarceration for the especially aggravated sexual exploitation convictions, six years at thirty percent for each of the criminal exposure of another to HIV convictions, and four years at thirty percent for each of the aggravated statutory rape convictions. The trial court ordered the convictions for especially aggravated sexual exploitation to be served consecutively to the seven convictions for criminal exposure of another to HIV and consecutively to each other. The trial court ordered Appellant’s aggravated statutory rape sentences to run concurrently with one another and with all other counts, for a total effective sentence of 174 years. Appellant appeals his convictions, contesting the sufficiency of the evidence and his sentences. After a review of the record, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and that the evidence supported individual convictions for events that occurred during one sexual encounter. Further, the trial court properly sentenced Appellant. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The petitioner, Derrick Sorrell, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his first-degree murder conviction, arguing he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Antonio Butler ("the Defendant") pleaded guilty to one count each of robbery and aggravated assault. In his plea agreement, he agreed to concurrent sentences of five years for each count, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied judicial diversion and ordered that the Defendant serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the manner of service of his sentence is improper. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This interlocutory appeal concerns the statutory employer rule under the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Act. The defendant subcontractor rented a crane from a construction rental company. The crane rental company sent its employee to the job site to operate the crane. On the job site, the crane rental company’s employee sustained crippling injuries. The employee’s co-conservators sued the subcontractor in tort. The subcontractor filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it was a statutory employer of the crane rental company’s employee, pursuant to the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Act, specifically T.C.A. § 50-6-113, and thus was immune from liability under the exclusive remedy provision of the Act, T.C.A. § 50-6-108. The trial court held that the subcontractor was not a statutory employer and therefore was not shielded by the exclusive remedy provision. The subcontractor was granted permission for this interlocutory appeal on the issue of whether it is a statutory employer under the Workers’ Compensation Act. We hold that, to reach the issue of whether the subcontractor is a statutory employer, it is first necessary to determine if the crane rental company was a subcontractor within the meaning of the Act, an issue not addressed by the trial court. Consequently, as we are unable on this record to consider the issue raised on appeal, we hold that this Court improvidently granted permission for this interlocutory appeal under Tenn. R. App. P. 9 and dismiss the appeal.

Appellant appeals from the trial court’s denial of a motion to vacate a default judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

The trial court dismissed this matter on appeal from general sessions court upon finding that Appellant failed to perfect his appeal where he failed to file a bond for good surety or pauper’s oath. We affirm.

I must respectfully dissent in part from the majority opinion in this case. I agree with the majority’s holding on whether Father presented a meritorious defense in support of his Rule 60.02 motion to set aside the default judgment. However, I must disagree with the majority’s affirmance of the trial court’ s finding that Father’s failure to respond or appear in the default proceedings was willful, and its affirmance of the trial court’s denial of Father’s Rule 60.02 motion to set aside..

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant- Appellant Kevin Glenn Tipton agreed to enter a guilty plea to one count of felony driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI) in exchange for a sentence of one year, which was suspended after service of the mandatory minimum sentence of 150 days in confinement. At the plea submission hearing, the trial court accepted Tipton’s guilty plea and imposed the agreed upon sentence but reserved judgment until October 6, 2010. On October 5, 2010, Tipton’s newly retained counsel filed a notice of appearance. On October 22, 2010, Tipton, through his newly retained counsel, filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. On appeal, Tipton argues that the trial court erred by (1) applying the “manifest injustice” standard under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(f)(2), and (2) denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and report of findings of fact and conclusion of law. The Employee alleged that he sustained a gradual injury to his back in 2007 as a result of his work as a maintenance technician. His employer denied that a compensable injury had occurred and denied that employee had provided timely notice. The trial court found the Employee had sustained a compensable injury and that timely notice had been given. The trial court also found that the Employee had been terminated for cause and limited the award to one and one-half times the anatomical impairment. The Employer has appealed, asserting that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding on compensability. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Isaiah Lawler, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense, a Class E felony; possession of an open container of beer while operating a motor vehicle, a Class C misdemeanor; and violation of the implied consent law. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-10-401, -403(a)(1)(A)(vi), -406, -416. As a result of these convictions, the Defendant received an effective two-year sentence. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for DUI, fourth offense; and (2) that the trial court, by accepting the jury’s guilty verdict with respect to the charge of DUI, fourth offense, failed to fulfill its duties as the thirteenth juror. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a divorce action in which the trial court ordered Husband to pay Wife alimony in futuro and alimony in solido. The trial court refused, however, to order Husband to pay for the costs of providing COBRA benefits for Wife. Husband and Wife appeal. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

