APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendants, Gregory Todd Whitaker and David Paul Coffey, were both indicted for manufacturing twenty or more, but less than 100, marijuana plants, a Class C felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-417(g)(3), -425(a)(1). The Defendants both filed motions to suppress the evidence recovered during a search of Defendant Whitaker’s trailer home. The trial court granted the Defendants’ motions and dismissed the indictments. In this appeal as of right, the State contends that the trial court erred by granting the Defendants’ suppression motions. Following our review, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand the cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal involves the Full Faith and Credit Clause and firearm rights. The petitioner was convicted of felony drug offenses in Georgia. The State of Georgia granted the petitioner a full pardon for his crimes; his Georgia pardon expressly restored his right to possess a firearm. The petitioner now resides in Tennessee. A Tennessee statute provides that it is a felony for a person who has been convicted of a felony drug offense to possess a firearm, and it does not make an exception for persons who have been pardoned for their crime. The petitioner filed this declaratory judgment action against the State of Tennessee, seeking a declaration that, because he received a pardon for his drug offenses in Georgia, he can purchase or possess a firearm in Tennessee without violating the Tennessee statute. The trial court held in favor of the petitioner, concluding that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution requires Tennessee to recognize Georgia’s pardon in full and to permit the petitioner to carry a firearm in Tennessee. The State of Tennessee now appeals. On appeal, we consider the public-policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause. We hold that Tennessee’s public policy on the restoration of firearm rights for a convicted non-violent drug felon is not entirely inconsistent with Georgia’s public policy, so the public-policy exception to full faith and credit is not applicable in that situation. However, Tennessee public policy proscribes the restoration of firearm rights for a convicted violent drug felon, contrary to Georgia’s public policy allowing the restoration of firearm rights for all felons, violent or not. This Tennessee policy implicates public safety so as to warrant application of the public-policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause under the appropriate circumstances. Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Oscar Thomas (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty-pleaded convictions for carjacking and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his plea was constitutionally invalid due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. He also contends that his employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony conviction violates Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324(c). Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a contested easement action regarding wooded mountain property in Monroe County. The Plaintiffs/Appellants, James and Edna Eberle, filed a complaint requesting that the Defendant/Appellee, Lisa Parrott Elliott, be enjoined from crossing the Eberles’ property from her adjoining thirty-acre tract without benefit of an easement. Following a bench trial, the Monroe County Chancery Court dismissed the Eberles’ complaint for injunctive relief and ruled that an easement exists for ingress and egress over the Eberles’ property, appurtenant to and serving Ms. Elliott’s property. The Eberles have appealed. At issue is whether the trial court erred by finding the existence of an easement, either express, prescriptive, or implied. The Eberles also assert that the trial court erred by failing to limit the easement to a use no greater than the use previously made over the servient property. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that an easement exists for ingress and egress and the court’s dismissal of the complaint for injunctive relief.

This case has gone unresolved for far too long. It was finally tried more than six years after Ms. Pratcher’s death and after the filing of four amended complaints. After the jury returned a defendant’s verdict, the trial court granted a new trial because of a perceived shortcoming in the verdict form and because of its disagreementwith the jury’s verdict. With the second trial pending, one of the defendants sought to amend its answer to include a substantively meritorious defense based on the statute of repose in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26116(a)(3) (2012). With little explanation or analysis, the trial court denied the motion to amend on the ground of waiver.
 

In this divorce case, the trial court divided property which had not been previously divided by agreement of the parties and awarded Wife alimony in solido. Wife appeals, asserting that the trial court erred in failing to classify the property as marital or separate prior to division, and in failing to award her alimony in futuro, rehabilitative alimony, transitional alimony, or attorney’s fees. Finding no error we affirm.