This post-divorce appeal concerns the agreed-upon parenting plan designating Mother as the primary residential parent. When Mother registered the Children in a new school district, Father objected. The trial court entered an order requiring the Children to remain in their current school district, despite the Cumberland County Board of Education’s policy providing otherwise. The Cumberland County Board of Education filed a motion to intervene, which was granted. Following a limited hearing, the court designated Father as the primary residential parent, allowing the Children to remain in their current school district per the applicable policy. Mother appeals. We reverse the decision of the trial court.

Petitioner, Michael Collins, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his guilty-pleaded conviction for second degree murder and the resulting thirty-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because of the ineffectiveness of counsel. Following our review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

The Tennessee Department of Health appeals from the award of attorneys’ fees and costs to four doctors following the dismissal of its administrative action against the doctors. Following a contested case hearing in which all material facts were stipulated, the Board of Medical Examiners dismissed all charges upon the finding that “the Department had not proven facts sufficient to establish that Respondent[s] violated Tenn.Code Ann.§§ 63-6-101 et seq., 63-6-214, and Tenn Comp. R. [and] Regs.” When the Department did not seek judicial review of the dismissal, the doctors requested and were awarded their attorneys’ fees and costs. The Department then filed a Petition for Judicial Review of the award. The chancery court affirmed the award and this appeal followed. Finding there is substantial and material evidence to support the administrative law judge’s decision to award the attorneys’ fees and costs under Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-5-325, we affirm.

The Defendant, James Snipes, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of felony murder, second degree murder, a Class A felony, aggravated criminal trespass of a habitation, a class A misdemeanor, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202, 39-13-210, 39-14-406, 39-17-1324 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment for felony murder, eleven months and twenty-nine days for aggravated criminal trespass, and six years for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The court merged the second degree murder conviction with the felony murder conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that mutually exclusive verdicts require dismissal of the felony murder conviction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Plaintiff was terminated from his at-will employment for violating company policy by allegedly lying during an investigation into whether he was involved in a romantic relationship with a human resources manager. Plaintiff filed this action against his former supervisor, and his former employer, for intentional interference with his employment. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that, as a matter of law, the corporate employer cannot be held liable for intentionally interfering with its own employment contracts, and that the undisputed facts established the supervisor did not act outside the scope of his authority in assisting in the investigation; thus, he could not be held liable. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion. We affirm.

Appellant, Mark Tyre, entered a guilty plea to violation of the sex offender registry act, a Class E felony, and received a two-year sentence as a Range I offender. He was subsequently placed on probation. While appellant was on probation, the State indicted him for sexual exploitation of a minor based on criminal conduct that pre-dated the guilty plea and judgment in the instant case. After the State requested revocation of the suspended sentence, the trial court held a hearing and revoked appellant’s probation. Appellant contends that the trial court erred by revoking his probation based on criminal conduct that pre-dated his guilty plea. We discern no error in the proceedings and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Lue Holcomb, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that his discovery of a written statement containing the victim’s recantation of her allegations against him constitutes newly discovered evidence of his innocence of aggravated assault. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

A couple who had cared for a minor child filed a petition alleging that the child was dependent and neglected. The juvenile court awarded the couple temporary custody, and after finding that the child was dependent and neglected, directed custody to remain with the couple. Mother appealed. Grandparents filed an intervening petition. After a trial de novo, the circuit court found that the child was not dependent and neglected, dismissed both petitions, and directed the juvenile court to implement Mother and child’s reunification. The couple appealed. Discerning no error and finding no clear and convincing evidence of dependence and neglect, we affirm.