A Hamilton County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Malcolm Witherow, of first degree murder for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, Witherow argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, the trial court erred in not allowing prior inconsistent recorded statements by a witness to be admitted as substantive evidence under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(26), and the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial based upon statements the prosecutor made in closing argument. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur in the majority’s conclusion that a trial court may impose both a period of partial confinement for a misdemeanor domestic assault conviction and a two-year probationary period. I write separately, however, to explain more fully the reasoning supporting my conclusion.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant, Rodney Dewayne Burton, entered a "no contest" plea for criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony, with sentencing to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced appellant to two years, suspended the sentence, and placed appellant on probation. On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court misapplied an enhancement factor when determining his sentence and asks that this court reduce his sentence to a one-year suspended sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a prolonged dispute among business associates which they have come to refer to as a “business divorce.” The parties in this matter, each doctors, formed a limited liability company for the purpose of acquiring property and constructing a medical office building on the property. In order to acquire the property from the current owner, the doctors executed an assumption and modification agreement whereby the LLC and the doctors each individually agreed to be jointly and severally liable to the current owner for its obligations on a promissory note. Subsequently, one of the doctors, the Appellee, withdrew membership from the LLC and executed an indemnity agreement with the remaining LLC members whereby the Appellee would be held harmless from any liability of the LLC, including the note. Thereafter, the LLC and its remaining members defaulted on the note, and the holder of the note filed a complaint against the Appellee, the LLC, and the individual LLC members, seeking to collect the balance due under the note. In order to avoid having a judgment entered against him, the Appellee purchased the note and pursued a claim against the LLC and its individual members for indemnification and breach of the note. Ultimately, the trial court granted the Appellee’s motion for summary judgment on his indemnification claim, awarded him attorney’s fees, costs, and prejudgment interest, and dismissed the Appellant’s cross-claims against the Appellee. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Defendant, Beau Clayton Epperson, entered a “best interest” guilty plea in the Circuit Court of Sevier County to the offense of domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor. There was no negotiated plea agreement as to the length or manner of service of the sentence. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court announced the following sentence: eleven (11) months, twenty-nine (29) days in the county jail, specifying that under the “sentencing structure” the sentence was to be “one hundred percent of seventy-five percent of eleven months and twenty-nine days.” The trial court declined to grant a fully suspended sentence, but imposed a sentence of split confinement, with ninety (90) days to be served by incarceration, with the balance of the sentence suspended, to be served on supervised probation. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-303(c)(2)(B), the trial court ordered the probationary period to be two (2) years. Defendant has raised two issues on appeal. First, he asserts that the trial court imposed an illegal sentence which exceeded the maximum statutory allowable sentence. Second, he argues the trial court erroneously ordered a two year probationary period when it failed to make mandatory findings of fact. After a thorough review we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Lorenzoe Landell Wilson, appeals the Robertson County Circuit Court’s imposition of consecutive sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days in confinement for his vandalism conviction in case number 117014 and eleven months and twenty-nine days, with 180 days to be served in confinement and the balance of the sentence to be served on probation, for his assault conviction in case number 118034. These sentences were imposed by the circuit court after it revoked Wilson’s probation in these cases. Wilson also appeals the Robertson County Circuit Court’s imposition of a suspended sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for his second assault conviction in case number 118603, which the court ordered to be served consecutively to the aforementioned sentences. On appeal, Wilson argues: (1) the circuit court wholly departed from the sentencing act when sentencing him for the second assault conviction, and (2) the circuit court, in revoking his probation, erred in failing to restart his probation anew, given his ability to comply with the terms of probation. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court but remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment showing that the percentage of service for the sentences in case numbers 118034 and 118603 is zero percent.

This appeal involves post-divorce proceedings arising out of numerous disputes between the parties. The only rulings that are challenged on appeal are the trial court’s conclusions that: (1) Father was required to pay uncovered medical expenses for the children’s counseling, pursuant to the divorce decree; and (2) Father must pay $14,000 of Mother’s attorney’s fees. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s decision on both issues.

The petitioner, William T. Bryant, filed a petition to test DNA evidence pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Edward Thomas Kendrick, III (“the Petitioner”) was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder. This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction on direct appeal. The Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we are constrained to conclude that the Petitioner established that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, because it is reasonably likely that a jury would have convicted him of a lesser degree of homicide absent the deficiencies in his trial counsel’s performance. Accordingly, we must reverse the Petitioner’s conviction and remand this matter for further proceedings.

In these acrimonious post-divorce proceedings, the father of two minor children filed a petition seeking, inter alia, to be given sole decision-making authority over the children’s educations, non-emergency health care, religion, and extracurricular activities, and to be designated the primary residential parent or alternatively to receive more parenting time. The trial court found a material change of circumstances had occurred due to the parties’ total inability to cooperatively co-parent and that it was in the children’s best interest to spend more quality time with their father. However, the court found it was in the children’s best interest for the mother to remain the primary residential parent and to have final authority over the children’s non-emergency medical care after consultation with the father. The court found that the other major decisions concerning the children should be made jointly. Each party was ordered to pay his or her own attorney’s fees. We affirm the foregoing decisions; however, we have determined the father may be entitled to a modification of his child support obligation, which was not addressed in the trial court’s final order, and we remand this issue for further proceedings.

This appeal involves a claim for damages filed with the Tennessee Claims Commission, arising out of the death of an inmate while he was housed in a state penitentiary. The Claims Commission denied the claimant’s motion for a default judgment. Thereafter, the Claims Commission determined that the gravamen of the complaint was for medical malpractice, and consequently, it granted the State’s motion to dismiss based upon the claimant’s failure to comply with various provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act. The claimant appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Leonard Jasper Young, appeals from the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief as it relates to the guilt phase of his trial. The post-conviction court granted the Petitioner relief as to the sentencing phase, and the State did not appeal this ruling. A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner of premeditated first degree murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and theft over $1,000. He received an effective sentence of death plus seventy-two years. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that trial counsel were ineffective during the guilt phase of his trial. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the Petitioner post-conviction relief.

Following a bench trial, a Montgomery County Circuit Court convicted the Petitioner, Gregory G. Kilgore, of aggravated robbery and possession with the intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to twelve years for each conviction to be served concurrently, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, and this Court affirmed the conviction. State v. George C. Kilgore, No. M2009-01539-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 2483546, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June 21, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. October 20, 2010). The Petitioner timely filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. The Petitioner appeals the post-conviction court’s denial, claiming that his attorney’s failure to adequately cross-examine a witness and to procure a surveillance video constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and relevant authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Jerry Louis Fitzgerald, Jr., was indicted in March of 2008 by the Gibson County Grand Jury for possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, unlawful sale of over .5 grams of cocaine, and unlawful delivery of over .5 grams of cocaine. Petitioner ultimately entered guilty pleas to three counts of selling over .5 grams of cocaine. As a result of the guilty pleas, he was sentenced to twenty years for each count, to be served concurrently, for a total effective sentence of twenty years. Following the entry of judgment, Petitioner filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial court denied without a hearing. Petitioner appealed. See State v. Louis Fitzgerald, Jr., No. W2009-02520-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 703, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Aug. 20, 2010). This Court remanded the case for a hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. On remand, the trial court held a hearing and again denied the motion. There was no direct appeal from this denial. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in November of 2011, seeking a delayed appeal from the denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas. In June of 2012, a consent order was entered allowing a delayed appeal from the denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas. On appeal, Petitioner challenges the trial court’s denial of the motion to withdraw his guilty pleas because the trial court failed to determine: (1) whether Petitioner was denied effective counsel; (2) whether the plea was knowingly and involuntarily made; and (3) whether manifest injustice exists as a ground for withdrawal of the pleas. After a review of the record, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas where there was substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court’s conclusion. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Convicted of felony murder, three counts of aggravated assault, and setting fire to personal property, petitioner, Edgar Bailey, Jr., filed the instant petition for writ of error coram nobis, alleging that the indictment under which he was tried and convicted for felony murder was defective in that it did not bear a return date from the grand jury and that the State withheld it from him prior to trial. He further claims that the allegedly defective indictment constitutes newly discovered evidence for the purpose of error coram nobis proceedings. The coram nobis court summarily dismissed the petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

After a trial by jury the defendant, Curtis Keller, was convicted of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping (against Tamika Jones and M.B.), Class A felonies; one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery (against Andrew Morrow), a Class B felony; one count of especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony; three counts of aggravated assault (against Andrew Morrow, Tamika Jones, and M.B.), Class C felonies; and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a “dangerous felony,” a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant to a total effective sentence of two hundred and forty years. On appeal, the defendant claims that: (1) the jury instructions concerning the especially aggravated kidnapping charges were inadequate in light of State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012), (2) the jury instructions concerning the employment of a firearm during the commission of a “dangerous felony” were erroneous, and (3) his eight separate convictions violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because his crime spree “was one continuous act.” After careful review, we conclude that: (1) the jury instructions were inadequate in light of White, but harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) the jury instructions concerning the employment of a firearm during the commission of a “dangerous felony” were erroneous because they did not foreclose the possibility that the jury used one of the especially aggravated kidnappings—which, as stated in the indictment, were based on the defendant’s use of a firearm—as predicate felonies. As the State concedes, the statute prohibiting an individual’s use of a firearm during the commission of a “dangerous felony” expressly forbids charging a defendant for a violation of that statute “if possessing or employing a firearm is an essential element of the underlying dangerous felony as charged.” T.C.A. § 39-17-1324(c). Accordingly, the defendant’s conviction for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony is reversed. In addition, it was plain error for the defendant to be convicted of both especially aggravated burglary and attempted especially aggravated robbery based on the same act of causing serious bodily injury to victim Andrew Morrow. The defendant’s conviction for especially aggravated burglary is reduced to a conviction of aggravated burglary, and a new sentence of fifteen years is imposed on this count. With respect to his other claims, the defendant has failed to establish any entitlement to relief, and his convictions of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery, and three counts of aggravated assault are affirmed.

The trial court decreed a resulting trust in a house paid for by the decedent on property owned by her son. We have concluded that the trial court erred.

The defendant, James Scott O’Brien, appeals the Robertson County Circuit Court’s order that he serve in confinement nine months of the 30-month sentence imposed for his conviction of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. Because the record supports the sentencing order, we affirm.

The petitioner, Raymond Hayden, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his 2012 petition for writ of habeas corpus in which he sought to challenge his 2009 Putnam County, guilty-pleaded conviction of the sale of cocaine. Following our review, we affirm the order of the circuit court.